ANTI COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS OR ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOREIGN TRADE UNIVERSITY DISSERTATION ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS OR ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY Major: International Trade Policy and Law Full name: Le Phuong Nam SUPERVISOR: Prof Dr Tang Van Nghia Ha Noi – 2019 i DECLARATION I hereby declare that this master thesis is the scientific research of my own which made on the basis of theoretical studies and under the direction and supervision of Prof Dr Tang Van Nghia The research contents and results of this thesis is completely honest These data and documents for the analysis, review and evaluation were collected from various sources which are fully listed in the reference list I am fully responsible for the content of this master thesis as well as this declaration Hanoi, 31 December 2018 Author Le Phuong Nam ii CONTENTS CONTENTS .iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .viii LIST OF FIGURES ix LIST OF BOXES ix ABSTRACT x CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Research rationale 1.2 Literature review 1.3 Research objectives 1.4 Research questions 1.5 Scope of research 1.6 Research methodology 1.7 Thesis outline CHAPTER 2: THE PRINCIPLE OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS, ABUSE OF DOMINANCE AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 2.1 Anti-competitive agreements 2.1.1 The concept of anti-competitive agreements 2.1.2 Characteristics of anti-competitive agreements 2.1.2.1 General characteristics of anti-competitive agreements 2.1.2.2 Main types of anti-competitive agreements 2.1.2.3 Anti-competitive agreements in terms of relevant market 10 iii 2.1.3 Overview of Legislation on anti-competitive agreements in the market economy 12 2.2 Abuse of dominance 13 2.2.1 The concept of abuse of dominance 13 2.2.2 Characteristics of abuse of dominance 15 2.2.2.1 General characteristics of abuse of dominance 15 2.2.2.3 Abuse of dominance in terms of relevant market 16 2.2.3 Overview of Legislation on abuse of dominance in the market economy 18 2.3 The digital economy 21 2.3.1 The concept of the digital economy 21 2.3.2 Characteristics of the digital economy 22 2.3.2.1 General characteristics of the digital economy 23 2.3.2.2 Objects in the digital economy and the relationship between them 25 CHAPTER 3: ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS OR ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 32 3.1 Anti-competitive agreements in the digital economy 32 3.1.1 Characteristics of anti-competitive agreements in the digital economy 32 3.1.2 Case-study of anti-competitive agreements in the digital economy 40 3.2 Abuse of dominance in the digital economy 43 3.2.1 Characteristics of abuse of dominance in the digital economy 44 3.2.2 Case-study of abuse of dominance in the digital economy 47 iv 3.3 Overview of developed countries’ experience in dealing with anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominance in the digital economy 48 CHAPTER 4: LEGAL REGULATIONS DEALING WITH ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN VIETNAM 56 4.1 The actual situation in Vietnam and the issues raised 56 4.1.1 Overview of Vietnam legislation on anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance in the digital economy 56 4.1.2 The situation on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance on the digital economy in Vietnam 58 4.2 Raising issues from dealing with anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance cases in the digital economy 59 4.2.1 The objective factors 59 4.2.1.1 Market definition and dominance 59 4.2.1.2 Anti competitive agreements by algorithms 64 4.2.2 The subjective factors 65 4.2.2.1 Competition law system 65 4.2.2.2 Quality of personnel of the competition management agency 66 CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 67 5.1 Recommendation 67 5.1.1 Improving provisions in Competition Law to enhance its adaptability to digital economy‟s problem 67 5.1.1.1 The relevant market definition 68 5.1.1.2 Procedure of lodging competition complaints 69 5.1.1.2 Using new assessment tools 69 v 5.1.2 Improving the skilled human resources in the field of competition law and policy 71 5.1.3 Raising awareness of competition law and policy 72 5.1.3.1 Raising awareness of consumer 72 5.1.3.2 Raising awareness of enterprises 73 5.2 Conclusion 73 REFERENCES 75 vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT During the completion of this master thesis, I received the guidance and valuable help from the lecturers, siblings and friends With great respect and deep gratitude, I would like to express sincere thanks to: Prof Dr Tang Van Nghia, Dean of Faculty of Graduate Studies of the Foreign Trade University (FTU) who wholeheartedly helped, supported and encouraged me from the initial to the final level of this dissertation He provided me with comprehensive guide from choosing the topic, outlining the thesis and editing this research Professors and lecturers from FTU as well as World Trade Institute in the Master of International Trade Policy and Law Intake Four, who not only spread profound knowledge and information in the fields of economy and law but generated strong motivation for me while I was taking this course as well Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my family, my colleagues and my friends, who have always by my side encouraging, supporting, contributing valuable ideas and giving me favorable conditions for me to complete this scientific research vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviation Full name EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product