Ảnh hưởng của kế hoạch thuế đến giá trị doanh nghiệp trường hợp các doanh nghiệp phi tài chính niêm yết tại việt nam

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING STATE BANK OF VIETNAM BANKING UNIVERSITY OF HO CHI MINH CITY VU THI ANH THU IMPACT OF TAX PLANNING ON FIRM VALUE: VIETNAMESE NON-FINANCIAL LISTED FIRMS SUMMARY OF PH.D THESIS HO CHI MINH CITY - JANUARY 2022 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING STATE BANK OF VIETNAM BANKING UNIVERSITY OF HO CHI MINH CITY VU THI ANH THU IMPACT OF TAX PLANNING ON FIRM VALUE: VIETNAMESE NON-FINANCIAL LISTED FIRMS SUMMARY OF PH.D THESIS Major: Finance – Banking Code: 9.34.02.01 Supervisors: Associate Prof Dr DOAN THANH HA Dr LE HOANG VINH HO CHI MINH CITY – JANUARY 2022 Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Research context Tax planning (TP) involves legal, strategic activities to get tax benefits expected to create value-adding for firms Tax planning aims to optimize taxes from reductions, relaxations, exemptions, and deferral Thus, TP can bring benefits that positively affect the firm value and owners' wealth Tax planning is a pivotal part of financial planning because tax expenses are recorded, generally not paid in exchange for a specific thing, and directly impact a firm's profits From the perspective of stewardship theory, financial managers make every effort to save expenditures to bring more profits for firms and thus to increase firm value (FV) There is a variety of prior research on the impact of TP on FV that results are not consistent, consist of TP positively/negatively affects FV or TP does not impact FV In other words, TP in different contexts impacts or does not impact FV; significantly, this relationship depends on a firm's managerial characteristics Desai & Dharmapala (2009) is the first study suggesting researchers moderate corporate governance representative by institutional investors' ownership on the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value However, Desai & Dharmapala (2009) and previous studies only base the traditional principal agency theory to explain the effect of TP on FV, but the principal-principal or the trade-off of state shareholder between tax revenue or stock price increase The Vietnamese Government plays a vital role in listed firms, shareholders, tax policymakers, and collectors How does it impact the association between TP and FV of Vietnamese non-financial listed companies? This research topic has not been done yet, even in Vietnam Thus, the Thesis will study the extent to which TP impacts FV in the case of Vietnamese non-financial listed companies Does TP affect Vietnamese non-financial listed firm value? How does state ownership moderate this association? Is state ownership level a new variable explaining the context to which TP affects FV? The Thesis extends this topic by explaining state ownership that moderates the effect of TP on FV based on the principal-principal agency theory, the stewardship theory, and other related theories Significantly, the lack of consensus relating to the objective of the Vietnam Government between tax revenue and stock price increase Therefore, the Thesis on "The impact of tax planning on firm value: Vietnamese non-financial listed firms." makes both theoretical and empirical contributions 1.2 Research objectives 1.2.1 General objectives The general objective of the research is to suggest tax planning based on estimating the impact of TP on FV for Vietnamese non-financial listed firms 1.2.2 Specific objectives - To estimate the impact of TP on FV for Vietnamese non-financial listed firms - To estimate the moderation of state ownership on the association between TP and FV for Vietnamese non-financial listed firms - To suggest and recommend valuable TP for non-financial listed firms when Vietnam Government does or does not moderate the relationship between TP and FV 1.3 Research questions Firstly, does tax planning affect Vietnamese non-financial listed firms' value? If the answer is yes, how does TP impact FV? Secondly, does state ownership moderate the impact of TP on Vietnamese non-financial listed firms' value? If the answer is yes, how does it moderate this relationship? Thirdly, is the tax planning of Vietnamese non-financial listed firms with or without the moderation of state ownership more valuable? How is the level of state ownership significant for tax planning's value-adding? 