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of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. The Twenty-fifth Amendment was proposed on July 6, 1965, and ratified on February 10, 1967. The amendment establishes the procedure for replacing the president or vice president when either office is vacant. The amendment, which was proposed in the aftermath of the assassination of President JOHN F. KENNEDY in 1963, has been used during the presidential terms of RICHARD M. NIXON, GERALD R. FORD, and RONALD REAGAN . Section 1 of the amendment states that in the event of “the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.” This section reaffirmed a precedent set by Vice President JOHN TYLER, in 1841, when President WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON died after only one month in office. Tyler rejected the concept of serving as acting president during the remaining 47 months of Harrison’s term. Instead, he an- nounced that he would assume the full duties and powers of the office and become president. Section 2 of the amendment established a new procedure for selecting a vice president if a vacancy occurs. This section was enacted in reaction to the situation after the Kennedy assassination. When Vice President LYNDON B. JOHNSON assumed the presidency on November 22, 1963, the Constitution left the office of vice president unfilled. Under the Constitution, if Johnson had died or been removed from office, his successor would have been the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who at the time was John McCormick, then in his eighties. Section 2 permits the president to choose a vice president, subject to confirmation by a majority vote of both houses of Congress. Section 2 was used twice in the 1970s in the wake of political scandals in the Nixon administration. In 1973 Gerald R. Ford became the first person chosen as vice president using this method. Nixon appointed Ford to replace Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, who resigned in the face of criminal BRIBERY charges. When Nixon resigned in August 1974 because of the WATERGATE scandal, Ford became president. Ford then appointed Nelson A. Rockefeller as vice president under the authority of Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 of the amendment deal with presidential disability. Several presidents have been temporarily disabled during their terms of office, but until the amendment, the Constitution contained no provision for the temporary replacement of a disabled president and provided no guidance as to who would have actual decision-making authority should the president become disabled. President WOODROW WILSON , for example, was seriously disabled by a stroke in 1919 and was totally incapacitated for a number of weeks. His wife, Edith, took on much of the responsibility of the office, an arrangement that aroused sharp criticism. Section 3 deals with a situation in which the president communicates in writing to Congress that he is “unable to discharge the powers and duties” of the office. The vice president then assumes the role of acting president. The vice president continues in this role unless and until the president is able to transmit a declaration to the contrary. Section 4 deals with the more difficult situation of a president who is unable or unwilling to acknowledge the inability to perform the duties of the office. The section authorizes the vice president and a majority of the presidential cabinet members to determine whether the president is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office. If they agree that the president is incapacitated, the vice president immediately becomes acting presi- dent. The president may transmit to Congress a statement declaring that no inability exists and resume the duties of president. The vice president and the majority of the cabinet, however, may send a declaration to Congress within four days disputing the assertion of the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 138 TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT president that he is able to discharge the duties of the office. If this happens, Congress must vote by a two-thirds majority in both houses that the president is unable to serve. Otherwise, the president will reassume office. The disability procedures were used for eight hours on July 13, 1985, when President Reagan underwent surgery for cancer. Vice President GEORGE H.W. BUSH temporarily assumed the powers and duties of the office as acting president. Section 4 was also invoked on June 29, 2002, when President GEORGE W. BUSH,who was set to undergo a colonoscopy, temporarily transferred power to Vice President Dick Cheney. Vice President Cheney acted as president from 7:09 A.M. until 9:24 A.M., when President Bush transmitted a letter announcing that he was resuming his duties. RESOURCES Bellamy, Calvin. 