The notion of “natural kinds” has been central to contemporary discussions of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Although explicitly articulated by nineteenthcentury philosophers like Mill, Whewell, and Venn, it has a much older history dating back to Plato and Aristotle. In recent years, essentialism has been the dominant account of natural kinds among philosophers, but the essentialist view has encountered resistance, especially among naturalist metaphysicians and philosophers of science. Informed by detailed examination of classification in the natural and social sciences, this book argues against essentialism and for a naturalist account of natural kinds. By looking at case studies drawn from diverse scientific disciplines, from fluid mechanics to virology and polymer science to psychiatry, the author argues that natural kinds are nodes in causal networks. On the basis of this account, he maintains that there can be natural kinds in the social sciences as well as the natural sciences.
NATURAL CATEGORIES AND HUMAN KINDS The notion of “natural kinds” has been central to contemporary discussions of metaphysics and philosophy of science Although explicitly articulated by nineteenth-century philosophers like Mill, Whewell, and Venn, it has a much older history dating back to Plato and Aristotle In recent years, essentialism has been the dominant account of natural kinds among philosophers, but the essentialist view has encountered resistance, especially among naturalist metaphysicians and philosophers of science Informed by detailed examination of classification in the natural and social sciences, this book argues against essentialism and for a naturalist account of natural kinds By looking at case studies drawn from diverse scientific disciplines, from fluid mechanics to virology and polymer science to psychiatry, the author argues that natural kinds are nodes in causal networks On the basis of this account, he maintains that there can be natural kinds in the social sciences as well as the natural sciences mu h a m m a d a li k li d i is Associate Professor of Philosophy at York University, Toronto NATURAL CATEGORIES AND HUMAN KINDS Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences MUHAMMAD ALI KHALIDI cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 8ru, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107012745 © Muhammad Ali Khalidi 2013 This publication is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press First published 2013 Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by the MPG Books Group A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Khalidi, Muhammad Ali, Professor Natural categories and human kinds : classification in the natural and social sciences / Muhammad Ali Khalidi pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index isbn 978-1-107-01274-5 (Hardback) Categories (Philosophy) Classification I Title bd331.k43 2013 001.010 2–dc23 2012044074 isbn 978-1-107-01274-5 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate For Diane, one of a kind, and Layla, in a category by herself Contents List of figures Preface page viii ix Metaphysical Realism and essentialism about kinds The naturalness of kinds 42 Kinds in the special sciences 82 Kinds in the biological and social sciences 125 Kinds of natural kinds 166 Kinds naturalized 201 Bibliography Index 231 241 vii Figures 3.1 Crosscutting classifications of atoms by atomic number and mass number (and pattern of decay) 3.2 Crosscutting classifications of stars according to spectral type and luminosity 3.3 Crosscutting classifications of fluid samples according to chemical kinds and fluid mechanical kinds 3.4 Crosscutting classifications of persons according to psychological kinds and neural kinds 5.1 Causal relationships among some of the properties associated with the kind polymer 5.2 Causal relationships among the properties associated with the kind cancer cell viii page 116 117 118 120 174 185 236 Bibliography (1995), The Advancement of Science (Oxford University Press) (1999), “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture,” in L Harris (ed.), Racism (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books), 87–117 Kornblith, H (1993), Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) Koslicki, K (2008), “Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms,” Philosophy