Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 6 P35 pptx

numerous arrests as well as physical and verbal abuse by local whites. Through it all, Lewis maintained a path of nonviolence toward achieving civil rights. Lewis was unanimously elected chairperson of SNCC in 1963 and served until 1966, when STOKELY CARMICHAEL, the proponent of the more aggressive “Black Power!” strategy, won his seat. During the time that he was chairman, Lewis was one of the speakers during the August 28, 1963, March on Washington, when nearly 250,000 people converged on the U.S. capital to stage a peaceful protest for freedom and fairness in hiring practices. After he was ousted as SNCC chairman, Lewis went on to work for the Field Fou ndation. One of his most signifi- cant roles there was as director of its Voter Education Project. From 1970 through 1977 Lewis led grass-roots efforts to organize South- ern African-American voters and to educate the youth politically. In 1977 President JIMMY CARTER appointed Lewis to be director of U.S. operations for ACTION, a federal agency overseeing econom ic recovery programs at the community level. In 1982 Lewis was elected to Atlanta City Council, where he was known for his close attention to the needs of the poor and the elderly. Twenty years after he stepped down as the leader of SNCC, Lewis was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives after a hard- fought battle with his former SNCC co-worker, Georgia state senator JULIAN BOND. Although, as a congressman, critics accused him of not adapt- ing his positions to the changing needs of African-Americans, he nonetheless remained a voice calling for a “sense of shared purpose, of basic morality that speaks to blacks and whites alike.” In 1991 Lewis became one of the three chief deputy whips for the DEMOCRATIC PARTY, one of the most influential positions in the House. His criticism of House speaker Newt Gingrich brought him to the forefront of controversy in 1996, although many African Americans considered him to be a moderate. In 1994, during a speech to African Leaders in Ghana, Lewis summed up his experience and his commitment to civil rights for all peoples: “Do not give up, do not give out, and do not give in. We must hold on, and we must not get lost in a sea of despair.” In 1998 Lewis published his autobiography: Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement. In 2000 he participated in a gathering in Selma, Alabama, commemorating the 35th anniversary of the Selma-to-Montgomery protest march. In 2003 Lewis was a me mber of the House Budget Committee, and served on the Subcom- mittee on Health that is part of the House Ways and Means Committee. He was also Senior Chief Deput y Democratic Whip in the 108th Congress, as well as a member of the Demo- cratic Steering Committee, the Congressional Black Caucus, and the Congressional Commit- tee to Support Writers and Journalists. Lewis additionally served as co-chair of the Faith and Politics Institute. Lewis has been the recipient of numerous and awards and honors, including the National Constitution Center’s “We the People” Award, the NAACP’s Spingarn Medal, and the Nation- al Education Association’sMartinLutherKing Jr. Memorial Award. In March 2003 Lewis led a group of fellow representatives and other politicians on a “Civil Rights Pilgrimage,” a tour of significant sit es in Birm ingham, Montgomery, and Selma, Alabama. The pur- pose of the tour was to acquaint political leaders with the history of the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT and to encourage dialogue on the topics of race and civil rights in the United States. In 2004 Lewis introduced a bill dubbed the “Civil Rights Act of 2004” by other congress- men. He not ed in a press release in 2004 that the work of the civil rights movement is “far from done,” adding that “There are doors that remain unopened and some that have slammed even harder shut.” On August 28, 2008, Lewis, speaking on the final night of the Democratic National Convention, called BARACK OBAMA’S presidential nomination “a testament” to Martin Luther King’s vision. Later that year, Lewis was re-elected to Congress in the 5th District of Georgia. FURTHER READINGS Bausum, Ann. 2005. Freedom Riders: John Lewis and Jim Zwerg on the Front Lines of the Civil Rights Movement.Des Moines, Iowa: National Geographic Children’s Books. Benson, Kathleen. 2006. John Lewis in the Lead: A Story of the Civil Rights Movement. New York: Lee and Low Books. John Lewis House of Representatives site. 2009. Available online at <www.house.gov/johnlewis> (accessed August 19, 2009). IF WE ARE EVER TO MOVE TOWARD A COLORBLIND SOCIETY , ONE AMERICA, ONE SOCIETY , ONE FAMILY , ONE PEOPLE —WE MUST HAVE POLICIES THAT PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE DIVERSITY . —JOHN LEWIS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 328 LEWIS, JOHN ROBERT Lewis, John, with Michael D’Orso. 1999. Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement. San Diego: Harcourt Brace. LEX [Latin, Law.] In medieval jurisprudence, a body or collection of various laws peculiar to a given nation or people; not a code in the modern sense, but an aggregation or collection of laws not codified or systematized. Also, a similar collection of laws relating to a general subject, and not peculiar to any one people. In modern U.S. and English jurisprudence this term signifies a system or body of laws, written or unwritten, applicable to a particular case or question regarded as local or unique to a particular state, country, or jurisdiction. LEX FORI [Latin, The law of the forum , or court.] The positive law of the state, nation, or jurisdiction within which a lawsuit is instituted or remedy sought. The lex fori, or law of the jurisdiction in which relief is pursued, governs all procedural matters as distinguished from subs tantive rights. LEX LOCI [Latin, The law of the place.] The law of the state or the nation where the matter in litigation transpired. The term lex loci can be employed in several descriptions, but, in general, it is used only for lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made), which is usually the law that governs the contract. LEXIS ® An online legal information service that provides the full text of opinions and statutes in electronic format. Subscribers use their personal computers to search the Lexis database for relevant cases. They may download or print the legal information they retrieve. The Lexis service began in 1973. In 1979 the Lexis service was joined by the companion Nexis® news and information service. Lexis contains more than 5,000 legal sources, and Nexis contains more than 10,000 news and information sources. The services add approximately 17.3 million documents each week to their more than three billion docu- ments online. The Lexis service contains major archives of federal and state CASE LAW, statutes of all 50 states, state and federal regulations, and public records from major U.S. states. The Lexis service has 41 specialized libraries covering all major fields of practice, including tax, securities, banking, environmental, energy, and INTERNA- TIONAL LAW . Group files combine legal informa- tion from all jurisdictions and, where appropri- ate, add sources of relevant business, financial, or general news. Lexis also has a public records service that provides online access to information from selected states about real and PERSONAL PROPERTY assets, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE liens, SECRETARY OF STATE corporation filings, a verdicts and settlements library, and court indices and dockets. The company is a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc., part of Reed Elsevier P.L.C., a group of international publishing and information busi- nesses with headquarters in London. Lexis-Nexis is based in Dayton, Ohio. During the 1990s and into the 2000s, Reed Elsevier purchased a number of other publishing companies; many of the materials published by these companies are available on the Lexis system. Among the most notable companies are Matthew Bender & Co., which publishes several popular legal practice materials, and Shepard’s, which pub- lishes Shepard’sCitations. FURTHER READINGS Emanuel, Steven L. 1997. Lexis-Nexis for Law Students. New York: LexisNexis. LexisNexis. 2004. Understanding LexisNexis. New York: LexisNexis. “The LexisNexis Timeline.” Available online at http://www. LexisNexis.com/anniversary/30th_timeline_fulltxt.pdf; website home page: http://www.LexisNexis.com (accessed August 7, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Computer-Assisted Legal Research; Legal Publishing; Westlaw®. LIABILITY A comprehensive legal term that describes the condition of being actually or potentially subject to a legal obligation. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LIABILITY 329 Joint liability is an obligation for which more than one person is responsible. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY refers to the status of those who are responsible together as one unit as well as individually for their conduct. The person who has been harmed can institute a lawsuit and recover from any or all of the wrongdoers—but cannot receive double com- pensation, for instance, the full amount of recovery from each of two wrongdoers. Primary liability is an obligation for which a person is directly responsible; it is distin- guished from secondary lia bility which is the responsibility of another if the party directly responsible fails or refuses to satisfy his or her obligation. LIBEL AND SLANDER Two torts that involve the communication of false information about a person, a group, or an entity such as a corporation. Libel is any defamation that can be seen, such as a writing, printing, effigy, movie, or statue. Slander is any defamation that is spoken and heard. Collectively known as “defamation,” libel and slander are civil wrongs that harm a reputation; decrease respect, regard, or confi- dence; or induce disparaging, hostile, or dis- agreeable opinions or feelings against an individual or entity. The injury to one’s good name or reputation is affected through written or spoken words or visual images. The laws governing these torts are identical. To recover in a libel or slander suit, the plaintiff must show evidence of four elements: that the defendant conveyed a defamatory message; that the material was published, mean- ing that it was conveyed to someone other than the plaintiff; that the plaintiff could b e identified as the person referred to in the defamatory material; and that the plaintiff suffered some injury to his or her reputation as a result of the communication. To prove that the material was defamatory, the plaintiff must show that at least one other person who saw or heard it understood it as having defamatory meaning. It is necessary to show not that all who heard or read the statement understood it to be defamatory, but only that one person other than the plaintiff did so. Therefore, even if the def endant contends that the communication was a joke, if one person other than the plaintiff took it seriously, the communication is considered defamatory. Defamatory matter is published when it is communicated to someone other than the plaintiff. This can be done in several different ways. The defendant might loudly accuse the plaintiff of something in a public place where others are present, or make defamatory state- ments about the plaintiff in a newsletter or an online bulletin board. The defamation need not