2000. “Presidential Disability: The Twenty- Fifth Amendment Still an Untried Tool.” Boston Univ. Public Interest Law Journal 9 (spring). Feerick, John D. 1992. The Twenty-fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and Applications. New York: Fordham Univ. Press. Gant, Scott E. 1999. “Presidential Inability and the Twenty- Fifth Amendment’s Unexplored Removal Provisions.” Law Review of Michigan State Univ. Law Review. (winter). Gilbert, Robert E., ed. 2000. Managing Crisis: Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. New York: Fordham Univ. Press. Toole, James F., Robert J. Joynt, and Arthur S. Link. 2001. Presidential Disability: Papers, Discussions, and Recom- mendations on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Issues of Inability and Disability among Presidents of the United States. Rochester, NY: Univ. of Rochester Press. TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT The Twenty-first Amendment to the U.S. Con- stitution reads: Section 1. The eighteenth article of amend- ment to the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES is hereby repealed. Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conven- tions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. The Twenty-first Amendment was proposed on February 20, 1933, and ratified on December 5, 1933. It is the only amendme nt to repeal another amendment, the Eighteenth, and the only one to be ratified by state conventions rather than by state legislatures. Repeal of the EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT ended fourteen years of PROHIBITION, a failed national experiment that sought to eliminate the con- sumption of intoxicating liquors. Though consumption was reduced, federal and state law enforcement officials could not prevent the illegal manufacture and sale of “bootleg” alcohol. ORGANIZED CRIME profited from the ban on alcohol, which enabled criminals such as Chicago gangster AL CAPONE to become multi- millionaires. Critics of Prohibition argued that the increase in crime and lawlessness offset any gains from reducing the consumption of liquor. Prohibition was supported most strongly in rural areas. In urban areas enforcement was difficult. Cities had large populations of immi- grants who did not see anything morally wrong with consuming alcohol. In the early 1930s, as production and sales of illegal liquor continued to rise, the onset of the Great Depression led to calls for repeal of the Eighteenth Amend- ment. A legalized li quor industry wo uld pro- vide more jobs at a time when millions were out of work. At its national convention in 1932, the DEMOCRATIC PARTY adopted a platform plank calling for repeal. The landslide Democratic victory of 1932 signaled the end of Prohibition. In February 1933 a resolution proposing the Twenty-first Amendment was introduced in Congress; it contained a provision requiring ratification by state conventions rather than by state legislatures. Though Article V of the Con- stitution authorizes this ratification method, it had never been used. Supporters of repeal did not want the state legislatures, which generally were dominated by rural legislators supportive of Prohibition, to vote against ratification. During 1933, 38 states elected delegates to state conventions to consider the amendment. Almost three-quarters of the voters supported repeal in these elections. The refore, it was not surprising that the ratification conventions certified the results and ratified the Twenty- first Amendment on December 5, 1933. Section 2 of the amendment gives states the right to prohibit the transportation or GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 139 importation of intoxicating liquors. Many states enacted their own prohibition laws in the 1930s, but all had been repealed by 1966. The regulation of liquor is now primarily a local issue. FURTHER READINGS Brown, Everett Somerville, compiler. 2003. Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: State Convention Records and Laws. Clark, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange. Rotter, Jonathan M. and Joshua S. Stambaugh. 2007. “What’s Left of the Twenty-First Amendment.” Car- dozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 6. TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT The Twenty-fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The Twenty-fourth Amendment was pro- posed on August 27, 1962, and ratified on January 23, 1964. It prohibits the federal government or the states from making voters pay a poll tax before they can vote in a national election. A poll tax, also called a head tax, is a tax collected equally from all voters. The amendment was proposed as a CIVIL RIGHTS measure because southern states had used the poll tax to keep African Americans from voting. POLL TAXES were commonly imposed in the United States at the time the Constitution was adopted but had fallen into disuse by the mid- nineteenth century. After the ratification of the FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT in 1870, the poll tax was revived in the South as a way to prevent African Americans, who were mostly poor, from voting. The poll tax also denied poor whites the right to vote. Typically, the unpaid fees would accumu- late from election to election, making it more difficult for poor persons to find the economic resources to qualify for voting. In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S. Ct. 205, 82 L. Ed. 252 (1937), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that poll taxes, by themselves, did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend- ments. Breedlove led to the introduction of the first poll tax constitutional amendment in 1939 and to efforts to abolish the poll tax through STATE ACTION. By 1960 only five southern states still had poll taxes. The abolition of the poll tax was not a controversial issue, even at a time of fierce southern resistance to racial desegregation. The amendment was limited to federal elections, however, leaving state elections outside its scope. Following the ratification of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court abandoned the Breedlove precedent. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966), the Court struck down poll taxes in state and local elections, ruling that such taxes violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT The Twen ty-second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term. Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress. The Twenty-second Amendment was pro- posed on March24, 1947, and ratified on February 27, 1951. The amendment imposed term limits on the office of president of the United States. The Framers of the Constitution vested power in a single executive, elected for a term of four years. Participants at the Constitutional Convention discussed the wisdom of limiting presidential terms, but in the end the conven- tion refused to limit the number of terms. The Framers believed a four-year term and an GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 140 TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT independent ELECTORAL COLLEGE would prevent a president from seeking more than two terms. President GEORGE WASHINGTON declined the offer of a third term, as did THOMAS JEFFERSON. Once the tradition of serving no more than two terms had been established in the early 1800s, it became a canon of U.S. politics. President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT ignored the tradition in 1940, however, when he chose to run for a third term. He did so in the belief that U.S. involvement in WORLD WAR II was imminent. In making his bid for a third term, Roosevelt ignored the advice of some members of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY.In1944, with the war raging, Roosevelt was elected to an unprecedented fourth term. In declining health when elected, he died in 1945. After the 1946 election, which produced Republican majorities in both houses of Con- gress, the Republicans sought to prevent a repetition of Roosevelt’s actions. The Twenty- second Amendment was introduced in 1947 and adopted in 1951. The amendment prohibits a person from serving more than two four-year terms. A person who serves more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected president may be elected only for one full term. For example, if a president dies in the first year of the term, the vice president who becomes president may be elected to only one four-year term. If, however, the pre sident dies in the third year of the term, the vice president would be eligible to serve a maximum of ten years. TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT The Twenty-seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: No law, varying the compensation for the services of Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Repre- sentatives shall have intervened. The effect of the Twenty-seventh Amend- ment is to prevent salary increases for federal legislators from taking effect until after an intervening election of members of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES . The amendment is an expression of the concern that members of Congress, if left to their own devices, may choose to act in their own interests rath er than the PUBLIC INTEREST. Because the amendment postpones salary increases until after an election, members of Congress may not immediately raise their own salaries. All Representatives must endure an election before a pay raise takes effect because Representatives are electe d on ce every two years; Senators need not necessarily succeed in an election before a pay raise takes effect unless the pay raise is approved within two years of the Senator’s next re-election effort. The long history of the Twenty-seventh Amendment is curious and unprecedented. The amendment was first drafted by JAMES MADISON in 1789 and proposed by the First Congress in 1789 as part of the original BILL OF RIGHTS.The proposed amendment did not fare well, as only six states ratified it during the period in which the first ten amendments were ratified by the requisite three-fourths of the states. The amend- ment was largely neglected for the next two centuries; Ohio was the only state to approve the amendment in that period, ratifying it in 1873. In 1982, Gregory Watson, a 20-year-old student at the University of Texas, wrote a term paper arguing for RATIFICATION of the amend- ment. Watson received a ‘C’ grade for the paper and then embarked on a one-man campaign for the amendment’s ratification. From his home in Austin, Texas, Watson wrote letters to state legislators across the country on an electric typewriter. During the 1980s, state legislatures passed pay raises. Public debate over the raises reached a fever pitch , and state legislatures began to pass the measure, mostly as a symbo- lic gesture to appease voters. Few obser vers believed that the amendment would ever be ratified by the required 38 states, but the tally of ratifying states began to