1.4 Object and scope of the study 1.4.1 Research object I research the impact of non-financial firms' value 1.4.2 Scope of the study About time: The longevity is five years, from 2015 to 2019 About space: The research is limited to 513 non-financial firms listed in Hanoi/Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange 1.5 Research data and methodology 1.5.1 Research data The research is mainly based on secondary data collected from annual audited financial statements and statistic data of state ownership in firms supplied by FiinPro Group 1.5.2 Research methodology I apply quality and quantity methodology to attain the research objectives (Creswell, 2018) 1.6 Theoretical, empirical, and new contributions The research results significantly contribute to theoretical, empirical, and new evidence Theoretical evidence The first is about the theory The Thesis has significant results such as: (i) The agency theory can explain both positively/negatively impact of TP on FV (ii) The stewardship theory indicates the mechanism to manage state capital in non-financial listed firms effectively The second is about methodology The research results are robust due to the combination of numerous methods, such as data visualizing to examine the research context, purposive sampling for the new content analysis of the moderation of state-controlled ownership in the relationship between TP and FV, and regression analysis for quantitative research answers Besides, the Thesis also indicates that the effective tax rate of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles is a suitable measurement for evaluating TP State ownership generally is a measurement of managerial qualification of listed state-owned firms and state ownership It can reflex the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders or between state shareholders and other shareholders, even state shareholders themselves The third is about the Thesis's empirical results The Thesis clarifies the moderation of state-controlled ownership strengthens the association between TP and FV In the context of Vietnam, the Thesis indicates that state ownership is a proxy implicating not only the agency-principal problem, The Government's aim in joint-stock companies in general, but political advantages of state ownership of non-financial listed companies Empirical evidence The Thesis results are helpful for investors, managers, and related bureaus It is notable that reducing the effective tax rate increases firm value for investors The stock price of state-controlled firms can increase before a divestment; however, the trade-off for tax revenue objectives may lead state- owned companies to take more risks and affect firm performance in the long run For managers, The Thesis is empirical evidence that confirms the benefit of investing in TP; optimal tax objective follows the SAVANT framework of Karayan & Swenson (2007) and concentrates on the benefits from the increase in capital intensive, firm size, but reduce debts because of the tax shield The Thesis is academic evidence for the Vietnam Ministry of Finance to increase listed firms' tax information for bureaus State capital management agencies only take the role of financial investors; thus, they have to authorize state-owned firms to independently contribute to promoting initiative, creativity, and self-responsibility in the business of listed companies For researchers, the Thesis supplements and expands more studies about the impact of TP on FV that are still little in Vietnam The Thesis also suggests researchers measure TP by GAAP effective tax rate State ownership can measure managers-principals conflicts/consistences of interest, principals-principals conflicts of interest, and state shareholders themselves when trading off between tax revenue and stock price increase Besides, the Thesis also suggests the difference between tax planning practice and tax policy probably leads firms to take more risks New contributions The Thesis has three new contributions: Firstly, the Thesis supplements and extends more than prior studies on TP's impact on FV from the case of Vietnam non-financial listed companies Compared to previous related research and the review of Wilde & Wilson (2018), the Thesis has new information on the moderating of state ownership to the relationship between TP and FV State-controlled rights will help firms exploit TP, and contrarily non-state-controlled ownership will lessen the value of TP This result is not consistent with Bradshaw et al (2019) Bradshaw et al (2019) provide state-controlled rights to avoid tax lesser, specifically local state-controlled ownership Besides, these authors also indicate that tax avoidance relates to the majority stockholders-minority shareholders' conflicts of interests State shareholders' focus on tax revenue affects the stock price increase of the minority Secondly, the Thesis suggests extending the modern agency theory to explain TP's impact on FV The Thesis provides that there needs to supplement the content of the agency theory: (i) In the short term, state shareholders come into conflicts with themselves (ii) There are statecontrolled shareholders- the minority conflicts of interests in the long run About this new point, the results of TP affecting FV differ from a variety of prior research, particularly Bradshaw et al (2019) on SOEs