Chính quyền obama với vấn đề tranh chấp biển đông luận văn thạc sỹ 60 22 50

ĐẠI HỌC QUỐC GIA THÀNH PHỐ HỒ CHÍ MINH TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC KHOA HỌC XÃ HỘI VÀ NHÂN VĂN NGUYỄN HÀ TRANG CHÍNH QUYỀN OBAMA VỚI VẤN ĐỀ TRANH CHẤP BIỂN ĐÔNG LUẬN VĂN THẠC SỸ KHOA HỌC LỊCH SỬ TP HỒ CHÍ MINH-2013 ĐẠI HỌC QUỐC GIA THÀNH PHỐ HỒ CHÍ MINH TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC KHOA HỌC XÃ HỘI VÀ NHÂN VĂN NGUYỄN HÀ TRANG CHÍNH QUYỀN OBAMA VỚI VẤN ĐỀ TRANH CHẤP BIỂN ĐÔNG LUẬN VĂN THẠC SỸ KHOA HỌC LỊCH SỬ CHUYÊN NGÀNH: LỊCH SỬ THẾ GIỚI MÃ SỐ: 60.22.50 NGUỜI HƯỚNG DẪN KHOA HỌC: TS TRẦN NAM TIẾN TP HỒ CHÍ MINH-2013 LỜI CAM ĐOAN Tơi xin cam đoan luận văn hồn tồn tơi thực với hướng dẫn TS Trần Nam Tiến Các trích dẫn, số liệu thơng tin cần thiết dùng luận văn tác giả thu thập Đề tài thực với thái độ hoàn toàn khách quan trung thực Các nguồn tài liệu trích dẫn viện dẫn phần Tài liệu tham khảo theo quy định TP HCM, ngày 10 tháng 05 năm 2013 Tác giả Nguyễn Hà Trang LỜI CÁM ƠN Trong suốt thời gian học tập nghiên cứu vừa qua, nhận nhiều quan tâm, nhiệt tình giúp đỡ, hỗ trợ, tạo điều kiện thầy cơ, gia đình, bạn bè, quý lãnh đạo quan, anh (chị) đồng nghiệp, cá nhân, tập thể có liên quan đến trình thực luận văn, nhân hội này, muốn gửi lời tri ân chân thành sâu sắc đến quý vị Trước tiên, xin kính lời cám ơn nhiệt thành đến TS Trần Nam Tiến – Người trực tiếp hướng dẫn khoa học suốt trình thực luận văn, bộn rộn với công tác giảng dạy nghiên cứu thầy ln tận tình hướng dẫn, hỗ trợ tơi mặt khoa học điều kiện cần thiết liên quan Xin chân thành cám ơn tập thể thầy (cô) Khoa Lịch sử, đặc biệt thầy cô Bộ môn Lịch sử Thế giới trường Đại học Khoa học Xã hội Nhân văn TP Hồ Chí Minh thầy ngồi trường hết lịng dạy dỗ giúp tơi xây dựng kiến thức tảng, cần thiết quan trọng trình học tập cho trình thực luận văn; thầy (cơ) Giáo vụ Khoa Lịch sử, thầy (cô), anh (chị) phòng, ban, trung tâm, thư viện, đơn vị ngồi trường nhiệt tình hỗ trợ, giúp đỡ tơi mặt tư liệu, thủ tục, điều kiện cần thiết cho việc thực bảo vệ luận văn Xin gửi lời cám ơn chân thành đến quý lãnh đạo quan, anh (chị) đồng nghiệp giúp đỡ, tạo điều kiện để tơi có thời gian học tập, nghiên cứu thuận lợi Xin chân thành cám ơn quý bạn bè, người không ngừng ủng hộ động viên, giúp đỡ nhiều mặt, đồng hành suốt thời gian học tập, nghiên cứu vừa qua Cuối cùng, xin gửi lời tri ân sâu sắc đến gia đình, người khơng ngừng động viên, giúp tơi có điều kiện thuận lợi để hoàn thành luận văn Một lần xin gửi lời cám ơn đến tất TP HCM, ngày 10 tháng 05 năm 2013 Tác giả Nguyễn Hà Trang MỤC LỤC DẪN LUẬN 1 Lí do, mục đích nghiên cứu…………………………………………………….1 Lịch sử nghiên cứu vấn đề…………………………………………………… 3 Đối tượng, nội dung nghiên cứu……………………………………………… Phương pháp nghiên cứu……………………………………………………….9 Hướng tiếp cận tư liệu…………………………………………………… … Kết cấu luận văn………………………………………………………… 10 CHƯƠNG I: BIỂN ĐÔNG TRONG CHÍNH SÁCH ĐƠNG NAM Á CỦA MỸ 1.1 Vị trí địa - trị Biển Đơng .11 1.1.1 Vị trí địa lý 11 1.1.2 Về địa chiến lược, quốc phòng - an ninh 12 1.1.3 Về địa - kinh tế .14 1.2 Biển Đông nhận thức số nước lớn 17 1.2.1 Trung Quốc 17 1.2.2 Nhật Bản 22 1.2.3 Ấn Độ 25 1.2.4 Liên bang Nga .27 1.2.5 Hiệp hội quốc gia Đông Nam Á (ASEAN) 29 1.3 Lịch sử xung đột Biển Đông .31 1.3.1 Tình hình tranh chấp chủ quyền Biển Đơng trước năm 1975 31 1.3.2 Tình hình tranh chấp chủ quyền Biển Đơng sau năm 1975 đến hết Chiến tranh lạnh .33 1.3.3 Thực trạng xung đột Biển Đông 37 1.4 Biển Đông sách Mỹ trước thời kỳ Obama 43 1.4.1 Thời kỳ Chiến tranh lạnh (1945-1991) 43 1.4.2 Giai đoạn từ sau Chiến tranh lạnh đến trước thời kỳ Obama 49 1.4.2.1 Quan điểm can thiệp phần vấn đề tranh chấp chủ quyền Biển Đông thập niên 1990 kỷ XX .49 1.4.2.2 Quan điểm trung lập tích cực, thực sách khơng can thiệp vấn đề tranh chấp chủ quyền Biển Đông từ đầu kỷ XXI đến năm 2008 58 CHƯƠNG 2: CHÍNH SÁCH CỦA CHÍNH QUYỀN OBAMA VỚI VẤN ĐỀ TRANH CHẤP BIỂN ĐƠNG 2.1 Lợi ích Hoa Kỳ Biển Đông 68 2.1.1 Về lợi ích kinh tế 69 2.1.2 Về lợi ích an ninh chiến lược quân 71 2.2 Chính sách quyền Obama vấn đề tranh chấp Biển Đơng 73 2.2.1 Cơ cở hình thành sách 73 2.2.1.1 Chính sách đối ngoại “xoay trục - đảo chiều”, chuyển trọng tâm chiến lược sang châu Á - Thái Bình Dương 73 2.2.1.2 Sự quan tâm Mỹ Đông Nam Á .77 2.2.1.3 Sự trỗi dậy Trung Quốc đe dọa tự hàng hải 79 2.2.2 Quan điểm sách quyền Obama vấn đề tranh chấp Biển Đông 83 2.3 Hoạt động triển khai sách quyền Obama trình tranh chấp, xung đột Biển Đông 91 2.3.1 Các hành động phi quân 92 2.3.2 Các hành động quân 96 2.3.2.1 Củng cố quan hệ đồng minh .96 2.3.2.2 Gia tăng diện quân 98 CHƯƠNG 3: ĐẶC ĐIỂM VÀ ẢNH HƯỞNG CỦA CHÍNH SÁCH ĐỐI VỚI QUAN HỆ QUỐC TẾ Ở KHU VỰC 3.1 Đặc điểm sách quyền Obama vấn đề tranh chấp Biển Đông 104 3.1.1 Chủ trương can dự tích cực…………………………………………… 104 3.1.2 Tích cực thúc đẩy vấn đề Biển Đơng theo xu hướng quốc tế hóa……….106 3.1.3 Cân quyền lực ổn định khu vực Biển Đơng…………………110 3.2 Vai trị quyền Obama việc giải tranh chấp Biển Đông……………………………………………………………………………111 3.2.1 Thuận lợi Mỹ việc giải vấn đề tranh