ICN International Competition Network JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency MFN Most Favoured Nation NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NT National Treatment OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development SME Small and Medium – Sized Enterprises SOE State – Owned Enterprises TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TRIPS Trade – Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights U.S United States of America UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development VCA Vietnam Competition Authority VCC Vietnam Competition Council WTO World Trade Organization viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1The features of the digital market call for a different and more nuanced approach to competition policy 22 Figure 2: Two side market 28 Figure 3: Marketing mix of digital platforms 30 Figure 4: Monitoring algorithms 34 Figure 5: Parallel algorithms 36 Figure 6: Signalling algorithms 38 Figure 7: Self-learning algorithms 40 LIST OF BOXES Box 1: The airline tariff publishing company case 42 Box 2: The Google case of abuse of dominant 51 Box 3: Article of the Competition Law 2018: "Determining the relevant market 57 Box 4: Determine the market of related products 57 Box 5: Grab-Uber case of merger 59 ix ABSTRACT The digital economy is developing very rapidly, digital technologies have gone into all aspects of life, including the production and business activities of enterprises This thesis shows the new characteristics of the digital economy, the differences that digital technologies have impacted on the competitive behavior of enterprises, including anti-competitive agreements as well as abuse dominant behaviors Since then, the thesis points out the difficulties and challenges faced by Vietnam 's competition authority when dealing with competition issues of the digital economy A number of solutions to improve the effectiveness of resolving anti-competitive agreement or abuse of dominance cases will also be discussed More specifically, the thesis presents some contents such as: (i) Basic concepts and principles of competition law, anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance behaviors of enterprises in the market; (ii) The legal provisions of Vietnam and the world in adjusting and managing competitive acts of enterprises, especially anticompetitive agreements as well as abuse of dominant position; (iii) The characteristics of the digital economy, the participants, the relationship between subjects, the difference in competitive behavior of enterprises on digital platforms; (iv) Differential characteristics of the anti-competitive agreements in the digital economy, the forms of agreements, the conditions of agreement, the method of agreement, the difficulties for the management agencies to check and detect ; (v) Differences in acts of abusing the dominant position of the enterprise in the digital economy, the main implementing entity, the implementation methods, difficulties in the detection and management of the competition authorities (vi) challenges competition authorities face when dealing with competition cases in the digital economy, difficulties in identifying relevant markets, managers not have expertise in digital technology, consumers lack awareness of protecting themselves ; (vii) Some solutions to help Vietnam's competition authority to improve the management capacity of anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, solutions to improve the agency's capacity management, improvement of the legal system, solutions to raise consumers' awareness x applicable, but it is challenging to concretely identify what determines the ability to act independently Having market power is a prerequisite for having a dominant position In their analyses, competition authorities often use quantitative indicators such as concentration ratios, market shares, price levels, or profit margins to determine market power In digital markets, the use of these (static) indicators is sometimes impossible as some services are offered for free and some business models make very little or no turnover or profit (such as WhatsApp) This does not mean that these companies are without market power Stock values and take-over prices indicate that these companies may generate considerable future profits The use of stock-values or take-over prices as alternative indicator is, however, problematic as these indicators not inform about particular markets but about the overall profitability of a firm in all of the markets in which it operates Another problem with using static indicators for assessing dominance is that they are less reliable in digital markets than in other markets due to the dynamics and innovation happening in the sector Dominance in digital markets, like the definition of the relevant market, is a notion that may be subject to (fast) change over a relatively short period of time An example of a how fast a market position can be challenged is the social media service Myspace There is a need to find a relevant and manageable interpretation of behaving independently in digital markets A starting point is an analysis of the strength of competitive constraints This is not uncommon for competition authorities The OFT (2004) as well as the European Commission (2009) distinguish as competitive constraints buying and selling power, including the degree of vertical integration, and the presence of (potential) competitors or level of entry barriers Buying and selling power typically depends on how much horizontal market power vis-à-vis competitors the buyer and seller have As such, the analysis of vertical power