of China between 1999 and 2012 In the context of Vietnam from 2015 to 2019, SOEs are deeply intervened by the Government Besides, the institutional environment which is not strong enough can cause risks Therefore, suggesting to extend the modern agency theory is not only new but also fills the gap on the lack of theoretical basis to explain the consequences of TP, according to suggestions of Wilde and Wilson (2018) The second contribution will explain why SOEs can exploit TP better to generate firm value in the short term Still, the Government has to maintain tax revenue in the long run Thirdly, the research claims that there needs to combine pairs of opposing theories to construct the theoretical framework fully as the agency theory-the stewardship theory, the helping hand theory-the grabbing hand theory, the political power theory-the political cost theory Thus, the Thesis suggests applying the stewardship theory to solve problems in state capital management in state-owned companies The Government should take financial investors' role and not intervene in firms' governance to control and adjust The empowering management mechanism will harmonize the interests between shareholders and managers; maximizing corporate value is the common goal 1.7 Structure The Thesis is structured into five chapters As follows: Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Theoretical basis and empirical Research Chapter 3: Research model and methodology Chapter 4: Research results and Discussion Chapter 5: Conclusion and suggestion, recommendation Chapter 2: THEORETICAL BASIS AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 2.1 The overview of tax planning, state ownership, and firm value 2.1.1 Tax planning 2.1.1.1 Definition of tax planning The Thesis displays the definition of tax planning as legal, strategic activities to get tax benefit that is expected to create value-adding for firms Tax planning is not simply a plan, it is more general strategic, and its objective is to optimize taxes legally Tax planning is different from tax avoidance because tax avoidance is only a part of tax planning, its consequence 2.1.1.2 Benefits & costs of tax planning 2.1.1.3 Measurements of tax planning 2.1.1.4 Approaches of tax planning • Scholes & Wolfson (1992): Tax planning consists of taxes, related parties, and costs • Karayan & Swenson (2007): The Krayan & Swenson (2007) SAVANT framework is easy to apply According to the author's observation, many tax advisory companies base this framework to advise tax planning Thus, in addition to Scholes et al (1992), the Thesis is primarily based on the SAVANT to discuss and suggest related tax planning in Vietnam in Chapter of this Thesis 2.1.2 State ownership State ownership is tested to directly affect firm value and moderate the impact of TP on FV, particularly in a conversion economy like Vietnam 2.1.3 Firm value Corporate management effectiveness, consisting of tax planning activities, measured by firm value as the market value or Tobin's Q 2.2 Theoretical basis of various effects of tax planning on firm value and moderating role of state ownership 2.2.1 Agency theory 2.2.2 Stewardship theory 2.2.3 Helping hand and grabbing hand theories 2.2.4 Political costs and political power theories 2.2.5 Discussion on theories explaining effects of tax planning on firm value and moderating role of state ownership 2.2.5.1 Effects of tax planning on firm value 2.2.5.2 Effects of tax planning on firm value moderated by state ownership 2.2.5.3 Theoretical framework for Research on effects of tax planning on firm value and the moderating role of state ownership The effects are concluded for four research objectives of the Thesis as follow: (i) Based on the stewardship theory, tax planning positively affects the firm value of 513 non-financial listed firms 11 The review and discussion on prior studies indicate that it is not immediately pointable the direction of the association between TP and FV Thus, there needs to have more studies that supplement and expand knowledge of this issue due to each research context, particularly estimating the moderating role of managerial characteristics based on the full theoretical basis Regarding the theoretical basis, previously published research is mainly based on interest conflicts between managers and shareholders to explain the effect of ownership structure, board characteristics, or profit management causing agency cost that affects the relationship between TP and FV However, there are interest conflicts between the main shareholders and the minority State-controlled owners come into conflict with themselves They have to trade-off between tax revenue or stock price increase; thus can significantly accelerate or decelerate managerial decisions, including tax planning, and finally affect firm value Above all, that was never discovered in previously published research Chapter 3: RESEARCH MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 3.1 Research procedure 3.2 Research model 3.2.1 The overview of the research model Based on the above theoritical framework and literature review, the two model of the Thesis are as follow: (1) FVi,t = β0 + β1 * TPi,t + β2 * SOWNi,t + β3 * CAPINTi,t + β4 * LEVi,t + β5 * SIZEi,t + εi,t (2) FVi,t = β0 + β1.TPi,t + β2.SOWNi,t + β3.