chấp……………….111 3.2.2 Khó khăn Mỹ việc giải vấn đề tranh chấp Biển Đông.113 3.3 Ảnh hưởng quan hệ quốc tế khu vực…………………………119 3.3.1 Ảnh hưởng quan hệ Mỹ - Trung…………………………………119 3.3.2 Ảnh hưởng quan hệ Mỹ - ASEAN………………………………122 3.4 Chính quyền Obama vấn đề tranh chấp Biển Đông nhiệm kỳ thứ hai (2012-2016) 125 KẾT LUẬN…………………………………………………………………….131 TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO 135 PHỤ LỤC………… 157 1  DẪN LUẬN Lí do, mục đích nghiên cứu Đơng Nam Á có vị trí chiến lược quan trọng khu vực châu Á nói riêng giới nói chung Do vị trí địa lý nằm án ngữ đường hàng hải nối liền Ấn Độ Dương Thái Bình Dương, Đơng Nam Á từ lâu coi cầu nối Trung Quốc, Nhật Bản với Ấn Độ, Tây Á Địa Trung Hải Sau Chiến tranh lạnh, tiềm lực kinh tế đại đa số quốc gia khu vực liên tục tăng trưởng mức cao, hình thức liên kết hợp tác thành viên khối ASEAN không ngừng đẩy mạnh, tạo cho khu vực Đông Nam Á trở thành trung tâm kinh tế, trị khu vực châu Á - Thái Bình Dương Bước vào kỷ thứ XXI, Đơng Nam Á lên khu vực có vị trí chiến lược quan trọng chiến lược phát triển hầu lớn, Mỹ Trung Quốc Bởi Đông Nam Á nằm tuyến đường biển nối liền khu vực có tiềm lực kinh tế, trị qn Đơng Bắc Á, Ấn Độ, Trung Đông, Australia nhiều nước thuộc khu vực Thái Bình Dương Trước yếu tố đầy tiềm đưa Đông Nam Á trở thành mảnh đất có vị trí chiến lược quan trọng, tạo “bước đệm” vô quan trọng chiến lược vươn rộng khu vực châu Á – Thái Bình Dương toàn cầu Mỹ Trung Quốc Bên cạnh đó, cường quốc khác Ấn Độ, Australia Nhật Bản mức độ khác tiến vào khu vực này, phần để kiềm chế ảnh hưởng nhau, chủ yếu để củng cố đòi hỏi họ vai trò to lớn tương lai khu vực Đối với Mỹ, với tư cách siêu cường từ sau Chiến tranh lạnh đến nay, giai đoạn quan tâm quyền Mỹ đến khu vực Đơng Nam Á có nhiều khác nhìn chung ln xem Đơng Nam Á trọng tâm chiến lược tồn cầu Từ lên nắm quyền, Tổng thống Obama có nhiều điều chỉnh sách Đơng Nam Á theo hướng tích cực, tăng cường hợp tác Chính sách Đông Nam Á nội dung tổng thể sách quay trở lại Châu Á – 2  Thái Bình Dương Mỹ Tại đây, Mỹ thể nhiều động thái tích cực tham dự hội nghị cấp cao thức Tổng thống Mỹ nguyên thủ quốc gia ASEAN tổ chức vào ngày 15/11/2009, quan tâm đến vấn đề hợp tác vùng sông Mekong, vấn đề với Myanmar, đặc biệt vấn đề tranh chấp Biển Đông Biển Đông nằm tuyến đường giao thông biển huyết mạch nối liền Thái Bình Dương - Ấn Độ Dương, châu Âu - châu Á, Trung Đông - châu Á Năm số mười tuyến đường biển thông thương lớn giới liên quan đến Biển Đông gồm: tuyến Tây Âu, Bắc Mỹ qua Địa Trung Hải, kênh đào Suez, Trung Đông đến Ấn Độ, Đông Á, Australia, New Zealand; tuyến Đông Á qua kênh đào Panama đến bờ Đông Bắc Mỹ biển Caribe; tuyến Đông Á Australia New Zealand, Nam Thái Bình Dương; tuyến Tây Bắc Mỹ đến Đông Á Đông Nam Á Do đó, Biển Đơng coi tuyến đường vận tải quốc tế nhộn nhịp thứ hai giới Nhiều nước khu vực Đơng Á có kinh tế phụ thuộc sống vào đường biển Nhật Bản, Hàn Quốc, Đài Loan, Singapore Trung Quốc Thực tế, vùng biển quan trọng tất nước khu vực địa-chiến lược, an ninh, giao thông hàng hải kinh tế, Mỹ Nhật Bản Biển Đơng cịn có liên hệ ảnh hưởng đến khu vực khác, Trung Đông Với tầm quan trọng nêu trên, Biển Đông trở thành địa bàn tranh chấp nhiều nước khu vực Thực tế, việc Biển Đông bị nước nhóm nước liên minh khống chế ảnh hưởng nghiêm trọng đến lợi ích an ninh, trị, kinh tế nước khu vực Với tư cách quốc gia có lợi ích “sống cịn” vùng biển này, Mỹ có nhiều “động thái”, sách để bảo vệ lợi ích đây, qua tác động lớn đến quan hệ quốc tế khu vực Nhìn chung, tranh chấp Biển Đông vấn đề an ninh gây trở ngại đến phát triển hịa bình, ổn định khu vực nói riêng nhiều quốc gia ngồi khu vực nói chung Đây nhiều đề tài hấp dẫn sinh viên, học giả chuyên ngành liên quan Mỹ quốc gia khu vực, quốc gia có vùng biển tranh chấp Biển Đơng quyền lợi 186  As I said at a speech last week, having removed the most troubled and questionable weapons programmes from the budget, we are left with modernisation efforts that our defence leaders have deemed absolutely critical to the future, relating to air superiority and mobility, long-range strike, nuclear deterrence, maritime access, space and cyber, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Though the review is not complete, I am confident that these key remaining modernisation programmes – systems that are of particular importance to our military strategy in Asia – will rank at or near the top of our defence budget priorities in the future Many of those key modernisation programmes would address one of the principal security challenges we see growing over the horizon: the prospect that new and disruptive technologies and weapons could be employed to deny US forces access to key sea routes and lines of communication The US Navy and Air Force have been concerned about anti-access and area-denial scenarios for some time These two military services are working together to develop a new concept of operations – called Air-Sea Battle – to ensure that America’s military will continue to be able to deploy, move, and strike over great distances