Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 10 P34 pptx

Warren himself believed that his most important contribution to the law came in the area of legislative reapportionment. Most state legislatures had not apportioned their seats since the early 1900s. The allocation of seats was based on geographic areas and favored rural districts with small populations over growing urban and suburban areas. Political change was almost impossible because rural-dominated legislatures prevented reapportionment. Until the 1960s the Supreme Court had refused to intervene, concluding that cases challenging APPORTIONMENT were POLITICAL QUESTIONS beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. In BAKER V. CARR, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962), the Court held that it did have jurisdiction, and two years later, in REYNOLDS V. SIMS, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964), Warren w rote the opinion that has come to be known as the ONE PERSON , ONE VOTE decision. Reynolds and a series of cases that followed forced state legislatures to be apportioned equally on the basis of popula- tion rather than geographic areas. Warren noted that “citizens, not history or economic interests cast votes,” and that “legislators represent people, not acres or trees.” Reapportionment based on population resulted in a shift of political power away from sparsely populated rural areas to met ropolitan areas. Warren also reshaped U.S. CRIMINAL PROCE- DURE , in the process drawing protest from law enforcement officials and those citizens who believed the Court was tipping the balance in favor of criminals. Many cases of this era limited police SEARCHES AND SEIZURES and the use of confessions and extended the RIGHT TO COUNSEL to poor persons accused of felonies. In GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), the Court held that the SIXTH AMENDMENT right to legal counsel encompassed state as well as federal criminal proceedings. Therefore, the state was required to appoint an attor ney to represent an indigent person charged with a crime. In MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the Court required what has come to be known as the Miranda warning: the police must inform arrested persons that they need not answer questions and that they may have an attorney present durin g questioning. Warren sought to ensure that suspects who are not sophisticated in law or who are not able to afford ready counsel are not disadvantaged. Nevertheless, rising crime convinced many citizens that the Court gave away too much of the government’s authority in Miranda. The Warren Court also recog nized the constitutional right of privacy in GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965). Griswold struck down a Connecticut statute that prohibited the dissem- ination of BIRTH CONTROL information. In declaring the right of privacy, the Court laid the groundwork for the post–Warren Court decision in ROE V . WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), which gave women the right to have an ABORTION. In 1963 President LYNDON B. JOHNSON per- suaded Warren to head a commission investi- gating the ASSASSINATION of President JOHN F. KENNEDY. Warren reluctantly agreed to the request but was uncomfortable participating in this extrajudicial activity. The 1964 WARREN COMMISSION report has remained controversial. Critics have attacked its conclusions that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin and that there was no CONSPIRACY to kill the president. Warren and the Court weathered a firestorm of criticism for the 1962 decision in Engel v. Vitale, which outlawed mandatory school prayer. However, Warren and his fellow justices believed strongly inthe Billof Rights, asthe Court proved repeatedly in numerous decisions that applied the national standard outlined by those rights to individual states. In 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court set forth a constitutionally protected right to privacy. Warren informed President Johnson in June 1968 of his intent to retire but left the date of his resignation open. When Republicans blocked Johnson’s nomination of Justice ABE FORTAS in the fall of 1968, Warren agreed to serve until the next president took office in 1969, leaving the bench in July 1969. President RICHARD M. NIXON appointed WARREN E. BURGER as Warren’s successor. Many commentators have praised Warren’s tenure as chief justice, but critics have charged that his judicial activism was outside the proper role of the Court and that many of the decisions were based on his personal values rather than the Constitution or other legal sources. Both Chief Justice Burger and his successor, Chief Justice WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, have eschewed IN CIVILIZED LIFE, LAW FLOATS IN A SEA OF ETHICS .EACH IS INDISPENSABLE TO CIVILIZATION . W ITHOUT LAW, WE SHOULD BE AT THE MERCY OF THE LEAST SCRUPULOUS ; WITHOUT ETHICS, LAW COULD NOT EXIST . —EARL WARREN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 318 WARREN, EARL Warren’s approach, applying more conservative principles. Warren died on July 9, 1974, in Washington, D.C. FURTHER READINGS Cray, Ed. 1997. Chief Justice: A Biography of Earl Warren. New York: Simon & Schuster. Schwartz, Bernard, ed. 1996. The Warren Court: A Retrospective. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Japanese American Evacuation Cases; Judicial Review; School Desegreg ation; Warren Court. WASH SALE The buying and selling of the same or a similar asset within a short period of time. A fictitious type of arrangement whereby a BROKER, upon receiving an order from one individual to purchase and an order from another individual to sell a certain amount of a particular stock or commodity, transfers it from one principal to the other and retains the difference in value. For the purposes of INCOME TAX, losses on a WASH SALE of stock may not be recognized as capital losses if stock of equal value is obtained within 30 days prior or subsequent to the date of sale. The rule is meant to discourage sales at a loss only in order to take a tax advantage. The loss from the earlier sale is not recognized but is instead added to the basis of the newly purchased security. Various stock exchanges disallow this prac- tice because the orders to buy and sell should be executed separately to the advantage of each of the broker’s clients. v WASHINGTON, BOOKER TALIAFERRO Booker Taliaferro Washington was born into SLAVERY, but grew up to become one of the nation’s most prominent leaders and educators. While various groups both supported and opposed his views, no one denied that Washington’s accomplishments were notable. He remained, until his death, an influential proponent of race relations and African American self-sufficiency. Booker Taliaferro was born on April 5, 1856, in Franklin County, Virginia. His mother was a slave; his father a white man whose identity remains unknown. When Boo ker was a child, his mother married a slave named Washington Ferguson. Booker took his step- father’s first name and became known as Booker T. Washington. After the U.S. CIVIL WAR ended, Washington and his family moved to Malden, West Virginia. At age nine, Washing- ton be gan work in the local salt mines. He then labored as a coal miner before going to work as a houseboy for the wife of Lewis Ruffner, the mine owner, while attendi ng a poorly equipped school that could only give him the bare rudiments of an education. Possessed of a quick and lively intelligence, Washington was fascinated by the books he saw at the Ruffners’ house and, with Mrs. Ruffner’s encouragement, became determined to get a higher education. When Washington was 16, he made a long trek on foot to attend the Hampton Agricultural Institute in Virginia. The institute had been founded in 1868 by Samuel Arm- strong, a former Union Army general who had led African American troops during the Civil War. Armstrong believed strongly that freed slaves must be educated but also must learn to provide for themselves by receiving training in manual skills. An ardent proponent of the virtues of good hygiene and strong morals as well as self-discipline, Armstrong became a mentor to Washington. Washington graduated from Hampton In- stitute in 1875 and returned to Malden where Booker T. Washington. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS I HAVE LEARNED THAT SUCCESS IS TO BE MEASURED NOT SO MUCH BY THE POSITION THAT ONE HAS REACHED IN LIFE AS BY THE OBSTACLES WHICH HE HAS OVERCOME WHILE TRYING TO SUCCEED . —BOOKER T. WASHINGTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WASHINGTON, BOOKER TALIAFERRO 319 he worked as a teacher. Washington later taught at Hampton. When a new school, the Tuskegee Negro Normal Institute, was opene d in Alabama on July 4, 1881, Washington, on Armstrong’s recommendation, was placed in charge of it. Following the Hampton Institute model, Tuskegee Institute had an academic regimen but placed an emphasis on learning such practical trades as farming, carpentry, brickmaking, shoemaking, and printing. Washington traveled the country to raise funds for his school, speaking to both whites and African Americans. His speeches eventually began to earn him a national reputation. In 1895 Washington spoke at the opening of the Cotton States Exposition in Atlanta, Georgia. In that speech Washington emphasized the need for African Americans to become economically self-sufficient before pressing for political rights. Washington’s speech, called the “Atlanta Com- promise,” was well-received by numerous politicians and white citizens in the South who were proponents of JIM CROW LAWS, legislation which mandated SEGREGATION and political disenfranchisement. Washington’s conservative views were de- nounced by W. E. B. DuBois and other African American, as well as white, leaders who felt that CIVIL RIGHTS could not be compromised and that Washington’s emphasis on a vocational educa- tion was an affront to those who wished to become professionals. Opposition to Washing- ton’s views helped to create the Niagara Movement, which was started in 1905 and served as the forerunner of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), established in 1909. Undaunted by criticism from both liberals and conservatives, Washington continued to write, lecture, and disseminate his personal philosophy of non-agitation. In addition, his influence expanded. He served as advisor to Presidents THEODORE ROOSEVELT and WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT , on the subject of political appointments of African Americans and issues concerning race relations. He also was instru- mental in securing funds for African-American institutions from such millionaire industrial leaders as Andre w Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller. When Washington died on November 14, 1915, Tuskegee Institute had more than 1,50 0 students enrolled, and approximately two hundred faculty