WASTE Harmful or destructive use of real property by one in rightful possession of the property. Waste is an unreasonable or improper use of land by an individual in rightful possession of the land. A party with an interest in a parcel of land may file a civil action based on waste committed by an individual who also has an interest in the land. Such disputes may arise between life tenants and remaindermen and landlords and tenants. The lawsuit may seek an INJUNCTION to stop the waste, damages for the waste, or both. Actions based on waste ordinarily arise when an owner of land takes exception to the manner in which the possessor or tenant is using the land. The concept of waste should not be confused with substances labeled as toxic waste. The four common types of waste are voluntary, permissive, ameliorating, and equita- ble waste. Voluntary waste is the willful destruction or carrying away of something attached to the property. In an action for voluntary waste, the plaintiff must show that the waste was caused by an affirmative act of the tenant. Such waste might occur if a life tenant (a person who possesses the land for his lifetime, after which a remainderman takes possession) chops down all the trees on the occupied land and sells them as lumber. Voluntary waste will also occur, for exam- ple, if the tenant of an apartment removes kitchen appliances that are attached to the apartment floors and walls. More commonly, the tenant breaks a window, damages walls or woodwork, or otherwise damages the apart- ment. Landlords typically protect against this type of voluntary waste by requiring a damage or security deposit from the tenant at the commencement of the lease. When the tenant vacates the apartment, the landlord inspects for waste. If the apartment has been damaged, the landlord will use part or all of the deposit for repairs. If the damage exceeds the deposit, however, the landlord may file an action seeking damages for the repairs not covered by the deposit. Permissive waste is an injury caused by an omission, rather than an affirmative act, on the part of the tenant. This type of waste might occur, for example, if a tenant permits a house to fall into disrepair by not making reasonable maintenance repairs. Ameliorating waste is an alteration in the physical characteristics of the premise s by an unauthorized act of the tenant that increases the value of the property. For example, a tenant might make improvements that increase the value of the property, such as remodeling a bathroom. Generally, a tenant is not held liable if she commits this type of waste. Equitable waste is a harm to the reversion- ary interest in land that is inconsistent with fruitful use. This CAUSE OF ACTION is recognized only by courts of EQUITY and is not regarded as legal waste in courts of law. For example, if the life tenant begins to cut down immature trees, the remainderman, who will someday take possession of the property, may file an action in equity seeking an injunction to stop the cutting. The remainderman would argue that the cutting imperils the productive use of the land in the future, because the value of the land after the immature trees have been cut would be decreased. In an action for waste, a plaintiff commonly will seek damages for acts that have already occurred and request an injunction against future acts. A court will order an injunction if it finds that irreparable harm will occur and that the legal remedy would be inadequate, unless otherwise provided by statute. Certain laws provide for temporary relief if acts of waste are either threatened or committed. The ordina ry measure of damages for waste is the diminution in value of the property to the nonpossessor as a result of the acts of the possessor. This is frequently difficult to mea- sure, particularly in situations where a signifi- cant period of time will elapse before the plaintiff is entitled to actual possession. CROSS REFERENCES Landlord and Tenant; Life Estate. WATER POLLUTION Water pollution is the contamination of bodies of water, including oceans, rivers, lakes, and groundwater, caused by human actions, which can be harmful to organisms and plants that live in water. Clean water is also necessary for recreational interests such as swimming, boat- ing, and w ater skiing. Yet, when Congress began assessing national water quality during the early 1970s, it found that much of the country’s groundwater and surface water was GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 328 WASTE contaminated or severely compromised. Studies revealed that the nation’s three primary sources of water pollution—industry, agriculture, and municipalities—had been regularly discharging harmful materials into water supplies through- out the country over a number of years. These harmful materials include organic wastes, sediments, minerals, nutrients, thermal pollutants, toxic chemicals, and other hazardous substances. Organic wastes are produced by animals and humans, and include such things as fecal matter, crop debris, yard clippings, food wastes, rubber, plastic, wood, and disposable diapers. Such wastes require oxygen to decom- pose. When they are dumped into streams and lakes and begin to break down, they can deprive aquatic life of the oxygen it needs to survive. Sediments may be deposited into lakes and streams through soil erosion caused by the clearing, excavating, grading, transporting, and filling of land. Minerals, such as iron, copper, chromium, platinum, nickel, zinc, and tin, can be discharged into streams and lakes as a result of various mining