in defence of our allies and vital interests The record of growing US engagement in Asia, combined with investments being made in capabilities most relevant to preserving the security, sovereignty and freedom of our allies and partners in the region, show that America is, as the expression goes, putting ‘our money where our mouth is’ with respect to this part of the world, and will continue to so These programmes are on track to grow and evolve further into the future, even in the face of new threats abroad and fiscal challenges at home, ensuring that we will continue to meet our commitments as a 21st-century Asia-Pacific nation, with appropriate forces, posture and presence I acknowledge that are still some myopic souls who will argue that we cannot sustain our role in Asia-Pacific, that there are some voices of gloom and doom who would also argue that the best days of the United States are behind it No doubt the challenges America faces as a nation are daunting but, as I end my career in government, I remain completely optimistic about the prospects of the United States, because I have seen first hand the staying power and adaptability of America over the course of my life Indeed, history’s dustbin is littered with dictators and aggressors who underestimated America’s resilience, will and underlying power It was 45 years ago this summer that I first went to Washington to begin my career at the height of the US build-up in Vietnam What lay ahead during my first decade in government were: two assassinations at home of historic consequence, with violent 187  domestic turmoil; the resignation of a president in disgrace; a costly and hasty withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam; and an economy battered by high inflation and high interest rates As I ended my first decade in government in the mid-1970s, the United States faced even more pointed questions about its place in the world, its place in Asia and its ultimate prospects for success than it does today But it was during that discouraging period that the groundwork was being laid – through policies pursued by administrations of both American political parties – for the remarkable turn of events of the following decades: victory in the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the liberation of hundreds of millions of people behind the iron curtain and around the world, and a period of renewed global prosperity, with Asia leading the way Despite predictions to the contrary, America’s setback in Vietnam did not spell the end of our engagement in Asia In fact, as I mentioned earlier, we pursued a new relationship in China and have been expanding our defence partnerships in the region, including Vietnam, ever since There is no way we can predict the future, nor can we predict the effect that decisions made today will have a decade or two from now, but I believe our work in Asia is laying the groundwork for continued prosperity and security for the United States and for all in the region It has been enormously gratifying through the course of my career to see the profound good that has come about from American engagement in Asia As I leave the United States government, I have no doubt that future generations will have a similar story to tell about the benefits of American power, presence and commitment in this region For when America is willing to lead the way, when we meet our commitments and stand with our allies, even in troubling times; when we prepare for threats that are on the ground and on the horizon, and even beyond the horizon; and when we make the necessary sacrifices and take the necessary risks to defend our values and our interests, then great things are possible and even probable for our country, this region and the world Thank you Dr John Chipman Mr Secretary, thank you very much for those remarks, which brought a tremendous historic perspective to the challenges that are faced today in this region and that describe the continued aspirations that the United States has to play – to quote a phrase that you used in a previous Shangri-La Dialogue – ‘its full role as a resident power in the Pacific’ 188  I picked out three sentences from your remarks: the requirement to understand the prospect that new and disruptive technologies and weapons could be employed to deny US forces access to key sea routes and lines of communications; the appreciation that a defence posture across the Asia-Pacific that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable is a core US goal; and thirdly, that the US presence and the associated impact and influences should not be solely measured in terms of conventional metrics or ‘boots on the ground’ Others will have picked up other elements of your remarks, but those three struck me as particularly important, given the core theme of this conference http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue2011/speeches/first-plenary-session/dr-robert-gates/ 189  Phụ lục 6: 112TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION S RES Calling for a peaceful and multilateral resolution to maritime territorial disputes in Southeast Asia IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES JUNE 27, 2011 Mr WEBB (for himself, Mr INHOFE, Mr LIEBERMAN, and Mr INOUYE) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to RESOLUTION Calling for a peaceful and multilateral resolution to maritime territorial disputes in Southeast Asia Whereas, on June 9, 2011, vessels from China, including fishing vessel and maritime security vessels, ran into and disabled the cables of an exploration ship from Viet- nam, the VIKING 2; Whereas that use of force occurred within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam, an area recognized as its Exclusive Economic Zone; Whereas, on May 26, 2011, a maritime security vessel from China cut the cables of another exploration ship from Vietnam, the BINH MINH, in the South China Sea in waters near Cam Ranh Bay; Whereas, in March 2011, the Government of the Philippines reported that patrol boats from China attempted to ram of its surveillance ships; Whereas those incidents occurred within disputed maritime territories of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, composed of 21 islands and atolls, 50 submerged land atolls, and 28 partly submerged reefs over an area of 340,000 square miles, and the Paracel Islands, a smaller group of islands located south of China’s Hainan Island; Whereas China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei have disputed territorial claims over the Spratly Islands, and China and Vietnam have a disputed claim over the Paracel Islands; Whereas the Government of China claims most of the 648,000 square miles of the South China Sea, more than any other nation involved in those territorial disputes; Whereas, in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Na- tions and China signed a 190  declaration on the code of con- duct of parties in the South China Sea; Whereas that declaration committed all parties to those terri- torial disputes to ‘‘reaffirm their respect for and commit- ment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea’’ and to ‘‘resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without re- sorting to the threat or use of force’’; Whereas the South China Sea contains vital commercial ship- ping lines and points of access between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean; Whereas, although not a party to these disputes, the United States has a national economic and a security interest in ensuring that no party uses force unilaterally to assert maritime territorial claims in East Asia; Whereas, in September 2010, the Government of China also deliberately provoked a controversy within the waters of the Senkaku Islands, territory under the legal adminis- tration of Japan in the East China Sea; Whereas the actions of the Government of China in the South China Sea have also affected United States military and maritime vessels transiting through international air space and waters, including the collision of a fighter plane of the Government of China with a United States surveillance plane in 2001, the harassment of the USNS IMPECCABLE in March 2009, and the collision of a Chinese submarine with the sonar cable of the USS JOHN MCCAIN in June 2009; Whereas, like every nation, the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation and open access to the maritime commons of Asia; Whereas the Government of the United States expressed sup- port for the declaration by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China in 2002 on the code of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, and supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolv- ing the various territorial disputes without coercion; Whereas the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation and in unimpeded economic development and commerce; Whereas, on October 11, 2010, Secretary Gates maintained ‘‘The United States has always exercised our rights and supported the rights of others to transit through, and op- erate in, international waters.’’; Whereas, on June 3, 2011, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary Gates stated that ‘‘[m]aritime secu- rity remains an issue of particular importance 191  for the re- gion, with questions about territorial claims and the ap- propriate use of the maritime domain presenting on-going challenges to regional stability and prosperity’’; Whereas, on June 4, 2011, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Liang Guanglie, the Defense Minister from China, said, ‘‘China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea.’’; Whereas, on June 11, 2011, the Government of Vietnam held a live-fire military exercise on the uninhabited island of Hon Ong, 25 miles off the coast of Vietnam in the South China Sea; and Whereas, on June 11, 2011, Hong Lei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman of China, stated, ‘‘[China] will not resort to force or the threat of force’’ to resolve the territorial