Quan hệ giữa sự kiêm nhiệm giám đốc điều hành với giá tri doanh nghiệp và chi phí đại diện của các công ty Việt Nam Luận văn thạc sĩ 2014

CHI PHÍ - Chuyên ngành : Tài Chính Ngân Hàng : 60340201 - L M I QUAN H GI A S KIÊM NHI M U HÀNH V I GIÁ TR DOANH NGHI P VÀ CHI PHÍ I DI N C A CÁC CƠNG TY VI T NAM cơng trình nghiên c u c a tác gi , n t t trình h c t p k t qu nghiên c u th c ti n th i gian qua, s li u s d ng trung th c có ngu n g c trích d n rõ ràng Lu c th c hi is ng d n khoa h c c a TS Tr n Th H i Lý Tác gi lu M CL C TRANG PH BÌA L M CL C DANH M C CÁC KÝ T VÀ CH VI T T T DANH M C CÁC B NG BI U DANH M VÀ PH L C C 1 Gi i thi u: 1.1 Lý ch tài: 1.2 M c tiêu nghiên c u: 1.3 Câu h i nghiên c u: 1.4 B c c c a lu T ng quan lý thuy t b ng ch ng th c nghi m v s nhi n giá tr th 2.1 ng c a s kiêm i di n c a công ty: T ng quan lý thuy t: 2.1.1 Lý thuy i di n (Agency Theory): .4 2.1.2 Lý thuy t qu n lý (Stewardship theory): .10 2.2 B ng ch ng v s ng c a s kiêm nhi u hành bi n qu n tr n giá tr doanh nghi i di n công ty: 13 D li 3.1 u: 32 M u nghiên c u: 32 3.2 Mô t bi n: 33 3.2.1 Bi n ph thu c: 33 3.2.2 Bi 3.2.3 Bi n ki m soát: 37 3.3 c l p: 34 Mơ hình nghiên c u: 37 3.3.1 Mơ hình h i quy g p Pooled OLS: 38 3.3.2 ng c 3.3.3 ng ng u nhiên (Random effect model REM): 40 3.3.4 ph c: Ki i, t c 41 3.3.5 Ki m tra n i sinh cách kh c ph c: 41 3.4 c ki 3.5 nh (Fixed effect model FEM): 39 nh th c nghi m: 42 Gi thuy t nghiên c u: 43 K t qu nghiên c u: 44 4.1 Th ng kê mô t bi n: 44 4.2 Phân tích m 4.3 K t qu h i quy: 51 4.4 Phát hi a bi n: 48 i t 4.4.1 Phát hi 4.4.2 Phát hi n t 4.4.3 Kh c ph c 55 i: 55 55 i t : 56 4.5 Ki m tra n i sinh: 57 4.6 H ng Arellano K t lu n, hàm ý h n ch c Bond system GMM: 58 tài: 62 5.1 K t lu n: 62 5.2 Hàm ý c 5.3 H n ch c tài: 63 tài: 63 TÀI LI U THAM KH O PH L C DANH M C CÁC KÝ T VÀ CH VI T T T HOSE: Sàn giao d ch ch ng khốn Thành Ph H Chí Minh HNX: Sàn giao d ch ch ng khoán Hà N i REM: Random Effect Model FEM: Fixed Effect Model - ng ng u nhiên ng c nh GLS: Generalized Least Square - i thi u t ng quát GMM: General Method of Moments - ng quát OLS: Ordinary least squareTP.HCM: Thành Ph H Chí Minh i thi u DANH M C CÁC B NG BI U B ng 3.1: Tóm t t nghiên c H ng qu n tr ng bi n giá tr doanh nghi p mc a i di n công ty 28 B ng 4.1: Th ng kê mô t bi n mơ hình 44 B ng 4.2: Ma tr a bi n 50 B ng 4.3: K t qu ch y h i quy cho bi n ph thu c TQ: 52 B ng 4.4: K t qu ch y h i quy cho bi n ph thu c ASSETS: 54 B ng 4.5: K t qu ki nh phát hi B ng 4.6: K t qu ki nh phát hi n t B ng 4.7: Ki B ng 4.8: K t qu i: 55 56 nh Dubin-Wu-Hausman cho n i sinh c a bi n h i quy: 58 ng Arellano Bond system GMM c a TQ ASSETS: 59 DANH M Bi 5.1: T tr ng s VÀ PH L C ng thành viên H ng qu n tr công ty Vi t Nam 47 Ph l c K t qu ch y h i quy d ng Pooled t ph n m m STATA 11 70 Ph l c K t qu ch y h i quy d ng FEM t ph n m m STATA 11 71 Ph l c 3: K t qu ch y h i quy d ng REM t ph n m m STATA 11 72 Ph l c 4: K t qu ch y h i quy GLS - kh c ph c m khuy i t 73 Ph l c 5: K t qu ch y h i quy GMM - kh c ph c m khuy i t i sinh 74 Ph l c 6: Danh sách công ty niêm y t sàn HOSE m u nghiên c u 77 C M c tiêu c a nghiên c u xem xét qu n tr mc aH t bi t s kiêm nhi ng n giá tr doanh nghi p chi i di n c a công ty t i Vi t Nam Bài nghiên c u s d ng m u g m 610 quan c thu th p t 122 công ty niêm y t S giao d ch ch ng khoán Thành Ph H Chí Minh th i gian t -2012 B ng vi c phân tích s d ng k thu t d li u b ng, th c hi n h i quy b soát hi ng quát (GMM)- ki m ng n i sinh m i quan h gi a qu n tr công ty v i giá tr doanh nghi i di n- Tác