encyclopedia of philosophy

Table of Contents: choose a letter ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ ● Timeline ● Philosophy Text Collection ● Key Words James Fieser, Ph.D., general editor Bradley Dowden, Ph.D., assistant general editor [Call for Submissions][IEP Editors][About the IEP] © 1998 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/ [4/21/2000 8:35:21 AM] Search A A Priori❍ Abortion❍ Academy❍ Active Powers❍ Aenesidemus❍ Affection❍ Anarchism❍ Anaxagoras❍ Anaxarchus❍ Anaximander❍ Anaximenes❍ Animal Rights❍ Anselm❍ Antisthenes❍ Applied Ethics❍ Apprehension❍ Aquinas, Thomas❍ Aristotle❍ Aristotle on Motion and its Place in Nature❍ Artificial Intelligence❍ Augustine❍ © 1998 A Index (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/ [4/21/2000 8:35:25 AM] A Priori "A priori" is a term used to identify a type of knowledge which is obtained independently of experience. A proposition is known a priori if when judged true or false one does not refer to experience. "A priorism" is a philosophical position maintaining that our minds gain knowledge independently of experience through innate ideas or mental faculties. The term a priori is distinguished from a posteriori, which means knowledge gained through the senses and experience. These are the two most common ways in which philosophers argue that humans acquire knowledge. For Aristotle, "a priori" referred to something which was prior to something else. By "prior" he meant that some thing's existence was caused by the existence of another. Aristotle argued that to have knowledge of a prior thing, then, was to have knowledge of a causal relationship. He argued that we can establish a causal relationship between things through syllogistic logic. Descartes used the term "a priori" in his quest for the foundation of all knowledge. For Descartes, knowledge of our own existence was a priori because (a) denying it leads to a contradiction, and (b) we do not need to rely on our experiences to ponder our existence. Kant believed that a priori truths could be found in the two areas; mathematics and the categories which organize the material of experience and science. Kant divided a priori truths into two categories: the synthetic and the analytic. Traditionally, mathematical propositions were seen as both analytic and a priori. Kant, however, classifies both mathematics and the categories as synthetic a priori. Math is synthetic a priori because it depends on the pure intuitions of the elements of time and space. Kant argued time and space were central intuitions to mathematical knowledge, and were thus the reasons for his grouping mathematical truths in the synthetic a priori. Our categories are identified as synthetic a priori because denying them does not lead to a contradiction. On the other hand, these categories are central to experience. Kant used the example of causality, in the "Second Analogy" of the Critique of Pure Reason, to demonstrate that the concept of an "event" having a "cause" must be connected before we can give apply either notion. This connection can only be a synthetic one, since it is not tautological. IEP © 1996 A Priori (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/apriori.htm [4/21/2000 8:35:27 AM] Abortion MAIN ETHICAL ISSUES. The applied ethical issue of abortion involves a consideration of the reasons for or against terminating the life of a fetus. Much has been written on the issue of abortion both in the popular press and in the philosophical literature. The debate focuses on two distinct issues: (1) whether a human fetus has a right to life, and, if so, (2) whether the rights of the mother ever override the fetus's right. Often the issues are discussed independently of each other. Discussion of the first issue, regarding a fetus's right to life, usually draws on the concept of moral personhood. A being is a morally significant person when it is a rights holder, and we are under moral obligation to that being. For example, I am a morally significant person and am entitled to the right to life, which others have a moral duty to acknowledge. The problem for moral theorists is to establish a criterion that explains why I am a morally significant person, and a fly or a worm is not a morally significant person. Some religious philosophers suggest that we are morally significant persons at the moment of conception. Nonreligious criteria include, when we first take the human form (in the fourth month of pregnancy), when our organs become differentiated, and when the fetus can survive outside the womb (both around the seventh month of pregnancy). Some philosophers suggest more general criteria such as when a being is self-aware or rational. These criteria are not exhibited until an infant is one or two years old. The criterion of personhood selected has decisive implications on the morality of abortion. If personhood is conferred on a being at the moment of conception, then, all things considered, aborting a fetus is immoral. On the other hand, if we select a criterion such as self-awareness, then, all things considered, aborting a fetus is not immoral. The challenge is in providing reasons in support of one criterion over another. But even if we all could agree on a criterion of personhood, such as the moment of conception, the abortion debate would not be over. For, questions arise about whether the mother's right of self-determination overrides the rights of the fetus. It is the mother's body that is affected by the pregnancy, and it is her emotional and social life that will be drastically altered for at least the next nine months and