members. Its endowment was larger than that of any other African American institution. Washington was able to add a considerable amount to Tuskegee funds through the sale of his popular and ground- breaking autob iography, Up from Slavery, which was published in 1901. Beginning in 1903 with the publication of Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk, and continu- ing for the rest of his life, Washington was criticized for his failure to be more publicly aggressive in fighting the deterioration of race relations in the United States, for his avoidance of direct public support for civil rights legisla- tion, and for his single-minded emphasis on industrial education as opposed to academic training for a “talented tenth” of the race. Washington, however, was adept at outmaneu- vering his critics, even resorting to the use of spies to infiltrate organizations critical of his leadership, such as the Niagara Movement, led Booker Taliaferro Washington 1856–1915 1850 1925 1900 1875 1856 Born, Franklin County, Va. 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford decision denied citizenship to African Americans 1865 Thirteenth Amendment ratified, abolished slavery 1870 Fifteenth Amendment ratified, established right of all male citizens to vote 1872–75 Attended Hampton Agricultural Institute 1868 Fourteenth Amendment ratified, gave citizenship rights to former slaves 1875 Graduated from Hampton 1881 Became head of Tuskegee Negro Normal Institute in Alabama 1895 Gave “Atlanta Compromise” speech at Cotton States Exposition in Atlanta 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision upheld “separate but equal” racial segregation 1901 Up from Slavery published 1915 Died, Tuskegee, Ala. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 320 WASHINGTON, BOOKER TALIAFERRO by Du Bois. His intimate friends called Washington “the Wiza rd” for his mastery of political intrigue and his exercise of power. Booker T. Washington was both praised and reviled for practicing the “politics of accom mo- dation.” To so me he was a hero who advocated for moral development and economic self- reliance for African Americans who had to forge a life after being freed from the bonds of slavery. To others he was supportive of segregation and a compatriot of whites who attempted to suppress equal rights for African Americans. Regardless of these views, Washing- ton was a pivotal figure in American race relations after the Civil War. FURTHER READINGS Harlan, Louis R. 1986. Booker T. Washington: The Wizard of Tuskegee, 1901–1915. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. ———. 1975. Booker T. Washington: The Making of a Black Leader, 1856–1901. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Washington, Booker T. 1901. Up from Slavery, an Autobiography. Reprint, New York: Gramercy Books, 1993. v WASHINGTON, BUSHROD Bushrod Washington served on the U.S. Supreme Court as an associate justice from 1798 to 1829. A strong Federalist and able jurist, Washington was tolerant and well-liked by other members of the bar. His reputation, though respectable, might shine more brightly today if it was not overshadowed by that of his contemporary and friend, Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL . Washington concurred with Mar- shall’s opinions so often that jokes were made about them being one justice. Although he wrote a handful of significant opinions on contract law, Washington is remembered pri- marily as a stalwart supporter of the chief justice. Born on June 5, 1762, in Westmoreland County, Virginia, Washington enjoyed the benefits of an aristocratic life. He was a nephew of GEORGE WASHINGTON, the nation’s first presi- dent, and the two were close. He inherited the president’s estate at Mount Vernon. Tutored at home in his childhood, Washington later attended the College of William and Mary, graduating in 1778. He studied law privately until 1781 and then served in the Revolutionary War. In 1784 he was admitted to the Virginia bar. Washington first practiced law in Alexan- dria, Virginia, where he also became involved in politics. In these early years of the young lawyer’s life, he specialized in chancery cases— typical lawsuits under the now-antiquated system of EQUITY law. Yet he had an eager mind and kept expanding the range of his experience. He became a keen supporter of FEDERALISM, ▼▼ ▼▼ Bushrod Washington 1762–1829 17501750 18001800 18251825 18501850 17751775 ❖ 1762 Born, Westmoreland County, Va. 1778 Graduated from William and Mary College 1790 Admitted to Va. bar 1775–83 American Revolution 1778–83 Served in Continental Army 1787 Served in Va. House of Delegates 1798–1829 Served as associate justice of U.S. Supreme Court 1812–14 War of 1812 1829 Died, Washington, D.C. ◆◆◆❖ Bushrod Washington. PHOTOGRAPH BY HARRIS & EWING. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION WASHINGTON, BUSHROD 321 embracing its belief in strong federal govern- ment, and in 1787 won election to the Virginia House of Delegates. In 1788, as the nation was preparing to ratify the Constitu tion, he served as a delegate to Virginia’s ratifying convention. By the late 1790s, Washington had established his own practice in Richmond, trained numerous lawyers, and written two enormous volumes of reports on cases as a recorder for the state’s court of appeals. His legal and political experience prompted President JOHN ADAMS to appoint him to the Supreme Court in 1798. On the Court, Washington almost always followed the lead of Chief Justice Marshall. The two had been friends since their student days and shared political sympathies. Marshall, widely viewed as the greatest leader of the Court in history, w as also an ardent judicial Federalist. Only three times did Washington vote differently from Marshall, and only once did he attach a concurring opinion to the chief justice’s opinion. This was in DARTMOUTH COLLEGE V . WOODWARD, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819), a landmark case that upheld the inviolability of co ntracts. Washington’s cautious concurrence sought to limit the implications of the decision. If the two men differed philosophically, it was only by degree. Washington wished to avoid conflicts with STATES’ RIGHTS whenever possible. He dissented only twice during 31 years on the Court. In fact, as a trusted supporter of the chief justice during the early tumultuous years of Marshall’s tenure, he even went so far as to discourage his colleagues from writing dissents when ordinary issues were involved. Washington also made independent contri- butions to the Court. He wrote the first part of the decision in Ogden v. Saunders,25U.S.(12 Wheat.) 213, 6 L. Ed. 606 (1827), which stated that any law passed before the execution of a contract is a valid part of that contract. He was noted for his fairness while “circuit riding”— traveling and performing the duties of a circuit judge, a routine though difficult task for Supreme Court justices in the early nineteenth century. Washington died in Philadelphia on November 26, 1829. FURTHER READINGS Abraham, Henry J. 1992. Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments to the Supreme Court. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Faber, David A. 1999. “Justice Bushrod Washington and the Age of Discovery in American Law.” West Virginia Law Review 102 (summer). Hall, Kermit, ed. 2005. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. v WASHINGTON, GEORGE George Washington was a U.S. military leader, statesperson, and the first president of the United States from 1789 to 1797. A leader of mythic proportion in U.S. history, Washing- ton’s leadership from the American Revolution ( WAR OF INDEPENDENCE) to the end of his presidential administrations proved crucial to winning independence from Great Britain and establishing a national union of states based on the U.S. Constitution. Washington was born on February 22, 1732, in Westmoreland County, Virginia, the first so n of Augustine Washington and his second wife, Mary Ball Washington. Born into the colonial aristocracy, Washington attended local schools and supplemented his formal education by reading widely. As a young man he became a surveyor, and in 1749 he was appointed county surveyor for Culpeper County, Virginia. In 1752, at the age of 20 Washington inherited the family estate at Mount Vernon and embarked on a military career. During the French and Indian War, Washington gained his first military experience. The war was fought to determine whether France or Great Britain would rule North America. In 1753 Washington requested and received the assignment of delivering an ulti- matum to the French, ordering them to retreat from the Ohio Valley. The French refused, and Washington led troops against them. Although Washington won an initial victory in 1754, the French counterattacked in force and Washing- ton had to surrender his camp at Fort Necessity, Pennsylvania. He resigned his commission, but in May 1755 Washington became an unpaid volunteer, serving as aide-de-camp to the British general Edward Braddock. Braddock was ambushed and killed later that year near Fort Duquesne, and Washington himself nar- rowly escaped. In August 1755 Washington was promoted to colonel and given command of the Virginia MILITIA, which defended the western frontier of the colony. During the remainder of the war, Washington successfully protected the frontier. IT IS BUT A DECENT RESPECT DUE TO THE WISDOM , THE INTEGRITY , AND THE PATRIOTISM OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY , BY WHICH ANY LAW IS PASSED , TO PRESUME IN FAVOR OF ITS VALIDITY , UNTIL ITS VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION IS PROVED BEYOND ALL REASONABLE DOUBT . —BUSHROD WASHINGTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 322 WASHINGTON, GEORGE In 1759 Washington returned to Mount Vernon, where he married Martha Custes, a young widow with a large estate. The marriage made Washington one of the wealthiest men in Virginia. He was elected to the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1759, serving until 1774. During this period, colonial anger at British taxation and control began to steadily build. Great Britain believed that the taxes were justified to help repay the war debt and recognize British efforts to successfully remove France from North America. Washington, like many other colonial leaders, joined the protes t against British interference and in 1774 endorsed the Fairfax Resolves, which called for a stringent boycott of British imports. In 1774 and 1775 he attended the first and second CONTINENTAL CONGRESSES as a delegate from Virginia. In 1775, as the Revolutionary War was imminent, the Congress appointed Washington commander in chief of the American forces, which were known as the Continental Army. It was hoped that Washington’s appointment would promote unity between Virginia and New England. Washington’s years as commander in chief were a mix of defeats and victories. In