mount. On May 7, 1992, Michigan became the thirty-eighth state to ratify the amendment, causing it to become part of the U.S. Constitution. The ratification process of the Twenty- seventh Amendment was by far the longest- running amendment effort in the history of the United States. Before the Twenty-seventh Amendment was ratified, the longest it had taken to ratify an amendment was four years. That measure, the TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT limiting the president to two terms in office, was ratified in 1951. The proposed EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT , which would have become the Twenty-seventh Amendment had it passed, failed to win ratification by the required 38 states during the 10-year period Congress had allowed for its consideration by the states. The gradual manner in which the Twenty- seventh Amendment was passed has raised questions about its validity, with concerns centering on the wisdom of allowing changes GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT 141 to the Constitution without reference to the passage of time. In Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921), the U.S. SUPREME COURT stated a requirement that ratifica- tion of amendments be contemporaneous with their proposal, but in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939), the High Court left it for Congress to decide whether a ratification was contemporaneous with its proposal. In Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992), aff’d, 30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the district court for the District of Columbia rejected a challenge to the constitu- tionality of pay raises in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989). The court observed that the pay raises complied with the Twenty-seventh Amendment because they took effect after an election had intervened. FURTHER READINGS Bernstein, Richard B. 1992. “The Sleeper Wakes: The History of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.” Fordham Law Review 61 (December). Dalzell, Stewart, and Eric J. Beste. 1994. “Is the Twenty- Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?” George Washington Law Review 62 (April). Paulsen, Michael Stokes. 1993. “A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.” Yale Law Journal 103 (December). CROSS REFERENCE Congress of the United States. TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT The Twenty-sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The Twenty-sixth Amendment was pro- posed on March 23, 1971, and ratified on July 1, 1971. The ratification period of 107 days was the shortest in U.S. history. The amendment, which lowered the voting age from 21 to 18, was passed quickly to avert potential problems in the 1972 elections. The drive for lowering the voting age began with young people who had been drawn into the political arena by the VIETNAM WAR. Proponents argued that if 18-year-olds were old enough to be drafted into military service and sent into combat, they were also old enough to vote. This line of argument was not new. It had persuaded Georgia and Kentucky to lower the minimum voting age to 18 during WORLD WAR II.Theoneflawinthe argument was that women were not drafted and were not allowed to serve in combat units if they enlisted in the armed forces. Nevertheless, the drive fo r lowering the voting age gained momentum. In 1970 Con- gress passed a measure that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 in both federal and state elections (84 Stat. 314). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, declared part of this measure unconstitutional in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S. Ct. 260, 27 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1970). The decision was closely divided. Four justices believed Congress had the consti- tutional authority to lower the voting age in all elections, four justices believed the opposite, and one justice, HUGO L. BLACK, concluded that Congress could lower the voting age by statute only in federal elections, not in state elections. The Court’s decision allowed 18-year-olds to vote in the 1972 presidential and congressio- nal elections but left the states to decide if they wished to lower the voting age in their state elections. The potential for chaos was clear. Congress responded by proposing the Twenty- sixth Amendment, which required the states as well as the federal government to lower the voting age to 18. TWENTY-THIRD AMENDMENT The Twenty-third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: Section 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The Twenty-third Amendment was pro- posed on June 16, 1960, and ratified on March 29, 1961. The amendment rectified an omission GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 142 TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT in the Constitution that prevented residents of the District of Columbia from voting in presidential elections. Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to accept land from the state s and administer it as the seat of national government. The District of Columbia was organized under this provision from land given to the federal government by Virginia and Maryland. The government of the city of Washington and the District of Columbia has been domi- nated by Congress for most of the district’s history. Congress is empowered by Article I to exercise exclusive authority over the seat of government. In the 1820s Congress allowed citizens of the district to vote for a mayor and city council. In 1871 Congress created a terri- torial form of government for the district. All the officials, including a legislative assembly, were appointed by the president. This system was abandoned in 1874, when Congress reestablished direct control over the city government. From the 1870s until 1961, residents of the district were denied all rights to vote. Though residents paid federal and local taxes and were drafted into the military services, they could not vote. The Twenty-third Amendment gave district residents the right to vote for president. Under the amendment the number of the district’s electors cannot exceed that of the state with the smallest population. In practice, this means that the district elects three presidential electors. The amendment did not address the issue of representation in Congress. Later, a constitutional amendment that would have given residents the right to vote for congressional representatives was proposed, but it failed to win ratification. In 1970 Congress created the position of nonvoting delegate to the House of Representatives, to be elected by the district’s residents. TYING ARRANGEMENT A tying arrangement is an agreement in which a vendor conditions the sale of a particular product on a vendee’s promise to purchase an additional, unrelated product. In a tying arrangement, the product that the vendee actually wants to purchase is known as the tying product, whereas the additional product that the vendee must purchase to consummate the sale is known as the tied product. Typically, the tying product is a desirable good that is in considerable demand by vendees in a given market. The tied product is normally less desirable, of poorer quality, or otherwise difficult to sell. Tying arrangements are governed by the law of UNFAIR COMPETITION. Such arrangements tend to restrain competition by requiring buyers to purchase inferior goods that they do not want or more expensive goods that they could purchase elsewhere for less. In addition, competitors may reduce their prices to below market level to draw purchasers away from prospective tying arrange- ments. Competitors who sell their products at below-market prices for an extended period can suffer enormous losses or go out of business. Not every tying arrangement is illegal under the law of unfair competition. Four elements must be proved to establish that a particular tying arrangement is illegal. First, the tying arrangement must involve two different pro- ducts. Manufactured products and their com- ponent parts, such as an automobile and its engine, are not considered different products and may be tied together without violating the law. However, the law does not permit a shoe manufacturer to tie the purchase of promo- tional T-shirts to the sale of athletic footwear because these items are considered unrelated. Second, the purchase of one product must be conditioned on the purchase of another product. A buyer need not actually purchase a tied product in order to bring a claim. If a vendor refuses to sell a tying product unless a tied product is purchased or agrees to sell a tying product separately only at an unreasonably high price, a court will declare the tying arrangement illegal. If a buyer can purchase a tying product separately on nondis- criminatory terms, however, there is no tie. Third, a seller must have sufficient market power in a tying product to restrain competition in a tied product. Market power is measured by the number of buyers the seller has enticed to enter a particular tying arrangement. Sellers expand their market power by enticing additional buyers to purchase a tied product. However, sellers are prohibited from dominating a given market by locking up an unreasonably large share of prospective buyers in tying arrangements. Fourth, a tying arrangement must be shown to appreciably restrain commerce. Evidence of anticompetitive effects includes unreasonably high prices for tied products and unreasonably low prices for competing products in a tied market. A PLAINTIFF need not establish that a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TYING ARRANGEMENT 143 business has actually controlled prices through a tying arrangement, as is required to establish certain monopolistic practices, but only that prices and other market conditions have been significantly influenced. Tying arrangements are regulated at both the state and the federal level. At the federal level, tying arrangements are regulated by the SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (15 U.S.C.A. § 1) and the CLAYTON ACT (15 U.S.C.A. § 14). At the state level, tying arrangements are regulated by analogous statutes and various common-law doctrines. At either level both purchasers and businesses that are injured by illegal tying arrangements have two remedies available: money damages (compen sation for pecuniary losses) and injunctive relief (a court order restraining a business from tying its products). One of the most notable tying cases in the early 2000s involved software giant Microsoft. In