Bench Warrants A BENCH WARRANT is initiated by, and issued from, the bench or court directing a law enforcement officer to bring a specified person before the court. A bench warrant is used, among other purposes, when a person has failed to appear in response to a subpoena, summons, or citation. It is also used when an accused person needs to be transferred from jail to court for trial, and when a person’s failure to obey a court order puts him or her in CONTEMPT of court. A bench warrant is sometimes called a “capias” or an “alias warrant.” Other Types Warrants A STOCK WARRANT is an instrument granting the holder a long-term (usually a five- to ten-year term) option to buy shares of stock at a fixed price. It is commonly attached to preferred stocks or bonds. A municipal warrant is an order to draw money from a municipality’s treasury for the payment of the municipality’s expenses or debts. Warrants may be used for financial transac- tions. For example, a private individual may draw up a warrant authorizing another person to pay out or deliver a sum of money or something else of value. A warrant may be issued to a collector of taxes, empowering him or her to collect taxes as itemized on the assessment role and to enforce the assessments by tax sales where necessary. FURTHER READINGS Hancock, Catherine. 2009. “Warrants for Wearing a Wire: Fourth Amendment Privacy and Justice Harlan’s Dissent in United States v. White.” Mississippi Law Journal 79 (fall). Lee, Christopher. 2009. “The Viability of Area Warrants in a Suspicionless Search Regime.” University of Pennsylva- nia Journal of Constitutional Law. 11 (April). CROSS REFERENCES Fourth Amendment; Criminal Procedure. WARRANT OF ATTORNEY A written authorization that allows an attorney named in it to appear in court and admit the liability of the person giving the warrant in an action to co llect a debt. This writing is usually given to help ensure that the person signing it will pay the amount that he or she would be obliged to pay if a judgment were entered against him or her. It usually contains an agreement that no action will be started against the signer if the obligation described in the paper is satisfied. Essentially the warrant of attorney is a COGNOVIT NOTE that permits a CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT (a shortcut to obtaining a judgment against a debtor that is now illegal in most states). CROSS REFERENCE Cognivit note. WARRANTY An assurance, promise, or guaranty by one party that a particular statement of fact is true and may be relied upon by the other party. Warranties are used in a variety of commer- cial situations. In many instances a business may voluntarily make a warranty. In other situations the law implies a warranty where no express warranty was made. Most warranties are made with respect to real estate, insurance, and sales and leases of goods and services. Real Estate When land, houses, apartments, and other forms of real estate are sold or leased, the real estate usually comes with at least one warranty. In a sale of realty, the seller usually includes a warranty regarding the title to the property. In some cases the title may have a cloud on it. This means that some party other than the seller has a claim to the property. Such claims may be made by a bank, a JUDGMENT DEBTOR,a construction company, or any other party that has obtained a lien against the property. If the seller thinks that the title is clouded, the seller may offer a quitclaim deed. This type of deed contains no promises as to the title and releases the seller from any liability to the buyer if a lien holder later makes a claim to the property. In other real estate transactions, the seller may warrant that the title is clear. In this situation the seller gives the buyer a general warranty deed. This kind of deed warrants that the title is clear and that the seller will be liable for any defects in the title that existed at the time of the sale. Other types of warranties related to real estate titles include special warranty deeds and covenants of further assurances. A special warranty deed warrants only that no party made a claim to the property during the seller’s GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 308 WARRANT OF ATTORNEY ownership. Under a special warranty deed, the seller is not liable for any defects in the title attributable to her predecessors. A seller may add to a deed a COVENANT of further assurances, which promises that the seller will take any steps necessary to satisfy any claims to the property. Sellers and buyers of real estate may negotiate warranties regarding the title to the property. They also may negotiate additional warranties regarding the property, such as warranties on plumbing or electricity or any other matter of special concern. If the seller of real estate is the same party who constructed a building on the property, a warranty of habitability may be automatically included in a sale of the property. A warranty of habitability in the context of a sale of real property is a promise that the dwelling complies with local BUILDING CODES, was built in a professional manner, and is suitable for human habitation. Warranties also accompany leases of real property. All states, through either statutes or court decisions, require landlords to observe the warranty of habitability in leases of residential property. In this context the warranty of habitability is a promise that the premises comply with all relevant building codes and that they will be properly maintained and will be fit for habitation throughout the