Compass 3/4, 789–802 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(1999), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) Wilson, R A., Barker, M J., and Brigandt, I (2009), “When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds,” Philosophical Topics 35, 189–215 Wimsatt, W C (1994/2007), “The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, Perspectives, and Causal Thickets,” in Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 193–240 Woodward, J (2003), Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford University Press) 240 Bibliography Yablo, S (1992), “Mental Causation,” Philosophical Review 101(2), 245–280 Zemach, E M (1976), “Putnam’s Theory on the Reference of Substance Terms,” Journal of Philosophy 73, 116–127 Zhang, H M (2003), “Driver Memory, Traffic Viscosity and a Viscous Vehicular Traffic Flow Model,” Transportation Research: Part B 37, 27–41 Index ADHD See attention deficit hyperactivity disorder air, 28–30, 94 alcoholism, 221 allotrope, 105 alpha particle, 170 Alzheimer’s disease, 1, 143–144, 221 American Psychiatric Association, 189 ammonia, 101 amoeba, 217 amphibian, 70 analogy (biological), 132–133, 136 ancestry, 45 common ancestor, 45, 51, 131, 136 Andreasen, Robin, 236 ant, 217 antineutrino, 1, 25 antiproton, 25 aquatic animal, 61–62, 64, 214 argon, 29, 106 Aristotle, 35, 124 Armstrong, David, 5–12, 17, 39, 209 arthropod, 133 artifact, 1, 5, 142 artificial selection, 137, 147–149 atmosphere, 30 atom, 26, 84, 114, 121, 136, 166–167, 170, 172, 213, 220, 228 atomic nucleus, 25, 38, 70, 96, 106, 114–115, 117, 122, 136, 139, 170–171, 220 atomic number, 13, 114–115, 117, 122, 141, 166, 168, 205 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 1, 188–199, 216, 225 ADHD-HI (hyperactivity-impulsivity), 190, 193, 195, 197–199, 215 ADHD-I (inattention), 190, 193 bachelor, 22 Bacon, Francis, 222 bacteria, 113 Ball, Philip, 139 Bambrough, Renford, 18 Barker, Matthew, 73 Barkley, Russell, 192 Batterman, Robert, 92 bee, 132, 138 belief revision, 15 Benditt, Theodore, 186 benzene, 128 beryllium beryllium-8, 70, 115, 171 beta-minus decay, 24, 70, 115, 167, 171 Bialystok, Ellen, 144 big bang, 105, 134, 139 bilingualism, 144 biochemistry, 82, 177, 220 biology, 4, 21, 57, 70, 74, 77, 82, 84, 125–129, 138, 158, 165–166, 189, 199–200, 207, 226–227 biological systematics, 75 biological taxon, 131 biological taxonomy, 26, 45, 130 developmental biology, 70 marine biology, 63 microbiology, 177 bird, 131, 133, 138 Bird, Alexander, 132–133 black hole, 105–106 Block, Ned, 38 Bogen, James, 147 Boltzmann’s constant, 85 boson, 39, 83, 228 Boyd, Richard, 72–73, 76–78, 80, 123, 143, 183, 200, 221 brain state, 40 bridge principle, 92 Brigandt, Ingo, 43, 73 bug, 28 butyric acid, 217 cancer, 181–188 cancer cell, 1, 181–188, 229 lung cancer, 187–188 241 242 Index carbon, 171 carbon dioxide, 182 Cargile, James, 209 Carlson, Stephanie, 192 Cartwright, Nancy, 105 cat, 132 category, 5, 227 aesthetic category, 63 artificial category, 196 common-sense category, 58 crosscutting category, 72, 115, 118, 122 disjunctive category, 91, 110, 191–192, 194, 203 evaluative category, 160, 194 folk category, 56–64 monothetic category, 184 normative category, 159, 194 polythetic category, 180, 184 projectible category, 62, 202, 214 scientific category, 11, 43, 46, 49, 55–56, 58–60, 72, 159, 197, 217, 219, 222–223 social category, 162–163, 197, 224 cation, 70, 72, 167 causation, 4, 40, 80, 92–93, 95–98, 123–124, 157, 162, 169, 198, 203–204, 208–215 causal closure, 96 causal criterion of reality, 209 causal epiphenomenalism, 40 causal exclusion argument, 95, 97, 208 causal exclusion principle, 96–98 causal history, 130–136 causal mechanism, 73–74, 77, 80, 141, 192 causal network, 174–176, 199–200, 203, 207, 212, 214, 228–229 causal overdetermination, 40, 96 causal pattern, 92, 111, 121, 123, 129, 134–135, 149, 156–158, 160, 165, 174, 176, 188, 195, 203, 210–211, 216, 218–219, 222, 227 causal power, 8, 17, 93, 96, 112, 133–135, 137, 195, 209 causal priority, 99, 204–205, 207 causal process, 77, 94, 100, 106, 108, 113–114, 120–121, 124, 127–128, 131, 139–141, 156–158, 164–165, 167, 176–177, 179–181, 184, 186, 198, 200, 207, 209, 219–222 causal relation, 39–40, 73, 78–81, 90, 92, 95, 98–99, 104, 107, 109–112, 117, 121–122, 124, 156–157, 164–165, 176, 199–200, 203–204, 207–213, 222 interventionist