beyond. These factors carry at least some weight. Other potentially overriding factors complicate the rights of the fetus, such as whether the pregnancy resulted from rape, or contraception failure. Arguments are required from both camps to establish the relative weight of these factors. Historically, attitudes about abortion and the moral status of a fetus have fluctuated. Aristotle endorses abortion when writing that "when couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation" (Politics, 7:16). The Hippocratic Oath states "Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure abortion." The Jewish Talmud, compiled around 600 CE, holds that "an embryo is a limb of its mother" [Hulin 58a] and for the first forty days after conception, the embryo is "simply water" [Yevamot 69b]. A fetus's life is of equal importance to Abortion (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/abortion.htm (1 of 5) [4/21/2000 8:35:32 AM] that of the mother's only "once its head has emerged (from her body)"[Mishna Oholot 7:6]. Medieval theologians address the question of the moral status of a fetus by examining whether the fetus has a human soul. Aquinas held that the fetus only gradually acquires a human soul, and in the early stages of pregnancy is not technically human. The basis for Aquinas's view is a position called hylomorphism, that is, that the human soul can only exist in a distinctly human body. For example, a wooden chair cannot have a human soul. God, then, does not implant the human soul in a fetus until it that fetus takes a distinctly human form. Aquinas believed that this happened at about 40 days for males and 80 days for females. Scholars speculate that the difference was based on the point at which male and female sex organs could be observed in miscarriages. The implication is that one does not kill a human by aborting a fetus prior to the point at which it obtains a soul. In the selection below, Aquinas describes the process by which a fetus acquires a distinctly human soul. Following Aristotle's tripartite division of the soul, Aquinas argues that the fetus first has only the vegetative soul, which allows it to take in nutrition. For Aquinas, the fetus gets this directly from the father's semen, which follows the natural mechanism by which life produces more life. Next, the fetus develops a sensitive soul, which allows it to have sensations. Finally, though a special act of creation, God implants the intellectual soul in the fetus, which supercedes and perfects the previous two souls. The intellectual soul is what makes the fetus human. During the Renaissance and modern period of philosophy, philosophers did not discuss the topic of abortion in detail. However, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John Locke implies that it "is part of the worship of God, not to kill another man; not to know more women than one; not to procure abortion; not to expose their children; not" (Essay, 1:2:19). MARQUIS'S CRITIQUE OF ABORTION. In one of the most influential contemporary critiques of abortion,"Why Abortion is Immoral" (1989), University of Kansas philosophy professor Don Marquis argues that killing in general is wrong because it deprives an individual of a future which contains value. Most abortions, therefore, are fundamentally immoral since they deprive fetuses of a future containing value. Marquis addresses only the first of the above two issues, and concludes that a human fetus has a right to life at the moment of conception. Marquis begins by noting the pitfalls of both the traditional pro-life and pro-choice arguments on this issue. Pro-life arguments begin noting facts, such as the fact that fetuses look like babies and already have their complete genetic codes. As supportive arguments they note that it is wrong in principle to kill a human being. The problem, Marquis argues, is that it is not clear that a fetus qualifies as a human being (as opposed to a mere human growth, such as a cluster of cancer cells). By contrast, typical pro-choice arguments begin with facts, such as the fact that fetuses are not rational or social creatures. As supportive arguments they note that, in principle, it is wrong to kill only rational and morally significant persons. The problem here, Marquis argues, is that infants are also nonrational, thus, in principle, killing infants would be permissible on this view. Both pro-life and pro-choice arguments flounder since they appeal to biological and psychological criteria of moral personhood. Marquis attempts to bypass this problem by isolating the specific criterion which makes all killing wrong. In general, killing is wrong because it deprives a being of its future. For example, I recognize that Jones will have a future similar to my own, containing experiences of great value. To deprive Jones of this is immoral. Marquis believes that the success of his theory hinges on whether his account of wrongful killing fits our intuitions, and whether it is superior to rival accounts of wrongful killing. In support of his criterion, he argues that killing generally is believed to be among the worst crimes Abortion (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/abortion.htm (2 of 5) [4/21/2000 8:35:32 AM] since it deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other crime. Also, people dying of AIDS or cancer report that their main tragedy is being deprived of a future. He notes four points as further evidence that his criterion is consistent with our intuitions. First, unlike many pro-life criteria, his criterion applies not only to human life, but to theoretically possible