relations often relies on the same static indicators which we concluded above are less useful Alternatively, the analysis of vertical power relations throughout the value web may be based on an analysis of the variety of current and future alternative routes available to reach end users and the identification current and future bottlenecks Moreover, when incumbents and/or 63 challengers are innovating in unexplored technologies or services, this may be an indication that the incumbent firm under investigation is about to face disruptive innovations/services In such cases, dominance would appear a short-lived phenomenon This is particularly true when the firm under investigation is a single platform operator In the case of a multiplatform operator, the firm may face the threat of a disruptive innovator for some of its platforms, but not for all 4.2.1.2 Anti competitive agreements by algorithms Tacit anti competitive agreements by algorithms Behaviour of anticompetitive agreements through algorithmic, as described in the above sections, are two-way deals that substantially harm consumers However, these types of agreements are competition cases that will make it difficult for regulatory authorities However, these types of agreements are less discovered by regulatory agencies On the one hand, these agreements are implicit, there is no existence of contracts, written agreements, or even verbal communication; therefore, under the provisions of the current competition law, there are not enough grounds to handle these cases On the other hand, these are also anti-competitive agreements of the new era which are difficult to detect, they will cause many difficulties for Competition Authorities 4.2.1.2.2 Exclusivity agreements and selective distribution The availability of multiple routes to deliver content to end users is critical for competition in the market and for contestability of the market Exclusive agreements on particular content and selective distribution agreements are strategies that may be used to foreclose routes As such competition authorities need to critically monitor exclusive deals between content or technology providers and digital platforms This would mean a change in current policy as such agreements are currently block exempted Exclusivity arrangements are part of the Google search case Exclusivity agreements are not a problem per se, as long as there is alternative content and/or 64 there are alternative routes for competitors to compete As such, a set of multiple exclusive agreements or a network of exclusive agreements may be problematic and found incompatible with both Article 101 and 102 TFEU Box below illustrates how Google might have excluded accessibility to competing search engines through multiple exclusivity agreements Geradin and Kuschewsky (2013) explain that ‗it is alleged that Google entered into intermediation agreements under which publishers must exclusively use Google‘s search and search advertising services on their websites [As a result] Google has become the exclusive search provider on many of the most heavily trafficked websites […] allowing Google to collect substantial query volumes […] while excluding other search engines from being accessible on such websites‘ 4.2.2 The subjective factors 4.2.2.1 Competition law system In general, in any field, the legal system always has a certain lag compared to the rapid transformation of the market Many cases that are new in nature and have not yet been settled to the extent that the provisions of the current law have not yet been settled are no longer appropriate The digital economy is also a good example of this trend Competition laws of many countries in the world in general and in Vietnam in particular, most are highly generalized, have not gone into specific details Therefore, there are many different factors of the digital market that make the provisions of the internal edge law no longer relevant For example, regulations on anticompetitive agreements in the Law, although highly comprehensive, cannot adjust the underground collusion behavior of enterprises through the use of automated algorithms Or identifying relevant markets through methods such as SSNIP test, or market share criteria is no longer effective because in the digital market, customers use the service without losing 65 money Determining the relevant market in the digital economy has also become a problem that will be painful for the authorities 4.2.2.2 Quality of personnel of the competition management agency Although the competition agency's human resources often have very general knowledge about the fields of economics and law, most of them are not those with knowledge of information technology, software, and arts math - the basic components of the digital economy The lack of understanding of information technology makes it difficult for competition managers to analyze, investigate and assess the number of behaviors in the digital market of businesses and consumers so it is difficult to identify behaviors that abuse the market's power or anticompetitive agreements 66 CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION All of the above challenges illustrate that assessing competitive constraints, the ultimate objective of the analysis, requires a close look at business models and the externalities/interdependencies between all sides of potentially multiple platforms We suggest that rather than analyzing whether end-users regard services as each other‘s substitutes, the assessment of competitive constraints should start by analyzing how digital platforms generate turnover and profit and to focus on what/who may steal turnover/profits What difference would such an