United States v. Microsoft (253 F.3d 34 [D.C. Cir. 2001]), the government claimed that Microsoft had illegally tied its Windo ws operat- ing system with its web browser, Internet Explorer. The government argued that Micro- soft developed Windows so that it was difficult to remove the browser and also that Microsoft developed Windows in a manner that made use of Internet Explorer’s competitor, Netscape Navigator, difficult to use. Microsoft countered that Windows and Explorer were merely part of the same product, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disagreed. The case was eventually settled out of court. FURTHER READINGS Dorton, Kathleen A. 2008. “Intellectual Property Tying Arrangements: Has the Market Power Presumption Reached the End of Its Rope? DePaul Law Review. (Winter). Hancock, William A., ed. 2001. Special Study for Corporate Counsel on Tying Arrangements. Chesterland, Ohio: Business Laws. Klarfeld, Peter J. 1994. Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing. New York: Practising Law Institute. CROSS REFERENCES Antitrust Law; Monopoly. v TYLER, JOHN John Tyler served as the tenth president of the United States from 1841 to 1845. A political maverick and a proponent of STATES’ RIGHTS, Tyler was the first vice president to succeed to the offi ce because of the death of a president. Rejecting the concept of an acting president, John Tyler. DAGUERROTYPE BY MATHEW BRADY. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ▼▼ ▼▼ John Tyler 1790–1862 1775 1825 1850 1875 1800 ❖ ◆ 1790 Born, Greenway, Va. 1775–83 American Revolution 1809 Admitted to the Va. bar 1812–14 War of 1812 1811–16 Served in the Virginia Legislature 1817–21 Served in U.S. House 1823–25 Served in the Virginia Legislature 1827–36 Served in U.S. Senate ◆ 1838 Elected to the Virginia Legislature ◆◆ 1841 President Harrison died 31 days after taking office; Tyler assumed presidency 1846–48 Mexican War ◆ ❖ 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1861 Elected to Confederate Congress 1862 Died, Richmond, Va. 1844 Failed to be renominated ◆ 1840 Elected vice president as the Whig party candidate GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 144 TYLER, JOHN Tyler established the right of the vice president to assume the powers and duties of president. Tyler was born the second of eight children into a politically active family on March 29, 1790, in Greenway, Virginia, son of John Tyler, Sr. and Mary Armistead. He is the first President born after the RATIFICATION of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. He graduated from the College of William and Mary in 1807 and was admitted to the Virginia bar in 180 9. He began his political career in 1811 when he was elected as a member of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY to the Virginia legislature. In 1817 he w as elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he remained until 1821. During his years in the House, he was a consistent supporter of states’ rights, believing that the role of the federal government should be limited. Tyler, who owned slaves, objected to the MISSOURI COMPROMISE OF 1820, which plac ed restrictions on the expansion of SLAVERY to new states. In 1823 Tyler returned to the Virginia legislature, where he served two years. In 1825 he was elected governor of Virginia, and in 1827 he was elected to the U.S. Senate. During his nine years in the Senate, Tyler opposed several of President Andrew Jackson’s policies though he and Jackson were both Democrats. In 1832 South Carolina issued its nullification policy, declaring its right as a state to reject federal tariff regulations. Jackson, in retalia- tion, initiated the Force Act of 1833 (4 Stat. 633), which permitted the president to use the military, if necessary, to collect tariff revenues. Tyler did not agree with South Carolina’s actions, but he vehemently opposed Jackson’s use of federal power to bring the state to heel. Tyler lost the support of Virginia Democrats when he refused to reverse his 1834 vote of censure against Jackson for removing deposits from the BANK OF THE UNITED STATES. In 1836, when the Virginia legislature gave him a direct order to change his vote, Tyler resigned from the Senate rather than obey. He returned to Virginia, where he was elected again to the Virginia legislature in 1838. In the presidential election of 1840, the WHIG PARTY sought to broaden its northern political base by selecting a vice presidential candidate who could attract southern voters. Accordingly, Tyler was chosen to be the vice presidential candidate to run with WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, known as “Tippecanoe” from the battle where he had defeat ed Chief Tecumseh of the Shawnee tribe. In a campaign devoid of political ideas, the political slogan “Tippecanoe and Tyler too” popularized the two Whig candidates, who won the election. The elderly Harrison died 31 days after becoming president, and Tyler assumed the presidency on April 4, 1841. As the first vice president to become president because of the death of the chief executive, Tyler rejected the idea that he serve as acting president. Though the U.S. Constitution was silent on the matter of succession, Tyler announced that he would assume the full powers and duties of the office, setting