activities. Excessive levels of sediments and minerals in water can inhibit the penetration of sunlight, which reduces the production of photosynthetic organisms. Nutrients, such as phosphorus and nitrogen, support the growth of algae and other plants forming the lower levels of the food chain. However, excessive levels of nutrients from sources such as fertilizer can cause eutrophica- tion, which is the overgrowth of aquatic vegetation. This overgrowth clouds the water and smothers some plants. Over time, excessive nutrient levels can accelerate the natural process by which bodies of water evolve into dry land. Thermal pollution results from the release of heated water into lakes and streams. Most thermal pollution is generated by power plant cooling systems. Power plants use water to cool their reactors and turbines, and discharge it into lakes and tributaries after it has become heated. Higher water temperatures accelerate biological and chemical processes in rivers and streams, reducing the water’s ability to retain dissolved oxygen. This can hasten the growth of algae and disrupt the reproduction of fish. Toxic chemicals and other hazardous mate- rials present the most imminent threat to water quality. The ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) has identified 582 highly toxic chemicals, which are produced, manufactured, and stored in locations across the United States. Some chemical plants incinerate toxic waste, which produces dangerous by-products such as furans and chlorinated dioxins, two of the most deadly carcinogens known. Othe r hazardous materials are produced or stored by households (motor oil, antifreeze, paints, and pesticides), dry cleaners (chlorinated solvents), farms (insecti- cides, fungicides, rodenticides, and herbicides), and gas stations and airports (fuel). Water pollution regulation consists of a labyrinth of state and federal statutes, adminis- trative rules, and COMMON LAW principles. Statutory Law Federal statutory regulation of water pollution has been governed primarily by three pieces of legislation: the Refuse Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), and the CLEAN WATER ACT . The Rivers and Harbors Appropria- tions Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq., commonly known as the Refuse Act, was the first major piece of federal legislation regulating water pollution. The Refuse Act set effluent standards for the discharge of pollutants into bodies of water. An effluent standard limits the amount of pollutant that can be released from a specific point or source, such as a smokestack or Sign alerts swimmers to high levels of bacteria in waters near Santa Monica, California. Beaches in the Los Angeles area are some of the most polluted in the state, largely due to runoff from nearby storm drains. DAVID MCNEW/GETTY IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WATER POLLUTION 329 sewage pipe. The Refuse Act flatly prohibited pollution disc harged from ship and shore installations. The Refuse Act was followed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. Instead of focusing on sources of pollution through effluent standards, the FWPCA created water quality standard s, which prescribed the levels of pollutants permitted in a given body of water. While the Refuse Act concentrated on deterring specific types of polluters, the FWPCA concentrated on reducing specific types of pollution. Since 1972, federal regulation of water pollution has been primarily governed by the Clean Water Act (CWA) 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq., which overhauled FWCPA. The CWA forbids any person to discharge pollutants into U.S. waters unless the discharge conforms with certain provisions of the act. Among those provisions are several that call upon the EPA to promulgate effluent standards for particular categories of water polluters. To implement these standards, the CWA requires each polluter to obtain a discharge permit issued by the EPA through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). Although the EPA closely monitors water pollution dischargers through the NPDES, primary responsibility for enforcement of the CWA rests with the states. Most states have also drafted permit systems similar to the NPDES. These systems are designed to protect local supplies of groundwater, surface water, and drinking water. Persons who violate either the federal or state permit system face civil fines, criminal penalties, and suspension of their discharge privileges. The CWA also relies on modern technology to curb water pollution. It requires many polluters to implement the best practicable control technology , the best available technol- ogy economically achievable, or the best practicable waste treatment technology. The development of such technology for nontoxic polluters is based on a cost-benefit analysis in which the feasibility and expense of the technology are balanced against the expected benefits to the environment. The CWA was amended in 1977 to address the nation’s increasing concern about toxic pollutants. Pursuant to the 1977 amendments, the EPA increased the number of polluta nts it deemed toxic from nine to 65 and set effluent limitations for the 21 industries that discharge them. These limitations are based on measures of the danger these pollutants pose to the public health rather than on cost-benefit analyses. Many states have enacted their own water pollution legislation regulating the discharge of toxic and other pollutants into their streams and lakes. The mining industry presents persistent water pollution problems for state