tiểu luận tổ chức ngành the vietnam telecommunications sector

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tiểu luận tổ chức ngành the vietnam telecommunications sector

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Contents ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION LITERATURE REVIEW THEORICAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 Structure, conduct, performance model 2.2 Market share .7 2.3 Concentration measures 10 2.4 Barriers to entry 11 DVESCREPTIVE ANALYSIS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET IN VIETNAM .13 3.1 General situation .13 3.2 Structure of telecommunication market 14 3.2.1 Fixed-line telephone services .15 3.2.2 Mobile phone services 16 3.2.3 3G services 18 3.2.4 Broadband Internet services .19 3.3 The policies of telecommunications market in Vietnam 20 3.3.1 Telecom regulator .21 3.3.2 Interconnection 22 3.3.3 Pricing 23 3.3.4 Cross ownership 24 3.3.5 Competition issues .25 3.3.6 Barriers to entry 26 Concentration measures of telecommunications market 30 4.1 Data analysis techniques 30 4.2 Market share of some big corporation 31 4.2.1 The whole telecommunication market .31 4.2.2 Wired Telecommunications market (61100) .33 4.2.3 Wireless telecommunication (61200) 34 4.2.4 Satellite telecommunication (61300) 35 4.2.5 Internet access (61901) 35 4.2.6 Other telecommunications service (61909) 36 4.3 4.3.1 Concentration ratio of the whole market: 38 4.3.2 Concentration ratio of wired telecommunication market 38 4.3.3 Concentration ratio of wireless telecommunication market .38 4.3.4 Concentration ratio of satellite telecommunication market 39 4.3.5 Concentration ratio of Internet access market 39 4.3.6 Concentration ratio of other service market .39 4.3.7 Summary 40 4.4 Concentration ratios 38 Evaluation about the concentration of market 40 4.4.1 For the whole market 40 4.4.2 For the wired telecommunication market 41 4.4.3 For wireless telecommunication 41 4.4.4 For satellite telecommunication 41 4.4.5 For the Internet access market 41 4.4.6 For other service market .41 Structure – Conduct – Performance regression 43 5.1 The SCP model for Vietnam telecommunications enterprises 43 5.2 Methodology .43 5.3 Data 44 5.4 Statistical description 45 5.5 Regression results .47 5.5.1 Testing the existence of multicollinearity 47 5.5.2 Testing the existence of heteroskedasticity 50 5.5.3 Correcting the model 51 5.5.4 Regression result and the meaning of regression coefficients 53 5.5.5 Testing the Significance of Regression Coefficients 54 5.5.6 Testing the suitability of the model 56 FURTHER ANALYSIS ABOUT TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET .57 6.1 Policy and institutional recommendations 57 6.2 Solution to improve the competitiveness of Vietnamese telecommunications industry 57 6.2.1 Investing in R&D activities to develop technology 57 6.2.2 Improve the quality of resources in the Telecommunications industry .58 CONCLUSION REMARKS 59 REFFERENCES 60 APPENDIX (LOG FILE) .61 ABSTRACT In this report, we include an empirical research about structure, conduct and performance in telecommunications markets in Vietnam We review the literature by focusing on the links between theoretical and empirical research This report considers basic conditions, variables of market structure, conduct and performance and public policies in the telecommunication industry We conduct this research on the basis of theorical framework on industrial organization and regression model in order to analyze the structure and competitiveness of telecommunication sector in Vietnam INTRODUCTION The telecommunications industry has always played an important role and contributed to Vietnam’s GDP, at the same time providing essential facilities for daily life needs Therefore, the structural transformation and division of the industry's concentration level has a direct impact on the benefits consumers and other industries The recent years marked the great improvement of the Telecommunications industry in terms of strong response to the development of science and technology and telecommunications trends of the world in order to provide high quality services to meet consumers’ needs When analyzing the operation of a telecommunications industry as well as economic sectors in general, market share, market concentration and related indicators plays an important role in the process These