(TP.SOWN)i,t + β4.CAPINTi,t + β5.LEVi,t + β6.SIZEi,t + εi,t Where: 12 - FV is the dependent variable measured firm value - TP is the independent variable measured firm value - SOWN is the control variable measured state ownership - TP.SOWN is the moderator between SOWN and TP to analyze the moderating role of state ownership on the effect of TP on FV - CAPINT is the control variable measured capital intensive - LEV is the control variable measured financial leverage - SIZE is the control variable measured firm value - β0 is the intercept - β is the respectively regressive coefficient of the independent variable, moderator, and control variables - i and t are respectively firms and years -  is the error term 3.2.2 Describing the variables and hypothesis development 3.2.2.1 Describing the variables 3.2.2.2 HypoThesis development The hypotheses are expected answers for the Thesis, as follow: H1: Tax planning positively affects firm value, meaning that tax planning measured by GAAP effective tax rate (abbreviated to ETR) negatively impacts firm value; thus, the lesser the ETR, the higher the firm value H2a: Generally, state ownership negatively affects the relationship between TP and FV, meaning that state ownership weakens this association 13 H2b: State-controlled ownership positively affects the relationship between TP and FV, meaning that state ownership strengthens this association when the state has controlled rights H2c: Non-state-controlled ownership negatively affects the relationship between TP and FV, meaning that state ownership weakens this association when the state has controlled rights H3: The tax planning of state-controlled firms is more suitable than that of non-state-controlled firms; in detail, the tax planning of state-controlled ownership enhances value to firms 3.3 Research sample and research data 3.3.1 Research sample Based on firms listed in HOSE and HNX and to meet the consistency of the research data, 513 non-financial listed firms were chosen and classified as state-controlled or non-state-controlled firms 3.3.2 Research data The data is the panel, having a longevity of years, from 2015 to 2019, supplied by FinnGroup Joint-stock Company 3.4 Research methodology The study combines qualitative and quantitative research methods to make it more robust 3.4.1 Qualitative method (i) To synthesize, analyze and conclude to construct the theoretical framework and the research gap (ii) To identify the background and discuss to build the research model, explain variables, and state theoretical hypotheses 14 (iii) Purposive sampling helps the Thesis estimate and test TP's effect on FV and clarify the impact of state ownership on this relationship (iv) To discuss the research results, conclusion, suggestions, and recommendations related to research questions 3.4.2 Quantitative Research Quantitative research methods applied to estimate the outcomes for answering the first and second questions are descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and panel data regression Chapter 4: RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 4.1 Descriptive statistics 4.2 Correlation Analysis 4.2.1 Correlation matrix 4.2.2 Correlation chart analysis There are several conclusions from graphing analysis as follows: (i) Tax planning (measured by GAAP ETR) harms firm value for the entire sample, state-controlled firms, and no-state-controlled firms (ii) The results of tax planning of the entire sample and subsamples show that the values of tax planning fluctuate during the research period, indicating that firms not follow their optimal tax objectives (iii) State ownership is a moderate variable to the relation between TP and FV 4.3 Regression analysis 4.3.1 Regression Analysis of Model 4.3.1.1 Regression Results of POLS, FEM, and REM 15 Figure 4.3 Regression Outputs of POLS, FEM, and REM - Model Pooled OLS FEM REM Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob TP -0.0689 0.1286 -0.0022 0.8350 -0.0040 0.7106 SOWN 0.2490*** 0.0000 -0.0419 0.1232 -0.0184 0.4839 CAPINT 0.2598*** 0.0000 0.1147*** 0.0032 0.1493*** 0.0001 LEV -0.3996*** 0.0000 0.2679*** 0.0000 0.2051*** 0.0000 SIZE 0.1120*** 0.0000 -0.2281*** 0.0000 -0.1469*** 0.0000 C 0.4689*** 0.0000 2.2249*** 0.0000 1.7689*** 0.0000 Notes: *** indicate significance at 1% Source: Calculated from research data 4.3.1.2 Selection of regression results These Redundant Fixed Effects, Breusch-Pagan, and Hausman test results respectively show FEM is more suitable than Pooled