gi khơng tìm th ng c a s kiêm nhi m Giám n hi u qu i di c ng hi u su t s d ng tài s n c a công ty t i Vi t Nam k t qu h i quy iv tr , Tác gi tìm th doanh nghi chi nghi ng qu n ng qu n tr n giá tr ng chi u c a quy mô H i di n; t l s h u c a H i di n S h u t ch ng th m khác c a H c chi T khóa: S kiêm nhi m, giá tr doanh nghi ng qu n tr ng chi i di n i di n c n giá tr doanh 1.1 Lý ch tài: T c chuy nhi u hành sang b t kiêm nhi i t c u trúc kiêm u hành, có m t c l i (Wei- Chen, Lin Yi, 2008) V i s bùng n c a v bê b i l n t i công ty c a M , v kiêm nhi quan tâm nhi c u hành l m d ng quy n l c c a h , có s t p trung nhi u quy n t vi c kiêm nhi ty c l c a công ty chuy uy n s h u tài s n cơng i sang b t kiêm nhi u Nhìn chung, 84 % công ty châu Âu tách bi t vai trò Ch t ch H ng qu n tr u hành T i công ty c, Hà Lan, Th n Anh tách bi t vai trò (Boards in Turbulent Times, 2009) M c dù m i quan h gi a s i di n r oc aH ng qu n tr , giá tr doanh nghi p c quan tâm nghiên c ch ng th c nghi m h n h p d ng n không th k t lu phát hi n t nghiên c u th c nghi c nh ng phát hi n Nh ng c ng h ng lý thuy i di n ho c lý thuy t qu n lý, mà lý thuy t mâu thu n tr c ti p v i Và h u h t nghiên c d gi a s kiêm nhi m c a H i quan h u hành giá tr doanh nghi p Tuy nhiên n u ng qu n tr th c t b nh có n i quy OLS s b ch ch không phù h n h u h t nghiên c u có th m t lý t qu c a nh ng phát hi n không thuy t ph c Trong nghiên c u Tác gi d ng d li phân tích s d ng k thu t d li u b ng, th c hi n h i quy b 2012, 6) Arellano and Bond, 1991 Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations The Review of Economic Studies, 58 pp 277 7) 297 Beverley Jackling Shireenjit Johl, 2009 Board Structure and Firm anies, Corporate GovernanceAn International Review, 2009, 174:492-509 8) Blanca Arosa, Txomin Iturralde Amaia Maseda, 2012 The Board structure and firm performance in SMEs: Evidence from Spain, G Model, IEDEE-22, No of pages 9) Chan Kaixian, Hee Pui Mun, Lee Chaw Chin Yeoh Huey Chyng, 2012 The Relationship between Board Characteristics and Firm Performance in Malaysian Public listed Companies, Faculty of Business and Finance Department of commerce and Accountancy, BAC RMP15 T5G5, May 2012 10) Dahya, 2005 One Man Two Hats - What's All the Commotion 11) Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993 Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, Econometric Theory, 1995, vol 11, issue 03, pages 631-635 12) Donaldson, 1990a The ethereal hand: organizational economics and management theory, Academy of Management Review, 15, 369 381 13) Donaldson, 1990b A rational basis for criticisms of organizational economics: a reply to Barney, Academy of Management Review, 15, 394 401 14) Elitza Mileva, 2007 Using Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimators in Stata, Economics Department Fordham University, July 9, 2007 15) Faleye, 2007 Does One Hat Fit All? The Case of Corporate Leadership Structure Journal of Management & Governance, Volume 11, Issue 3, 239259 16) Henk Berkmana , Rebel A Coleb, Andy Leec and Madhu Veeraraghavand, 2005 The Effect of Board Composition and Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: Evidence from India, the 2005 China International Conference in Finance, July 7, 2005 in Kunming, PRC 17) Johnny Jermias, 2008 Board capital Board characteristic and Managerial share ownership: impact on firm performance, Simon Fraser University Beedie School of Business 18) Khaled Elsayed, 2007 Does CEO Duality Really Affect Corporate Perfomance?,Journal complication, Volume 