indicators will be useful tools for policy makers to ensure consumers’ benefits Therefore, quantifying these indicators in to easily calculated variables which are independent of market size is very important for the process of building firms’ strategies Recognizing the importance of the telecommunications industry in the economic sector as well as human’s life, our group decided to conduct this research, analyze the indicators, levels of concentration of telecommunication enterprises through the report “The Vietnam telecommunications sector” In the process of making this essay, it is inevitable that we may make some mistakes We are looking forward to receiving comments from the course’s lecturers so that we can complete our research LITERATURE REVIEW The relationship between firm behavior and market structure has been a central focus of study in the field of industrial organization (IO) Historically, the discipline's emphasis on firm behavior and market structure is, to a large extent, influenced by the work of a group of economists at Harvard in the 1930s The SCP paradigm became the dominant framework for empirical work in IO between the early 1950s until the early 1980s Its influence only began to wane in the 1980s with the emergence of game theoretical analysis of oligopolistic markets - an approach labeled as the `New Industrial Organization' (NIO) There have been a large number of empirical researches in the literature examining the SCP hypothesis for various countries in the world However empirical works in this literature for Vietnamese firms are still scared, in particular telecommunications industry This paper shed lights on this meaningful literature The origin of the SCP paradigm can be traced to the work of the Harvard economist Edward Mason in the 1930s The theoretical work of Mason's colleague Edward Chamberlin provided inspiration for both Mason and his student Joe Bain to study empirically how pricing and production policies of firms are determined Mason (1939)’s (p.63) starting point was that market share is important in determining production and pricing policy of a firm Mason argued that empirical analysis is essential to ensure that the theories of firm are useful This is because theories are based on mathematical constructs such as demand and cost functions which are not ascertainable (in Mason's words, p.64) Thus, it is not that theories are not important; rather their relevance cannot be determined without empirical observations This leads to the question of the set of empirical observations that are useful Interestingly, Mason argued that the price and production decisions of a firm are influenced by both the internal organization of the firm and market structure Mason challenge for future empirical-policy work was subsequently taken-up by his Ph.D student, Joe S Bain Despite being inspired by the work of Mason, the research methodologies of the master and his student were a bit different Bain used industry-level data - an approach which Mason was a bit skeptical of In contrast, Mason was more in favor of case studies involving specific firms or industries It was Bain's work which proved to be more influential in charting the course of empirical IO after the 1930s THEORICAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 Structure, conduct, performance model The structure–conduct–performance (SCP) paradigm,first published by economists Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson in 1933, and developed by Joe S Bain is a model in Industrial Organization Economics which offers a causal theoretical explanation for firm performance through economic conduct on incomplete markets The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm comprises of three major elements: Structure refers to market structure The variables that are used to describe market structure include seller concentration, degree of product differentiation and barriers of entry Conduct refers to a firm's behavior The variables used to capture firm behavior include pricing strategies, collusion, advertising, research and development and capacity investment Some have interpreted conduct as whether firms collude or compete Performance refers to outcome or equilibrium assessed in terms of allocative efficiency The variables mostly used to measure performance are profitability and pricecost margin The SCP paradigm posits specific