and federal governments. It has polluted more than a thousand miles of streams in Appalachia with acid drainage. In response, the affected state governments now require strip miners to obtain licenses before commencing activity. Many states also require miners to post bonds in amounts sufficient to repair potential damage to surrounding lakes and streams. Similarly, the federal government, under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., requires each mining applicant to “submit a plan of construc- tion, operation and rehabilitation” for the affected area, that takes into account the need for “restoration, revegetation and curtailment of erosion.” The commercial timber industry also pre- sents persistent water pollution problems. Tree harvesting, yarding (the collection of felled trees), and road building can all deposit soil sediments into watercourses, there by reducing the water quality for aquatic life. State govern- ments have offered similar responses to these problems. For instance, clear-cutting (the removal of substantially all the trees from a given area) has been prohibited by most states. Other states have created buffer zones around particularly vulnerable watercourses and have banned unusually harmful activities in certain areas. Enforcement of these water pollution measures has be en frustrated by vaguely worded legislation and a scarcity of inspectors in several states. Common Law State and federal water pollution statutes provide one avenue of legal recourse for those harmed by water pollution. The commo n law doctrines of NUISANCE, TRESPASS, NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, and riparian ownership provide alternative remedies . Nuisances can be public or private. Private nuisances interfere with the rights and interests GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 330 WATER POLLUTION of private citizens, w hereas public nuisances interfere with the common rights and interests of the people at large. Both types of nuisance must resul t from the “unreasonable” activities of a polluter and inflict “substantial” harm on neighboring landowners. An injury that is minor or inconsequential will not result in liability under common law nuisance. For example, dumping trace amounts of fertilizer into a stream abutting neighboring property will not amount to a public or private nuisance. The oil and agricultural industries are frequently involved in state nuisance actions. Oil companies often run afoul of nuisance principles for improperly storing, transporting, and disposing of hazardous materials. Farmers represent a unique class of persons who fall prey to water pollution nuisances almost as often as they create them. Their abundant use of fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, and roden- ticides makes them frequent creators of nui- sances, and their use of streams, rivers, and groundwater for irrigation systems makes them frequent victims. Nuisance actions deal primarily with con- tinuing or repetitive injuries. Trespass actions provide relief even when an injury results from a single event. A polluter who spills oil, dumps chemicals, or otherwise contaminates a neigh- boring water supply on one occasion might avoid liability under nuisance law but not under the law of trespass. Trespass does not require proof of a substantial injury. However, only NOMINAL DAMAGES will be awarded to a land- owner whose water supply suffers little harm from the trespass of a polluter. Trespass requires proof that a polluter intentionally or knowingly contaminated a particular course of water. Yet water contami- nation often results from unintentional behav- ior, such as industrial accidents. In such instances, the polluter may be liable under common law principles of negligence. Negli- gence occurs when a polluter fails to exercise the degree of care that would be reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, a landowner whose water supply was inadvertently contami- nated might bring a successful lawsuit against the polluter for common law negligence where a lawsuit for nuisance or trespass would fail. Even when a polluter exercises the utmost diligence to prevent water contamination, an injured landowner may still have recourse under the doctrine of strict liability. Under this doctrine, polluters who engage in “abnormally dangerous” activities are held responsible for any water contamination that results. Courts consider six factors when determining whether a particular activity is abnormally dangerou s: the probability that the activity will cause harm to another, the likelihood that the harm w ill be great, the ability to eliminate the risk by exercising reasonable care, the extent to which the activity is uncommon or unusual, the activity’s appropriateness for a particular loca- tion, and the activity’s value or danger to the community. The doctrine of strict liability arose out of a national conflict between competing values during the Industrial Revolution. This conflict pitted those who believed it was necessary to create an environment that promoted com- merce against those who believed it was necessary to preserve a healthy and clean environment. For many years, courts were reluctant to impose strict liability on U.S. businesses, out of concern over retarding industrial growth. Since the early 1970s, courts have placed greater emphasis on preserving a healthy and clean environment. In Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. App. 1975), the court explained that “though many hazardous activi- ties are socially desirable, it now seems