their differences and negotiate an employment contract, the parties may use different types of pressure to produce an agreement, including boycotts, strikes, the carrying of signs and banners, picketing, and lockouts. A labor boycott is any type of union action that seeks to reduce or stop public patronage of a business. It is a refusal to purchase from or to handle the products of a particular employer. Employees may legally exert economic pressure on their employer through a boycott, so long as they act peacefully. But a union is forbidden to engage in a secondary boycott. For example, if a union’s primary dispute is with a hardware manufacturer, it may not picket or use other methods to get the employees of a hardware store, who are neutral or secondary parties, to stage a strike at the store in order to force it to cease handling the manufacturer’s products. A strike is a concerted refusal of employees to perform work that they have been assigned, in order to force the employer to grant concessions that the employees have demanded. The right of employees to strike is protected by the courts. A lawful strike must be conducted in an orderly manner and may not be used as a shield for violence or crime. Intimidation and coercion in the course of a strike are unlawful. The peaceful carrying of signs and banners advertising a labor dispute is ordinarily a lawful means to publicize employees’ grievances against an employer. Picketing consists of posting one or more union members at the site of a strike or boycott, in order to interfere with a particular employ- er’s business or to influence the public against patronizing that employer. It can be reasonably regulated. Lawful picketing is peaceful and honest. The use of force, intimidation, or coercion on a picket line is not constitutionally protected activity. In addition, employees are not acting within their rights when they seize any part of the employer’s property. A lockout is an employer’s refusal to admit employees to the work place, in order to gain a concession from them. In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 85 S. Ct. 955, 13 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1965), the U.S . Supreme Court upheld the right of an employer to lock out employees if the intent is to promote the company’s bargaining position and not to destroy the collective bargaining process or the union. With some frequency, lower federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board have upheld lockouts by employers. In Local 702, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 215 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a RULING by the NLRB finding that an employer’s lockout did not violate the NLRA. Employees of the union in the case resorted to “inside game” tactics, where the employees refused to work voluntary overtime and adhered strictly to company rules to such an extent that it slowed the company’s productivity. The union began using this strategy during labor negotiations with the company. The company imposed a lockout of the employees in order to facilitate the negotia- tions and to counter the effects of the union’s strategy. The appellate court, in upholding a decision by the NLRB, found that the employer had legitimate and substantial business justifi- cations for the lockout and that the union had not proven that the employer had acted with an improper motive in initiating the lockout. Unfair Labor Practices An unfair labor practice is any action or statement by an employer that interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in their exercise of the right to organize and conduct collective bargaining. Such interference, restraint, or coer- cion can arise through threat s, promises, or offers to employees. An unfair labor practice can occur during collective bargaining. In Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 116 S. Ct. 1754, 135 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an NLRB ruling that the employer had com- mitted an unfair labor practice. After the union accepted one of the employer’s collective bar- gaining proposals, the employer disavowed the agreement because of good faith doubts about whether the union still commanded a majority of the employees. The Court reasoned that the employer’s doubts arose from facts that the employer had known about before the union had accepted its contract offer. Labor laws are not intended to interfere with an employer’s normal exercise of discre- tion in hiring and firing employees. In general, an employer may hire employees based on their individual merit, with no regard to union affiliation. Refusal to hire an applicant owing to affiliation with a LABOR UNION is an unfair labor practice. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 198 LABOR LAW The motive of an employer in discharging an employee may be a controlling factor in determining whether the discharge is an unfair labor practice. An employer’s history of anti- union bias is an extremely important factor in ascertaining the motive for discharge of an employee. An employer may discharge an employee on various grounds without being guilty of an unfair labor practice. Such grounds include misconduct, unlawful activity, disloyalty, and termination of the business operation. In addition, inefficiency, disobedience, or insub- ordination is proper grounds for dismissal, provided the discharge is not motivated by the employer’s reaction to union activity. Firing an employee based on union activity or me mber- ship is an unfair labor practice. Furthermore, the filing of unfair labor practice charges or the giving of testimony in a case based on such charges does not warrant dismissal. In general, an unfair labor practice exists when an employer contributes financial or any other support to a labor organization. An employer must, therefore, remain neutral be- tween competing unions. It is also an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization. A union commits an unfair labor practice when it causes, or attempts to cause, an employer to hire, discharge, or discriminate against an employee fo r the purpose of encouraging or discouraging union activity. The same is true when a union restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organize; to form, join, or assist