March 1776 he successfully forced the British out of Boston, but in August the British defeated his forces at New York City. Washington then sought safety in New Jersey and emerged victorious again with his surprise attack on Trenton on December 25, 1776. On January 3, 1777, Washington’s troops defeated the British at Princeton, New Jersey. The two victories were critical to maintaining colonial morale, and by the spring of 1777, more than 8,000 new soldiers had joined the Continental Army. The tide turned, however, in September 1777, when Washington unsuccessfully tried to stop British forces from advancing on Philadel- phia at the battle of Brandywine Creek. After the British occupied Philadelphia, Washington made a futile attack at nearby Germantown. During the winter of 1777 and 1778, Washing- ton’s troops stayed at Valley Forge, west of Philadelphia. The conditions were adverse, requiring all of Washington’s leadership skills to hold his army together. During the winter his actions aroused DISSENT in Congress, and his critics so ught to have General Horatio Ga tes replace Washin gton as commander in chief. Several congressmen and military officers backed Gates, but the public rallied behind Washington. George Washington. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS George Washington 1732–1799 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17251725 18001800 17751775 17501750 ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆◆◆◆ ❖ ❖ 1732 Born, Westmoreland County, Va. 1752 Inherited family estate at Mount Vernon, Va.; began military career 1754–63 French and Indian War 1759–74 Served in the Va. House of Burgesses 1775 Attended Second Continental Congress; appointed commander in chief of the Continental Army 1774 Attended First Continental Congress 1781 British General Cornwallis surrendered at the Battle of Yorktown 1799 Died, Mount Vernon, Va. 1783 Treaty of Paris signed, ending Revolutionary War 1775–83 American Revolution 1793 Neutrality Proclamation issued 1794 Sent out militia to quell the Whiskey Rebellion 1795 Jay Treaty settled commerce and navigation rights with Great Britain 1789– 97 Served as first president of the United States GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WASHINGTON, GEORGE 323 In June 1778 Washington attacked the British at Monmouth, New Jersey, but again was defeated. He then shifted his military strategy, keeping his troops encamped around British fo rces in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. In 1781 Washington defeated General Charles Cornwallis at the Battle of Yorktown in Virginia. The surrender of Corn- wallis marked the end of major military actions in the Revolutionary War. The signing of the TREATY OF PARIS in 1783 officially ended the conflict, with Great Britain recognizing the independence of the thirteen colonies and the geographic boundaries of the new nation. After the war Washington returned to Mount Vernon, but he was soon drawn back into politics. The ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION proved ineffective for governing the national affairs of the 13 states. SHAYS’S REBELLION, named after its leader Daniel Shays, was an armed insurrection in Massachusetts in 1787 and 1788 that con- vinced U.S. political leaders that a strong national government was needed. Washington agreed and consented to serve as president at the Constitu- tional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia. Though he played no part in the drafting of the Constitution and did not participate in behind- the-scenes political discussions, Washington’s presence lent legitimacy to the effort to craft a new government. As the leading national figure, Washington was the logical choice to become the first president of the United States. His election in 1788 helped shape the EXECUTIVE BRANCH of federal government. Washington decided to surround himself with a group of national leaders as his advisors and administrators. Though the presidential cabinet is not discussed in the Constitution, Washington’s use of it made it a traditional part of a president’s administration. The first cabinet included THOMAS JEFFERSON as SECRETARY OF STATE and ALEXANDER HAMILTON as secretary of the treasury. Washington was sympathetic to Hamilton’s belief that a strong national government was needed, includin g the establishment of a national bank. In contrast, Jefferson believed that the states should con- tinue to be dominant, with the national government confined to the enumerated powers contained in the Constitution. The conflict between Hamilton and Jefferson dominated Washington’s administration. Jefferson supported the French Revolution, whereas Hamilton favored British efforts to organize a coalition to topple the new regime through warfare. As events unfolded, Washington announced in the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 that the United States favored neutrality in the war between France and the British coalition. U.S. neutrality clearly favored the British. When the French emissary Edmond- Charles Genet tried to recruit U.S. soldiers to serve as volunteers for the French cause, Washington had Genet recalled and repudiated the 1778 treaty with France. Jefferson opposed Washington’s actions and resigned as secretary of state, causing a rift in the REPUBLICAN PARTY and precipitating the format ion of the FEDERALIST PARTY , with Hamilton as its leader. Reelected in 1792, Washington faced do- mestic problems in 1794 with