approach make for competition policy? Regarding the first challenge (multiple relevant markets), such an approach might have alerted the FTC and the Commission in the Google/DoubleClick case to consider the fact that more than one platform was involved Regarding the second challenge (absence of nominal prices), the Commission could have reached the conclusion that WhatsApp did impose competitive constraints on Facebook, as various services offered by other multiplatform operators such as Google, Microsoft, and Apple Regarding the third challenge (fluid market boundaries), the focus on business/earning models helps to identify potential rivals which may steal away profits, not so much by introducing substitute products but by undermining existing business models This approach reflects the notion that competitive pressure does not only come from demand-side and supply-side substitution, but more generally from disruptive entry and innovation The aim is not to define and freeze a market, but to identify in a forward looking manner the potential forces of innovation, entry and contestability, that may change and overturn markets, rather than affect competition on given markets 5.1 Recommendation 5.1.1 Improving provisions in Competition Law to enhance its adaptability to digital economy‟s problem Although competition regulators have the tools necessary for dealing with digital firms‘ anticompetitive practices and with structural changes due to 67 multisided markets, some of their arguments and tools should be adapted specifically to the digital economy For example, it might be more complicated to identify and define ―relevant‖ markets in cases of mergers or of abusive practices, since, by definition, digital platforms hook up at least two different categories of users But that does not at all mean there is no need for competition regulators to formulate a definition (or even adapt the current one) of the damage to competition This would help us understand and anticipate how platforms‘ practices affect competition Given, however, the wide room of maneuver that digital firms have for continually resifting the bounds of existing markets, or even creating new ones, competition regulators should concentrate, above all, on business models Their aim should be to identify the competitors who are likely to challenge a dominant position not by proposing alternative goods and services but by vying with the dominant business model This approach would pay more attention to the ability of digital firms to maintain, through innovations, strong competitive pressure in the marketplace From this perspective, the collection and possession of big data are factors to be meticulously examined when applying competition policies 5.1.1.1 The relevant market definition The potential for competition should be assessed over a sufficiently long timeframe, with milestones established for the removal of regulation to attract new entry if possible This would help to avoid unnecessary, self-perpetuating regulation Flexibly improve competition laws to follow market developments, based on previous general provisions and thereby regulate more details in line with other things Specialization of the digital market In particular, pay special attention to the anticompetitive agreements based on algorithms Ensure market definition is sufficiently forward-looking, and revise and adapt policies to fully capture changes in the relevant market Digital markets are extremely dynamic, which makes it important to define them in a way that captures 68 the likely future effects of competition The time horizon used in the definition should consider the period in which any remedy might impact the market Ex ante market definition is likely to require a longer time horizon than that typically used by competition authorities for ex post enforcement Where evidence indicates that markets have changed or are likely to change and warrant deregulation, competition and regulatory authorities should revise their interventions, including establishing sunset clauses that define the temporary measures in place It is best to be cautious when introducing new interventions or tightening existing ones, as operators may be less willing to invest and innovate if they are unable to recover their costs 5.1.1.2 Procedure of lodging competition complaints Like whistle blow tool in Europe, the provisions on individuals, organizations to lodge complaints related to violations should also be revised Instead of complaint procedure with the onus of proof belonging to complainants, VCA need a mechanism of receiving all market information and issues to decide whether to intervene if necessary Moreover, all individuals and organizations should have the right to lodge complaints on violations against Competition Law instead of the provisions that only victims/sufferers of/from Competition Law violations can lodge complaints at present; complainants can provide information, evidence on their complaints, however, this shouldn‘t be an obligation; the complainants ‗onus of paying competition case fee in advance should be removed Only then, can the competition management be able to update the new developments of the market in the fastest way When the mechanism for complaints, reflecting increasingly clear and convenient cases of anti-competition, the initial investigation costs will also be significantly reduced 5.1.1.2 Using new assessment tools Adjust existing tools to account for specific features of digital markets When defining relevant markets and assessing market power, competition authorities need to take the unique features of digital markets into account Existing tools (e.g the SSNIP test) may have