be printed or distributed. However, if the defendant does not intend it to be conveyed to anyone other than the plaintiff, and conveys it in a manner that ordinarily would prevent others from seeing or hearing it, the require- ment of publication has no t been satisfied, even if a THIRD PARTY inadvertently overhears or witnesses the communication. Liability for republication of a defamatory statement is the same as for original publication, provided that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the statement. Thus, news- papers, magazines, and broadcasters are liable for republication of libel or slander because they have editorial control over their communica- tions. In contrast, bookstores, libraries, and other distributors of material are liable for republication only if they know, or had reason to know, that the statement is defamatory. Common carriers such as telephone companies are not liable for defamatory material that they convey, even if they know that it is defamatory, unless they know, or have reason to know, that the sender does not have a privilege to communicate the material. Suppliers of com- munications equipment are never liable for defamatory material that is transmitted through the equipment they provide. In general, there are four defenses to libel or slander: truth, consent, accident, and privilege. The fact that the allegedly defamatory commu- nication is essentially true is usually an absolute defense; the defendant need not verify every detail of the communication, as long as its substance can be establi shed. If the plaintiff consented to publication of the defama tory material, recovery is barred. Accidental publica- tion of a defamatory statement does not constitute publication. Privilege confers immu- nity on a small number of defendants who are directly involved in the furtherance of the public’s business—for example, attorneys, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 330 LIBEL AND SLANDER judges, jurors, and witnesses whose statements are protected on PUBLIC POLICY grounds. Before 1964 defamation law was deter- mined on a state-by-state basis, with courts applying the local COMMON LAW. Questions of FREEDOM OF SPEECH were generally found to be irrelevant to libel or slander cases, and defen- dants were held strictly liable even if they had no idea that the communication was false or defamatory, or if they had exercised reasonable caution in ascertaining its truthfulness. But the Court changed the direction of the law with its decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). For the first time, the Court placed some libelous speech under the protection of the FIRST AMENDMENT . The plaintiff, a police official, had claimed that false allegations about him had been published in the New York Times, and he sued the newspaper for libel. The Court balanced the plaintiff’s interest in preserving his reputation against the public’s interest in freedom of expression in the area of political debate. The Court wrote that “libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional lim- itations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.” Therefore, in order to protect the free flow of ideas in the political arena, the law requires that a public official who alleges libel must prove actual malice in order to recover damages. The First Amendment protects open and robust debate on public issues even when such debate includes “vehement, caustic, unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” Since Sullivan, a public official or other person who has voluntarily assumed a position in the public eye must prove that a libelous statement “was made with ‘actual malice—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard to whether it was false or not” (Sullivan). The actual-malice standard does not require any ill will on the part of the defendant. Rather, it merely requires the defendant to be aware that the statement is false or very likely false. Reckless disregard is present if the plaintiff can show that the defendant had “serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication” (see Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 115 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1991)). Since the Court’s decision in Sullivan, the question of who is a public official has been raised often. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S. Ct. 669, 15 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1966), the Court found that non-elected officials “who have, or appear to have, substantial responsibility for, or control over, the conduct of public affairs” are public officials within the meaning of Sullivan. The Court said that the employee’s position must be one that would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion arising out of the allegedly libelous communication. The Court emphasized that a person’s status as a “public official” will not be determined by state laws defining that term, because those defini- tions are usually developed for “local adminis- trative purposes, not for the purposes of a national constitutional protection.” Instead, the Court ruled that the determination of whether a public employee is a “public official” will be made on the facts of each case in light of all the relevant First Amendment jurisprudence. Courts have struggled to apply this standard in a consistent manner. For example, in Hiner- man v. Daily Gazette Co. 188 W. Va. 157, 423 S.E.2d 560 (1992), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff, who was a member of the State Racing Commission, a municipal judge, and a member of the State Bar’s Board of Governors and subsequently its VICE PRESIDENT,wasnota“public official” under Sullivan. The court did acknowl- edge that the plaintiff