the WHISKEY REBELLION in Pennsylvania. Organized as a protest against a federal liquor tax, the Penn- sylvania uprising was quelled when Washington ordered the militia to maintain peace. In 1795 Washington faced opposition to the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, which JOHN JAY had negotiated to settle commerce and naviga- tion rights. One section of the treaty permitted the British to search U.S. ships. The treaty was adopted because of Washington’s popularity, but both the president and the treaty were severely criticized. The ELECTORAL COLLEGE unanimously elected Washington in 1789 and 1792; he is the only president to date to be unanimously elected. Washington did not seek reelection in 1796. In his celebrated “Farewell Address,” he advised against “entangling alliances” with European nations. He returned to Mount Vernon, where he spent the rest of his years managing his estate. Washington died on December 14, 1799, at Mount Vernon. FURTHER READINGS Marshall, John. 2000. The Life of George Washington. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Rozell, Mark J., William D. Pederson, and Frank J. Williams, eds. 2000. George Washington and the Origins of the American Presidency. Westport, Conn: Praeger. Shogan, Colleen J. 2001. “The Moralist and the Cavalier: The Political Rhetoric of Washington and Jefferson.” Northern Kentucky Law Review 28 (summer). Zall, Paul M., ed. 2003. Washington on Washington. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky. LIBERTY, WHEN IT BEGINS TO TAKE ROOT , IS A PLANT OF RAPID GROWTH . —GEORGE WASHINGTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 324 WASHINGTON, GEORGE CROSS REFERENCES “Farewell Address” (Appendix, Primary Document); War of Independence. WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to review the constitutionality of a Washington state statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. By up- holding the statute and denying mentally competent, terminally ill patients a constitu- tional right to hasten their death through lethal doses of self-a dministered, doctor-prescribed medication, the Supreme Court returned this controversial issue to the states where it continues to be debated among residents, legislators, and judges. In handing down its decision, the Court was careful to point out that it was not foreclosing reconsideration of the issue at some later time. The case arose in January 1994 when four Washington physicians, three gravely ill patients, and a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering doctor-assisted suicide filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of Washington Revised Code Section 9A.36.060, which makes it a crime to knowingly assist, aid, or cause the suicide of another person. The district court ruled the statute unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the liberty interest protected by the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the FIFTH and FOURTEENTH AME NDMENTS to the U.S. Consti- tution (Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454). The case was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appe als for the Ninth Circuit, where a panel of judges reversed the district court’s ruling and reinstated the Washington statute. In a2–1 decision, the court of appeals emphasized that no right to assisted suicide has ever been recognized by a court of final jurisdiction anywhere in the United States (Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (1995). Agreeing to rehear the case en banc (before 11 judges on the ninth circuit), the court of appeals reversed the panel’s decision and affirmed the district court’s ruling, which had invalidated the Washington statute (Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (1996). In an 8–3 decision, the appellate court said that “the Constitution encompasses a DUE PROCESS liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one’s death,” including the liberty interest of certain patients to hasten their deaths by taking deadly amounts of medication prescribed by their physicians. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST cast the issue in a slightly different light. In an opinion joined by Justices SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, ANTONIN SCALIA, ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, and CLARENCE THOMAS, Rehnquist said that the case turned on whether the Due Process Clause prote cts the right to commit suicid e with another’s assistance. According to the Court, three reasons sup- ported its decision to reject such a constitu- tional claim. First, the Court observed that suicide and assisted suicide have been disapproved by Anglo-Saxon law for more than seven hundred years. From thirteenth-century England through nineteenth-century America, the Court said, the COMMON LAW has consistently autho- rized the punishment of those who have attempted to kill themselves or assisted others in doing so. Second, the Court pointed to the overwhelming majority of states that currently prohibit physician-assisted suic ide. Only Ore- gon expressly allows doctors to help their patients hasten their demise through lethal doses of prescribed medication, and the law that allows this pra ctice is constantly being challenged in court. Third, the Court found that the history of the Due Process Clause does not support the asserted right to assisted suicide. Although the Due Process Clause protects certain fundamental rights, the Court