period of the tenancy. Specifically, the landlord promises to make necessary repairs in a prompt and reasonable fashion and to provide such basic services as water, heat, and electricity. If a landlord breaches the IMPLIED WARRANTY of habitability, the tenant may withhold rent and sue for any financial losses resulting from the breach. Insurance A warranty in an insurance policy is a promise by the insured party that statements affecting the validity of the contract are true. Most insurance contracts require the insured to make certain warranties. For example, to obtain a HEALTH INSURANCE policy, an insured party may have to warrant that he does not suffer from a terminal disease. If a warranty made by an insured party turns out to be untrue, the insurer may cancel the policy and refuse to cover claims. Not all misstatements made by an insured party give the insurer the right to cancel a policy or refuse a claim. Only misrepresentations on conditions and warranties in the contract give an insurer such rights. To qualify as a condition or warranty, the statement must be expressly included in the contract, and the provision must clearly show that the parties intended that the rights of the insured and insurer would depend on the truth of the statement. Warranties in insurance contracts can be divided into two types: affirmative or promis- sory. An affirmative warrant y is a statement regarding a fact at the time the contract was made. A promissory warranty is a statement about future facts or about facts that will continue to be true throughout the term of the policy. An untruthful affirmative warranty makes an insurance contract void at its incep- tion. If a promissory warranty beco mes true, the insurer may cancel cover age at such time as the warranty becomes untrue. For example, if an insured party warrants that property to be covered by a fire insurance policy will never be used for the mixing of explosives, the insurer may cancel the policy if the insured party decides to start mixing explosives on the property. Warranty provisions should contain language indicating whether they are affirmative or promissory. Many states have created laws that protect insureds from cancellations due to misrepre- sented warranties. Courts tend to favor insureds by classifying indefinite warranties as affirma- tive. Man y state legislatures have created laws providing that no misrepresented warranty should cancel an insurance contract if the MISREPRESENTATION was not fraudulent and did not increase the risks covered by the policy. Sales and Leases of Goods Every contract for the sale or lease of goods contains a warranty that the seller or lessor actually owns the property. Courts hold that this warranty is implied if it is not included in the contract, and a seller or lessor cannot disclaim it. The two basic types of sales warranties are express warranties and implied warranties. Express warranties are specific promises made by the seller and include oral representations, written representations, descriptions of the goods or services, representations in samples and models, and proof of prior quality of the goods or services. Puffing, or the seller’s GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WARRANTY 309 exaggerated opinion of quality, does not constitute a warranty. For example, if a car salesperson says, “This car will last you a lifetime,” a court would likely consider such a statement puffing and not an express warranty. Implied warranties are warranties that courts assume are implied in sales made by merchants. A merchant is a person who is in the business of selling the good or service being sold in the contract. All sales contracts made by merchants contain an implied warranty of merchantability. This is a promise that the goods, as they are described in the contract, pass without objection in the merchant’s trade, are fit for the ordinary purpose for which they are normally used, are adequately contained, pack- aged, and labeled, and conform to any promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label. If the goods are fungible, or easily replaced or substituted, such as grain or oil, the replacement goods must be of fair and average quality, fit for their ordinary purposes, and similar to previous goods delivered in the same contract or previous similar contracts. In some situations a sales contract may include an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. This kind of warranty is a promise that the goods are useful for a special function. Courts infer this warranty is implied when the seller has reason to know of a particular purpose for which the goods are required and also knows that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill and knowledge in choosing the goods. The buyer does not need to specifically inform the seller that the goods are for a particular purpose; it is enough that a reasonable seller would be aware of the purpose. For example, assume that a farmer, intend- ing to plant no-till soybeans, appro aches a seller to buy herbicide. Assume further that the buyer requests a particular herbicide mix but the seller suggests a less expensive mix. If the chemicals fail to kill crabgrass and the farmer has a low yield of soybeans, the farmer could sue the seller for breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because the seller knew what the farmer required. In some cases an implied warranty may be lost or waived. If a seller issues a disclaimer— for example , states that the goods are as is—and the buyer examines or refuses to examine the goods, the buyer may