account of causation, 97, 204, 208 mental causation, 40, 96 simple causal theory, 78, 80, 82–83, 99, 124, 166, 201, 203, 211–212 special-science causation, 40 cell, 177–178, 180, 182–188, 226 ceteris paribus clause, 104, 107–108, 173, 212 Chakravartty, Anjan, 14, 42, 228 charge (electric), 8, 10, 20, 23, 31, 70 Chemero, Anthony, 217 chemistry, 4, 20, 57, 74, 82–83, 118, 121, 138, 166, 171, 227 chemical bond, 93, 106, 128, 170, 172, 206, 212 chemical compound, 29, 37, 67, 108, 117, 138, 140, 149, 228–229 chemical element, 13, 21, 26, 37, 138–139, 141, 166, 169, 205 chemical formula, 26–27, 90, 94 chemical reaction, 121, 138, 167–168, 212 chemical substance, 1, 27, 29–30, 94, 138, 173, 196 chemical theory, 27 ecological chemistry, 82 organic chemistry, 82 child abuse, 1, 159, 161–163, 195, 215–216, 221 child television viewer, 145–146 Clark, Andy, 217–218 classification, 200 biological classification, 61 classification of isotopes, 70 crosscutting classification, 136, 179 folk classification, 56, 60–61, 63 natural vs artificial classification (Mill), 48–49 ordinary language classification, 56 phylogenetic classification system, 179–180 scientific classification, 48, 58, 60–61, 63, 70 climate change, 225 cocktail party, 152–155 cognitive science, 125, 134, 192 concept, 202, 224 kind-concept, 15 scientific concept, 15, 45, 59 conjunction, 10 conjunction of universals, 9–11 consumption, 59, 64 convention, 154, 157, 208 Cooper, Rachel, 149, 191 copying process, 136–142, 205 corrigibility, 43, 199, 211 cosmic microwave background radiation (CMBR), 134, 217 cosmology, 134 Craik, Fergus, 144 Craver, Carl, 76, 78, 80, 123, 199, 201 Crawford, Dorothy, 177, 181 Cronbach, Lee, 203 crosscutting, 70, 116, 199, 228 crosscutting system, 70, 120, 122, 170, 176, 180 crosscutting taxonomy, 119 Index Dennett, Daniel, 121, 123, 210 deoxyribonucleic acid See DNA Devitt, Michael, 143, 149 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 189–194 discoverability by science, 13–14, 41–42, 44–55, 59, 80, 82 disease, 59, 181, 185–186 disjunction, 17–18, 33, 203 disjunction of kinds, 87 disjunction of laws, 87 DNA, 1, 37, 138–139, 149, 171–172, 177–179, 182–183 dsDNA (double-stranded DNA), 178 ssDNA (single-stranded DNA), 178 dog (Canis familiaris), 147–149, 213, 221 domain, 122, 129, 166, 199, 203, 210, 214, 219, 228–229 See also science, scientific domain domains contrasted with levels, 121, 220 Donnellan, Keith, 28 Douglas, Mary, 147 DSM See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Dupré, John, 56, 60–64, 72, 125, 219 ecological niche, 180, 218 economics, 102 economic market, 103, 155 Elder, Crawford, 97, 137 election, 151 electromagnetic radiation, 132, 134 electron, 24, 31, 36, 38–39, 70, 72, 101, 106, 115, 136, 167, 171 electron emission, 70 electron orbital, 122, 220 elementary particle, 1, 24–25, 37–40, 82, 84, 113, 117, 138, 211, 228–230 Ellis, Brian, 9, 12, 21, 37 emotion, 158–160 engine oil, 94 enzyme, 139 epidemiology, 188 epistemology, 4, 65, 216 epistemic interest, 71, 225 epistemic objectivity, 150–151 epistemic purpose, 63–64, 124, 162–164, 202, 216, 222 epistemic subjectivity, 150 equilibrium, 80, 200 Ereshefsky, Marc, 75, 77, 125, 180 essence, 12–14, 34–35, 47, 71, 76 extrinsic essence, 36 nominal essence, 47 real essence, 13, 48, 55 243 essentialism, 12–15, 17, 21, 24, 31, 34–35, 37, 41–43, 47, 71–72, 76, 158, 175, 201–202, 215 “counter-essential” statements, 24 Aristotelian essentialism, 35 folk essentialism, 76 microphysical essentialism, 40 origin essentialism, 34 ethylene, 172 etiology, 130–137, 162, 180 See also causation, causal history Euthyphro problem, 79 evolution, 141, 147, 159, 180, 218 See also natural selection convergent evolution, 131–132, 138, 140 evolutionary theory, 45, 67, 130, 132, 226 executive function, 192–194, 198 explanation, 54, 78, 92, 95, 98, 159, 197–198 causal explanation, 92, 95, 97 explanatory efficacy, 62, 163 explanatory unification, 91, 109, 111 scientific explanation, 91–92, 95 externalism (mental), 119 eye, 132–133, 135, 138 family (phylogenetic taxon), 6, 131 FAO See Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations Faraone, Stephen, 198 father, 24 Fay, Brian, 163–164 fermion, 36 financial interest, 196–197, 216 fish, 60–64 aquarium fish, 64, 214 fluid, 84, 90–91, 94, 109–111, 113, 118 See also Newtonian fluid fluid diffusion, 84–85, 89, 100, 110–111, 