dis- pute: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate—(1) reaffirms the strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and pledges continued efforts to facilitate a multilateral, peaceful process to resolve these disputes; (2) deplores the use of force by naval and maritime security vessels from China in the South China Sea; (3) calls on all parties to the territorial dispute to refrain from threatening force or using force to assert territorial claims; and (4) supports the continuation of operations by the United States Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international waters and air space in the South China Sea 192  Phụ lục 7: 112TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION S RES Reaffirming the strong support of the United States for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea among the member states of ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES JULY 23, 2012 Mr KERRY (for himself, Mr LUGAR, Mr WEBB, Mr INHOFE, Mr LIEBER- MAN, and Mr MCCAIN) submitted the following resolution; which was re- ferred to the Committee on Foreign Relations RESOLUTION Reaffirming the strong support of the United States for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea among the member states of ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays a key role in strengthening and contrib- uting to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region; Whereas the vision of the ASEAN Leaders in their goals set out in the ASEAN Charter to integrate ASEAN economi- cally, politically, and culturally furthers regional peace, stability, and prosperity; Whereas the United States Government recognizes the impor- tance of a strong, cohesive, and integrated ASEAN as a foundation for effective regional frameworks to promote peace and security and economic growth and to ensure that the AsiaPacific community develops according to rules and norms agreed upon by all of its members; Whereas the United States is enhancing political, security and economic cooperation in Southeast Asia through ASEAN, and seeks to continue to enhance its role in partnership with ASEAN and others in the region in ad- dressing transnational issues ranging from climate change to maritime security; Whereas the United States Government welcomes the devel- opment of a peaceful and prosperous China which re- spects international norms, international laws, international institutions, and international rules, and en- hances security and peace, and seeks to advance a ‘‘coop- erative partnership’’ between the United States and China; 193  Whereas ASEAN plays an important role, in partnership with others in the regional and international community, in addressing maritime security issues in the AsiaPacific region and into the Indian Ocean, including open access to the maritime commons of Asia; Whereas the South China Sea is a vital part of the maritime commons of Asia, including critical sea lanes of commu- nication and commerce between the Pacific and Indian oceans; Whereas, in the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea, the governments of the member states of ASEAN and the Government of the People’s Republic of China have affirmed ‘‘that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region’’ and have agreed to work towards the attainment of a code of conduct; Whereas, pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the member states of ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China have committed to ‘‘exer- cise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and stability, including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting pres- ently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, and other fea- tures and to handle their differences in a constructive manner’’; Whereas, pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the member states of ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China affirmed their commit- ment ‘‘to the freedom of navigation in and overflight of the South China Sea provided for by the universally rec- ognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’’; and Whereas, although not a party to these disputes, the United States has national interests in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for inter- national law, and unimpeded lawful commerce: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate—(1) reaffirms the strong support of the United States for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea among the member states of ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China; (2) supports the member states of ASEAN, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, as they seek to adopt a legally binding code of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, and urges all countries to substantively support ASEAN in its efforts in this regard; (3) strongly urges that, pending adoption of a code of conduct, all parties, consistent with commitments under the declaration of