causal relationships between market structure, conduct and performance In particular, market structure determines conduct and conduct in turn determines performance: Structure → Conduct → Performance The SCP approach assumes that there is a stable, causal relationship between the structure of an industry, firm conduct, and market performance Since this relationship is assumed to be stable, a direct link between the two sets of more easily observed variables, structure and performance, is usually assumed The basic idea is to establish relationships between structural variables and market performance that generalize, or hold, across industries The typical SCP exercise consists of specifying a measure of market performance and a set of observable structural variables that are thought to explain interindustry differences in market performance The aspect of market performance that has attracted almost exclusive interest is the exercise of market power The structural variables have typically been measures of seller concentration and barriers to entry The typical SCP study involves estimating the following equation: πi = α + β1CONC + β2B.Ei1 + β3B.Ei2 +···+ βN+1B.EIn + where πi is a measure of market power in industry i, CONC is a measure of seller concentration in industry i, and the B.Ei’s are measures of the N barriers to entry in industry i Econometric techniques are used to estimate the coefficients on the structural variables (the betas, β’s) The interpretation of each of the betas is the effect on market power from marginal changes in each of the structural variables For instance, β1 is the increase in market power associated with a small increase in concentration (however measured) in an industry The a priori SCP hypothesis is that each should be positive and statistically different from zero 2.2 Market share Market share is the proportion of a particular business in the total consumption or output of a market Market share data are used to calculate the concentration of sellers in a market Market share = sales of firm / total market sales or Market share = Number of products sold by the firm / Total market consumption products Besides, we also consider relative market share: Relative market share = Firm’s sales share / Competitor's sales share or Relative market share = Number of products sold by firm / Product number sold by its competitor  If the market share is relatively larger than 1, then the competitive advantage belongs to the business  If the relative market share is less than 1, then the competitive advantage belongs to the competitor  If the market share is relatively equal to 1, then the competitive advantage of the business and its competitors are the same Investors and analysts monitor the increase and decrease of market share very carefully, because this can be a sign of the relative competitiveness of the company's products or services When the total market for a product or service increases, a company that maintains its market share will increase revenue at the same rate and speed as the total market A company that is growing its market share will increase revenue faster than its competitors REFFERENCES Bain, J (1951) Relation of Profit Rate to Concentration: American Manufacturing,1936- 1940 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65(3), 293–324 Bain, J (1954) Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries American Economic Review, 44(1), 15–39 Mason, E (1939) Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise American Economic Review, 29(1), 61–74 Mason E.S., (1949), The current state of the monopoly problem in the United States, Havard Law Review, Vol 62, pp.1265-85 Vietnam White Book 2017, 39 – 44 General Statistic Office of Vietnam, https://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx? tabid=781 Tu Thuy An, Dinh Thi Thanh Binh and Nguyen Viet Duong The StructureConduct-Performance paradigm revisited: an empirical analysis for Vietnamese firms, 2-4 Cabral, L (2000) Introduction to Industrial Organization MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Cabral, L and Mata, J (2003) On the Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution: Facts and Theory American Economic Review, 93(4), 1075–1090 APPENDIX (LOG FILE) name: log: log type: opened on: E:\stata\refer.log text Jun 2019, 15:26:43 use "E:\stata\dung.dta", clear gen sector2 = 61100 if nganh_kd ==61100 | nkd1 ==61100 | nkd2 ==61100 | nkd3 > == 61100 | nkd4 == 61100 (105 missing values generated) drop if sector2 != 61100 (105 observations deleted) gen kqc = kqkdc if nganh_kd >= 61100 & nganh_kd = 61100 & nkd1 = 61100 & nkd2 = 61100 & nkd3 = 61100 & nkd4 61909 (0 real changes made) drop if kqc == | kq1 == | kq2 == | kq3 == | kq4 == (3 observations deleted) gen kqvt = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 gen ms = kqvt/17392455*100 sort ms gen sector2 = 61100 if nganh_kd == 61100 | nkd1 == 61100 | nkd2 == 61100 | nk > d3 == 61100 | nkd4 == 61100 (105 missing values generated) drop if sector2 == (105 observations deleted) gen kqvtcd = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 gsort kqvtcd sort kqvtcd gsort kqvtcd gen ms = kqvtcd/11494447 drop ms gen ms = kqvtcd/11494447*100 gen sector2 = 61200 if nganh_kd == 61200 | nkd1 == 61200 | nkd2 == 61200 | nk > d3 == 61200 | nkd4 == 61200 (83 missing values generated) drop if sector2 == (83 observations deleted) gen kqvtkd = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 (3 missing values generated) drop if kqvtkd == (3 observations deleted) gen ms = kqvtkd/3173942*100 gsort ms gen sector2 = 61300 if nganh_kd == 61300 | nkd1 == 61300 | nkd2 == 61300 | nk > d3 == 61300 | nkd4 == 61300 (128 missing values generated) drop if sector2 == (128 observations deleted) gen sector2 = 61901 if nganh_kd == 61901 | nkd1 == 61901 | nkd2 == 61901 | nk > d3 == 61901 | nkd4 == 61901 (83 missing values generated) drop if sector2 == (83 observations deleted) gen kqvti = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 gen ms = kqvti/1411855 sort ms drop ms gen ms = kqvti/1411855*100 sort ms *(1 variable, observation pasted into data editor) gen sector2 = 61901 if nganh_kd == 61901 | nkd1 == 61901 | nkd2 == 61901 | nk > d3 == 61901 | nkd4 == 61901 (83 missing values generated) drop if sector2 == (83 observations deleted) gen kqvti = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 gen ms = kqvti/1411855*100 sort ms gen sector2 = 61909 if nganh_kd == 61909 | nkd1 == 61909 | nkd2 == 61909 | nk > d3 == 61909 | nkd4 == 61909 (117 missing values generated) gen sector2 = 61901 if nganh_kd == 61901 | nkd1 == 61901 | nkd2 == 61901 | nk > d3 == 61901 | nkd4 == 61901 (83 missing values generated) drop if sector2 == (83 observations deleted) gen kqvti = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 sort kqvti gen kqvtk = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 sort kqvtk gen ms = kqvtk/1080915 replace ms = ms*100 (12 real changes made) gen sector2 = 61909 if nganh_kd == 61909 | nkd1 == 61909 | nkd2 == 61909 | > nkd3 == 61909 | nkd4 == 61909 (117 missing values generated) drop if sector2 == (117 observations deleted) gen kqvtk = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 sort kqvtk gen ms = kqvtk/1080915 replace ms = ms*100 (12 real changes made) clear use "E:\stata\dung.dta", clear gen kqvt = kqc + kq1 + kq2 + kq3 + kq4 (3 missing values generated) gen ms = kqvt/17392455*100 (3 missing values generated) gen mssq = ms*ms (3 missing values generated) clear log close name: log: log type: E:\stata\refer.log text closed on: Jun 2019, 01:40:19 -name: log: log type: D:\INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION\Log_file.log text opened on: Jun 2019, 08:06:21 des profit si labor limited jointstock fdi storage variable name value format label type display variable label -profit double %10.0g si float %9.0g labor long %12.0g limited byte %9.0g jointstock byte %9.0g fdi byte %9.0g sum profit si labor limited jointstock fdi if sector == 61 Variable | Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max -+ -profit | 83 -19237.41 209702.1 -1562011 458297 si | 83 0120482 0367221 6.57e-08 2328168 labor | 84 310.5595 697.5443 4993 limited | 84 1904762 3950352 jointstock | 84 1309524 3393744 -+ -fdi | 84 0119048 1091089 corr profit si labor limited jointstock fdi if sector == 61 (obs=82) | profit si labor limited joints~k fdi -+ -profit | 1.0000 si | -0.1349 1.0000 labor | 0.0331 0.8448 1.0000 limited | 0.0490 -0.1050 -0.1119 1.0000 jointstock | 0.1204 -0.0136 0.0831 -0.1763 1.0000 fdi | -0.8174 0.0091 0.0579 -0.0526 -0.0414 1.0000 reg profit si limited jointstock if sector == 61 Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 82 -+ -0.96 F( 3, 78) = Model | 1.2804e+11 4.2680e+10 Prob > F = Residual | 0.0355 3.4775e+12 78 4.4584e+10 