6, 1203-1211 19) Lex Donaldson, James H Davis, 1991 Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns, Australian Journal of Management, 16, 1, June 1991 20) oy Value?, Faculty of Finance, Cass Business School 21) Mark A Bliss, 2011 Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing, Accounting and Finance 51, 361-368 22) Mary A Callaghan, 2005 The Relationship Between Chief Executive Officer Duality and Subsequent Corporate Financial Performance, A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy, Capella University, January 2005 23) Md Abdur Rouf, 2011 The Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Value of the Firm in Developing Countries: Evidence from Bangladesh, The International Journal of Applied Economics and Finance, ISSN 1991-0886 24) Michael C Jensen, et Al, 1976 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, Volume.3, No.4, pp.305-360 25) Mike W Peng, Yang Li, En Xie, Zongfeng Su, 2010 CEO duality, organization slack and firm performance in China, Asia Pac J Manag 27, 611-624 26) Morten Bennedsen, Hans Christian Kongsted Kasper Meisner Nielsen, 2008 The causal effect of board size in the performance of small and medium-sized firms, Journal of Banking & Finance, 32 2008 1098-1109 27) Naveen Kumar J P Singh, 2012 Outside Directors, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India, Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, ISSN 1946-052X, 2012, Vol 4, No 28) Paul M Guest, 2009 The Impact of Board Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from the UK, The European Journal of Finance, Volume 15, Issue 4, June 2009, pages 385-404 29) Peng Wang, 2013 The Effectiveness and independence of supervisory board: evidence from China 2000-2009, International Business Review - INT BUS REV 10/2012; DOI:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2011.09.008 30) Peng, Mike W., Shujun Zhang Xinchun Li, 2007 CEO Duality and Firm Management and Organization Review, Volume 3, Issue 2, 205 225 31) Pi Timme, 1993 Corporate control and bank efficiency, Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 17, Issue 2-3, 515-530 32) Ph m Qu c Vi n hi u qu ho u ng c a nhân t ng c a công ty c ph Lu u hành công nS 33) Ramdani, Dendi Arjen van Witteloostuijn, 2010 The Impact of Board Independence and CEO Duality on Firm Performance: A Quantile Regression Analysis for Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand British Journal of Management, Vol 21, Issue 3, 607-627 34) Theo Hemalin Weisbach, 2003 Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, Economic Policy Review, Vol 9, No 1, April 2003 35) 2011 36) Wei- Chen, Lin Yi, 2008 CEO duality and firm performance - An endogenous issue, Corporate Ownership and Control, 6(1) 37) Wellalage Locke, 2011 Does CEO duality is really matter? Evidence from an emerging market, Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol 8, No 4, Summer 2011 38) Y.T.Mak Yuanto Kusnadi, 2005 Size really matters: Further evidence on the negative relationship between board size and firm value, Pcific-Basin Finance Journal, 301-308 39) Yermach, 1996 Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40 1996 185-211 PH L C Ph l c K t qu ch y h i quy d ng Pooled OLS t ph n m m STATA 11 Mơ hình bi n TQ: reg tq ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt Source | SS df MS -+ -Model | 14.977089 1.87213612 Residual | 104.525464 601 173919241 -+ -Total | 119.502553 609 196227509 Number of obs F( 8, 601) Prob > F R-squared Adj R-squared Root MSE = = = = = = 610 10.76 