reasonable that they pay their own way.” Cities Service involved a situation in which a dam burst during a phosphate mining operation, releasing a billion gallons of phosphate slime into adjacent waterways, where fish and other aquatic life were killed. The court concluded that this mining activity was abnormally dangerous. Some activities inherently create abnormally dangerous risks to abutting waterways. In such cases, courts do not employ a BALANCING test to determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. Instead, they consider these activi- ties to be dangerous in and of themselves. The transportation and storage of high explo- sives and the operation of oil and gas wells are activities that courts have held to create inherent risks of abnormally dangerous proportions. The doctrine of riparian ownership forms the final prong of common law recovery. A riparian proprie tor is the owner of land abutting GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WATER POLLUTION 331 a stream of water and has the right to divert the water for any useful purpose. Some courts define the term useful purpose broadly to include almost any purpose whatsoever, whereas other courts define it more narrowly to include only purposes that are reasonable or profitable. In any event, downstream riparian proprie- tors are often placed at a disadvantage because the law protects upstream owners’ initial use of the water. For example, an upstream proprietor may construct a dam to appropriate a reason- able amount of water without compensating a downstream proprietor. However, cases involv- ing thermal pollution provide an exception to this rule. For examp le, downstream owners who use river water to make ice can seek injunct ive relief to prevent upstream owners from engag- ing in any activities that raise the water temperature by even one degree Fahrenheit. FURTHER READINGS Andreen, William L. 2003. “The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972.” Stanford Environmen- tal Law Journal 22 (January). Findley, Roger W., Daniel A. Farber, and Jody Freeman. 2004. Cases and Materials on Environmental Law. 6th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West. Hipfel, Steven J. 2001. “Enforcement of Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control and Abatement Measures Applicable to Federal Facilities, Activities and Land Management Practices under Federal and State Law.” Environmental Lawyer 8 (September). Houck, Oliver A. 2002. The Clean Water Act TMDL Program: Law, Policy, and Implementation. 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: Environmental Law Institute. Ryan, Mark A., ed. 2003. The Clean Water Act Handbook. 2d ed. Chicago: Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources, American Bar Association. CROSS REFERENCES Environmental Law; Fish and Fish ing; Law of the Sea; Mine and Mineral Law; Pollution; Riparian Rights; Solid Wastes, Hazardous Substances, and Toxic Pollutants; Tort Law; Water Rights. WATER RIGHTS A group of rights designed to protect the use and enjoyment of water that travels in streams, rivers, lakes, and ponds, gathers on the surface of the earth, or collects unde rground. Water rights generally emerge from a person’s ownership of the land bordering the banks of a watercourse or from a person’s actual use of a watercourse. Water rights are conferred and regulated by judge-made COMMON LAW, state and federal legislative bodies, and other govern- ment departments. Water rights can also be created by contract, as when one person transfers his water righ ts to another. In the eighteenth century, regulation of water was primarily governed by custom and practice. As the U.S. population expanded over the next two centuries, however, and the use of water for agrarian and domestic purposes increased, water became viewed as a finite and frequently scarce resource. As a result, laws were passed to establish guidelines for the fair distribution of this resource. Courts began developing common-law doctrines to accom- modate landowners who asserted co mpeting claims over a body of water. These doctrines govern three areas: riparian rights, surface water rights, and underground water rights. An owner or possessor of land that abuts a natural stream, river, pond, or lake is called a riparian owner or proprietor. The law gives riparian own ers certain rights to water that are incident to possession of the adjacent land. Depending on the jurisdiction in which a watercourse is located, riparian rights generally fall into one of three categories. First, riparian owners may be entitled to the “natural flow” of a watercourse. Under the natural flow doctrine, riparian owners have a right to enjoy the natural condition of a watercourse, undiminished in quantity or quality by other riparian owners. Every riparian owner enjoys this right to the same extent and degree, and each such owner maintains a qualified right to use the water for domestic purposes, such as drinking and bathing. However, this qualified right does not entitle riparian owners to transport water away from the land abutting the watercourse. Nor does it permit riparian owners to use the water for most irrigation projects or commercial enterprises. Sprinkling gardens and watering animals are normally considered permissible uses under the natural flow doctrine of riparian rights. Second, riparian owners may be entitled to the “reasonable use” of a watercourse. States that recognize the reasonable use doctrine found the natural flow doctrine too restrictive. During the industrial revolution of the nine- teenth century, some