extra-terrestrial life as well. Second, in keeping with the intuitions of some animal rights advocates, his criterion may apply to higher animals. Third, in keeping with the intuitions of defenders of mercy-killing, his criterion does not rule out euthanasia. Finally, unlike many pro-choice criteria, his criterion makes infanticide wrong. Having established his general criterion of wrongful killing, Marquis concludes that abortion is clearly wrong since it deprives a fetus of a value-filled future (which would be a future similar to our own). He cautions that his argument establishes only the prima facie wrongness of abortion, thereby allowing that there may be overriding circumstances. Marquis again notes that his criterion of wrongful killing will succeed only if rival criteria fail. Turning to the rival criteria, he begins by criticizing a view he calls the desire account: killing is wrong since it deprives us of our desire to live. For Marquis, this criterion fails since it implies that it is permissible to kill people who lost their desire to live. Also, this criteria fails to recognize that the goodness of life rests in our valuable experiences, not in the desire itself. He also finds problems with a view he calls the discontinuation account: killing is wrong since it discontinues the experiences of the victim. This criterion fails, though, since if Jones's life right now is bad (although his future will be good), then killing Jones right now would be permissible. Critics of Marquis might argue that it is not enough for the fetus to merely have a value-filled future. It must have an interest in its future before it can have a right to it. For example, some might argue that the fetus must be able to value its future. Marquis responds that this condition fails since it would make it permissible to kill someone in despair who no longer valued her life. Michael Tooley has suggested that a being must have the capacity to care about its continued existence. Marquis argues that, even when we are unconscious and unable to care about anything, we still retain certain rights. Finally, Marquis addresses a possible counter-example which the issue of contraception might pose to his criterion. For, if killing is wrong because it deprives a future, then contraception would also be wrong since it deprives a future. This counter example fails, though, since it would be arbitrary to select a single victim from among an egg and millions of sperm. THOMSON'S DEFENSE OF ABORTION. In "A Defense of Abortion," Massachusetts Institute of Technology philosophy professor Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that, even if we grant that fetuses have a fundamental right to life, in many cases the rights of the mother override the rights of a fetus. Accordingly, abortions are permissible in cases of rape, life-threatening pregnancies, and contraception failure. For the sake of argument, Thomson grants the initial contention made by Marquis and others that the fetus has a right to life at the moment of conception, even though she does not personally believe that a fetus has rights. She comments that, for critics this is all that is needed to establish the immorality of abortion. However, Thomson explains, it is not self-evident that the fetus's right to life will always outweigh the mother's right to self-determination. She makes her point with the following illustration. Imagine that you wake up one morning and find that you have been kidnapped, taken to a hospital, and a famous violist has been attached to your circulatory system. You are told that the violinist was ill and, in an emergency decision, you were selected to be the host because only you had the compatible blood-type. The violinist will recover in nine months, but will die if disconnected from you before then. Clearly, Thomson argues, you are not morally required to continue being the host. This, she believes, parallels the situation of Abortion (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/abortion.htm (3 of 5) [4/21/2000 8:35:32 AM] pregnancy by rape, and situations where the mother has to spend nine months in bed. Thomson next examines an extreme anti-abortion view which maintains that abortion is impermissible even to save the mother's life. The rationale behind this view is that the child is innocent, and killing the child would be active; on the other hand, letting the mother die would be passive. Thomson criticizes that additional premises are needed to get to the conclusion that killing the child is murder; but when formulated, such premises are not universally acceptable. For example, it is an overstatement to say that directly killing an innocent person is always and absolutely impermissible. She concludes that abortion is justified if the mother's life is in danger. She then criticizes a modified extreme view: abortion is permissible to save the mother's life, but a third party cannot perform the abortion, since the third party must be impartial. Thomson criticizes that impartiality here is an illusion since the mother owns her body, and thus has first rights; a particular bystander may not feel justified in intervening, but some authority will be justified in performing the abortion. Thomson continues by examining the notion of the right to life, and what it implies. Some have suggested that the right to life is the right to be given the bare minimum of what one needs for continued existence. She replies that if I need "the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow" to survive, I have no right to that. Some have also suggested that the right to life means that one has