conduct, ‘‘exercise selfrestraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and 194  stability, including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner’’; (4) supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving outstanding territorial and jurisdictional disputes, allowing parties to peacefully settle claims and disputes using international law; (5) reaffirms the United States commitment—(A) to assist the nations of Southeast Asia to to help ensure each nation enjoys peace remain strong and independent; (B) and stability; (C) to broaden and deepen economic, political, diplomatic, security, and its member states; social, and cultural partnership with ASEAN and (D) to promote the institutions of emerging regional architecture and prosperity; and (6) supports enhanced operations by the United States armed forces in the Western Pacific, including in the South China Sea, including in partnership with the armed forces of others countries in the region, in support of freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, including the peaceful resolution of issues of sovereignty, and unimpeded lawful commerce 195  Phụ lục 8: 112TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H RES 352 Calling for a peaceful and collaborative resolution of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea and its environs and other maritime areas adjacent to the East Asian mainland IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JULY 15, 2011 Ms ROS-LEHTINEN FALEOMAVAEGA, Mr (for herself, Mr MANZULLO, Mr ROYCE, Mr GALLEGLY, Mr KING of New York, Mr BURTON of Indiana, Mr CHABOT, Mr RIVERA, Mrs ELLMERS, Mr MCCOTTER, Mr POE of Texas, Mr CRAVAACK, Mr JOHNSON of Ohio, Mrs SCHMIDT, Mr COBLE, Mr MILLER of Florida, Mr FORBES, Ms BORDALLO, Mr SABLAN, Mr PIERLUISI, Mr PAYNE, Mr ENGEL, Ms HIRONO, Ms HANABUSA, Mr BACA, and Mr KELLY) submitted the following resolu- tion; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in ad- dition to the Committee on Armed Services for a period to be subse- quently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned RESOLUTION Calling for a peaceful and collaborative resolution of mari- time territorial disputes in the South China Sea and its environs and other maritime areas adjacent to the East Asian mainland Whereas the South China Sea contains vital commercial ship- ping lanes and points of access between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean and provides a maritime lifeline to Taiwan, Japan, and the Korean peninsula; Whereas China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei have disputed territorial claims over the Spratly Islands, and China, Taiwan, and Vietnam have disputed territorial claims over the Paracel Islands; Whereas the Government of the People’s Republic of China claims most of the 648,000 square miles of the South China Sea, more than any other nation involved in those territorial disputes; Whereas although not a party to these disputes, the United States has a national 196  economic and security interest in ensuring that no party uses force unilaterally to assert maritime territorial claims in East Asia, including in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or the Yellow Sea; Whereas, on May 26, 2011, a maritime security vessel from China cut the cables of an exploration ship from Viet- nam, the Binh Minh, in the South China Sea in waters near Cam Ranh Bay; Whereas, on May 31, 2011, three Chinese military vessels used guns to threaten the crews of four Vietnamese fish- ing boats while they were fishing in the waters of the Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelago; Whereas, on June 3, 2011, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry re- leased a statement that ‘‘Vietnam is resolutely opposed to these acts by China that seriously violated the Exclusive sovereign and jurisdiction rights of Viet Nam to its continental shelf and Economic Zone (EEZ), running counter to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and going against the spirit and wording of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (South China Sea) signed between ASEAN and China in 2002’’; Whereas, on June 9, 2011, three vessels from China, includ- ing one fishing vessel and two maritime security vessels, ran into and disabled the cables of another exploration ship from Vietnam, the Viking 2; Whereas, on June 13–14, 2011, the Government of Vietnam held a live-fire military exercise on the uninhabited island of Hon Ong, 25 miles off the coast of Vietnam in the South China Sea; Whereas, on June 25, 2011, Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Major General (Ret.) Peng Guangqian stated in a television interview that ‘‘China once taught Vietnam a lesson If Vietnam is not sincere, it will receive a bigger lesson’’, adding that ‘‘If Vietnam continues to act tough, play with the knife, sooner or later it will get cut’’; Whereas, on June 26, 2011, the Chinese news agency Xinhua announced that China and Vietnam had agreed to hold talks