0.0000 0.1253 0.1137 41704 -tq | Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | 0999551 0365007 2.74 0.006 0282706 1716396 board | -.0096745 0141394 -0.68 0.494 -.0374431 0180941 inside | -.1503772 1273442 -1.18 0.238 -.4004709 0997166 none | -.1413495 082433 -1.71 0.087 -.3032412 0205422 owner | 2224666 0398562 5.58 0.000 1441922 300741 lnsize | 1668938 0391227 4.27 0.000 09006 2437276 lnage | -.0610853 0426616 -1.43 0.153 -.1448693 0226987 debt | -.0597746 0832955 -0.72 0.473 -.2233601 1038109 _cons | -.8773498 4649561 -1.89 0.060 -1.790486 0357863 Mơ hình bi n ASSETS: reg assets ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt Source | SS df MS -+ -Model | 170.494073 21.3117592 Residual | 1075.40583 601 1.78936078 -+ -Total | 1245.8999 609 2.04581264 Number of obs F( 8, 601) Prob > F R-squared Adj R-squared Root MSE = = = = = = 610 11.91 0.0000 0.1368 0.1254 1.3377 -assets | Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | 142251 1170784 1.22 0.225 -.0876814 3721835 board | -.10898 0453529 -2.40 0.017 -.1980495 -.0199105 inside | 6085746 4084645 1.49 0.137 -.1936166 1.410766 none | -.4337827 264409 -1.64 0.101 -.9530605 085495 owner | 552518 1278414 4.32 0.000 3014479 8035882 lnsize | -.9141683 1254885 -7.28 0.000 -1.160618 -.667719 lnage | 1728694 1368399 1.26 0.207 -.095873 4416118 debt | 4361174 2671754 1.63 0.103 -.0885934 9608282 _cons | 12.19367 1.491376 8.18 0.000 9.264729 15.12261 Ph l c K t qu ch y h i quy d ng FEM t ph n m m STATA 11 Mơ hình bi n TQ: xtreg tq ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt, fe Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: ck Number of obs Number of groups = = 610 122 R-sq: Obs per group: = avg = max = 5.0 within = 0.0331 between = 0.0194 overall = 0.0219 corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0649 F(8,480) Prob > F = = 2.05 0.0390 -tq | Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | 0304885 0407509 0.75 0.455 -.0495836 1105607 board | 012118 0163426 0.74 0.459 -.0199939 0442298 inside | 3063876 2397491 1.28 0.202 -.1646999 7774751 none | 107468 093259 1.15 0.250 -.0757784 2907144 owner | 088963 0602243 1.48 0.140 -.029373 2072989 lnsize | 0174805 124939 0.14 0.889 -.2280145 2629756 lnage | -.1405679 0624367 -2.25 0.025 -.2632508 -.017885 debt | 094792 1566623 0.61 0.545 -.2130366 4026207 _cons | 806394 1.384187 0.58 0.560 -1.91342 3.526208 -+ -sigma_u | 38423376 sigma_e | 24125726 rho | 71723239 (fraction of variance due to u_i) Mơ hình bi n ASSETS: xtreg assets ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt, fe Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: ck Number of obs Number of groups = = 610 122 R-sq: Obs per group: = avg = max = 5.0 within = 0.1518 between = 0.0800 overall = 0.0818 corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.4012 F(8,480) Prob > F = = 10.74 0.0000 -assets | Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | -.0481924 0792017 -0.61 0.543 -.2038174 1074325 board | 0611919 0317628 1.93 0.055 -.0012194 1236032 inside | -.5146986 4659665 -1.10 0.270 -1.430285 4008877 none | -.2500438 1812544 -1.38 0.168 -.6061939 1061063 owner | 0525628 1170495 0.45 0.654 -.17743 2825556 lnsize | -1.859741 2428264 -7.66 0.000 -2.336875 -1.382607 lnage | 6192775 1213493 5.10 0.000 380836 857719 debt | -.0623675 3044824 -0.20 0.838 -.6606507 5359156 _cons | 22.26252 2.690249 8.28 0.000 16.9764 27.54864 -+ -sigma_u | 1.430246 sigma_e | 46889769 rho | 90294942 (fraction of variance due to u_i) -F test that all u_i=0: F(121, 480) = 36.46 Prob > F = 0.0000 Ph l c 3: K t qu ch y h i quy d ng REM t ph n m m STATA 11 Mơ hình bi n TQ: xtreg tq ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt, re Random-effects GLS regression Group variable: ck Number of obs Number of groups = = 610 122 R-sq: Obs per group: = avg = max = 5.0 within = 0.0244 between = 0.1178 overall = 0.0943 Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian corr(u_i, X) = (assumed) Wald chi2(8) Prob > chi2 = = 27.34 0.0006 -tq | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | 0553755 0365329 1.52 0.130 -.0162276 1269786 board | 0076107 0144484 0.53 0.598 -.0207076 035929 inside | 0307297 1712338 0.18 0.858 -.3048823 3663418 none | 0451316 0833253 0.54 0.588 -.118183 2084462 owner | 1569182 0480188 3.27 0.001 0628031 2510333 lnsize | 0934006 0615497 1.52 0.129 -.0272347 2140358 lnage | -.1471559 0435063 -3.38 0.001 -.2324268 -.0618851 debt | 0147404 1130262 0.13 0.896 -.2067869 2362676 _cons | -.0120316 6967043 -0.02 0.986 -1.377547 1.353484 -+ -sigma_u | 34478242 sigma_e | 24125726 rho | 67130634 (fraction of variance due to u_i) Mơ hình bi n ASSETS: xtreg assets ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt, re Random-effects GLS regression Group variable: ck Number of obs Number of groups = = 610 122 R-sq: Obs per group: = avg = max = 5.0 within = 0.1480 between = 0.0853 overall = 0.0871 Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian corr(u_i, X) = (assumed) Wald chi2(8) Prob > chi2 = = 82.29 0.0000 -assets | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | -.0224126 0772021 -0.29 0.772 -.1737259 1289007 board | 0453747 030803 1.47 0.141 -.014998 1057474 inside | -.2816882 4122991 -0.68 0.494 -1.08978 5264032 none | -.2951693 1765284 -1.67 0.095 -.6411586 05082 owner | 1103391 1087796 1.01 0.310 -.1028649 3235431 lnsize | -1.344245 1745432 -7.70 0.000 -1.686344 -1.002147 lnage | 3873111 1014301 3.82 0.000 1885118 5861104 debt | -.1415989 2697787 -0.52 0.600 -.6703554 3871577 _cons | 16.63996 1.951141 8.53 0.000 12.81579 20.46413 -+ -sigma_u | 1.275521 sigma_e | 46889769 rho | 88094932 (fraction of variance due to u_i) Ph l c 4: K t qu ch y h i quy GLS - kh c ph c m khuy i t Mơ hình bi n TQ: tq ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt, panel (het) corr(ar1) Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression Coefficients: Panels: Correlation: generalized least squares heteroskedastic common AR(1) coefficient for all panels Estimated covariances = Estimated autocorrelations = Estimated coefficients = 122 (0.5326) Number of obs Number of groups Time periods Wald chi2(8) Prob > chi2 = = = = = 610 122 60.24 0.0000 -tq | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | 0333527 0185924 1.79 0.073 -.0030878 0697931 board | -.0022301 0080955 -0.28 0.783 -.018097 0136367 inside | -.0420359 0612494 -0.69 0.493 -.1620825 0780107 none | 047801 0429528 1.11 0.266 -.0363849 1319868 owner | 0816319 0207624 3.93 0.000 0409384 1223254 lnsize | 1095986 0275748 3.97 0.000 0555529 1636443 lnage | -.0007906 024182 -0.03 0.974 -.0481865 0466053 debt | 1401807 0547398 2.56 0.010 0328926 2474687 _cons | -.5511762 3143606 -1.75 0.080 -1.167312 0649593 Mơ hình bi n ASSETS: assets ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt, panel (het) corr(ar1) Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression Coefficients: Panels: Correlation: generalized least squares heteroskedastic common AR(1) coefficient for all panels Estimated covariances = Estimated autocorrelations = Estimated coefficients = 122 (0.7725) Number of obs Number of groups Time periods Wald chi2(8) Prob > chi2 = = = = = 610 122 189.16 0.0000 -assets | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | 0452619 0412273 1.10 0.272 -.0355422 126066 board | 0208119 013865 1.50 0.133 -.0063631 0479869 inside | 134765 1994007 0.68 0.499 -.2560531 5255832 none | -.2373555 0891469 -2.66 0.008 -.4120801 -.0626309 owner | 1850049 0538615 3.43 0.001 0794384 2905715 lnsize | -.7316599 0675896 -10.83 0.000 -.8641331 -.5991866 lnage | 0388236 0567261 0.68 0.494 -.0723575 1500048 debt | -.2289549 1239243 -1.85 0.065 -.4718421 0139324 _cons | 9.763276 7873422 12.40 0.000 8.220113 11.30644 Ph l c 5: K t qu ch y h i quy GMM - kh c ph c m khuy i t i sinh Mơ hình bi n TQ: xtabond2 tq ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt,gmm(tq ceo lnsize lnage debt,lag(4 4)) iv( board inside none owner) robust twostep Favoring speed over space To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor space, perm Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM -Group variable: ck Number of obs = 610 Time variable : year Number of groups = 122 Number of instruments = 15 Obs per group: = Wald chi2(8) = 17.03 avg = 5.00 Prob > chi2 = 0.030 max = -| Corrected tq | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | -.5834995 5141762 -1.13 0.256 -1.591266 4242673 board | 0971303 0537095 1.81 0.071 -.0081383 2023989 inside | 9607988 6123581 1.57 0.117 -.239401 2.160999 none | -.4940013 3524901 -1.40 0.161 -1.184869 1968666 owner | 299234 14187 2.11 0.035 0211739 5772941 lnsize | -1.5229 5423414 -2.81 0.005 -2.585869 -.45993 lnage | 3531399 4150664 0.85 0.395 -.4603753 1.166655 debt | 2.773801 1.708707 1.62 0.105 -.575203 6.122806 _cons | 16.72168 5.351254 3.12 0.002 6.233418 27.20995 -Instruments for first differences equation Standard D.(board inside none owner) GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L4.(tq ceo lnsize lnage debt) Instruments for levels equation Standard board inside none owner _cons GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) DL3.(tq ceo lnsize lnage debt) -Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.82 Pr > z = 0.069 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -3.42 Pr > z = 0.001 -Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(6) = 7.41 Prob > chi2 = 0.284 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(6) = 6.27 Prob > chi2 = 0.393 (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: GMM instruments for levels Hansen test excluding group: chi2(1) = 0.58 Prob > Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 5.70 Prob > iv(board inside none owner) Hansen test excluding group: chi2(2) = 0.07 Prob > Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4) = 6.21 Prob > chi2 = chi2 = 0.448 0.337 chi2 = chi2 = 0.967 0.184 Mơ hình bi n ASSETS: xtabond2 assets ceo board inside none owner lnsize lnage debt,gmm(assets ceo board owner lnsize lnage debt,lag(1 1))iv(inside none) robust twostep Favoring speed over space To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor space, perm Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM -Group variable: ck Number of obs = 610 Time variable : year Number of groups = 122 Number of instruments = 59 Obs per group: = Wald chi2(8) = 11.97 avg = 5.00 Prob > chi2 = 0.152 max = | Corrected assets | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval] -+ -ceo | 1311932 185439 0.71 0.479 -.2322605 494647 board | -.1677314 0968763 -1.73 0.083 -.3576054 0221426 inside | 2.17274 1.194197 1.82 0.069 -.1678427 4.513324 none | -.4763182 3892213 -1.22 0.221 -1.239178 2865414 owner | 1.329984 5014952 2.65 0.008 3470714 2.312896 lnsize | -1.387898 4928948 -2.82 0.005 -2.353954 -.4218419 lnage | 2653843 1646707 1.61 0.107 -.0573642 5881329 debt | 4917548 8456569 0.58 0.561 -1.165702 2.149212 _cons | 17.33909 5.685972 3.05 0.002 6.194793 28.48339 -Instruments for first differences equation Standard D.