enjoyed some degree of authority in his various positions. However, the court stressed that he was not an elected official, and in his roles as an unelected official, the plaintiff did not exercise “substantial control” over the governmental functions giving rise to the lawsuit. In another case, however, the Supreme Court of Alaska found that a private doctor who had contracted to provide medical services to five jails was a “public official” under the First Amendment, even though he performed that role in a part-time capacity and was not highly visible in the community (Green v. Northern Pub. Co., Inc., 655 P.2d 736 [1982]). Since 1985, courts have tried to clarify this area of law by establishing criteria to help them determine whether non-elected government employees are “public officials” for First Amend- ment purposes. These criteria include: (1) the employee’s remuneration (the higher the com- pensation, the more likely “public official” status will be found); (2) the employee’sroleinmaking decisions on public issues (the more authority the employee wields, the more likely “public GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LIBEL AND SLANDER 331 official” status will be found); (3) the impact of the governmental position on everyday life (the greater the impact, the more likely “public official” status will be found); and (4) the potential for social harm caused by someone occupying the position (the more harm that may be caused, the more likely “public official” status will be found). Eventually, Sullivan ’s actual-malice require- ment was extended to include plaintiffs who are not government officials of any kind, elected or unelected. In the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967), the Court held that a football coach at the University of Georgia and a retired Army general were similar to public officials in that they enjoyed a high degree of prominence and access to the mass media that allowed them to influence policy and to counter criticisms leveled against them. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974), the Court expanded its definition of “public figure” to include anyone who has invited public scrut- iny by thrusting themselves into the pu blic eye. The Court recognized two types of public figures: those who are “public figures for all purposes” and those who are public figures for limited purpose s. For an individual to be considered a PUBLIC FIGURE in all situations, the person’s name must be so familiar as to be a household word—for example, Oprah Winfrey or David Letterman. A limited-purpose public figure is one who voluntarily injects himself or herself into a public controversy and becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. Limited-purpose public figures have at least temporary access to the means to counteract false statements about them. By voluntarily placing themselves in the public eye, they relinquish some of their privacy rights. For The Public Figure Doctrine: An Unworkable Concept? T he “public figure” doctrine an- nounced by the Supreme Court in Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967), held that prominent public persons had to prove actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of whether a statement is true or false) on the part of the news media in order to prevail in a libel lawsuit. Prior to Butts only public officials had to prove actual malice. In the years since this decision, the PUBLIC FIGURE doctrine has proved a troublesome area of the law, primarily because it is difficult to apply with any consistency. Some, generally from the news media, have called for making it easier to classify a person as a public figure. Others believe that a strict line must be maintained between public and private figures, so as to prevent the damaging of personal reputations by the media. Both sides agree that greater clarity is needed in defining what constitutes a public figure. Those who favor a less restrictive definition of public figure argue that FREEDOM OF THE PRESS requires such a definition. It is in the PUBLIC INTEREST to encourage the reporting of news without fear that the subject of a story will sue the news organization for libel. Without adequate safeguards news editors may resort to self-censorship to avoid the possibility of a lawsuit. In a democratic society, self-censorship would prove to be a damaging restriction on the public’s right to information. For these advocates the Supreme Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974), signified a step away from the protections of the FIRST AMEND- MENT . The Court held that a person who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy” becomes a public figure “for a limited range of issues.” The Court also held that there are persons who “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.” This category would include, for example, a national labor or CIVIL RIGHTS leader. Critics of Gertz argue that these two categories make little sense and are of no help to a court in determining whether a person is a public figure. For example, should a Hollywood entertainer or a professional athlete be cast as a public person in a libel suit? Do these persons have “persuasive power and influence”? As for persons who become involved in public events, courts have been unable to articulate a consistent standard for mea- suring whether a person “thrust” himself or herself into the status of a public figure. Studies have revealed contradic- tory ways of applying the Gertz standard. Some commentators have advocated abandoning Gertz and replacing it with a “subject matter” test. Under this test if an article or story involves PUBLIC POLICY or GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 332 LIBEL AND SLANDER these