a precedent that would be followed by other vice presidents. (Procedures for presi- dential succession were added to the Constitu- tion by the TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT in 1967.) Tyler’s maverick streak, which had once stung the Democrats, soon offended the Whigs. Still a staunch supporter of states’ rights, Tyler twice vetoed a Whig-sponsored act establishing a national bank. As a result, his entire cabinet resigned, with the exception of the SECRETARY OF STATE , DANIEL WEBSTER. For the remainder of his term, Tyler was a chief executive without a political party. Consequently, his accomplish- ments were few. He did approve the ANNEXATION of Texas and he signed the PREEMPTION Act of 1841 (5 Stat. 453), which gave squatters on government land the right to buy 160 acres of land at the minimum auction price without competitive bidding. After leaving office in 1845, Tyler continued to defend states’ rights. In 1861, before the outbreak of the Civil War, Tyler directed the Washington conference, which was convened in a final attempt to ave rt war. When that meeting failed, Tyler favored secession and was elected as a member of the Confederate Congress. He died on January 18, 1862, in Richmond, Virginia, however, befor e he could take his seat in the secessionist Congress. FURTHER READINGS Monroe, Dan. 2003. The Republican Vision of John Tyler. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press. Peterson, Norma Lois. 1989. The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison & John Tyler. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. THE GREAT PRIMARY AND CONTROLLING INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IS UNION —UNION NOT ONLY IN THE MERE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT BUT UNION FOUNDED IN AN ATTACHMENT OF INDIVIDUALS FOR EACH OTHER . —JOHN TYLER GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TYLER, JOHN 145 UCC See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. UCCC See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE. UCMJ See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. ULTIMATE FACTS Information essential to a plaintiff’s right of action or a defendant’s assertion of a defense. The concept of ultimate facts used to be an essential part of preparing a PLEADING in a civil action. Until the late 1930s, the rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE in federal and state courts required parties to plead on the basis of a statement of facts constitu ting the CAUSE OF ACTION or defense. These ultimate facts alleged the substance of the cause of action and were distinguished from evidentiary facts, which concerned the particu- lar events of the case, and conclusions of law. The highly technical distinctions among ulti- mate facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of law created great confusion and often led to the dismissal of cases based on a pleading mistake. The development of these distinctions can be traced to the 1848 New York Code of Civil Procedure, which was largely drafted by DAVID DUDLEY FIELD . During the next few decades, most of the states, except those on the East Coast, adopted what came to be known as the Field Code. The Field Code was a significant improve- ment over common-law systems of procedure. However, the code required that the complaint contain “a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting plaintiff’s cause of action,” and used the pleading as a way of narrowing and defining the dispute rather than as a general means of initiating a civil action. Over time, however, CODE PLEADING became very technical and required the pleader to set forth the facts underlying and demonstrating the existence of the cause of action. The pleading of ultimate facts was necessary, while the inclusion of evidentiary facts and conclu- sions of law was improper. Judges and attorneys found it difficult, if not impossible, to draw meaningful and consistent distinctions among these three terms. With no clear dividing line between a fact that demonstrated a cause of action and one that introduced specific evi- dence, courts made formal and often ARBITRARY decisions that were unrelated to the merits of the case. Courts demanded a high degree of specificity and bound the parties to prove the ultimate facts alleged or lose the lawsuit. This requirement was particularly harsh because it forced a party to allege detailed facts early in the case when there was still uncertainty over what facts had occurred. By the 1930s legal commentators agreed that the need to plead ultimate facts was hindering the cause of justice. The Federal Rules of Civil U 147 . candidate GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 144 TYLER, JOHN Tyler established the right of the vice president to assume the powers and duties of president. Tyler was born the second of. 1933. Section 2 of the amendment gives states the right to prohibit the transportation or GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 139 importation of intoxicating. wisdom of limiting presidential terms, but in the end the conven- tion refused to limit the number of terms. The Framers believed a four-year term and an GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E

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