U.S. courts applied the natural flow doctrine to prohibit riparian own- ers from detaining or diverting a watercourse GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 332 WATER RIGHTS for commercial development, such as manu- facturing and milling, because such develop- ment impermissibly altered the water’s original condition. In replacing the natural flow doctrine, a majority of jurisdictions in the United States now permit riparian owners to make any reasonable use of water that does not unduly interfere with the competing rights and interests of other riparian owners. Unlike the natural flow doctrine, which seeks to preserve water in its original condition, the reasonable use doctrine facilitates domestic and commercial endeavors that are carried out in a productive and reasonable manner. When two riparian owners assert competing claims over the exe rcise of certain water rights, courts applying the reasonable use doctrine generally attempt to measure the economic value of the water rights to each owner. Courts also try to evaluate the prospective value to society that would result from a riparian owner’s proposed use, as well as its probable costs. No single factor is decisive in a court ’s analysis. Third, riparian owners may be entitled to the “prior appropriation” of a watercourse. Where the reason able use doctrine requires courts to balance the competing interests of riparian owners, the doctrine of prior appropri- ation initially grants a superior legal right to the first riparian owner who makes a beneficial use of a watercourse. The prior appropriation doctrine is applied in most arid western states, including Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming and requires the riparian owner to demonstrate that she is using the water in an economically efficient manner. Consequently, the rights of a riparian owner under the prior appropriation doctrine are always subject to the rights of other riparian own ers who can demonstrate a more economically effic ient use. Under any of the three doctrines, the interests of riparian owners are limited by the constitutional authority of the state and federal governments. The COMMERCE CLAUSE of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate NAVIGABLE WATERS, a power that Con- gress has exercised in a variety of ways, including the construction of dams. In those instances where Congress does not exercise its power under the Commerce Clause, states retain authority under their own constitutions to regulate waterways for the public good. However, the EMINENT DOMAIN CLAUSE of the FIFTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution limits the power of state and federal governments to impinge on the riparian rights of landowners by prohibiting the enactment of any laws or regulations that amount to a “taking” of private property. Laws and regulations that completely deprive a riparian owner of legally cognizable water rights constitute an illegal governmental taking of private property for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay the victims of takings an amount equal to the fair market value of the water rights. Some litigation arises not from the manner in which neighboring owners appropriate water but from the manner in which they get rid of it. The disposal of surf ace waters, which consist of drainage from rain, springs, and melting snow, is typically the source of such litigation. This type of water gathers on the surface of the earth but never joins a stream, lake, or other well- defined body of water. Litigation arises when one owner drains excess surface water onto neighboring property. Individuals who own elevated property may precipitate a dispute by accelerating the force or quantity of surface water running downhill, and individuals who own property on a lower level may rankle their neighbors by backing up surface water through damming and filling. Courts are split on how to resolve such disputes. Some courts apply the common-law rule that allows landowners to use any method of surface water removal they choose without liability for flooding that may result to nearby property. Application of this rule generally rewards assertive and clever landowners and does not discourage neighbors from engaging in petty or vindictive squabbles over surface water removal. Other courts apply the civil-law rule, which stems from Louisiana, a civil-law jurisdiction. This rule imposes STRICT LIABILITY for any damage caused by a landowner w ho interrupts or alters the natural flow of water. The civil-law rule encourages neighbors to let nature take its course and live with the consequences that may follow from excessive accumulation of standing surface water. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WATER RIGHTS 333 Since the mid-1980s many courts have begun applying the reasonable use rule to surface water disputes. This rule enables land- owners to make reasonable alterations to their land for drainage purposes as long as the alteration does no t unduly interfere with a neighbor’s right to do the same. In applying this rule, courts balance the neighbors’ competing needs, the feasibility of more appropriate methods of drainage, and the comparative severity of injuries. Surface water that seeps underground can also create conditions ripe for litigation. Sand, sod, gravel, and even rock are permeable substances in which natural springs may form and moisture can collect. Underground reser- voirs can be tapped by artificial wells that are used in conjunction by commercial, municipal, and private parties. When an underground