lose any implied warran- ties. One important caveat is that courts will not find that an implied warranty has been waived if, under the circumstances of the sale, it is unreasonable to expect that the buyer would have understood that there were no warranties under the circumstances of the transaction. A seller may disclaim the warranty of merchantability either orally or in writing, but a seller cannot orally disclaim a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. A disclaimer of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must be in writing, and the disclaimer must be conspicuous to the buyer. Express warranties made by a seller may not be disclaimed. However, if a disclaimer and an express warranty can be construed as consistent, a court may uphold the disclaimer. FURTHER READINGS Clark, Barkley, and Christopher Smith. 2002. The Law of Product Warranties. 2d ed. Eagan, Minn.: West Group. Crawford, Franklin E. 2002. “Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco, Fast Food, and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability.” Ohio State Law Journal 63 (August). Glatzova, Vladimira. 1998. “When Is a Warranty Not a Warranty? Common Law versus Civil Law.” Interna- tional Business Lawyer 26 (November). CROSS REFERENCES Cloud on Titl e; Consumer Protection; Landlord and Tenant; Merchantable; Product Liability; Sales Law. WARRANTY DEED An instrument that transfers real property from one person to another and in which the grantor promises that title is good and clear of any claims. A deed is a written instrument that transfers the title of property from one person to another. Although many types of deeds exis t, title is usually transferred by a warranty deed. A warranty deed provides the greatest protection to the purchaser because the grantor (seller) pledges or warrants that she legally owns the property and that there are no outstanding liens, mortgages, or other encumbrances against it. A warranty deed is also a guarantee of title, which means that the seller may be held liable for damages if the grantee (buyer) discovers the title is defective. There are two types of warranty deeds: general and special. A general warranty deed not only conveys to the grantee all of the grantor’s interest in and title to the property but also guarantees that if the title is defective or has a “cloud” on it, such as a mortgage claim, tax lien, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 310 WARRANTY DEED title claim, judgment, or mechanic’s lien, the grantee may hold the grantor liable. A special warranty deed conveys the gran- tor’s title to the grantee and promises to protect the grantee against title defects or claims asserted by the grantor and any persons whose right to assert a claim against the title arose during the period in which the grantor held title to the property. In a special warranty deed, the grantor guarantees to the grantee that the grantor has done nothing during the time he held title to the property that might in the future impair the grantee’s title. A warranty deed should contain an accurate description of the property being conveyed, be signed and witnessed according to the laws of the state where the property is located, and be delivered to the purchaser at closing. The deed should be recorded by the buyers of the property at the public records office, which is usually located in the county courthouse. Recording a deed gives “notice to the world” that a particular piece of property has been sold. Though the grantor guarantees good titl e in a warranty deed, the deed is no substitute for title insurance because a warranty from a grantor who later dies or goes bankrupt may have little value. CROSS REFERENCES Cloud on Title; Property Law; Recordin g of Land Titles; Registration of Land Titles; Title Search. v WARREN, CHARLES Charles Warren, a prominent lawyer and legal historian, is best known for his three-volume study, The Supreme Court in U.S. History, which won the Pulitzer Prize in 1923. Warren was born on March 9, 1868, in Boston, Massachusetts. He attended Harvard College, receiving his A.B. in 1889. He then attended Harvard Law School, graduating in 1892. He was admitted to the bar that same year, and began to practice law in Boston. Warren’s foray into state politics began in 1893, when he became Governor William Eustis Russell’s private secretary. The following year, in 1894, and again in 1895, Warren unsuccess- fully ran for the state senate. During this period, he cofounded the Immigration Restriction League along with fellow Harvard graduates Robert DeCourcy Ward and Prescott Farns- worth Hall. The league, which was started in Boston but quickly spread to industrial centers around the United States, was seen as a response to the perceived threat to the American way of life by the growing numbers of immigrants from various European countries including Ireland, Italy, and Germany. The primary purpose of the league was to lobby for restriction of the number of immigrants permitted to enter the United States. The league remained active for approximately two decades before Hall died and the organization disbanded. When Russell left the governorship in 1894, Warren became an associate in Russell’s law practice until 1896. He then became a senior attorney in the Boston firm of Warren & Perry, where he practiced from 1897 to 1914. In 1905, Warren received a key appointment, when he became chair of the Massachusetts State Civil Service Commission. He served in that capacity until 1911. From there, he moved on to the national political scene. Warren’s work on the commission drew attention from President WOODROW WILSON, who, in 1914, appointed the progressive Demo- crat from Massachusetts assistant attorney ▼▼ ▼▼ Charles Warren 1868–1954 1850 1900 1925 1950 1875 ❖ ❖ 1868 Born, Boston, Mass. ◆ 1892 Graduated from Harvard Law School; admitted to Massachusetts bar 1897-1914 Senior attorney with Boston law firm, Warren & Perry ◆ 1911 History of the American Bar, Colonial and Federal, to 1860 published ◆ 1922 The Supreme Court in U.S. History published ◆ 1923 Won Pulitzer Prize in history for The Supreme Court in U.S. History ◆ 1935 Bankruptcy in U.S. History published 1954 Died, Washington, D.C. 