OLS, REM is better than Pooled OLS, REM is not better than FEM As a result, FEM is the most relevant to identifying the effects of TP on FV 4.3.1.3 Violating test The Thesis is robust by testing more regression violations, including autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and heteroskedasticity The test results show that heteroskedasticity exists 16 4.3.1.4 Detecting and Correcting Violations The research uses Generalized Least Squares regression to correct heteroscedasticity The Thesis is robust by the regression results of Group (state-controlled firms) and Group (non-state-controlled firms) Table 4.9 Empirical results of GLS-Model The entire sample Group Group Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob TP -0.0502*** 0.0000 -0.0718*** 0.0000 -0.0196* 0.0564 SOWN 0.1899*** 0.0000 -0.1219*** 0.0000 0.7940*** 0.0000 CAPINT 0.2336*** 0.0000 0.0799*** 0.0000 0.3225*** 0.0000 LEV -0.2874*** 0.0000 -0.4663*** 0.0000 -0.3157*** 0.0000 SIZE 0.0894*** 0.0000 0.0934*** 0.0000 0.1462*** 0.0000 C 0.5354*** 0.0000 0.7929*** 0.0000 0.1474*** 0.0000 Variables R2 = 0.4116 R2 = 0.6703 R2 = 0.6332 Notes: ***, * indicate significance at 1% and 10%, respectively Source: Calculated from research data Figure 4.9 proposes the GLS regression results of the entire sample; Group and Group support H1 on the positive effect of tax planning on firm value Besides, the impacts of control variables are significant, in which SOWN variable has a negative effect in Group but a positive effect in Group and the entire sample The coefficients of CAPINT and SIZE of Group are the lowest; however, the coefficient of LEV of Group is the biggest 17 4.3.2 Regression Analysis of Model 4.3.2.1 Regression Outputs of POLS, FEM, and REM Figure 4.10 Regression Outputs of POLS, FEM, and REM - Model Pooled OLS FEM REM Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficients Prob Coefficient Prob TP -0.0473 0.5465 -0.0097 0.6188 -0.0146 0.4528 SOWN 0.2582*** 0.0000 -0.0449 0.1084 -0.0227 0.4021 TP*SOWN -0.0456 0.7353 0.0150 0.6462 0.0214 0.5124 CAPINT 0.2610*** 0.0000 0.1152*** 0.0031 0.1498*** 0.0001 LEV -0.4002*** 0.0000 0.2677*** 0.0000 0.2049*** 0.0000 SIZE 0.1121*** 0.0000 -0.2276*** 0.0000 -0.1465*** 0.0000 C 0.4642*** 0.0000 2.2233*** 0.0000 1.7679*** 0.0000 Notes: *** indicates significance at 1% Source: Calculated from research data 4.3.2.2 Selection of regression results The results of tests show FEM is the most suitable compared to REM and Pooled OLS 4.3.2.3 Violating test The violating test results show that heteroskedasticity exists 4.3.2.4 Detecting and Correcting Violations 18 Figure 4.15 Empirical results of GLS-Model The entire sample Group Group Coefficient Prob Coefficients Prob Coefficient Prob TP -0.0311** 0.0203 -0.5096*** 0.0003 -0.0179** 0.0161 SOWN 0.2099*** 0.0000 -0.2539*** 0.0000 0.8827*** 0.0000 TP*SOWN -0.0911* 0.0547 0.6501*** 0.0021 -0.4741*** 0.0024 CAPINT 0.2342*** 0.0000 0.0811*** 0.0000 0.3158*** 0.0000 LEV -0.2865*** 0.0000 -0.4633*** 0.0000 -0.3159*** 0.0000 SIZE 0.0895*** 0.0000 0.0942*** 0.0000 0.1492*** 0.0000 C 0.5304*** 0.0000 0.8758*** 0.0000 0.1296*** 0.0000 Variables R2 = 0.4138 R2 = 0.7059 R2 = 0.6482 Notes: ***,**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively Source: Calculated from research data Figure 4.15 indicates the GLS regression results of the entire sample, Group and Group in Model support H1 on the positive effect of tax planning on firm value The largest coefficient of tax planning variable belongs to Group and conversely with Group State-controlled ownership strengthens the relation between TP and FV in Group 1; however, it weakens it in Group and the entire sample The effects of other control variables remain much change compared to the regression results of Model 4.4 Discussion 19 4.4.1 Effects of tax planning on firm value The regression results of Model and Model are consistent with the graphing analysis in Section 4.2.2 of the Thesis They also show the positive effect of TP on FV for the entire sample, Group and Group 2, and H is also supported; thereby, TP results in a reduction of ETR and increase in FV of Vietnamese non-financial listed companies from 2015 to 2019 The direction of the effect does not change due to state-controlled ownership The research results align with various prior studies on TP's benefits measured by ETR contributes to increasing FV (measured by Tobin's Q) (Khaoula et al., 2015; Assidi et al., 2016; Ji et al., 2018; Lestari & Wardhani, 2015; Tang, 2017) The consensus results of Model and Model on the positive effect of TP on FV are consistent with the stewardship theory of the same goal between managers and owners makes tax decisions optimal and creates value-adding for firms 4.4.2 Moderating of state ownership on effects of tax planning on firm value The moderating role of state ownership on the effects of tax planning on firm value depends