reasons, false statements about limited- purpose public figures that relate to the public controversies in which they are involved are not considered defamatory unless they meet the actual-malice test set forth in Sullivan. Determining when someone has voluntarily injected themselves into the public eye such that they forfeit some of their privacy rights has not been easy for courts. For example, courts typically rule that individuals do not make themselves public figures simply by filing for divorce. Gettner v. Fitzgerald, 677 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. App. 2009). This is true, courts have ruled, even when one s pouse is a well-known professor at a religious university, and both spouses are publicly active on social issues. Maguire v. Journal Sentinel, Inc.,232 Wis.2d 236, 605 N.W.2d 881 (1999). However, if a divorce includes allegations of spousal abuse in a MARRIAGE involving at least one famous person, those facts might be enough for a court to find that the divorce proceedings are of “genuine social concern,” thereby converting the plaintiff- spouse into a public figure under the First Amendment. Huggins v. Moore 94 N.Y.2d 296, 726 N.E.2d 456 (1999). A 1991 case made it somewhat easier for public figures to sue for libel. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 115 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1991), held that a plaintiff alleging libel satisfies the actual-malice standard if it can be proved that the author deliberately altered the plaintiff’s words and that the alter- ation resulted in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the plaintiff in the original statement. Jeffrey M. Masson, a prominent psychoanalyst, had sued Janet Malcolm, the author of an article and book about him, as well as The New Yorker magazine and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., which had published the article and book, respectively. Masson claimed that the functioning of government, it should be protected by the public figure doc- trine. Therefore, if a story discusses a relatively unknown person’s divorce proceeding or supposed Communist political leanings, this would be a matter of public policy (divorce law or political parties) that invokes the actual-malice standard in a libel suit. The use of subject matter analysis would give public figures more protection than they currently have under Gertz. A story about the private life of an enter- tainer or professional athlete would generally not involve a public issue under even the broadest definition. Under the subject matter test, the celebrity would not be forced to prove actual malice. Defenders of the Gertz decision admit that the public figure concept has been difficult to apply, but argue that the subject matter test is not a good alternative. They note that although freedom of the press is an important value, the need to protect the reputation of private citizens is also an important societal value. Citizens are encouraged to participate in public affairs, yet a liberal reading of the public figure doctrine could discourage participation if there is no redress for injury to reputation. In addition, private citizens who are deemed public figures could never match the news media’s power and pervasiveness in telling one side of the story. Even with the difficulties inherent in Gertz, defenders note that it narrowed the public figure category in ways that protect the public. Simply appearing in the newspapers in connection with some newsworthy story or stories does not make one a public figure. Forced involve- ment in a public trial does not by itself make one a public figure. Most impor- tant, those charged with libel cannot create their own defense by converting a private citizen into a public figure solely by virtue of their news coverage. Defenders of Gertz are leery of the subject matter test. They contend this test is too one-sided in favor of the news media. Almost any topic in human affairs can be generalized into a public policy issue or one that involves the government. It would be unfair to allow a publication to falsely bra nd a relatively unknown person a Communist and then assert the person is a public figure because r adical political parties are a matter of public concern. The victim of this charge would have a difficult time proving ac tua l malice to win a libel suit. Those who favor a restrictive defini- tion of the public figure doctrine also note that a libel action serves as a private means of controlling irresponsible jour- nalism. Gertz, even with its difficulties in application, has allowed private persons a better chance of success in libel suits, which in turn sends a strong message to the media to be more careful in their reporting. As to the concerns about self- censorship, defenders of Gertz point out that journalists make choices every day about what is published. Falsely tarnish- ing the reputation of a person should be the object of self-censorship in profes- sional news-gathering organizations. FURTHER READINGS Jones, Nora. 2003. “Defamation Lawsuit Sparks a ‘Public Figure’ Debate.” Roche- ster (N.Y.) Daily Record (May 30). Lore, Michelle. 2002. “High Court Mulls Limited Public Figure Doctrine.” Minne- sota Lawyer (November 18). Mitchell, James C. 2002. “The Accidental Purist: Reclaiming the Gertz All Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of ‘Celebrity Journalism’.” Loyola of Los Angeles Enter- tainment Law Review 22 (spring): 559–81. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LIBEL AND SLANDER 333 quotations that were attributed to him in those publications were false and libelous. Malcolm conceded that she had altered quotations i n order to make the finished product more readable, but she maintained that the essence of Masson’s words had not been changed. The Court held that quotation marks around a passage “indicate to the reader that the passage reproduces the speaker’s words verbatim.” It was careful to protect journalistic freedom and went on to write that deliberate alteration of quota- tions does not automatically prove actual malice: We conclude that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan … and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. … unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement. The use of quotations to attribute words not in fact spoken bears in a most important way on that inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every case. The tremendou s growth of electronic com- munications networks since the 1990s has raised numerous questions about liability for defamation. Suddenly, it is possible to commi t libel and to communicate a libelous statement to thousands of people, instantly. When libel is perpetrated in cyberspace, who is responsible? Richard Jewell and the Olympic Park Bombing T B he strange ordeal of Ric hard Jewell grew out of the 1996 Summer Olympi cs bombing. One of thousands of securi ty guards hired for the Atlanta games, Jewell discovered a suspicious knapsack containing a bomb on July 27, 1996. Before it exploded, he helped lead an evacuation that limited casualties to two dead and more than one hundred wounded. His heroism was widely praised. But within three days, celebrity turned into notoriety as the FBI had made him a primary suspect. Suspicious of the 11 interviews Jewell granted following the bombing, the FBI theorized that he mighthaveplantedthebombinordertobeseenas a hero. This theory w as promptly lea ked to the press, which made it a cause célébre. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution published an extra edition on July 30, with a headline that read “FBI Suspects ‘Hero’ May Have Planted Bomb.” The allegations mounted: Jewell had reportedly sought publicity for his heroism, while persons at Piedmont College, his former employer, were s aid to have made allega- tions to the FBI about his character and cond uct. On NBC’s nightly news program, Tom Brokaw stated that the FBI “probably” had enough evidence to arrest and try Jewell. The investigation lasted three months. During this time Jewell b ecame the target of two lawsuits by bombing survivors, which were later dismissed. He maintained his innocence and tried to clear his name by pointing out that he had not approached the news media seeking attention, a fact which was quickly confirmed. Only on October 26, 1996, did the FBI finally clear him as a suspect. He appeared at a press confere nce where he de clared that he had spent 88 days living in fear. Nearly a year later, after initially refusing, Attorney General Janet Reno formally apologized to Jewell. After being cleared in the fall of 1996, Jewell sued or threatened suit against several media companies for defamation. They included ABC, NBC, CNN, the New York Post, NBC anchor Tom Brokaw, and a local Georgia radio station. Initially, he was successful. In December 1996, NBC negotiated a settlement with Jewell for a reported $500,000. CNN and ABC settled, too, a s did Piedmont College, which Jewell had sued for allegedly supplying false information. The most controversial lawsuit was filed in January 1997 against the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and its parent company, Cox Enterprises Inc. Although truth is the key defense in a defamation case and Jewell was a suspect in the bombing, the libel action was based on more than just a statement of his status as a suspect. Listing 19 allegedly libelous headlines and excerpts from articles, the suit claimed that the newspaper libeled him “inaseries GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 334 LIBEL AND SLANDER Are online information providers considered publishers, distributors, or common carriers? What level of First Amendment protection should be afforded to defamatory statements transmitted electronically? In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 1 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the plaintiff sued CompuServe, an online service company, for libel because of statements that had appeared in a newsletter written and uploaded by an independent company and transmitted through CompuServe’s network. The federal district court found that CompuServe had no editorial control over the contents of the newsletter and that it was therefore only a distributor of the newsletter. CompuServe could not be held liable for the newsletter’s contents unless it had known, or had had reason to know, that the newsletter contained defamatory statements. Conversely, in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 2765, 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); reh’gdenied,24 Media L. Rep. 1126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), the court found that Prodigy, an o nline provider similar to CompuServe, was a publishe r rather than a distributor, and that it was liable for the of false and defamatory articles that portrayed him as an individual with a bizarre employment history and an aberrant personality who was likely guilty” (Jewell v. Cox En terprises Inc). But early on, an unusual ruling went against the plaintiff. Fulton Cou nty state court judge John R. Mather ruled on October 5, 1999, that Jewell was a “public figure” for purposes of his legal burden in the defamation case. Mather determin ed that Jewell made himself a public figure throu gh his extensive media interviews following the bombing. Unexpected and far-reaching, the ruling put a huge obstacle before the plaintiff. As the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in its oft-cited 1964 ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d. 686 (1964), there is a distinction in defamation cases between private individuals and public figures. Private individuals have the easier task. As a private individual , Jewell would simply need to prove that the newspaper acted wi th negligence or carelessness in reporting information that was false and defamatory in content. But in order for a public figure to prevail, the plaintiff must prove “actual malice” on the part of the media defendants. Meeting the test for actual malice requires showing that the defendants knew that the reported information was false or had a reckless disregard for the truth. Faced with meeting this significantly higher burden of proof, Jewell appealed the ruling unsuccessfully. In October 2001 the state Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, Atlanta Journal- Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), and a year later appeals were turned down by both the Supreme Court of Georgia and the U.S. Supreme Court. As the lawsuit moved toward trial in 2003, Lin Wood, his attorney, warned that the decision to hold Jewell a public figure “threatens the reputations of any private citizen who is discussed by a member of the media” (The Associated Press. October 07, 2002. “Supreme Court Sends Several First Amendment Cases Packing”). The newspaper’s attorney Peter Canfield observed that Jewell had already admitted to being the focus of the FBI investigation about which the p aper had reported. FURTHER READINGS Calvert, Clay, and Robert D. Richards. 2002. “A Pyrrhic Press Victory: Why Holding Richard Jewell Is a Public Figure Is Wrong and Harms Journalism.” The Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review (April 2). “Court Upholds Ruling that Jewell Was Public Figure.” 2001. Associated Press (October 11). “Georgia High Court Won’t Hear Jewell Appeal.” 2002. Associated Press (February 12). Noe, Denise. 2003. “The Olympics Bombed.” Court TV’s Crime Library. Available online at <www.crimelibrary.com/ terrorists_spies/terrorists/eric_rudolph/2.html?sect=22> (accessed July 15, 2003). “Supreme Court Sends Several First Amendment Cases Packing.” 2002. Associated Press (October 7). CROSS REFERENCES Public Figu re; Terrorism. B GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LIBEL AND SLANDER 335 defamatory material in question because it exercised considerable editorial control over what appeared on its system. Some states have laws that seek to protect vital industries and businesses from unfounded rumors and scare tactics. Such was the case in Texas, which enacted food- and business- disparagement laws that allow victims of false statements about their perishable food or business to sue for damages. Television host Oprah Winfrey was ensnared in litigation involving these laws after she broadcast an episode of her show in 1996 about the problems surrounding the outbreak of mad cow disease in Great Britain. The episode, which was labeled “dangerous food,” included a guest who suggested that unless the U.S. banned certain practices, a mad cow disease epidemic in the U.S. would “make AIDS look like the common cold.” Beginning the day of the broadcast, the price of beef dropped drast ically and remained low for two weeks. The Texas Beef Group filed a civil lawsuit against Winfrey, her company, and the guest, alleging that comments made on the program had violated Texas’s disparage- ment laws. The judge dismissed the food- disparagement charge, and a jury fo und the defendants not guilty of business disparage- ment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld these rulings in Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000). The appeals court concluded that the key issue was the statute’s definition of a “perishable food product.” At trial, the defendants argued that live cattle are not perishable food, but the appeals court declined to rule on that issue. Instead, it focused on whether the defendants had knowingly disseminated false information about beef. The court grounded its analysis on the legal precedent that the First Amendment protects the expression of opinion as well as fact “so long as a factual basis underlies the opinion.” It found that, at the time of the broadcast, the factual basis for the guest’s opinions was truthful. As for the AIDS comparison, the court characterized it as hyperbole; in its view, exaggeration did not equal defamation. Because the challenged com- ments had a factual basis, Winfrey and her guest had a First Amendment right to say them. FURTHER READINGS “Beyond Words: The Potential Expansion of Defamation by Conduct in Massachusetts.” 2003. Boston University Law Review 83 (June). Coad, Jonathan. 2003. “The Price of Truth in the New Law of Libel.” New Law Journal 153 (April 18). Fenno, Edward T. 1995. “Public Figure Libel: The Premium on Ignorance and the Race to the Bottom.” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 4. Friedman, Jessica R. 1995. “Defamation.” Fordham Law Review 64. Hiemstra, Nathalie L. 1993. “Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.: A ‘Material Alteration.’” University of Miami Entertainment and Sports Law Review 10. “Jewell Box: An Archive on Richard Jewell and the Olympic Park Bombing.” 1997. Creative Loafing Network site. Available online at www.cln.com (accessed February 10, 2003). Karniel, Yuval. 2009. “Defamation on the Internet—A New Approach to Libel in Cyperspace.” Journal of Interna- tional Media & Entertainment Law. 2 (Winter). “The Media and Richard Jewell: Rush to Judgment.” 1997. Media Studies Center site. Available online at www. mediastudies.rutgers.edu (accessed February 10, 2003). Pritchard, David. 2009. “Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study.” Communication Law and Policy. 