wrote, the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide does not rise to this level of importance. Before a right may be deemed fundamental in nature, it must be deeply rooted in the nation’s LEGAL HISTORY . Bec ause the Court found the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide to be contrary to U.S. history, tradition, and practice, it concluded that it was not a fundamental right. This conclusion meant that the Court would not apply the STRICT SCRUTINY standard of JUDICIAL REVIEW that is required when a piece of legislation affects a highly valued liberty or freedom. Instead, the Court applied a minimal standard of judicial scrutiny. Known as the rational relationship test, this standard of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG 325 judicial scrutiny requires courts to uphold laws that are reasonably related to some legitimate government interest. In this case the Court said that the state of Washington had a legitimate interest in preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, and safeguarding vulnerable members of society, such as the poor, elderly, and disabled, from friends and relatives who see physician-assisted suicide as a way to end the heartache and burden that often accompany the protracted illness of a loved one. On the same day that the Court released its decision in Glucksberg, it announced its decision in a companion case, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997). Vacco differed from Glucksberg in that the plaintiffs in Vacco (three doctors and three terminally ill patients) challenged a New York law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide on the ground that it violated the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. New York Penal Law Section 125.15 makes it a crime to intentionally help another person commit suicide. However, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depa rtment of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990), New York permits compe- tent adult patients to terminate life-sustaining treatment, such as artificial hydration, nutrition, and respiration. The Equal Protection Clause requires the government to provide equal treatment to all similarly situated people. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from denying legal rights to one group of persons when those same rights are afforded to another group confronted by indistinguishable circum- stances. The plaintiffs argued that the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is tanta- mount to suicide, because by definition its withdrawal typically ends life by ceasing to sustain it. The plaintiffs in Vacco contended that, in allowing some patients to hasten their death by terminating life-sustaining measures but not allowing other patients to hasten their deaths by taking lethal doses of prescribed medication, New York had denied patients equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court disagreed. A funda- mental distinction exists between letting a patient die and killing her, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in the majority opinion that was again joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. In one instance, the patient is allowed to die by natural causes when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn. The patient’s cause of death in that instance, the Court said, is the underlying illness. In the other instance, the Court continued, death is inten- tionally inflicted by the joint effort of doctor and patient. The caus e of death in that instance, the Court emphasized, is not the underlying illness, but human action. The Court also pointed out that the Cruzan decision was based on the ancient common-law tradition of protecting patients from unwanted medical treatment. Under the common law, it is considered a BATTERY (an intentional TORT that makes any unwanted touching actionable) for a physician to force a competent adult to undergo life-sustaining treatment over a clearly voiced objection. Based in part on this common-law tradition, the Court in Cruzan recognized a limited constitutional right of a competent, adult patient to disconnect hydration, nutr ition, and respiration equipment, even if exercising this right would necessarily result in the patient’s death. However, the Court in Vacco noted that a right to physician-assisted suicide has never been approved by the common law but has been historically discouraged by both common-law and statutory schemes throughout the United States. Thus, the Court concluded that physician-assisted suicide is not substantially similar to refusing medical treatment and that the legal systems of New York and other states may treat each practice differently without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Although the decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco were both unanimous, a number of justices wrote concurring opinions that were applicable to both cases. In a concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor, which was joined by Justice RUTH BADER GINSBURG,O’Connor stressed that the states remain free to establish a right to physician-assisted suicide or to otherwise strike a proper balance between the interests of terminally ill patients and the interests of society. State legislatures, O’Connor suggested, are a more appropriate forum for making such difficult decisions because their members are accountable to the electorate at the ballot box. By contrast, the federal