on the state-controlled right or not The research results of the entire sample and Group propose the negative moderating of state ownership to the association between TP and FV, meaning that the participation of the Government as a shareholder facilitates transferring more resources from the enterprise to the state budget through tax instruments As a result, the H2a and H2c hypotheses of state ownership weakening the relationship between TP and FV are supported 20 The combination of the agency theory, the grabbing hand theory, and political power theory explain non-state-controlled ownership negatively affects the association between TP and FV In more detail, the firm value may decrease because of the rise in tax expense, tax compliance costs, or negative wealth transfer for more extensive and profitable companies Above all, the Thesis's results align with Nguyen & Phan (2017) that the bigger the state ownership is, the lesser a firm avoids tax In this case, shareholders reluctantly accept benefits from state ownership The research results of Group reveal that state ownership positively moderates the positive effect between TP and FV, meaning that statecontrolled shareholders facilitate state-controlled firms to benefit a valuable TP Thus, H2b on state ownership strengthens the positive impact of TP on FV for several reasons Firstly, the agency theory and stewardship theory explicate state collectivization inspires managers to obtain their tax planning objectives quickly Secondly, based on the helping hand theory, statecollectivized firms can exploit tax activities through tax procedure smoothing, tax compliance, tax-exempt land use rights, having information regarding future tax policy changes, and licenses for tax preferential investment projects In all, these tax advantages add more value for firms Thirdly, the political power theory advocates that large-size firms benefit from tax-reducing to raise earnings after tax and positively affect FV The Thesis results support H2a, H2b, and H2c The regress outcomes of Model answer that the higher the state ownership is, the easier the consensus on shareholders' interests is and manipulate firms' political power to decrease tax expenses to enhance FV The outcomes are also in line with graphing analysis and clearly explain the association between tax planning 21 and firm value for the total sample, Group and Group Finally, H is also supported because the tax planning of state-controlled firms is better than that of non-state controlled; state controlling ownership strengthens the effect of TP on FV and versa 4.4.3 Effects of other variables on firm value The regress outcomes of control variables of Model and Model show more detailed characteristics of TP of 513 firms in the entire sample, as well as Group and Group State ownership differently affects firm value in both Model and Model 2, positive impact in the entire sample and Group 2, and adverse effect in Group The magnitude of SOWN's coefficient in Model is larger and largest in Group In other words, when state ownership is under 50% of a firm's right and smaller, firm value rises Conversely, the firm value decreases when state ownership is 50% and larger Group does not focus on capital investment effectiveness in firms; however, the tax planning of Group1 is more valuable due to tax optimal Among control variables, CAPINT and SIZE positively affect firm value, but LEV negatively does; their magnitudes are not much different between the outcomes of model and model but significantly defer among the whole sample, Group and Group The outcomes of the two models show that the coefficients of the capital intensive and firm size of Group are smaller than those of Group and smallest among the three samples However, the coefficient of LEV of Group is the highest, during the LEV' s of the whole sample is smallest In other words, SOEs finance more by debts However, the negative impact of 22 financial leverage on firm value implies that firms take more risks from debt financing for investment decisions (Le et al., 2019; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2020) Besides, the coefficient of the capital intensive is somewhat lower than that of Group 2, which means investment in tangible fixed assets is lower, and tax benefits from these assets are more down Overall, the research results of the impact of CAPINT, SIZE, and LEV are consistent with the political power theory, the agency theory, the tax planning based on SAVAT of Karayan & Swenson (2007), and a variety of prior research (Assidi et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2020, and Dharwardkar et al., 2000) Chapter 5: CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION, RECOMMENDATION 5.1 Conclusion The objectives of the Thesis are archived, expending the content of effects of tax planning on firm value, in which clarifying in the context of