labor unions; to bargain collectively; or to refrain from any of these activities. The refusal of a labor organization to bargain collectively or to execute a formal document embodying agree- ment with an employer is another unfair labor practice. Contract Enforcement and Contract Disputes Almost every collective bargaining agr eement in the United States contains a GRIEVANCE PROCE- DURE . In the grievance procedure, the union and the employer try to settle any disputes over the meaning or application of the contract by themselves. If the parties fail, they may invoke arbitration, a procedure that typically calls for referring the issue to an impartial third party for a final and binding determination. Grievance provisions of a collective bargain- ing agreement govern the procedure to be followed to settle on-the-job disputes. Typical grievance procedures generally consist of at least three steps: (1) an employee and his or her union steward present their complaint orally to the supervi sor, who has the power to settle it; (2) in the event that the matter is not settled at that stage, it is reduced to writing, and the union steward and union officers confer with management; (3) if no agreement is reached, the aggrieved employee may submit the matter to arbitration, which will be binding on all parties. The arbitration of disputes under a collec- tive bargaining agreement is a matter of contract, and the parties to it may delineate the scope of their arbitration clause. Common grievances settled under arbitration clauses include disputes over seniori ty rights, employee discipline, pension or WELFARE benefits, rates of pay, and hours of work. Ordinarily, the issue of whether a strike or lockout is a breach of an agreement is a proper subject for arbitration. The vast majority of union-employer con- tract disputes are resolved in a grievance procedure, and most of the rest are disposed of routinely through arbitration. Occasionally, a party will resist arbitration or will refuse to comply with an arbitrator’s award. In such a case, section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes a suit in federal court to enforce the agreement to arbitrate or the arbitrator’s award. The federal courts have enforced a pro- arbitration policy in labor contracts. If a union strikes over a grievance it could have arbitrated, the employer may secure an injunction against the strike under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, even though ordinarily the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents the federal courts from enjoining strikes by labor unions. Regulation of Unions The Landrum-Griffin Act contains provisions that regulate how labor unions conduct their internal affairs. These provisions seek to prevent union corruption and to guarantee to union members that unions will be run democratically. The act provides a BILL OF RIGHTS for union GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LABOR LAW 199 members, requires certain financial disclosures by unions, prescribes procedures for the election of union officers, and provides civil and criminal remedies for financial abuses by union officers. Employees who are not union members can be required to paid a portion of the union dues as a condition of their employment. These contributions are called “service fees.” Since 1956 the Supreme Court has issued rulings on what service fees may be charged to nonmem- bers without violating the FIRST AMENDMENT rights of nonmembers. The general approach to analyzing the components of a service fee has been to exempt from the fee political or ideological activities with which the nonmem- bers might disagree. The Court determined that the payment of the service fee furthered the government’s interest in preventing free-riding by nonmembers who benefit from the union’s collective bargaining actions and in preserv- ing peaceful labor relations. In Locke v. Karass, __U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 798, __L.Ed.2d__ (2009), the Court ruled that a union could charge nonmembers for “national litigation” expenses as long as the litigation was of the type that would be chargeable if the litigation were local and the charge were reciprocal in nature. National litigation expenses are those that do not directly benefit the local union. The Court concluded that the fee could be collected if the subject-matter of the litigation were related to collective bargaining and the arrangement were reciprocal. In this context, reciprocal would mean that the local’s payment to the national organization was for services “that may Reinventing the Workplace: Improving Quality, or Creating Company (Sham) Unions? F oreign competition, technological change, and concerns about declin- ing productivity have led to significant modifications in the way many U.S. businesses manage their affairs. These changes, which have been championed by a long list of management consultants, have appeared under numerous labels, including quality circles and total quality management (TQM). All of these approaches emphasize that the goal of a business is to achieve a high standard of quality in goods manufactured or ser- vices provided. To meet this quality goal, businesses have moved away from top- down management, substituting a team approach. Traditional management per- sonnel and line-level workers meet in committees to discuss and resolve issues within the company concerning product, service, and the way work is organized. The advocates of teamwork and quality circles have hit a legal brick wall in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.). Under the NLRA, sections 2(5) and 8(A)(2), employers are forbidden to create employer-dominated company unions. In Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB) ruled that Electromation, a nonunion company, could not sponsor an “action committee” because that committee was, under the NLRA provi- sions, a labor organization. Additional cases have confirmed the NLRB’s posi- tion on this issue. Proponents of quality circles and teamwork argue that the NLRA is an antiquated set of laws, based on a period of U.S. history when businesses used every tool at their disposal to subvert unions and union organization. The adversarial posture of labor and manage- ment may have made sense