R-squared = 0.4172 -+ 0.0016 Total | 3.6056e+12 81 Adj R-squared = 4.4513e+10 Root MSE = 2.1e+05 profit | Interval] Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf + -si | -725549.9 639266.7 -1.13 0.260 -1998232 limited | 154420.7 31701.77 61641.55 0.51 0.609 -91017.13 jointstock | 226826.9 82628.74 72430.54 1.14 0.257 -61569.39 -0.90 0.371 -85186.35 547132.5 _cons | -26500.1 29478.03 32186.15 - reg profit si labor limited jointstock fdi if sector == 61 Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 82 -+ -64.60 Model | 0.0000 2.9188e+12 5.8376e+11 F( 5, Prob > F 76) = = Residual | 0.8095 6.8677e+11 76 9.0365e+09 R-squared -+ -0.7970 Total | 3.6056e+12 81 = Adj R-squared = 4.4513e+10 Root MSE = 95060 profit | Interval] Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf + -si | -3882485 543898.8 -7.14 0.000 -4965753 labor | 196.2953 28.61676 6.86 0.000 139.3001 limited | 61113.76 5740.251 27802.52 0.21 0.837 -49633.26 jointstock | 81110.49 15028.56 33179.11 0.45 0.652 -51053.36 -2799216 253.2905 fdi | -1619453 96412.53 -16.80 0.000 -1811475 _cons | -17646.6 13638.2 -1.29 0.200 -44809.42 -1427431 9516.229 - vif Variable | VIF 1/VIF -+ -labor | 3.64 0.274469 si | 3.62 0.276609 jointstock | 1.07 0.934868 limited | 1.05 0.953846 fdi | 1.02 0.984148 -+ -Mean VIF | 2.08 imtest, white White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity chi2(12) = 81.29 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test Source | chi2 df p -+ Heteroskedasticity | 81.29 12 0.0000 Skewness | 6.10 0.2964 Kurtosis | -+ Total | 18 - hettest Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of profit chi2(1) = 9.05 Prob > chi2 = 0.0026 reg profit si labor limited jointstock fdi if sector == 61, robust Linear regression 82 Number of obs = F( 4, 76) = Prob > F = R-squared = Root MSE = 0.8095 95060 | profit | Interval] Robust Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf + -si | -3882485 2156405 -1.80 0.076 -8177338 labor | 196.2953 88.98225 2.21 0.030 19.07178 limited | 34145.09 5740.251 14261.8 0.40 0.688 -22664.59 412369.1 373.5188 jointstock | 153506.9 15028.56 69528.68 0.22 0.829 -123449.8 fdi | -1619453 26356.05 -61.45 0.000 -1671946 _cons | -17646.6 8188.321 -2.16 0.034 -33955.05 -1566961 -1338.14 - reg profit si labor limited jointstock fdi if sector == 61 Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 82 -+ -64.60 F( 5, 76) = Model | 2.9188e+12 5.8376e+11 Prob > F = Residual | 0.8095 6.8677e+11 76 9.0365e+09 R-squared = 0.0000 -+ -0.7970 Total | 3.6056e+12 81 Adj R-squared = 4.4513e+10 Root MSE = 95060 profit | Interval] Coef Std Err t P>|t| [95% Conf + -si | -3882485 543898.8 -7.14 0.000 -4965753 labor | 196.2953 28.61676 6.86 0.000 139.3001 -2799216 253.2905 limited | 61113.76 5740.251 27802.52 0.21 0.837 -49633.26 jointstock | 81110.49 15028.56 33179.11 0.45 0.652 -51053.36 fdi | -1619453 96412.53 -16.80 0.000 -1811475 _cons | -17646.6 13638.2 -1.29 0.200 -44809.42 -1427431 9516.229 - log close name: log: log type: closed on: D:\INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION\Log_file.log text Jun 2019, 08:06:49 ... the market share is relatively larger than 1, then the competitive advantage belongs to the business  If the relative market share is less than 1, then the competitive advantage belongs to the. .. market 4.4.1 For the whole market According to the market share, the CR4 and CR8 and the HHI index, it could be seen thatin 2010, the concentration of the telecommunications industry as the whole was... shed lights on this meaningful literature The origin of the SCP paradigm can be traced to the work of the Harvard economist Edward Mason in the 1930s The theoretical work of Mason's colleague Edward

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Mục lục

    2.1 Structure, conduct, performance model

    3 DVESCREPTIVE ANALYSIS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET IN VIETNAM

    3.2 Structure of telecommunication market

    3.3 The policies of telecommunications market in Vietnam

    4 Concentration measures of telecommunications market

    4.2 Market share of some big corporation

    4.2.1 The whole telecommunication market

    4.3.1 Concentration ratio of the whole market:

    4.3.2 Concentration ratio of wired telecommunication market

    4.3.3 Concentration ratio of wireless telecommunication market

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