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II ◆ 1929 Stock market crashed; Great Depression began 1950–53 Korean War 1914–18 Served as U.S. assistant attorney general GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WARREN, CHARLES 311 general of the United States. Warren served from 1914 until 1918—the WORLD WAR I years. During this time, he develop ed expertise in the areas of governmental neutrality and INTERNATIONAL LAW. He also argued or wrote briefs on 39 cases that were heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. Following the war, Warren remained in Washington, D.C., where he served as a SPECIAL MASTER for the Supreme Court on severa l original jurisdiction cases involving state boundary lines and WATER RIGHTS. He also practiced law and lectured at numerous colleges and law schools throughout the country. He became a prolific writer, authoring essays, law journal articles, and nonlegal works, including short stories. In addition, Warren wrote several influential books on law and LEGAL HISTORY. One of them, The History of the American Bar, Colonial and Federal, to 1860, published in 1911, traced the develop ment of courts and the legal profession in the American colonies in Part One. Part Two looked at the growth of the bar from the beginning of the U.S. Supreme Court to the start of the Civil War. Warren’s reputation as a legal scholar was cemented in 1922, when he published a three- volume set called The Supreme Court in U.S. History, an analysis of each term of the Supreme Court and its most significant decisions between 1789 and 1918. Warren included contempora- neous writings with the cases so that readers could understand how the Court’s decisions were viewed at the time they were issued. A monumental work that was still in print in the early 2000s, War ren’s opus was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for history in 1923. Because of his expertise, Warren frequently was consulted by the U.S. government during the 1930 s. For example , the STATE DEPARTMENT sought out his advice on neutrality issues. Warren also continued to publish. In 1935, he released Bankruptcy in U. S. History. Drawing on a series of lectures he had delivered at Northwestern University Law School, Warren’s book was an historical and constitutional analysis of the topic of BANK- RUPTCY from 1793 to 1935 at both the state and federal level. During WORLD WAR II, Warren again was at the fore of international politics. Warren retired from public service in the late 1940s. He died in Washington, D.C., on August 16, 1954. FURTHER READINGS Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History, Harvard Univ. Available online at http://www.fas. harvard.edu/~cwc; website home page: http://www.fas. harvard.edu (accessed August 27, 2009). Warren, Charles. 1935. Bankruptcy in United States History. Reprint, 2009: Charleston, SC: BiblioLife. WARREN COMMISSION The assassination of President JOHN F. KENNEDY in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963, was a shocking event that immediately raised ques- tions about the circumstances surrounding the death of the president. Those questions in- creased when the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, was murdered while in the custody of Dallas police on November 25 by JACK RUBY,a Dallas nightclub owner. President LYNDON B. JOHNSON moved quickly to reassure the nation that a thorough inquiry would take place by creating a commission of distinguished public servants to investigate the evidence. On November 29, 1963, Johnson appointed EARL WARREN, chief justice of the U.S. SUPREME COURT, to head the commission, which became known as the Warren Commission. Its 1964 report, which sought to put to rest many issues, proved contro versial, provoking charges of a whitewash. The facts surrounding the Kennedy ASSASSINATION remain the subject of debate. Chief Justice Warren, fearing that his service disrupted the traditional SEPARATION OF POWERS, reluctantly agreed to serve as director of the commission. The other members of the com- mission were Senators Richard B. Russell of Georgia and JOHN SHERMAN Cooper of Kentucky; two members of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIV ES, Hal e Boggs of Louisiana, and GERALD R. FORD of Michigan; Allen W. Dulles, former head of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;JohnJ.McCloy, former head of the WORLD BANK;andJames Lee Ran kin, former U.S. SOLICITOR GENERAL, who was appointed general counsel for the commission. The Warren Commission began its investi- gations on December 3, 1963. The commission used accounts and statements provided by the Dallas police force, the SECRET SERVICE, the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, the military, and government and congressional commis- sions. Over the course of ten months, the commission took testimony from 552 witnesses. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 312 WARREN COMMISSION The commission published its conclusions, popularly known as the Warren Report,in September 1964 . According to the commission, Oswald acted alone in the assassination. The commission characterized Oswald as a resentful, belligerent man who hated authority. It endorsed the “single-bullet theory,” which concluded that only one bullet, rather than two, struck President Kennedy and Texas governor John Connally, who was sitting directly in front of the president in the open convertible. This was important because it appeared unlikely that Oswald could have fired his rifle twice in succession quickly enough to strike the two men. It found no connection between Oswald’s Communist affiliation (and time living in the Soviet Union) and the MURDER, nor between Oswald and his murderer, JACK RUBY . The commission also found no evidence that Ruby was part of a CONSPIRACY. It criticized the security measures taken to protect Kennedy and recommended that more effective measures be taken in the future. Although the conclusions of the commis- sion were well received at first, public skepti- cism soon grew about the findings. In 1966 two influential books were published that challenged the methods and conclusions of the commis- sion. Both Inquest by Edward Jay Epstein and Rush to Judgment by Mark Lane declared that the commission had not investigated deeply enough to produce c onclusive results. I n t hat same year, Jim Garrison, a New Orleans district attorney, st unned t he publ ic wi t h h is r evelations of a conspiracy and his accusations against promi- nent businessman Clay Shaw. Shaw was tried on conspiracy charges but was acquitted in 1969. Since the release of the Warren Commis- sion’s report, thousands of articles and books have been pu blished promoting various theories surrounding the assassination. A 1979 special committee of the House of Representatives re- examined the evidence and concluded that Kennedy “was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy.” However, the committee’s conclusion was based on acoustic evidence suggesting that a fourth shot was fired in the plaza. During the first decade of the 2000s, however, independent studies conducted with modern forensic tools have generally shown that the acoustic evidence was unreliable. Allegations that federal agencies withheld assassination evidence led Congress to enact the President JOHN F. KENNEDY Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C.A. § 2107). The act created the Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency that oversees the identification and release of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The act granted the review board the mandate and the authority to identify, secure, and make available, through the National Archives and Records Administration, records related to Kennedy’s assassination. Creation of the review board has allowed the release of thousands of previously secret government documents and files. Research into the Kennedy assassination has led to many theories about what might have happened. However, none of this research has led to an accepted conclusion about the assassination other than the one reached in by the Warren Commission. FURTHER READINGS Galanor, Stewart. 1998. Cover-Up. New York: Kestrel Books. Kaiser, David. 2008. The Road to Dallas: The Assassination of John F. Kennedy. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. O’Neill, William L. 1971. Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960s. New York: Quadrangle Books. Simon, Jonathan. 1998. “Ghosts of the Disciplinary Machine: Lee Harvey Oswald, Life-History, and the Truth of Crime.” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 10 (winter). CROSS REFERENCES President of the United States. WARREN COURT From 1953 to 1969, EARL WARREN presided as chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Under Warren’s leadership, the Court actively used A bipartisan commission was assembled to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy. The Warren Commission included (l-r) Rep. Gerald R. Ford, Rep. Hale Boggs, Sen. Richard Russel, Chief Justice Earl Warren, Sen. John Sherman Cooper, John McCloy, Allen W. Dulles, and J. Lee Rankin. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION WARREN COURT 313 JUDICIAL REVIEW to strictly scrutinize and over- turn state and federal statutes, to apply many provisions of the BILL OF RIGHTS to the states, and to provide opportunities for those groups in society who had been excluded from the political process. During Warren’s tenure, the Court became increasingly liberal and activist, drawing the fire of political and judicial conservatives who believed that the Warren Court had overstepped its constitutional role and had become a legislative body. The Warren Court itself became a catalyst for change, initiating reforms rather than res- ponding to pressures applied by other branches of government. The Warren Court was committed to the promotion of a libertarian and egalitarian society. The Court used the STRICT SCRUTINY test of constitutional review to strike down legisla- tion that directly abridged the exercise of fundamental rights or narrowed the number of people who might exercise them and to invalidate legislation that discriminated on the basis of race, religion, and other suspect classifications. Under strict scrutiny, the gov- ernment has the burden of proving that a compelling STATE INTEREST exists for the legisla- tion and that the law was narrowl y tailored to minimize the restriction on the FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT . This burden proved difficult to meet during the Warren Court years, turning the federal courts into institutions that protected the interests of politically unpopular individuals and me mbers of relatively powerless minority groups who had been victimized by pervasive historical, political, economic, and social DISCRIMINATION. Racial Discrimination The first major decision of the Warren Court was arguably its most important. In BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), the Court overruled its 1896 decision of PLESSY V. FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256, which had allowed racially segregated facilities on trains and, by implication, in public schools. The Court made clear that state-sponsored racial SEGREGATION of public schools was inherently unequal and that it violated the EQUAL PROTEC- TION CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. The Brown decision helped trigger the modern CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT. During the 1960s, the Warren Court upheld federal civil rights legislation, including the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.) and the VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq.). The Court struck down state laws that were racially discriminatory, including statutes that forbade racially mixed marriages. The Court applied the THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, which abolished SLAVERY, to outlaw all discrimination in the sale and rental of property and in the making of contracts. Voting and Reapportionment Apart from upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Warren Court removed impediments to voting by striking down state POLL TAX and property qualifications, unreasonable residency requirements, and obstacles to putting third political parties on the ballot. The Court also changed the makeup of state legislatures by reversing precedent and agreeing to hear legislative reapportionment cases. In REYNOLDS V. SIMS, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964), Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion that has come to be known as the “one person, one vote dec ision.” Reynolds and a series of cases that followed forced state legislatures to be apportioned equally on the basis of population rather than geographic areas. Reapportionment based on population resulted in a shift of political power away from sparsely populated rural areas to metropolitan areas. Criminal Procedure The Warren Court aroused bitter controversy with its decisions in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. The Court sought to provide equal justice by providing criminal defendants with an attorney in felony cases if they could not afford one ( GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 [1963]). It also ruled that indigent defendants could not be denied the opportunity to appeal their cases or to partici- pate fully in post-conviction proceedings be- cause of a lack of funds to obtain the necessary transcripts or to hire counsel. The decision in MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), proved to be the Warren Court’s most contro- versial criminal procedure case. The Court required what has come to be known as the Miranda warning: police must inform arrested persons that they need not answer questions GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 314 WARREN COURT and that they may have an attorney present during questioning. In addition, the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate federal constitutional rights, thus making them applicable to the states. Using this process, the Court applied the EXCLU- SIONARY RULE to the states. This meant thatevidence seized in violation of the FOURTH AMENDMENT could not be used in a criminal prosecution. In MAPP V. OHIO, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, the Court held that Fourth Amendment protec- tions extended to the states as well as the federal government. Under Warren, the Court clarified standards related to searches and seizures. For instance, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), the Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to tele- phone wiretaps, meaning that such surveillance requires a warrant upon proof of PROBABLE CAUSE that a crime has been or will be committed. On the other hand, the Court also recognized that, in some instances, probable cause is not necessary. In TERRY V. OHIO, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the Court held that an officer who suspects a passer-by of criminal activity may STOP AND FRISK the suspect based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. The Warren Court also applied to the states the federal constitutional right against CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT in the EIGHTH AMENDMENT, the RIGHT TO COUNSEL in the SIXTH AMENDMENT, the right against compelled SELF-INCRIMINATION in the FIFTH AMENDMENT, and the rights to confront witnesses and to have a jury trial in all criminal cases, which are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. These decisions radically changed the criminal justice system and generated criticism that the Court had gone too far in protecting the accused. First Amendment The Warren Court sought to protec t FIRST AMENDMENT rights. It invalidated the Georgia House of Representatives’ exclusion of one of its members because of his antiwar and antidraft statements. The Court also attacked vagueness and overbreadth in compulsory LOYALTY OATHS and ruled against the compulsory disclosure of organization