the right not to be killed. This is inadequate, though, since frequently dilemmas arise when one innocent life must be selected over another. Finally, she suggests that the right to life means that one has the right not to be killed unjustly. Thus, if abortion is wrong, it needs to be shown that it is unjust killing. In cases of rape and where the mother's life is in danger, this cannot be shown. Regarding abortion in non-life threatening and non-rape cases, the critic argues that when a woman voluntarily has sex, and accidentally gets pregnant, she is partially responsible; and this partial responsibility gives the fetus a right to her body. Thomson replies that if reasonable contraception precautions are taken, then the woman does not give the fetus a right to her body. Thus, abortion will be wrong only in those cases where pregnancy is intentional. Returning to rape cases, Thomson notes that the fetus's right to life would not be any stronger if the pregnancy lasted only one hour. Although the mother would be callous for not bringing the pregnancy to term, she would still be in her rights. She concludes by noting the unfair demands that society places on women by making them bring unintentional pregnancies to term. In no other area of social conduct are people required to be such good Samaritans. It will not help the critic to argue that the mother has a special responsibility which issues from her role as a mother. For Thomson, a person does not have a special responsibility unless it has been assumed by that person. BIBLIOGRAPHY Robert M. Baird, ed., The Ethics of Abortion (Prometheus, 1989). ❍ Jane English, "Abortion and the Concept of a Person"❍ Joel Feinberg, The Problem of Abortion (Wadsworth, 1984).❍ R.D. Goldstein, Mother-Love and Abortion (University of California Press, 1988).❍ B.W. Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion (Beacon Press, 1983). ❍ J.C. Mohr, Abortion in America (Oxford University Press, 1978).❍ Abortion (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/abortion.htm (4 of 5) [4/21/2000 8:35:32 AM] John T. Noonan Jr., The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives (1970).❍ L.W. Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton University Press, 1981).❍ Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford University Press, 1983).❍ Mary Anne Warren, "The Abortion Issue"❍ IEP © 1996 Abortion (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/abortion.htm (5 of 5) [4/21/2000 8:35:32 AM] The Academy Philosophical institution founded by Plato, which advocated skepticism in succeeding generations. The Academy (Academia was originally a public garden or grove in the suburbs of Athens, about six stadia from the city, named from Academus or Hecademus, who left it to the citizens for gymnastics (Paus. i. 29). It was surrounded with a wall by Hipparchus, adorned with statues, temples, and sepulchres of illustrious men; planted with olive and plane trees, and watered by the Cephisus. The olive-trees, according to Athenian fables, were reared from layers taken from the sacred olive in the Erechtheum, and afforded the oil given as a prize to victors at the Panathenean festival. The Academy suffered severely during the siege of Athens by Sylla, many trees being cut down to supply timber for machines of war.Few retreats could be more favorable to philosophy and the Muses. Within this enclosure Plato possessed, as part of his patrimony, a small garden, in which he opened a school for the reception of those inclined to attend his instructions. Hence arose the Academic sect, and hence the term Academy has descended to our times. The name Academia is frequently used in philosophical writings, especially in Cicero, as indicative of the Academic sect. Sextus Empiricus enumerates five divisions of the followers of Plato. He makes Plato founder of the first Academy, Aresilaus of the second, Carneades of the third, Philo and Charmides of the fourth, Antiochus of the fifth. Cicero recognizes only two Academies, the Old and the New, and makes the latter commence as above with Arcesilaus. In enumerating those of the old Academy, he begins, not with Plato, but Democritus, and gives them in the following order: Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Socrates, Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, and Crantor. In the New, or Younger, he mentions Arcesilaus, Lacydes, Evander, Hegesinus, Carneades, Clitomachus, and Philo (Acad. Quaest. iv. 5). If we follow the distinction laid down by Diogenes, and alluded to above, the Old Academy will consist of those followers of Plato who taught the doctrine of their master without mixture or corruption; the Middle will embrace those who, by certain innovations in the manner of philosophizing, in some measure receded from the Platonic system without entirely deserting it; while the New will begin with those who relinquished the more questionable tenets of Arcesilaus, and restored, in come measure, the declining reputation of the Platonic school. Views of the New Academy. The New Academy begins with Carnades (i.e. the Third Academy for Diogenes) and was largely skeptical in its teachings. They denied the possibility of aiming at absolute truth or at any certain criterion of truth. Carneades argued that if there were any such criterion it must exist in reason or sensation or conception; but as reason depends on conception and this in turn on sensation, and as we have no means of deciding whether our sensations really correspond to the objects that produce them, the basis of all knowledge is always uncertain. Hence, all that we can attain to is a high degree of probability, which we must accept as the nearest possible approximation to the truth. The New Academy teaching represents the spirit The Academy (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/academy.htm (1 of 2) [4/21/2000 8:35:34 AM] of an age when religion was decaying, and philosophy itself, losing its earnest and serious spirit, was becoming merely a vehicle for rhetoric and dialectical ingenuity. Cicero's speculative philosophy was in the main in accord with the teachings of Carneades, looking rather to the probable (illud probabile) than to certain truth (see his Academica). © 1996 The Academy (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/academy.htm (2 of 2) [4/21/2000 8:35:34 AM] [...]