113–114, 118 fluid flow, 84–87, 89, 100, 106, 108–109, 111, 113, 118, 128, 173, 212 fluid mechanics, 84–121, 128 Fodor, Jerry, 84, 123 folk, 60–62, 64 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 62 Foucault, Michel, 225 fox gray fox, 131 red fox, 131 Frankfurt school, 164 Franklin, C L., 67 Franklin, F., 67 Freedman, Morris, 144 function, 139, 141, 186 normal function, 184, 186, 188 244 fundamental particle See elementary particle Furman, Lydia Mary, 197 Garson, Justin, 134 gas, 84–87, 89–90, 99–100, 102, 106, 109, 128, 138, 198 gaseous phase, 113, 173–174 noble gas, 106 gender, 226 gene, 57, 109, 177, 182 genetic material, 177–179 genetic mutation, 75, 77, 113, 181–188 genetics, 226 genome, 178 oncogene, 187 population genetics, 111–112 generalization basic-science generalization, 104–105 causal generalization, 156, 163, 178, 212 empirical generalization, 54, 100, 108, 110, 112, 123, 126, 134, 138, 140, 161, 179, 229 inductive generalization, 72 special-science generalization, 92, 99–101, 103–108 genome, 187 genotype, 73, 132, 136, 180, 182 genus, 6, 131 geology, 82, 133 giraffe, 217 gold, 28, 47, 89 Goldstein, Sam, 192–194, 199 Goodman, Nelson, 3, 14, 202 government, 221 Graham, Janice, 162 Gratzer, Walter, 173 Greene, Brian, 24 Griffiths, Paul, 34, 43, 76, 157–162 Grosberg, Alexander, 173 Guala, Francisco, 154 Gutting, Gary, 225 H2O See water Hacking, Ian, 3, 52, 144–149, 152, 155–156, 159, 161–164, 214–215, 224 hadron, 25, 35, 39 Hamilton, W D., 109 Hanahan, Douglas, 181–183 Haslam, Nick, 69 Haslanger, Sally, 147, 164, 226 Hawking, Stephen, 24 Heil, John, 7–8, 37–38 helium, 29, 106 helium-3, 139 Index helium-4, 139 helium-8, 70, 115, 171 Hendry, Robin, 67, 119, 206 Hey, Jody, 130 hierarchy thesis, 69–72 See also mutual exclusivity thesis Hitchcock, Christopher, 101 homeostasis, 73, 77, 139, 184, 200 homeostatic mechanism, 73, 75–76, 78 homeostatic property cluster account, 72–79, 123, 183 imperfect homeostasis, 73 homology, 1, 131–133, 136 Horgan, Terry, 98 Hull, David, 21 human being, 1, 24, 34, 142, 144, 148, 152, 160, 164, 186, 189, 197, 219, 221, 223–224 human genome, 187 human mind, 142, 144, 147, 152, 156, 165, 221, 227–228 Hume, David, 209 hydrogen, 9, 24, 213 hypertension, 221, 223 hysteria, 1, 59, 64, 214 ichthyology, 63 ICTV See virus, International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses imago, 77 induction, 58, 78 inductive inference, 14–15, 173, 204 innate quality space, 58 insect, 70, 72, 109 intentionality, 84, 139 intrinsicality, 12, 31–36 See also property, intrinsic property iridium, 25 isobar, 70, 115, 171 isomer, 67, 108, 117, 206 isotope, 70, 139, 141, 167–168, 205, 229 jade, 87, 89–91 jadeite See jade Karbasizadeh, Amir Eshan, 105 Kendler, Kenneth, 199 Keynes, John Maynard, 21 Khalidi, Muhammad Ali, 25, 46, 59, 70–71, 120, 146–147 Khokhlov, Alexei, 173 Kim, Jaegwon, 31, 84, 87, 90, 92–93, 95–98, 119, 126, 129, 208–209, 211 Kincaid, Harold, 107 kind, 5–7, 11, 227 artifactual kind, 5, 136, 142 Index artificial kind, 1, basic-science kind, 83, 120 biological kind, 77, 125–142, 148, 150, 157, 164, 180, 186, 195, 227 causal kind, 135–137, 154 chemical kind, 138–141, 171 cluster kind, 16, 22–23, 63, 65–66, 73–74, 184, 205, 228 cluster theory of kinds, 16 coextensive kinds, 11 common-sense kind, 58 conventional kind, 152–157 copied kind, 136–142, 148, 165, 205 crosscutting kind, 69–72, 115, 117, 176, 220 definable kind, 16 designed kind, 129 discrete kind, 65 disjunctive kind, 17–18, 89, 128, 169, 203 epistemic kind, 43, 65, 78, 117 essence kind, 227 eternal kind, 136–141, 205 etiological kind, 130–138, 165, 180, 186, 188, 200 evaluative kind, 158–164 focal member, 66, 69, 170, 176, 223 functional kind, 87, 128, 171, 187, 200 fuzzy kind, 65–69, 108, 170, 175, 177, 188, 192, 206, 214, 223–224 gerrymandered kind, 55 graded membership, 19, 66, 169–170, 177, 223 historical kind, 136–137, 148 See also kind, copied kind homeostatic property cluster kind, 74 human kind, 64, 125, 147–148, 157, 165, 195 institutional kind, 152–157 interactive kind, 145–150, 152, 155–156, 165 investigative kind, 43, 158–159 kind-concept, 15–16, 52, 224 kind membership, 7, 19–22, 66, 99, 174–175, 200 marginal member, 66, 169 mental kind, 221 microlevel kind, 37 microphysical kind, 39 microstructural kind, 87 microstructural kind, 20 mind-dependent kind, 143, 150–151, 155–156, 165, 222 