on how to resolve conflicts arising from a sovereignty dispute over the South China Sea after a June 25 meeting in Beijing between Dai Bingguo, the senior Chinese official in charge of foreign affairs, and Viet- namese Vice Foreign Minister and Special Envoy Ho Xuan Son; Whereas, on February 25, 2011, a frigate from China’s navy fired shots at fishing boats from the Philippines; Whereas, on March 2, 2011, the Government of the Phil- ippines reported that two patrol boats from China at- tempted to ram one of its surveillance ships; 197  Whereas it was reported, on June 17, 2011, that the Phil- ippines removed a string of wooden markers that Manila determined was placed by China in disputed areas of the South China Sea amid growing regional tensions; Whereas, on June 23, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told visiting Philippines Foreign Sec- retary Albert del Rosario that ‘‘We are determined and committed to supporting the defense of the Philippines’’; Whereas Philippines Foreign Secretary del Rosario stated that the Philippines is a small country, but is ‘‘prepared to what is necessary to stand up to any aggressive ac- tion in our backyard’’; Whereas the United States, on June 23, 2011, stated that it was ready to provide hardware to modernize the military of the Philippines; Whereas the United States and the Philippines conducted combined naval exercises in the Sulu Sea, near the South China Sea, from June 28 to July 8, 2011; Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has promoted multilateral talks and the estab- lishment of Joint Development Authorities in disputed areas to jointly develop the areas, without settling the issue of sovereignty; Whereas in 2002, ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; Whereas that declaration committed all parties to those terri- torial disputes to ‘‘reaffirm their respect for and commit- ment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law’’, and to ‘‘re- solve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peace- ful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force’’; Whereas a spokesperson for Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out, on June 20, 2011, that ‘‘as a major trading nation, Singapore has a critical interest in any- thing affecting freedom of navigation in all international sea lanes, including those in the South China Sea.’’; Whereas Singapore further urged China to clarify its claims in the South China Sea with more precision as the cur- rent ambiguity as to their extent has caused serious con- cerns in the international maritime community; Whereas, on June 17, 2011, China dispatched one of its larg- est patrol ships, the Haixun 31, on a voyage through dis- puted areas of the South China Sea in a deliberate show of force en route to a port of call in Singapore; Whereas China’s official media stated that the sailing route of the Haixun 31 in the 198  South China Sea was determined to protect its ‘‘rights and sovereignty’’; Whereas in September 2010, tensions were raised in the East China Sea off of the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands, a ter- ritory under the legal administration of Japan, when a Chinese fishing vessel deliberately rammed Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats; Whereas the Government of the People’s Republic of China deliberately heightened these tensions by making a series of diplomatic protests, including on one occasion sum- moning the Japanese Ambassador after midnight, by threatening ‘‘further repercussions’’ if Japan did not im- mediately release the Chinese ship captain involved in the collisions, and by encouraging anti-Japanese demonstra- tions in Chinese cities; Whereas at a press roundtable in Beijing, China, held on January 15, 2008, former Commander of the Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy Keating, stated that ‘‘We (the United States) don’t need China’s permission to go through the Taiwan Strait It’s international water We will exercise our free right of passage whenever and wherever we choose as we have done repeatedly in the past and we’ll in the future.’’; Whereas in July 2010, People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, reported that General Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the general staff of the Peo- ple’s Liberation Army, said that China ‘‘strongly op- posed’’ combined naval exercises to be conducted in the West (Yellow) Sea by the United States and the Republic of Korea; Whereas these exercises were to be conducted in international waters, as well as Republic of Korea territorial waters, in the vicinity of the site of the March 2010 North Korean torpedo attack on the South Korean military vessel Cheonan, which resulted in 46 deaths; Whereas these exercises were to include participation by the USS George Washington aircraft carrier group; Whereas in July 2010, Chinese Major General Luo Yuan, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, in an interview with a Hong Kong TV station, stressed