... (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Anarchism Anarchism as a doctrine of political philosophy maintains that every form of government is harmful, and that the individual should be absolutely free to act as he things proper Godwin's Political Justice (1793) is the first modern expression of this view insofar as the ultimate goal of political progress is "the dissolution of political government, of that... (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) the secular spirit of the Ionians, and it is quite conceivable that his immediate circle may have offended the religious susceptibilities of old-fashioned Athenians by ridiculing ceremonies which were still sacred in their eyes IEP © 1996 http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/anaxagor.htm (3 of 3) [4/21/2000 8:35:45 AM] Anaxarchus (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) ... notion of moral responsibility is a distinctly human notion, and therefore is not found in animal societies (in spite of superficial similarities) There is, then, no room for the notion of animal rights IEP © 1996 http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/animalri.htm (3 of 3) [4/21/2000 8:35:55 AM] Anselm of Canterbury (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) LIFE The father of medieval... the life and death of Christ; in the other theories, the satisfaction is threefold in http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/anselm.htm (2 of 3) [4/21/2000 8:35:58 AM] Anselm of Canterbury (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) the expression of the divine good-will, through the life and death of Christ, in the initial response of sinners to forgiving grace, and in the final bringing of all souls to perfect... Thomas Aquinas (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) LIFE The birth-year of Thomas Aquinas is commonly given as 1227, but he was probably born early in 1225 at his father's castle of Roccasecea (75 m e.s.e of Rome) in Neapolitan territory He died at the monastery of Fossanova, one mile from Sonnino (64 m s.e of Rome), Mar 7, 1274 His father was Count Landulf of an old high-born... From the point of view of the first cause all is unchangeable; although from the limited point of view of the secondary cause miracles may be spoken of In his doctrine of the Trinity Thomas starts from the Augustinian system Since God has only the functions of thinking and willing, only two processiones can be asserted from the Father But these establish definite relations of the persons of the Trinity... perennial spring of the vices of mankind (Bk 5, Ch 24, end) The growth of modern anarchism may be dated from the writings of Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), particularly his principal work, The Philosophy of Misery (1846 Himself a laborer, Proudhon expressed the misery of his class which, foreshadowing communism, he attributed to capitalist competition and monopoly No satisfactory state of things was... one world are not cut off from one another with a hatchet' (fr 8) Empedocles had made each of these four opposites a 'root' by itself; each of the 'seeds' of Anaxagoras contains them all In this way he thought he could explain nutrition and growth; for it is clear that the product of a number of 'seeds' might present quite a different proportion of the opposites than any one of them if they were taken... the habits of the school, which, to the more refined Athenians, appeared those of dogs rather than of men Towards the close of his life, the gloomy cast increased to such a degree as to become troublesome to his friends, and the object of ridicule to his enemies He lived to the age of seventy Antisthenes wrote many books, of which none are extant except two declamations under the names of Ajax and... http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/appliede.htm (2 of 3) [4/21/2000 8:36:04 AM] Applied Ethics (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) When examining both sides of the iss ue, the parents and the courts concluded that the arguments against surgery were stronger than the arguments for surgery First, foregoing surgery appeared to be in the best interests of the infant given the poor quality of life it would endure Second, t he status of Baby Doe's . of this view insofar as the ultimate goal of political progress is "the dissolution of political government, of that brute engine, which has been the only perennial spring of the vices of. survived. IEP Anaximander (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/anaximan.htm (1 of 2) [4/21/2000 8:35:49 AM] © 1996 Anaximander (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/anaximan.htm. spirit The Academy (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/academy.htm (1 of 2) [4/21/2000 8:35:34 AM] of an age when religion was decaying, and philosophy itself, losing