monothetic kind, 16–17, 19–20, 63, 167, 177, 205 multiply realizable kind, 88, 128 neural kind, 120, 197, 221 nominal kind, non-natural kind, 5, 10, 12, 20, 24, 29–31, 42, 51 normative kind See kind, evaluative kind 245 polythetic kind, 16–21, 51, 63, 65–66, 73–74, 169, 184, 205 projectible kind, 18–19, 156–157, 160, 222 psychiatric kind, 192, 197, 199, 221 psychological kind, 120, 143, 192, 195, 221 real kind, 3, 5, 24, 26, 30, 49–50, 60 scientific kind, 24, 43, 45, 58, 71, 79–80 selected kind, 129 social kind, 125, 129–130, 140–165, 195, 221, 224–227 socially constructed kind, 224 sociological kind, 227 special-science kind, 40, 83–84, 86, 88–93, 120, 123, 126, 129, 132–133, 138, 165 stellar kind, 116 stipulative kind, 52 structural kind, 200 weighted cluster kind, 65–66, 74 weighted cluster theory, 19 Kistler, Max, 123, 209 Kitcher, Philip, 91, 202, 218, 220, 226 Kornblith, Hilary, 14, 123, 228 Kripke, Saul, 26 Ladyman, James, 38, 102, 121, 123, 210–212, 219 Langton, Rae, 33 language, natural language, 1, 58 philosophy of language, 28 LaPorte, Joseph, 26, 34, 60 larva, 1, 70, 72, 77, 207 law basic-science law, 101, 105, 107 causal law, 128–129, 156, 173, 212 exceptionless law, 101, 106 Fick’s first law of diffusion, 85, 87, 91, 99, 109–110 Galileo’s law, 105 law of mass–energy conservation, 105 law of nature, 4, 8, 33, 36–37, 39–40, 54, 87, 90, 99–109, 112, 123, 126, 136, 138, 140–142, 158, 205, 207, 213, 229 law of physics, 108 Mendel’s law, 105 Navier–Stokes equation, 89, 128 nomological necessity, 101 phenomenological law, 100 qualitative law, 100 quantitative law, 100 Schrödinger equation, 107 second law of thermodynamics, 105, 107 special-science law, 88, 92, 140 lepton, 25, 39, 82, 228 level, 112, 114, 118, 120–121, 169, 208, 211, 220 level of explanation, 105, 112 246 Index level (cont.) level of reality, 112, 203 levels contrasted with domains, 122 ultimate level of reality, 38–39, 96, 106 Lewis, David, 7, 9, 32–33, 38, 86, 214 Linnaeus, 48–49 liquid, 84–87, 89–91, 99, 103–104, 109, 128, 198, 212 List, Christian, 97 lithium, 13–14, 70–71, 114–115, 166–171, 176, 188, 212–213, 229 lithium isotopes, 167–169 lithium oxide, 72 lithium-6, 70, 114, 167–169 lithium-7, 70, 114, 136, 138, 167–169 lithium-8, 114, 171 Locke, John, 47–48, 54–55, 204, 218 Longino, Helen, 197 looping effect (Hacking), 145–150 López-García, Purificación, 180 Lowe, E J., macaque monkey, 125 magnesium magnesium oxide, 72 Mallon, Ron, 150 Mandik, Peter, 217–218 Marras, Ausonio, 97 marriage, 151, 221 mass, 8, 20 mass number, 114, 122, 167–168, 170, 205 Matthen, Mohan, 77 mechanism, 77–78 copying mechanism, 140 homeostatic mechanism in biology, 76 Medawar, Peter, 177 medicine, 158, 181, 186, 189, 223 Meehl, Paul, 203 Mellor, D H., 28 melting point, 169, 212 mental state, 40, 119, 122, 143, 223 Menzies, Peter, 97 metal, 167 metaphysical realism See Realism (uppercase R) metaphysics, 65, 124, 216 meteorite, 1, 133 meteorology, 82 methodology philosophical methodology, 3, 98 scientific methodology, 203, 222 microphysical fundamentalism, 37–40, 96, 211, 229 microstructure, 12, 26–28 See also microstructural property mild cognitive impairment, 162–163, 214, 216 Mill, John Stuart, 3, 5, 8, 47–55, 62, 65, 67–68, 71, 80–81, 158, 172, 202, 208 Miller, Richard, 164 Millikan, Ruth, 136–142, 148, 205 mind-dependence, 145–153, 155–157, 165, 221–222, 224, 227 mind-independence, 142, 165, 222, 227 Miron, Louis, 224 Mitchell, Sandra, 101, 104–105 Mlodinow, Leonard, 24 modality, 100 counterfactual possibility, 25 counterfactual statement, 24, 101 de re necessity, 24–25 first modal necessity thesis, 22–26, 34 modal necessity, 12, 21–31, 34 second modal necessity thesis, 22–23, 26–30, 34 temporal possibility, 25 mode (metaphysics), mole European mole, 131 marsupial mole, 131 molecule, 38, 57, 84–85, 87, 93–94, 113, 139, 149, 172 molecular structure, 67 monarch butterfly, 72 Monck, W H S., 67 money, 151 monomer, 171–172 Moreira, David, 180 mud, 28–30 Mukherjee, Siddhartha, 187 multiple realizability, 84, 86, 88, 92, 112, 118–120, 123, 133, 187, 198–199 Mumford, Stephen, 27 muon, 25 Murphy, Dominic, 195 mutual exclusivity thesis, 69, 71 See also hierarchy thesis Naglieri, Jack, 192–194, 199 natural law See law, law of nature natural science, natural selection, 77, 84, 113, 126–130, 132, 137, 140–141, 229 naturalism, 4, 80, 82, 98, 123–124, 201, 204, 