in the past, this argument goes, but it is counterpro- ductive in an economy that must adapt quickly to world market forces. The most radical proposal by critics of the NLRB’s position on this issue is to abolish the NLRA altogether. More moderate proponents argue instead for changes in the NLRA to permit committees, teams, and more of what they call workplace democracy. They point out that with the steady decline of union membership and blue-collar jobs, traditional labor-management r elations have become irrelevant. They note that white-collar workers, who now dominate the U.S. economy, are less likely to join a LABOR UNION. Therefore, worker morale and job satisfaction are better when employees are included in the decision- making process of a business. Proponents of quality circles also believe that a better educated workforce is capable of making informed decisions about its relations with employers. They assert that the days of the employer’s being an absolute sovereign are over. It is more productive to allow nonunion employees to organize within the com- pany based on committees and circles. These workers are entitled to the same type of participatory democracy found in labor unions. Most proponents would give employees the chance to make up their own mind about their work environ- ment. If a union successfully wins over GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 200 LABOR LAW ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union.” Unions have also had to confront unfriendly state governments. In 2003 the Idaho Legisla- ture passed a law prohibiting state and local governments from making union payroll deductions for political activities. These activi- ties included “electoral activities, independent expenditures, or expenditures made to any candidate, political party, political action com- mittee or in support or against any ballot measure.” Unions in Idaho objected to this change, as it would make the collection of these types of dues very difficult and costly. In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, __U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 1093, __L.Ed.2d__ (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the state law. The Court ruled that Idaho was under no obligation to aid the unions in their political activities and the state’s decision not to do so was not “an abridgment of the union’s speech.” Changing Labor-Management Relations For most of the history of U.S. labor-manage- ment relations, employers and labor unions have seen each other as adversaries. Federal labor law has been shaped by this adversarial relationship, yet shifts in the structure of the U.S. economy have led to more cooperation. In the 1980s unions agreed to givebacks, in which employees agree to reduced wages and benefits in return for job security, particularly in the manufacturing industries. In response, employ- ers have given unions a larger voice in the allocation of jobs and in the work environment itself. enough employees to be certified as the legal BARGAINING AGENT, that would indi- cate dissatisfaction with the employer and would be an acceptable outcome. These proponents would object to unions filing complaints with the NLRB over company committees where the employees have rejected union represen- tation in the past. As long as employees want to participate in a company com- mittee or circle, they should be permitted to do so. Proponents argue that the bar on these types of workplace organizational innovations hurts workers. These inno- vations give employees more autonomy to plan work schedules, meet deadlines, operate equipment, make repairs, and handle health and safety issues. In the past an employee could suggest a change to management but then had to stand back and observe whether the change took place. In today’s workplace an employee wants to implement as well as suggest improvements. Finally, proponents note that in union-organized companies unions are free to negotiate the participation of employees in teams and quality circles. They suggest that it is unfair to restrict nonunion employees from electing to participate in similar business manage- ment ventures. The U.S. labor movement has resisted vigorously the introduction of employee involvement programs by management in both union and nonunion environments. Labor union leadership views the intro- duction of employer-sponsored commit- tees as a return to the past and as a way of undercutting the ability of unions to organize white-collar workers. Opponents point out the sordid history of U.S. labor relations prior to the passage of the NLRA in 1935. Company-sponsored unions were put forward as a way to resolve disputes over wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Employees believed that these unions acted in GOOD FAITH to negotiate a contract with management. In reality, these organizations were sham unions, dominated by the employer. The employers would put company spies in them to monitor what was discussed. Employees were either bought off or fired if they proved too effective in their union duties. Opponents argue that the NRLA is preserving the independence of labor unions. Without its decisions employers of nonunion employees would use TQM, quality circles, and other buzzwords to promote a nonunion status that would place employees at a disadvantage. Employees will quite likely be intimidated in employer-organized groups, and un- able to raise or meaningfully discuss certain issues that managemen t does notwanttohear.Withouta COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT negotiated by a union, opponen ts maintain, employees will not have job security or promotion protection. Opponents also question who makes the decisions in these groups. Though the rhetoric suggests empowerment of employees, employee committees are purely advisory, and the employer retains the authority to decide all issues. In addition, because management creates these committees, management can dis- solve them at any time. The inequality of power within a nonunion business dictates that the employer can do whatever management wants, regardless of a recommendation by an employee committee. The NLRA has placed a barrier to new models of business organization. The distrust of labor unions and their difficulty in making inroads with white- collar workers reconfirms to the unions the need for an adversarial posture with management. Those who seek funda- mental change in the way U.S. business operates believe that the NLRA must be amended to accommodate a major shift in economic organization. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LABOR LAW 201 When economic hardships fall on employ- ers, these employers must often negotiate concessions with employees and the unions representing employees in order to save their businesses. After the SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS in 2001, for instance, many airlines in the United States suffered devastating economic down- turns. Many of these airlines were forced to negotiate concessions from unions representing airline employees in order to avoid BANKRUPTCY. When the U.S. economy went into a steep decline in the fall of 2008, the three major U.S. automakers, General Motors, Ford, and Chrys- ler, suffered a precipitous drop in sales. General Motors and Chrysler secured multibillion- dollar loans from the federal government, and as a condition, the unions had to agree to givebacks for current and retired union members. Since the 1980s, innovations in corporate management that advocate teamwork, quality circles, and total quality management (TQM) have led to legal disputes and questions about the continued vitality of the adversarial model of labor-management relations. Under the NLRA, sections 2(5) and 8(A)(2), employers are prohibited from creating employer- dominated company unions. This prohibition was included in the original NLRA because employers had created sham unions that promised representation for workers but in fact toed the company line. With the beginning of TQM and quality circles in the late 1980s, some employers have attempted to reinvent the workplace by empow- ering all levels of workers to help make decisions, instead of delegating this task to a set of managers. The creation of quality circles and employee committees has run afoul of the NLRA provision against employer-created unions. In Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), the board held that the company’s “action committee” was a labor organization involved with and dominated by the company, in violation of sections 2(5) and 8(A)(2). Electromation was a nonunion company. In E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993), the board considered identical issues in a union-organized company. The board ruled that a series of safety and fitness committees created by du Pont were illegal under the NLRA. These cases illustrate the skepticism of some unions about the true intentions of management and the difficulty in adjusting to change in some areas of labor law. FURTHER READINGS Covington, Robert and Decker, Kurt. 2002.Employment Law in a Nutshell. 2d. ed. Saint Paul, Minn.: West Group. Gould, William. 2004.A Primer on American Labor Law. 4th ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Jasper, Margaret C. 2002. Labor Law. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. Lareau, N. Peter, et al. 2003. Labor and Employment Law. Conklin, N.Y.: Matthew Bender. Leslie, Douglas. 2000 Labor Law in a Nutshell.4th ed. Saint Paul, Minn.: West Group. CROSS REFERENCES Administrative Agency; Bargaining Agent; Boycott; Em- ployment Law; Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service; Landrum-Griffin Act; Norris-Laguardia Act; Taft-Hartley Act; Unfair Labor Practice. LABOR UNION An association, combination, or organization of employees who band together to secure favorable wages, improved working conditions, and better work hours, and to resolve grievances against employers. The history of labor unions in the United States has much to do with changes in technology and the development of capitalism. Although labor unions can be compared to European merchant and craft guilds of the Middle Ages, they arose with the factory system and the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. The first efforts to organize employees were met with fierce resistance by employers. The U.S. legal system played a part in this resistance. In Commonwealth v. Pullis (Phila. Mayor’sCt. 1806), generally known as the Philadelphia Cordwainers’ case, bootmakers and shoemakers of Philadelphia were indicted as a combination for conspiring to raise their wages. The prosecu- tion argued that the common-law doctrine of criminal conspiracy applied. The jury agreed that the union was illegal, and the defendants were fined. From that case came the labor conspiracy doctrine, which held that collective (as distin- guished from individual) bargaining would interfere with the natural operation of the marketplace, raise wages to artificially high levels, and destroy competition. This early resistance to unions led to an adversarial relationship between unions and employers. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 202 LABOR UNION Between 1806 and 1842 the labor conspiracy doctrine was applied in a handful of cases. Then, during the 1840s, U.S. courts began to question the doctrine. The most important case in this regard was Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 11, 38 A.M. Dec. 346 (Mass. 1842), in which Chief Justice LEMUEL SHAW set aside an indictment of members of the boot- makers’ union for conspiracy. Shaw agreed with employers that competition was vital to the economy but concluded that unions were one way of stimulating competition. As long as the methods they used were legal, unions were free to seek concessions from employers. By the end of the nineteenth century, courts generally held that strikes for higher wages or shorter work- days were legal. Despite the decline of the labor conspiracy theory, unions faced other legal challenges to their existence. The labor injunction and prosecution under antitrust laws became pow- erful weapons for employers who were involved in labor disputes. In an 1896 case, Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077, the highest court in Massachusetts upheld an injunction that forbade peaceful picketing outside the employer’s premises. The first national labor federation to remain active for more than a few years was the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor. It was estab- lished in 1869 and