(inside none) GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L.(assets ceo board owner lnsize lnage debt) Instruments for levels equation Standard inside none _cons GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.(assets ceo board owner lnsize lnage debt) -Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.68 Pr > z = 0.007 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -1.44 Pr > z = 0.150 -Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(50) =1178.24 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(50) = 54.37 Prob > chi2 = 0.312 (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: GMM instruments for levels Hansen test excluding group: chi2(22) = 24.50 Prob > Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(28) = 29.86 Prob > iv(inside none) Hansen test excluding group: chi2(48) = 52.86 Prob > Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2) = 1.50 Prob > chi2 = chi2 = 0.321 0.370 chi2 = chi2 = 0.292 0.471 Ph l c 6: Danh sách công ty niêm y t sàn HOSE m u nghiên c u Mã Tên Công Ty 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Khoán ABT ACL AGF ALP ANV ASP BBC BHS BMC BMP BT6 CDC CII CLC CNT COM DCL DCT DHA DHG DIC DMC DPM DPR DQC DRC DTT DXV FMC FPT GIL Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công Ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Bibica Beton - Hoá An FPT 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 GMC GTA HAI HAP HAS HAX HBC HLA HMC HPG HRC HSG HSI HT1 ICF IMP KDC KHP KMR KSH L10 LAF LBM LCG LGC LSS MCP MPC NAV NSC OPC PAC PAN PET PGC Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công Ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công Ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Hacisco Cao su Hịa Bình Mirae LILAMA 10 LICOGI 16 - Xuyên Thái Bình Gas Petrolimex 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 PIT PJT PNC PPC PVT RAL RIC SAM SAV SBT SC5 SFC SFI SGT SMC SSC ST8 SVI TAC TBC TCM TCR TMS TNA TNC TPC TRA TRC TS4 TSC TTF TTP TYA UIC VHC Công ty Công Ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công Ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Bourbon Tây Ninh Siêu Thanh Bao bì Biên Hịa - Traphaco Cao su Tây Ninh - 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 VHG VID VIP VIS VNA VNE VNM VNS VPK VSC VSH VTB VTO HAG HDC KBC KHA NTL SZL TDH VIC Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty - Hàn Sơng Hinh Viettronics Tân Bình Hồng Anh Gia Lai -CTCP Công ty Công ty Công ty Công ty Ngu n: http://www.hsx.vn/ Sonadezi Long Thành - Công ty ... tài I QUAN H GI A S KIÊM U HÀNH V I GIÁ TR DOANH NGHI P VÀ CHI I DI N C A CÁC CÔNG TY VI 1.2 c làm lu t nghi p M c tiêu nghiên c u: Xem xét m ng c a s kiêm nhi n giá tr th i di n c a Công ty niêm... chuy u hành sang b t kiêm nhi ng i t c u trúc kiêm nhi m Giám u hành, có m t vài cơng ty c l i (Wei- Chen , Lin Yi , 2008) V i s bùng n c a v bê b i l n t i công ty c a M , v kiêm nhi nhi c quan. .. công ty giao d ch th ng ch ng khoán M t s kiêm nhi c y quan h chi u c a u hành giá tr doanh nghi t ch c u hành danh ti ng quy n s h u qu n lý K t qu cho th y r ng công ty nên cân nh c gi a chi phí