220, 227–228 nature, 4, 20, 67, 223 necessary and sufficient conditions, 15–16, 18–22, 66, 72–73, 76, 122, 167–169, 175, 177, 184, 187, 200, 206 necessity See modality, modal necessity Needham, Paul, 119, 171 neon, 106 Index nephrite See jade neuron, 40 neuroscience, 82, 119, 134, 159, 198 neutrino, 25 electron neutrino, 115 neutron, 24, 38, 136 Newman, William, 110 Newtonian fluid, 1, 84, 86, 89–91, 99–104, 109, 118–119, 128, 138, 174, 198, 206 nitrogen, 29, 170 nothing-but argument, 38 nucleosynthesis, 139 nucleotide, 149 nuclide, 70, 106, 114–118, 121, 171, 220 See also atom, atomic nucleus objectivity, 151, 165 observer relativity, 121 Okasha, Samir, 34 ontology, 6, 84, 121, 123 ontological objectivity, 150–151 ontological subjectivity, 151 owamosk (artificial category), 30, 50, 52 oxygen, 29, 72, 128, 170 pain, 127, 129–130 Pamilo, Pekka, 110 Papineau, David, 84, 126–130, 132 pattern of decay, 115 Pauli exclusion principle, 36 Peirce, Charles Sanders, 52 periodic table, 13, 106, 166, 169 permanent resident, 1, 154–157, 208 Pettenger, Mary, 224 pharmaceutical corporations, 196–197, 216 phase of matter, 94, 113, 170, 173, 176 phenotype, 45, 61, 73, 131, 133, 136, 140, 148, 180, 195 philosophy of language, phosphorus, 50 photon, 39 physics, 4, 25, 39, 74, 82–83, 121, 138, 210, 227 astrophysics, 115–117 biophysics, 82 elementary particle physics, 82, 103, 210–211, 228–229 fundamental physics, 20, 39, 102, 210–212 geophysics, 82 nuclear physics, 114 physical theory, 35, 38, 83 quantum physics, 96, 106–107, 211, 229 solid-state physics, 82 superstring theory, 36 physiology, 181, 186, 189, 195 Pickering, Andrew, 224 247 pion, 10 placebo effect, 59 planetary science, 133 plant, 49, 53 Plato, 5–6, 209 plutonium, 213 polyethylene, 171–172, 221 polymer, 171–177, 184, 200, 206, 223 copolymer, 172 polymerization, 1, 105–106, 212 polystyrene, 1, 171 population genetics See gene possible worlds, 21–30, 34 prediction, 2, 54, 198 predictive value, 92–93, 197 pressure, 133, 217 private property, 151 projectibility, 13–14, 18–19, 54–55, 69, 76, 80, 89–90, 92, 98, 109, 123, 134, 157–159, 163, 169, 203–204 proper name, 28 property, 4–7, 11 accidental property, 14 basic-science property, 87 categorical property, causal property, 115, 128, 130, 157, 172, 174, 181, 187, 198, 222 chemical property, 70, 167 conjunctive property, conventional property, 157 determinable property, 8, 206 determinate property, 8, 206 disjunctive property, 17, 33 dispositional property, 8, 33, 170, 178, 181, 206 essential property, 12–14, 21, 33, 35–36, 48 etiological property, 131 extrinsic property, 31, 35, 131 functional property, 86–87 fundamental property, 36 higher-level property, 40, 86–87 “important” property (Mill), 48, 54, 172 inexhaustibility of properties, 49–52, 158 intrinsic property, 31–33, 35, 94, 131 lower-level property, 220 macrolevel property, 12, 220 macroproperty, 27–28, 90, 119, 128, 169–171 microphysical property, 12, 39, 47 microproperty, 29, 94, 119, 128, 169–170 microstructural property, 37–41, 87 See also microproperty modal property, 30 multiply realizable property, 198 natural property, 11, 33, 36, 214 neural property, 40 248 Index property (cont.) neuropsychological property, 167 nuclear property, 70, 167 physiological property, 188 primary property, 79, 169, 174–175, 200, 205–207, 213–214 projectible property, 44, 54, 80, 134, 204 property cluster, 9, 14, 19, 66, 74, 77, 168–169, 174, 176, 199–200, 207 psychological property, 199 secondary property, 79, 169–170, 205, 207 set of properties, 156–157, 201 special-science property, 83–84, 86, 88–89, 91–92, 123, 126, 129, 132 statistical property, 173 superficial property, 14, 44 weighted property cluster, 19, 170, 207 protein, 79, 177–179, 182 proton, 1, 7–8, 10, 20, 23–25, 28, 38–39, 70, 72, 101–102, 136, 139, 230 proton decay, 25 proton emission, 167 psychiatry, 82, 159, 189, 197–199 psychiatric condition, 198 psychiatric diagnosis, 192 psychiatric disorder, 196 psychiatrist, 191, 195 psychogeriatrics, 162 psychology, 84, 102, 119, 125, 192, 229 Putnam, Hilary, 26–28, 37 pyrite, 89 quark, 35–36, 38–39, 82, 226, 228, 230 down quark, 39 top quark, 103, 217 up quark, 9, 39 Quine, W V., 6, 56–60, 64, 218 Raatikainen, Panu, 97 raccoon, 131 raccoon dog, 131 race, 226 radioactive decay, 1, 26, 96, 115, 167, 171 radioactivity, 167, 170 radius bone, 131, 134–135 realism, 5, 42, 