memberships. It moved to invalidate attempts in southern states to inhibit the functioning of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), to make public the identities of the organization’s members, and to deny its members opportunities for public employment. During the 1960s, the Court upheld the legitimacy of demonstrations at state capitols and in the streets and sit-ins at segregated lunch counters. It also upheld the right of individuals to picket in a privately owned shopping center and the right of high-school students to express their opposition to the VIETNAM WAR by wearing black armbands to school. The Warren Court also changed state slander and LIBEL laws that stifled open discussion of controversial issues. It held that persons who are public officials or public figures cannot recover damages in a DEFAMATION action unless they prove that a false statement was made with “actual malice” (with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false). The Court in 1969 issued an important case involving the rights of students. In TINKER V. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT , 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, the Court held that the First Amendment protected two students’ rights to wear armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. This case has continued to apply to First Amendment cases involving students. The Court also reviewed many freedom- of-religion cases, provoking controversy over its interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Warren Court struck down Bible reading and the reciting of state- written prayers in public schools, even those religious acts done on a voluntary basis. The Court did, however, uphold, with qualifications, state aid to children attending religious schools. As to the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, the Court sought to protect the rights of religious dissenters and nonconformists when it struck down a Maryland constitutional provi- sion requiring the declaration of a belief in God as a prerequisite to holding public office. It also held that an individual need not believe in a supreme being to be eligible for CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR status. Right to Privacy One of the most significant rulings of the Warren Court was its recognition of the constitutional right of privacy. In GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WARREN COURT 315 Ed. 2d 510 (1965), the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that prohibited the dissem- ination of BIRTH CONTROL information. In declaring the right of privacy, the Court laid the groundwork for the post-Warren Court decision in ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), which gave women the right to have an ABORTION. FURTHER READINGS Compston, Christine L. 2002. Earl Warren: Justice for All. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Horwitz, Morton J. 1999. The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux. Krotoszynski, Ronald J., Jr. 2002. “A Remembrance of Things Past?: Reflections on the Warren Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights.” Washington and Lee Law Review 59 (fall). Lewis, Frederick P. 1999. The Context of Judicial Activism: The Endurance of the Warren Court Legacy in a Conservative Age.” Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Powe, Lucas A. 2001. The Warren Court and American Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. Scheiber, Harry N., ed. 2007. Earl Warren and the Warren Court: The Legacy in American and Foreign Law. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Schwartz, Bernard, ed. 1996. The Warren Court: A Retrospective. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Apportionment; Baker v. Carr; Custodial Interrogation; Equal Protection; Incorporation Doctrine; Libel and Slander; Mapp v. Ohio; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan; Overbreadth Doctrine; School Desegregation; Symbolic Speech; Void for Vagueness Doctrine. v WARREN, EARL Earl Warren served as the 14th chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1953 to 1969. A former PROSECUTOR, state attorney general, and governor of California, Warren previously had not served as a judge. In spite of his lack of judicial experience, Warren led a constitutional revolution that reshaped U.S. law and society and granted the lower federal courts wide latitude in enforcing individual constitutional rights. Although criticized by conservatives for his judicial activism, Warren has also been hailed as one of the greatest chief justices in U.S. history. Warren was born on March 19, 1891, in Los Angeles, California, to Methias H. Warren and Crystal Hernlund, both Scandinavian immi- grants, but he moved with his family to Bakersfield, California, as a young boy. The son of a railroad worker, Warren worked summers on railroad crews as a you ng man to earn money to attend college. It was in Bakersfield that Warren’s father was murdered during a ROBBERY. He earned a bachelor’s degree and a law degree from the University of California at Berkeley and was admitted to the California bar in 1914. After a brief period of service in the Army during WORLD WAR I, Warren returned to northern California where he practiced law for a short time in San Francisco. Warren joined the Alameda County district attorney’s office in 1920 and in 1925 was elected district attorney. Reelected two times, Warren established a reputation as a tough but fair prosecutor. A liberal Republican, he was elected California attorney general in 1938. Though he helped modernize the office during his term as attorney general, Warren’s record was tarnished by his actions during the early months of U.S. involvement in WORLD WAR II. ▼▼ ▼▼ Earl Warren 1891–1974 19001900 19501950 19751975 19251925 ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆◆◆◆◆ ❖ 1891 Born, Los Angeles, Calif. 