14 (Summer). Ransom, Elsa. 1995. “The Ex-Public Figure: A Libel Plaintiff without a Class.” Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law 5. Stonecipher, Harry W. 1993. “A Survey of the Professional Person as Libel Plaintiff: Reexamination of the Public Figure Doctrine.” Arkansas Law Review 46. CROSS REFERENCES First Amendment; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint. LIBELANT Formerly the party who filed an initiatory pleading (a formal declaration of a claim) in an ecclesiastical or religious matter or in an admiralty case, corresponding to the plaintiff in actions at law. Since 1966 the Federal Rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE and Supplementary Admiralty Rules have governed admiralty actions, which are presently commenced by complaint. CROSS REFERENCES Admiralty and Maritime Law; Civil Procedure. LIBELOUS In the nature of a written defamation, a communi- cation that tends to injure reputation. LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. LIBERTARIAN PARTY The Libertarian Party was founded in Colorado in 1971 and held its first convention in Denver in 1972. In 1972, it fielded John Hospers for president and Theodora Nathan for VICE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 336 LIBELANT PRESIDENT in the U.S. general election. The part appeared on two state ballots, receiving a total of 2,648 votes in Colorado and Washington. In the 1976 elections the party’s 176 candidates garnered 1.2 million votes across the United States. The Libertarian Party asserts that people have certain natural, individual rights and that deprivation of those rights is unjust. Two basic rights—the right to personal autonomy and the right to utilize previously unused resources— form the foundation of the party’s values. The Libertarian Party views government as both the cause and the effect of societal ills. Government causes crime and prejudice be- cause excessive laws divide citizens, rob people of their independence, and frustrate initiative and creativity. It then attempts to eradicate crime and prejudice by exercising more control over individual rights. The Libertarian Party promotes the ABOLI- TION of compulsory military service, govern- ment control of television and other media, laws regarding sexual activity between consenting adults, laws against the use of mood-altering substances, and government control of migra- tion and IMMIGRATION. Under its leadership , farming quotas and subsidies would be elimi- nated, there would be no mandatory schooling and no MINIMUM WAGE, and defense spending would be drastically reduced. According to the party, the form of government it promotes would be far less expensive than the current system of federal, state, and local governance. The Libertarian Party has achieved a small measure of electoral success. In 1980 Ed Clark received more than 1 million votes in his bid for the presidency. Having failed to win the popular vote in any state, however, Clark received no electoral votes. Andre Marrou garnered slightly less support as the party’s presidential candidate in 1984, 1988, and 1992. In 1992 Marrou and his running mate Nancy Lord received approximately 291,000 votes. Although the party was not a factor in national politics during the 1990s, it had some success locally. In 1994 it had state r epresentatives in New Hampshire and Alaska, mayors in Cali- fornia, and over 30 city council members in cities across the country. In 1996 the party held its national conven- tion in Washington, D.C., over the Fourth of July holiday. At the convention, it nominated economist and author Harry Browne as its presidential candidate. In his acceptance speech, Browne presented a number of controversial suggestions, including making a sizable reduc- tion in the federal gover nment, abolishing the federal INCOME TAX, abolishing federal drug and seizure laws, and increasing recognition of individual rights. Browne and running mate Jo Jorgensen appeared on the election ballot in all 50 states, along with approximately 1,000 Libertarian Party candidates for various public offices. Browne and Jorgensen won 485,759 votes, 0.5 percen t of the national vote. Browne ran again for president i n 2000, this time with Art Oliver as a running mate. Although the Libertarian Party was on the ballot in all 50 states, the Browne ticket received only 382,982 votes, over 100,000 fewer than in the 1996 election. During the 2000 elections, the party also entered candidates for more than half of the seats in Congress up for election. In the elections for the U.S. House of Representatives, Libertarian Party candidates received a total of 1.7 million votes, the first time in history a THIRD PARTY received more than one million votes for the House. In the 2004 presidential race, Michael Badnarik received 397,265 votes, but the party’s 2008 candidate, Bob Barr , tallied Bob Barr, a former Georgia state representative, ran as the Libertarian Party’s presidential candidate in 2008. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION LIBERTARIAN PARTY 337 . Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of ‘Celebrity Journalism’.” Loyola of Los Angeles Enter- tainment Law Review 22 (spring): 559–81. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LIBEL AND SLANDER. Nathan for VICE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 3 36 LIBELANT PRESIDENT in the U.S. general election. The part appeared on two state ballots, receiving a total of 2 ,64 8 votes in Colorado. the question of who is a public official has been raised often. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S. Ct. 66 9, 15 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1 966 ), the Court found that non-elected officials “who have, or appear