Vietnam tax planning increases the firm value, and the impact more strongly obtains for state-controlled companies Conversely, the lesser the state owns equity, the weaker the effect is 5.2 Suggestion and recommendation 5.2.1 For investors • Investors should evaluate tax planning before investing because tax planning creates value-adding for shareholders Investors can determine the value-adding of TP through GAAP effective tax rate • The tax planning of state-controlled companies is more valuable than that of non-state-controlled firms 23 • Investors should not hold stocks of state-controlled firms for a long time because the stock price can violently fluctuate before and right after state divestment In the long run, high managerial qualifications will be advantageous to implement effective tax planning, leading to a steady rise in firm value and stock price (Cai & Liu, 2009; Santana & Rezende, 2016) • The indicators to evaluate tax planning's value-adding are GAAP ETR, deferred tax, capital intensive, firm size, and financial leverage 5.2.2 For managers • Listed companies should be active in deciding tax activities based firm's specific characteristics and follow the theoretical framework of tax planning of Scholes et al (1992) and Karayan & Swenson (2007) • To prefer tax benefits from increasing capital intensive, firm size, and to limit tax benefits from tax shield • To claim responsibility for tax management aligning with the firm's general financial planning and public tax information to protect shareholders' rights • Firms should not depend on retaining the state ownership rate to promote the firm value from tax planning in the long run They can use their resources and experiences to create tax benefits • Firms should invest in mixed tax planning based on the SAVANT of Karayan & Swenson (2007) due to matching a firm's strategy brings more tax benefits to increase the firm value of Vietnamese listed firms 5.2.3 For related bureaus 5.2.3.1 For The Ministry of Finance 24 • To regulate to public more tax information • To issue more regulations on managers' responsibility on the consequences of tax planning • To supplement more rules on investor protection relating to tax planning • The General Department of Taxation has to strengthen monitoring tax compliance • State Securities Commission of Vietnam strengthens tax due diligence and strictly handles tax violations 5.2.3.2 For state capital management agencies • The second is to apply the stewardship theory to solve problems in state capital management in state-owned companies; specifically, the Government takes the role of financial investors and does not intervene in firms' governance to control and adjust The empowering management mechanism will harmonize the interests between shareholders and managers; maximizing corporate value is the common goal • The Government should take financial investors' role rather than intervene in firms' governance to control and adjust • To apply the empowering management mechanism, matching the stewardship theory in objective consensus between managers and shareholders • Do not trade-off tax revenue with the stock price increase in the long run 5.2.4 For academic researchers 25 • To address empirical research on the positive effect of tax planning on firm value • To suggest applying these following indicators: (i) GAAP ETR to measure a firm's general tax planning (ii) State-controlled ownership in listed firms to evaluate the conflicts/consensus of interest between managers and shareholders • To propose the difference in tax planning practices and tax policy to detect risks affecting the firm's tax planning, which may cause hazards to shareholders 5.3 Limitation and future research 5.3.1 Limitation • Do not use Bayes's method to indicate the probability happing the positive effect of tax planning on firm value • Do not analyze the impact of state-controlled ownership on the association of tax planning on firm value based on the governmental or local state capital management agencies • The longitude of data is only five years • Do not analyze the impact of the industry 5.3.2 Future Research • Should use Bayes's method • Should examine the effect of industry and the moderating role of governmental or local state shareholders ... been done yet, even in Vietnam Thus, the Thesis will study the extent to which TP impacts FV in the case of Vietnamese non-financial listed companies Does TP affect Vietnamese non-financial listed... increase The Vietnamese Government plays a vital role in listed firms, shareholders, tax policymakers, and collectors How does it impact the association between TP and FV of Vietnamese non-financial...MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING STATE BANK OF VIETNAM BANKING UNIVERSITY OF HO CHI MINH CITY VU THI ANH THU IMPACT OF TAX PLANNING ON FIRM VALUE: VIETNAMESE NON-FINANCIAL LISTED FIRMS SUMMARY OF PH.D