1914 Admitted to Calif. bar 1920 Joined Alameda County (Calif.) district attorney's office 1925–39 Served as district attorney of Alameda County 1944 Korematsu v. United States upheld relocation of Japanese Americans 1954 Wrote unanimous opinion striking down "separate but equal" education in Brown v. Board of Education 1948 Ran for vice president on unsuccessful Dewey ticket 1942 Led efforts to relocate West Coast Japanese Americans 1939–43 Served as attorney general of Calif. 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 1974 Died, Washington, D.C. 1966 Miranda v. Arizona required the reading of rights now known as the Miranda warning 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut recognized right to privacy 1964 Wrote "one person, one vote" opinion in Reynolds v. Sims 1953–69 Served as chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court ◆ 1943–53 Served as governor of California ◆ ◆ 1963 Wrote majority opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 316 WARREN, EARL In 1942 Warren was a key leader in demanding the removal of people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. At the time, Warren and others justified the removal of Japanese Americans on national security grounds, believing that California was vulnera- ble to Japanese spies and saboteurs. The U.S. Supreme Court, in KOREMATSU V. UNITED STATES , 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944), upheld the removal. Thousands of Japanese Americans lost their property and businesses and were “relocated” to concentra- tion camps for the duration of the war. Warren defended his actions throughout his public career, but in retirement he admitted the relocation was a mistake based on hysteria and unsubstantiated fears. Warren was elected governor of California in 1942 and proved a popular political leader. He was reelected with Republican and DEMO- CRATIC PARTY support in 1946 and 1950. Warren’s only political defeat came in 1948, when he was the Republican vice-presidential candidate on the ticket headed by THOMAS E. DEWEY that lost to President HARRY S. TRUMAN.In 1952 he played a key role in securing the Republican presidential nomination for DWIGHT D . EISENHOWER, who in return promised Warren an appointment to the Supreme Court when a vacancy occurred. When Chief Justice FRED M. VINSON died unexpectedly in September 1953, Eisenhower appointed Warren as his successor. In his first term as chief justice, Warren confronted the issue of state-mandated racial SEGREGATION in public schools. The case, which the Court had heard the previous year but was unable to decide, came back for reargument. In May 1954 Warren wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). Brown overruled the 1896 Supreme Court decision of PLESSY V. FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256, which had allowed racially segregated facilities on trains and by implication in public schools. Writing that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,” Warren held that racial segregation in Kansas denied African Americans EQUAL PROTECTION of the laws. Brown unleashed a torrent of controversy and protest in the South and immediately established Warren’s image as a liberal. Throughout the South, billboards appeared that read “Impeach Earl Warren.” Nevertheless, in 1955 the Court ordered Kansas and other states with segregated schools to move with “all deliberate speed” to dismantle their dual school systems. The modern CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT was founded in this decision, which radically altered the traditional legal position on RACIAL DISCRIMI- NATION . When comprehensive federal CIVIL RIGHTS legislation was enacted in the 1960s, the WARREN COURT easily upheld the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.) and the VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq.). The Warren Court was marked by its STRICT SCRUTINY of legislation that directly abridged the exercise of fundamental rights or narrowed the number of people w ho might exercise them, and of legislation that discriminated against various suspect classes. The strict scrutiny standard of review shifte d to the government the burden of proving a compelling STATE INTEREST that could justify discriminatory legis- lation. On most occasions the government could not meet this burden. In addition, the Court “read into” the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, applicable to the states, most of the provisions of the BILL OF RIGHTS, which until then had been applicable only to the federal government. Earl Warren. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WARREN, EARL 317 . descriptions of the goods or services, representations in samples and models, and proof of prior quality of the goods or services. Puffing, or the seller’s GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WARRANTY. states, most of the provisions of the BILL OF RIGHTS, which until then had been applicable only to the federal government. Earl Warren. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WARREN,. chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court ◆ 1943–53 Served as governor of California ◆ ◆ 1963 Wrote majority opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 316