123, 143, 150–151, 155, 165, 204, 209, 215–220, 222 antirealism, 150, 215, 217–218, 223–224 mind-independence criterion for realism, 149 promiscuous realism, 63, 219 scientific realism, 42, 55, 64 structural realism, 210 Realism, 5, 8, 10, 12, 41–42 anti-Realism, Realist view of kinds, 11–12 Realist view of properties, 7–9, 11 recession, 152, 154–155, 221 reduction, 109 classical reduction, 87 functional reduction, 86, 93 reflective equilibrium, 3–4, 98, 202 refugee, 1, 146 representation problem of selective representation, 217–218 retrodiction, 135 revisability, 44–45, 51–52 ribonucleic acid See RNA ribosome, 178, 206 rigid designation See term, rigid designator Ritchie, Karen, 162 RNA, 177–179 mRNA (messenger RNA), 178, 206 ssRNA (single-stranded RNA), 178 rock igneous rock, 133, 135 metamorphic rock, 133 sedimentary rock, 133 roentgenium, Rorty, Richard, 215, 217 Ross, Don, 38, 84, 102, 105, 121, 123, 210–212, 219 Ruddon, Raymond, 185 Ruphy, Stephanie, 115–117 Russell, Bertrand, 21, 210 Sagan, Carl, 110 Salmon, Nathan, 27 scattering experiment, 38 Schaffer, Jonathan, 38 schizophrenia, 189 Schwartz, Stephen, 28 science, 13–14, 24, 42–44, 46, 48, 53–55, 80, 91, 98, 135, 209, 214 basic science, 12, 82–88, 100–101, 104–108, 126, 170–171, 228 immature science, 58 scientific discoverability See discoverability by science scientific domain, 103, 122–123, 227 scientific evidence, 4, 201 scientific inquiry, 15, 24, 38, 44, 51–52 scientific practice, 223 scientific progress, 55 scientific theory, 1, 4, 6, 11, 15, 24, 41–43, 45–46, 71, 79, 82, 130, 144, 199, 211 scientism, 56 scientist, 60–61, 223 special science, 82–84, 87–89, 92–93, 97–124, 129, 173, 210–212, 228–229 Searle, John, 150–154 Seidman, Steven, 224 Index semantics, 27–28 Seppä, Perttu, 110 sex, 226 Shapiro, Lawrence, 84, 88–89, 119, 126, 129 sickle cell anemia, 142 silicon, 90, 171 similarity, 7, 56, 58, 75, 172 brute similarity, innate similarity standard, 56 Simon, Herbert, 114 Slater, Matthew, 79 Smolin, Lee, 211 Soames, Scott, 12, 28 Sober, Elliott, 21, 77, 170 social constructionism, 224–227 social institution, 140, 156, 195 social science, 4, 82, 84, 125–126, 138, 157–158, 161–166, 189, 197, 199–200, 224, 226–227 critical social science, 163 social scientist, 162–163 sociolinguistics, 61 sociology, 82, 226 sociologist, 163, 226 solid, 86 Sophist (Plato), 209 species, 6, 21, 26, 34, 36–37, 62, 66, 73–78, 113, 121, 129, 131, 135, 138–141, 179–180, 229 ancestral species, 34, 77 phylogenetic species concept, 68 ring species, 68 sexual species, 140 speciation, 26, 67–68, 75, 77 species extinction, 26 spin (quantum number), 8, 10, 20 Spurrett, David, 84 star, 1, 114–117, 122, 138–139 Steinberg, Philip, 224 Sterelny, Kim, 28 Stich, Stephen, 218 Stokes–Einstein equation, 85 substrate neutrality, 84, 86 sulfur, 50, 105, 212 supervenience, 92, 95, 119, 123, 228–229 taxonomy, 179, 200 biological taxonomy, 26, 75 cladistic taxonomy, 62, 75, 130, 135 folk taxonomy, 60 phenetic taxonomy, 130, 135 phylogenetic taxonomy, 6, 68 scientific taxonomy, 60 special-science taxonomy, 88 taxonomic practice, 184, 200, 214 249 temperature, 85, 90, 93–95, 99, 104–105, 108, 118–119, 121, 127, 133, 170, 212, 217 ten-dollar bill, 151–153 term general term, 2, 27–30, 47 natural kind term, 26–30 rigid designator, 28 singular term, 28 thermodynamics, 39 thermostat, 127, 129 Thomasson, Amie, 152, 154 tick, 217 tiger, 29, 136, 140 Towry, M H., 50, 67 trope (metaphysics), truthmaker, 7–8 tuberculosis, 59, 64 Twin Earth, 26, 28–30 typological thinking, 77 Umwelt, 217 unification, 130 universal, 5–11, 41 cluster of universals, 11 conjunction of universals, universe, 31, 37, 71, 96, 101–103, 135, 139, 141, 143, 213, 217, 219 Vallentyne, Peter, 32 value-ladenness, 157–160, 186, 191 Van Valen, Leigh, 180 Venn, John, 3, 14 vertebrate, 44–45, 51, 131, 133–134, 159 virology, 177, 229 virus, 1, 177–181, 184, 188, 206–207, 213, 228 Baltimore classification system, 179 International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses, 179–180 virion, 177, 213 viscosity, 84–95, 99–100, 103–106, 108–113, 128, 173–175, 198, 212 war, 153–156 water, 26–28, 30, 88, 90–91, 94, 99–103, 108, 128, 171, 213 Weatherson, Brian, 35 weed, 28, 53 weighted cluster theory, 19 Weinberg, Robert, 181–183 Weisberg, Michael, 108, 119 Weiskopf, Daniel, 133 whale, 60–62 Whewell, William, 62, 158 Wilkerson, T.E., 12–13, 21 Williams, Neil, 186 250 Wilson, Robert A., 73, 180 Wimsatt, William, 113–114 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 18 Woodward, James, 97, 101 XYZ, 27 Index Yablo, Stephen, 97 Zachar, Peter, 199 Zemach, E M., 28 Zhang, H M., 110 zoology, 82 [...]