water supply is appreciably depleted by one party, other parties with an interest in the well may sue for damages. As with surface water and riparian rights, three theories of underground water rights have evolved. The first theory, known as the absolute ownership theory, derives from ENGLISH LAW and affords landowners the right to withdraw as much underground water as they wish, for whatever purpose, requiring their neighbors to fend for themselves. Under the second theory, known as the American rule, landowners may withdraw as much underground water as they like as long as it is not done for a malicious purpose or in a wasteful manner. This theory is now applied in a majority of jurisdictions in the United States. California has developed a third theory of underground water rights, known as the correlative theory. The correlative theory pro- vides each landowner with an equal right to use underground water for a beneficial purpose. But landowners are not given the prerogative to seriously deplete a neighbor’s water supply. In the event of water shortage, courts may apportion an underground supply among land- owners. Many states facing acute or chronic shortages have adopted the correlative theory of underground water ri ghts. Water rights can also be affected by the natural avulsion or accretion of lands underly- ing or bordering a watercourse. Avulsions are marked by a sudde n and violent change to the bed or course of a stream or river, causing a measurable loss or addition to land. Accretions are marked by the natural erosion of soil on one side of a watercourse and the gradual addition of soil to the other side. The extended shoreline made by sedimentary deposits is called an alluvion. Water rights are not altered by avulsions. However, any accretions of soil enure to the benefit of the landowner whose holdings have increased by the alluvion addition. Although water covers more than two- thirds of the earth’s surface, U.S. law treats water as a limited resource that is in great demand. The manner in which this demand is satisfied varies according to the jurisdiction in which a water supply is located. In some jurisdictions the most productive use is rewarded, whereas in other jurisdictions the first use is protected. Several jurisdictions are dissatisfied with both approaches and allow a water supply to be reasonably appropriated by all interested parties. Each approach has its weaknesses, and jurisdictions will continue experimenting with established legal doctrines to better accommodate the supply and demand of water rights. FURTHER READINGS Brunner, Ronald D., Christine H. Colburn, Christina M. Cromley, et al. 2002. Finding Common Ground: Governance and Natural Resources in the American West. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Freyfogle, Eric. 1996. “Water Rights and the Common Wealth.” Environmental Law 26 (spring). Getches, David H. 2008. Water Law in a Nutshell. St. Paul: West Publishing. Hall, G. Emlen. 2002. High and Dry: The Texas-New Mexico Struggle for the Pecos River. Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press. Scott, Anthony, and Georgina Coustalin. 1995. “The Evolution of Water Rights.” Natural Resources Journal 35 (fall). Sherk, George William. 2000. Dividing the Waters: The Resolution of Interstate Water Conflicts in the United States. Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Law International. Snoey, Janis. 2003. “Water, Property, and the Clean Water Act.” Washington Law Review 78 (February). Stoebuck, William B., and Dale A. Whitman. 2000. The Law of Property. 3d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West. Whitehead, Roy, Jr., and Walter Block. 2002. “Environ- mental Takings of Private Water Rights—The Case for Water Privatization.” Environmental Law Reporter 32 (October). CROSS REFERENCES Environment al Law; Land-Use Control; Law of the Sea; Pollution; Solid Wastes, Hazardous Substances, and Toxic Pollutants; Water Pollution. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 334 WATER RIGHTS WATERGATE Watergate is the name given to the scandals involving President RICHARD M. NIXON, members of his administration, and operatives working for Nixon’s 1972 re-election organization. The name comes from the Watergate apartment and hotel complex in Washington, D.C., which in 1972 was the location of the Democratic National Committee (DNC). On June 17, 1972, several burglars were caught breaking in to DNC headquarters. The break-in and the subsequent cover-up by Nixon and his aides culminated two years later in the president’s resignation. Nixon’s departure on August 9, 1974, prevented his IMPEACHMENT by the SENATE. President GERALD R. FORD’s pardon of Nixon one month later prevented any criminal charges from being filed against the former presiden t. It has never been disclosed what the burglars who broke into DNC headquarters were seeking, but they were acting on orders from Nixon’s first attorney general, JOHN N . MITCHELL, who was heading Nixon’s re-election campaign, and several other high officials in the campaign staff and the Whit e House. Though Nixon may not have known in advance about the break-in, by June 23, 1972, six days later, he had begun to participate in the cover-up. On that date, he ordered the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) to direct the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) to stop investigating the burglary, on the pretense that an investigation would endanger national securi ty. This particular plan failed, but Nixon and his aides contained the damage during the fall presidential