judiciary is often insulated from public opinion because GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 326 WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG their members are appointed to the bench for life. Relying on several studies undertaken by the states to evaluate the problem of physician-assisted suicide, O’Connor said that the right to die must first be grappled with at the local level before entangling federal courts in the controversy. Justice JOHN PAUL STEVENS’s concurring opin- ion also underscored the need for further national debate on the propriety of physician- assisted suicide, but in a different vein. Although the states’ interests may have been adequately served in Glucksberg and Vacco, Stevens cautioned, the Court’s holding in these two cases does not foreclose the possibility that other circumstances might arise in which such statutes would infringe on a constitutionally protected area. There will be times, Stevens wrote, when a patient’s interests in hastening his death will outweigh the state’s countervailing interests in preserving his life. Although Stevens did not speculate about the circumstances in which a patient might successfully assert a right- to-die claim, Justice STEPHEN BREYER took the opportunity to do so in his concurring opinion. Breyer suggested that the right to die should be renamed “the right-to-die with dignity.” Once recognized by the Court, Breyer said, the right to die with dignity would include a competent patient’s right to control the manner of her death, the quality and degree of professional care and intervention, and the amount of physical pain and suffering. Accord- ing to Breyer, a statute that would prevent patients from obtaining acce ss to certain pallia- tive care aimed at reducing pain and suffering might infringe on the right to die with dignity. Competent, terminally ill adult patients, Breyer intimated, may enjoy a constitutional right to prescription medication that will minimize the agony that often tortures the final days of their existence. Justice DAVID H. SOUTER articulated a different method of analysis for evaluating right-to-die cases. Souter argued that the so-called right to die is a species of SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS. Substantive due process, Souter reminded the Court, is a doctrine under which a judge evaluates the substantive merits of a statute, as opposed to the procedure by which it is implemented or administered. Under the rubric of substantive due process, the Court has recognized an individual’s interest in dignity, autonomy, and privacy, among other things, over the course of the last century. The right to refuse unwanted medical treatment recognized by the Court in Cruzan, for example, was designed in part to serve these three interests. Souter contended that the doctrine of substantive due process protects individuals from “arbitrary impositions” and “purposeless restraints” created by the government. Souter advocated viewing substantive due process claims on a continuum of liberty in which the level of judicial scrutiny would increase in direct proportion to the level of government restraint or imposition. First enunciated by Justice JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989 (1961), this approach to substantive due process would require courts to carefully balance the competing interests presented by the litigants in each right-to-die case. Souter contrasted this simpler approach with the more complicated analysis presently employed by the Court, an analysis that involves multiple tiers of judicial scrutiny, ranging from strict to minimal scrutiny, different categories of constitutional rights, ranging from fundamental to non-fundamental rights, and different classes of protected status into which a plaintiff may fall, ranging from suspect to non-suspect classes. A BALANCING approach such as the one articulated in Poe, Souter maintained, would allow for the gradual evolution of a constitu- tional right to die, instead of the complicated all-or-nothing approach that the Court has effectively adopted. FURTHER READINGS Cantor, Norman L. 2001. “Glucksberg, the Putative Right to Adequate Pain Relief, and Death with Dignity.” Journal of Health Law 34 (summer). Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. 2001. The Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press. Gunther, Gerald, and Gerhard Casper, eds. 1998. Washing- ton v. Glucksberg. Bethesda, MD: Univ. Publications of America. Hanafin, Patrick. 2003. “Surviving Law: Death Community Culture.” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 28 (spring). “Supreme Court Unanimously Upholds State Laws against Criminally Assisted Suicide.” 1997. United States Law Week (July 1). CROSS REFERENCES Death and Dying; Euthanasia; Living Will; Quinlan, In re. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG 327 . Washington. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky. LIBERTY, WHEN IT BEGINS TO TAKE ROOT , IS A PLANT OF RAPID GROWTH . —GEORGE WASHINGTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 324 WASHINGTON,. relationship test, this standard of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG 325 judicial scrutiny requires courts to uphold laws that are reasonably related to. navigation rights with Great Britain 1789– 97 Served as first president of the United States GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WASHINGTON, GEORGE 323 In June 1778 Washington attacked