certain shortcomings when applied to digital markets 69 Authorities should be flexible in the analytical tools they rely on to define certain markets Generally, there will not be a compelling reason for authorities to dispense with a formal market definition stage, as this can be important when answering specific competition and regulation questions about digital markets Ultimately, market definition should support an analysis of likely competitive effects It is important for authorities to consider the links between the different sides of platform markets (either during the market definition stage or in the subsequent competitive assessment) Adjusting the SSNIP test to two-sided or multi-sided markets can help with this Use alternative tools to capture the main determinants of consumers‘ switching behavior In a standard market definition exercise, price is typically considered the main reason consumers switch products However, in digital markets, differences in product features or functionality may be more relevant When digital products are free and non-monetary factors, such as quality or privacy, are more important to consumers, authorities should consider alternative approaches to the SSNIP test to better capture and understand consumer switching behaviour Using the SSNDQ test The key concept behind the ‗small significant non-transitory decrease in quality‘ (SSNDQ) test is to consider whether a change in performance attributes (e.g network quality, reliability, etc.) of a given product or service would induce substitution to or from another product/service If a supplier were to reduce quality significantly, holding all else equal, and no substitution takes place, then the product is a relevant market If customers switch to anotherproduct/service, then this other product/service would be also be in the relevant market Like the SSNIP test (which, despite its prominence in various guidelines, is actually seldom applied formally), authorities should use the SSNDQ as a framework to consider non-price competition when defining markets As the OECD notes, the SSNDQ is “more useful as a loose conceptual guide than as a precise tool that courts and competition authorities should actually attempt to apply” 70 5.1.2 Improving the skilled human resources in the field of competition law and policy When applying competition law, competition authorities face a different set of challenges These challenges involve the analytical steps and instruments used for assessing the relevant market and dominance The analytical steps typically start with describing the market boundaries, followed by an analysis of market power and whether the behaviour of firms is anti-competitive Digital firms, however, constantly redefine the boundaries of the market by competing largely on the basis of innovation It follows that in digital markets, the traditional step-by-step analytical approach does not work because of strong dynamic feedback effects running from firm behaviour to market structure For the same reason, market shares or profit margins are less useful for determining market power In response to these challenges, competition authorities may need to: - take the business models as a starting point, focusing on how a company makes profits and what other companies or business models may steal that profit away Such approach integrates the market definition and market power assessment stages It allows to better account for interdependencies between multiple platforms and the interactions between firm conduct and market boundaries; - rely less on traditional indicators such as market shares or profit margins They rather focus on indicators that inform about contestability, such as the presence of entry barriers, the availability of alternative routes to reach end-users, including the presence of measures aimed at locking-in end-users, and the degree of innovation in unexplored technologies/services; - follow a more forward looking approach because of the central role of potential competition In practice this means following a cautious approach and relying on self-correcting powers of digital markets that make permanent harm less likely; 71 - involve more external IT experts to help to better understand business models and future trends; - intensify cooperation with competition authorities from various nations/continents because the digital economy is operating globally with consequences for defining the relevant geographical market In order to support competition authorities, policy makers may: - potentially mitigate competition problems by amending data protection regulation Introducing data portability as a right to transfer one's own data from one platform to another in a commonly-used electronic format would have a positive impact on the interoperability between platforms, lower switching costs, and improve the competitive process; - draft a guideline/a guidance paper on assessing competitive restraints in digital markets; - review existing guidelines on horizontal mergers, where particular attention should be paid to: - mergers involving non-transaction markets with indirect network effects; - defining new metrics used in setting the threshold values for determining when a merger needs to be notified; - developing the concept of maverick firms in the context of dynamic markets 5.1.3 Raising awareness of competition law and policy 5.1.3.1 Raising awareness of consumer Although the Competition Law has appeared and been enforced in Vietnam for more than 15 years, it is still limited for many people, especially consumers Enhancing consumer understanding of competition law not only helps them understand and self-consciously protect their rights when