campaign. Nixon won a landslide victory over Democratic Senator George S. McGovern of South Dakota in November 1972. During the first two months of 1973, Watergate receded from the public eye. How- ever, on March 23, 1973, Judge John J. Sirica of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia imposed harsh sentences on the Watergate burglars. Sirica, who had presided at the trial, was convinced that the burglars were acting at the direction of others not yet revealed. He told the burglars that he would reduce their sentences if they would cooperate with the investigation then being conducted by the U.S. Senate. He also released a letter from convicted burglar James W. McCord Jr., who said that pressure had been applied to convince the burglars not to reveal all that they knew, that administration officials had committed PERJURY, and that higher-ups were involved. The investigation of the break-in and cover up by Washington Post reporters Bob Wood- ward and Carl Bernstein also kept the matter in the public eye. The reporters, relying in part on an anonymous government official dubbed “Deep Throat ,” uncovered links to the FBI, CIA, and Nixon re-election campaign organiza- tion. It was not until 2005 that the reporters revealed that Deputy Director William Mark Felt, Sr. was Deep Throat. A federal GRAND JURY soon began to receive information from campaign insiders about campaign and White House involvement in the cover-up. In addition, the continuing investigative work of Washington Post reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward provided more details about the inner workings of Nixon’s 1972 campaign and its connections with the White House. Finally, the Senate investigating committee headed by Senator SAM J . ERVIN JR. began to call Nixon aides to testify before it. Nixon, who initially called the break-in “a third-rate burglary,” sought to have his chief aides—John D. Ehrlichman and H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman—“stonewall” prosecutors. The three John D. Ehrlichman, a former chief aide to ?President Richard Nixon, testifies before the Senate Watergate Committee in July 1973. He later spent 18 months in prison for his role in the Watergate conspiracy. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION WATERGATE 335 men attempted to make JOHN MITCHELL the scapegoat, but public pressure forced Nixon to accept the resignations of Ehrlichman, Halde- man, White House counsel John W. Dean III, and Attorney General RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST on April 30, 1973. Nixon appointed ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON attor- ney general to succeed Kleindienst, who had been accused of political improprieties. Richardson appointed Harvard law professor ARCHIBALD COX as special Watergate PROSECUTOR to investigate whether federal laws had been broken in connection with the break-in and the attempted cover-up. Richardson assured Cox, who was a personal friend, that he would have complete independence in his work. At the Senate hearings, Dean and others disclosed the “dirty tricks” used by Nixon’s political operatives and the cover-up activities after the break-in. However, in July 1973, the Watergate investigation changed course when Alexander Butterfield, a Haldeman aide, dis- closed that Nixon had secretly taped all conversations in the Oval Office. Cox immedi- ately subpoenaed the tapes of the conversations. When Nixon refused to honor the SUBPOENA, Judge Sirica ordered Nixon to turn over the tapes. After the federal court of appeals upheld the order, Nixon offered to provide Cox with written summaries of the conversations in return for an agreement that Cox would not seek the release of any more presidential documents. Cox refused the proposal. On Saturday, October 20, Nixon ordered Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson and his deputy attorney general, William D. Ruckelshaus, resigned rather than carry out the order. Cox was fired that night by solicitor general ROBERT H. BORK. The two resignations and the firing of Cox became known as the “Saturday NightMassacre.” The national outrag e at Nixon’s actions forced him to appoint a new prosecutor, LEON JAWORSKI. Jaworski immediately renewed the request for the tapes. Although Nixon released edited transcripts of some of the subpoenaed conversations, he refused to turn over the unedited tapes on the grounds of EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE. When the district court denied Nixon’s motion to quash the subpoena, he appealed, and the case was quickly brought to the SUPREME COURT. Nixon contended that the doctrine of executive privilege gave him the prerogative to withhold documents from Congress and the courts. In UNITED STATES V. NIXON, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized the l egitimacy of the doctrine of executive privilege but held that it could not prevent the disclosure of materials needed for a criminal prosecution. The Court ordered the judge to review the subpoenaed tapes in private to determine which portions should be released to prosecutors. This confi- dential review would prevent sensitive, but irrelevant, information from being disclosed. Nonetheless, the Court directed Nixon to turn over the tapes. The decision was handed down on July 24, 1974, at the same time the House Judiciary Committee was nearing completion of its impeachment hearings. Despite more than a year of damaging disclosures, many congressio- nal Republicans remained loyal to the president, arguing that he had committed no criminal offenses that