the importance of the Yellow Sea as ‘‘a gateway to Chi- na’s capital region’’ and said that ‘‘if a U.S aircraft car- rier enters the Yellow Sea, it will become a living tar- get.’’; Whereas the actions of the Government of the People’s Re- public of China in the South China Sea have also affected United States military and maritime vessels 199  transiting through international air space and waters, including the collision of a fighter plane of China with a United States surveillance plane in 2001, the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in March 2009, and the collision of a Chinese submarine with the sonar cable of the USS John McCain in June 2009; Whereas, on July 23, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum that ‘‘the United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea’’; Whereas Secretary Clinton further expressed the support of the United States for the Declaration by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China in 2002 on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and stated, ‘‘The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various terri- torial disputes without coercion.’’; Whereas, on October 12, 2010, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated at the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus, ‘‘The U.S position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and com- merce; and in respect for international law.’’; Whereas former Secretary Gates further maintained ‘‘The United States has always exercised our rights and sup- ported the rights of others to transit through, and oper- ate in, international waters.’’; Whereas, on June 4, 2011, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, former Secretary Gates stated that ‘‘maritime security remains an issue of particular importance for the region, with questions about territorial claims and the appropriate use of the maritime domain presenting on-going challenges to regional stability and prosperity’’; Whereas, on June 5, 2011, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Liang Guanglie, the Defense Minister from China, said, ‘‘China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea’’; Whereas, on June 14, 2011, Hong Lei, the spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stated that ‘‘China always upholds and has been committed to a proper resolution of differences and disputes over the South China Sea in a peaceful manner through bilateral direct negotiation and friendly consultation with relevant countries.’’; 200  Whereas, on June 22, 2011, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai told reporters, in reference to the South China Sea disputes, that ‘‘I believe the individual coun- tries are actually playing with fire, and I hope the fire will not be drawn to the United States.’’; and Whereas, on June 29, 2011, the Defense Ministry of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China stated that ‘‘Recent drills by the Chinese navy are routine and not connected to the situa- tion in the South China Sea’’, further calling for people to view the exercises in a ‘‘rational’’ way: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the House of Representatives—(1) reaffirms the strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of maritime terri- torial disputes in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea and pledges continued efforts to facilitate acollaborative, peaceful process to resolve these disputes; (2) condemns the use of force by naval, maritime security, and fishing vessels from China in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as well as the use of force by China’s North Korean ally in the Yellow Sea; (3) notes that overt threats and gun boat diplomacy are not constructive means for settling these outstanding maritime disputes; (4) calls on all parties to these territorial disputes to refrain from threatening force or using force to assert territorial claims (5) welcomes the diplomatic efforts of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States allies and partners in Taiwan, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to amiably and fairly resolve these outstanding disputes; and (6) supports the continuation of operations by the United States Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international waters and air space in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Yellow Sea ... trình tranh chấp Biển Đông cách có nhìn tổng quan sách Mỹ vấn đề Biển Đông từ thời kỳ Chiến tranh lạnh đến trước thời kỳ Tổng thống Obama Chương 2: Chính sách quyền Obama với vấn đề tranh chấp Biển. .. KHOA HỌC XÃ HỘI VÀ NHÂN VĂN NGUYỄN HÀ TRANG CHÍNH QUYỀN OBAMA VỚI VẤN ĐỀ TRANH CHẤP BIỂN ĐÔNG LUẬN VĂN THẠC SỸ KHOA HỌC LỊCH SỬ CHUYÊN NGÀNH: LỊCH SỬ THẾ GIỚI MÃ SỐ: 60. 22. 50 NGUỜI HƯỚNG DẪN KHOA... chấp Biển Đơng chỉnh thể, qua nghiên cứu sách quyền Obama vấn đề tranh chấp Mỹ khơng phải quốc gia có vùng biển tranh chấp khu vực Biển Đông với vai trò siêu cường với quyền lợi gắn bó khu vực Biển