... properties in common Having laid out the distinction between monothetic and polythetic kinds (and distinguished a subset of polythetic kinds – namely, disjunctive kinds) , we can go on to ask whether polythetic kinds can be natural kinds What grounds might essentialists give for claiming that only monothetic kinds can be natural kinds? Let us start by considering the subset of polythetic kinds that I... scientific realism (not to be confused with metaphysical Realism, discussed in Chapter 1), I give some reason for adopting a realist attitude towards natural kinds In doing so, I further clarify the relationship between natural kinds and properties and the role of causality in the proper characterization of natural kinds In defending a realist account of natural kinds, I counter the charge that natural kinds. .. those in the natural sciences and that biological and social kinds can be natural kinds as well Chapter 5 looks at several case studies drawn from a range of sciences in order to test the claims about natural kinds that I have made so far In the spirit of philosophical naturalism, I examine a number of widely accepted and controversial kinds to ascertain whether they can be considered natural kinds The. .. attempts to distinguish kinds in the natural sciences from those in the biological and social sciences Some philosophers think that biological and social kinds cannot be natural kinds for the very reason that special-science kinds generally cannot But others hold that they cannot for other reasons, the most prominent of which are explored in this chapter, and I argue in each case that they give us no... Then I counter the view that social kinds are conventional (Searle 1995); though the most conventional of kinds are not natural kinds, it is clear that many social kinds are not conventional, or not entirely so Hacking (1999, 2002) claims that human kinds can be interactive whereas natural kinds cannot, but some natural kinds also come into existence as a result of human intervention and they can interact... determined by our interests or perspective on the world Though my account of natural kinds is pluralist and does not set an upper limit on the number of natural kinds that may exist, it holds that these kinds really exist in the world It is common for philosophers to express realism about kinds in terms of the claim that kinds are human- or mind-independent, but I reject this way of grounding realism since... of the categories therein, as we shall see), but the very use of the term should not lead us to prejudge the issue At least, I want to consider it an open question and will try to determine whether the restriction of natural kinds to the natural sciences is justifiable The word natural in the term natural kind’ is more plausibly regarded as alluding to the fact that the kinds in question are 1.2 Kinds. .. for thinking that biological and social kinds cannot be natural kinds I consider the view that biological kinds are etiological kinds, individuated by causal history rather than causal powers I also examine the distinction between “eternal kinds and “copied kinds (Millikan 1999), the latter being kinds whose members resemble each other not as a matter of natural law but as a result of a copying process... nature is owing, much more than is often suspected, to the arrangement of things in natural kinds, each of them containing a large number of individuals.” More recently, Kornblith (1993, 36) writes that the existence of natural kinds, and the fact that scientists can reliably infer the presence of some properties from the presence of others, is the key to understanding and explaining the world In other words,... whether they pertain only to the basic sciences or whether they can occur in the special sciences, and so on 1.3 kinds and essences Metaphysical Realism about natural kinds is often conjoined with essentialism about kinds, even though there is no necessary connection between the two theses They are often held together because they provide answers to complementary questions (roughly, what are natural kinds,