would make him liable for impeachment. Nevertheless, the committee voted three ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT against Nixon: for obstructing justice in the Watergate investigation, for exceeding PRESIDENTIAL POWER in waging a secret war in Cambodia without congressional approval, and for failing to cooperate with Congress in its attempt to gather evidence against him. Nixon complied with the Supreme Court decision and turned over the tapes. When prosecutors discovered the June 23, 1972, conversation in which Nixon directed the CIA to halt the FBI investigation, they knew they had the “smoking gun” that tied Nixon to the cover- up. On August 6, 1974, Republican congressio- nal leaders were infor med about the contents of this tape. Nixon’s political support vanished. Faced with an impeachment trial, Nixon announced his resignation on August 8, 1974, and left office the next day. Though President Ford pardoned Nixon, most of the other participants in Watergate were convicted for their crimes. Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlich- man, among others, spent time in prison. FURTHER READINGS Bernstein, Carl, and Bob Woodward. 1999. All the President’s Men. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster. Davis, Richard J. 2002. “Watergate: A Look Back.” New York Law Journal (June 17). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 336 WATERGATE Genovese, Michael A. 1999. The Watergate Crisis. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. Gormley, Ken. 1999. Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation. New York: Perseus. Olsen, Keith W. 2003. Watergate: The Presidential Scandal that Shook America. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. Rosen, James. 2008. The Strong Man: John Mitchell and the Secrets of Watergate. New York: Doubleday. Woodward, Bob. 2000. Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate. New York: Simon & Schuster. CROSS REFERENCES Executive Privilege; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Impeachment; Pardon. v WATTLETON, ALYCE FAYE From 1978 to 1992, ALYCE FAYE WATTLETON held the stage as an articulate defender of reproduc- tive rights for U.S. women. As president of the Planned Parenthood FEDERATION of America, Wattleton was a national spokesperson for reproductive freedo m and a lightning rod in the highly charged debate over ABORTION. Wattleton was the first woman and the first African American to head Planned Parenthood, the oldest voluntary family planning organiza- tion in the United States. During her 14-year tenure, she took an unequivocal stand on abortion rights and fought for improved reproductive HEALTH CARE for women with low incomes. Wattleton was known for her tremen- dous poise during confrontations with abortion foes and for her intelligent television interviews. As U.S. courts and lawmakers chipped away at abortion rights, Wattleton held fast to her conviction that women, not governments, had the right to control their reproductive destiny. Born in St. Louis, Missouri on July 8, 1943, Wattleton was the only child of George Wattleton, a factory employee, and Ozie Garret Wattleton, a seamstress and a Fundamentalist minister in the Church of God. Wattleton credits her parents for developing in her a strong social conscience and a will to succeed. She excelled in school and was only 16 years old when she enrolled in Ohio State University. After graduating from Ohio State in 1964 with a nursing degree, Wattleton taught at Miami Valley Hospital School, in Dayton. She left that position in 1966 to begin work on a master’s degree in maternal and infant health care, at New York’s Columbia University. Alyce Faye Wattleton 1943– ▼▼ ▼▼ 2000 1975 1950 ❖ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 1943 Born, St. Louis, Mo. ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1964 Graduated from Ohio State Univ. with nursing degree 1978 Appointed president of Planned Parenthood Federation of America 1989 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services ruled that state legislatures could regulate abortion 1997 Received Premier Black Woman of Courage Award from the National Federation of Black Women Business Owners 1995 Founded and became president of the Center for the Advancement of Women 1993 Inducted into National Women’s Hall of Fame ◆ 1996 Life on the Line published 1992 National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Assn. v. Sullivan struck down gag rule that kept federally funded clinics from mentioning abortion as a medical option ◆ 1970 Became executive director of a Planned Parenthood affiliate in Dayton 2004 Received the Fries Prize for Improving Health 1973 U.S. Supreme Court guaranteed women’s right to abortion in Roe v. Wade 1992 Resigned from Planned Parenthood to become host of syndicated talk show Faye Wattleton. JEMAL COUNTESS/ WIREIMAGE/GETTY IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION WATTLETON, ALYCE FAYE 337 . dangerous proportions. The doctrine of riparian ownership forms the final prong of common law recovery. A riparian proprie tor is the owner of land abutting GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WATER. REFERENCES Environment al Law; Land-Use Control; Law of the Sea; Pollution; Solid Wastes, Hazardous Substances, and Toxic Pollutants; Water Pollution. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 334. and interests GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 330 WATER POLLUTION of private citizens, w hereas public nuisances interfere with the common rights and interests of the people at