consuming, shopping, but also making consumers an organic observation channel on the behavior of businesses In fact, it is the consumers who get the most direct impact when competition cases occur Therefore, it is essential to improve consumer awareness of competition 72 policies and laws Especially in the digital economy, when consumer interests are more easily deprived through technology Consumers must be aware of their protection before the competition authority intervenes 5.1.3.2 Raising awareness of enterprises Competition law since its inception in 2005, in addition to positive impacts, has revealed many inadequacies and backwardness In particular, the thinking about competition or proper understanding of this issue is not standard So far, many Vietnamese enterprises have not really understood the concept of true competition They still think about competition as something far away and not grasp the Competition Law, nor they understand how to apply this law This leads to many anti-competitive behaviors of businesses that are not aware of themselves Raising awareness of enterprises about competition law is a measure of impact from the root, which is aimed directly at the object that can cause violations This measure not only helps enterprises to consciously protect themselves, avoiding unnecessary illegal acts At the same time, this also helps to enhance the observation and competition among enterprises to create a more equal and competitive playing field In the digital economy, when the legal provisions not mention in detail the emerging issues of the market, opportunities for businesses to implement anticompetitive behaviors such as collusion or abuse Dominance becomes easier Raising the awareness of businesses is the solution that needs to be implemented as soon as possible 5.2 Conclusion Competition law plays an important role in the economy, both has the effect of adjusting the behavior of enterprises, and has the effect of adjusting the interventions of the state Anticompetitive agreements or acts of abuse of dominant position are the behaviors of enterprises that are specifically regulated by the competition laws of all countries However, in Vietnam as well as many countries, 73 the existing competition law provisions need to be revised in some aspects in order to take account of the specifics of the digital economy Competition in digital markets is characterized by scale economies and network effects In the competitive process, access to user data is essential for improving the experience of a digital service for end-users on both sides of the platform The experience can be further enhanced when a company operates multiple platforms The company can obtain end-user data from multiple platforms and use that data to improve the experience across the platforms As such, digital platform operators aim at making themselves indispensable for (i.e lock-in) endusers at each side of the platform and place themselves in gatekeeper positions The competitive process among digital firms gives rise to potential tipping markets with winner-takes-all outcomes However, even when some digital platforms are considered to be near monopolists or gatekeepers, they can hardly afford to relax First, it is not easy to create or maintain gatekeeper positions as there are many alternatives for bypassing a gatekeeper The digital economy can be described as a complex structure of platforms stacked on each other allowing for multiple routes to reach end-users Second, if dominant digital firms not innovate, they will be replaced by others As a result the digital economy is characterized by a very high degree of innovations by both challengers and incumbents Digital firms compete by developing new business models and, by doing so, continuously redefine the boundaries of a market or create new markets On the other hand, the superiority of the algorithm helps the dominant position abuse or micro-structure become more sophisticated and difficult to detect Requires management agencies to have appropriate new solutions In response to anti competitive agreements and abuses of dominant position in the digital economy, there are some feasible solutions that have been implemented by developed countries in Europe and becomes a lesson for other developing countries In particular, we can mention solutions such as improving the quality of competition regulations, improving the quality of human resources at the competition management agency, applying new methods in investigation and 74 handling competition cases, raising the awareness of consumers and businesses about competition policy and law Although these are fairly basic measures when compared to the rapid development of digital economy and competition issues that occur in the digital market If the coordination of all solutions is complete, the competition authority can fully control the competition cases in the digital economy, especially the anti-competitive agreements or the dominant abuse of the case REFERENCES Books A Amelio and D Donath, ‗Market Definition in recent EC Merger Investigations: The role of empirical analysis‘ Law & Economics Concurrences (3) 2009 Bellamy and Child ―European Union Law of Competition‖ , Seventh Edition, Oxford, 2016 C Rochet and J Tirole, ―Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets‖, Journal of the European Economic Association 2003 C Rochet and J Tirole, ―Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets‖, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003 Competition policy in the digital economy – 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related to the corporation in that or any other market; (b) Preventing the entry of