had set as goals the eight- hour workday, equal pay for equal work, and the abolition of child labor. The Knights of Labor grew to 700,000 members by 1886 but went into decline that year with a series of failed strikes. By 1900 it had disappeared. Labor unions nevertheless gained strength in 1886 with the formation of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Composed of 25 national trade unions and numbering over 316,000 members, the AFL was a loose CONFEDERATION of autonomous unions, each with exclusive rights to deal with the workers and employers in its own field. The AFL concentrated on pursuing achievable goals such as higher wages and shorter hours, and it renounced identification with any political party or movem ent. Members were encouraged to support politicians who were friendly to labor, whatever their party affiliation. Following the passage of the SHERMAN ANTI- TRUST ACT in 1890 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq.), which prohibited combinations in restraint of trade, courts punished and enjoined labor practices that were considered wrongful. In the Danbury Hatters case (Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488 [1908]), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the application of the act to an appeal that involved a labor publication for a general boycott of named nonunion employers. In 1911, in Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, the Court upheld an injunction against a union that had placed the name of the employer on the AFL “We Don’t Patronize” list, which was a call for a boycott of the employer. Opposition to labor unions was particularly intense during the late nineteenth century. Several unsuccessful strikes in the 1890s dem- onstrated the power of companies to crush unions. In 1892, steelworkers struck against the Carnegie Steel Company’s Homestead, Penn- sylvania, plan t. The company hired private guards to protect the plant, but violen ce broke out. The strike failed, and most of the workers quit the union and returned to work. In 1894 members of the American Railway Union struck the Pullman Palace Car Company, which made railroad cars. The federal government sent in troops to end the strike. Despite these setbacks, labor unions grad- ually increased their political power at the Median Usual Weekly Earnings, by Union Affiliation, in 2008 Earnings (in dollars) $722 $886 $880 $691 Union members a Represented by unions b Not represented by unions a Members of a labor union or an employee association similar to a labor union. b Members of a labor union or an employee association similar to a union as well as workers who report no union affiliation but whose jobs are covered by a union or an employee association contract. SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 800 900700 Total ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION LABOR UNION 203 federal level. In 1914 Congress en acted the CLAYTON ACT, sections 6 (15 U.S.C.A. § 7) and 20 (29 U.S.C.A. § 52), declaring that human labor was not to be considered an article of commerce and that the existence of unions was not to be considered a v iolation of antitrust laws. In addition, the act prohibited federal courts from issuing in junctions in labor disputes except to prevent IRREPARABLE INJURY to property. This prohibition was absolute when peaceful picketing and boycotts were involved. Employers had better success fighting unions by using the so-called yellow-dog contract. This agreement required a prospective employee to state that he or she was not a member of a union and would not become one. Although some states enacted laws that pro- hibited employers from requiring employees to sign this type of contract, the U.S. Supreme Court declared such statutes unconstitutional as an infringement of freedom of contract (Cop- page v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441 [1915]). By 1920 trade unions had more than five million members. During the 1920s, however, the trade union movement suffered a decline, precipitated in part by a severe economic depression in 1921-22. Unemployment rose, and competition for jobs became intense. By 1929 union membership had dropped to 3.5 million. The Great Depression of the 1930s caused more unemployment and a further decline in union membership. Unions responded with numerous strikes, but few were successful. Despite these reverses, the legal position of unions was enhanced during the 1930s. In 1932 Congress passed the NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq.), which declared yellow-dog contracts to be contrary to public policy and stringently limited the power of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. In cases in which an injunction still might be issued, the act imposed strict procedural limitations and safeguards in order to prevent more instances of abuses by the courts. The Norris-LaGuardia Act effec- tively ended “government by injunction” and has remained a FUNDAMENTAL LAW in labor disputes. During the 1930s the AFL itself was in turmoil over the aspirations of the labor movement. The trade unions that dominated the AFL were composed of skilled workers who opposed organizing the unskilled or semiskilled workers on the manufacturing production line. Several unions rebelled at this refusal to organize and formed the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). The CIO aggressively organized millions of workers who labored in automobile, steel, and rubber plants. In 1938, unhappy with this effort, the AFL expelled the unions that formed the CIO. The CIO then formed its own organization, changed its name to Congress of Industrial Organizations, and elected John L. Lewis, of the United Mine Workers, as its first president. U.S. labor relations were dramatically altered in 1935 with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, also known as the WAGNER ACT (29 U .S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq.). Forthefirsttime,laborunionsweregiven legal rights and powers under federal law. The act guaranteed the right of COLLECTIVE BARGAIN- ING , free from employer domination or influ- ence. It made it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with employees in the exercise of their right to bargain collectively; to interfere with or to influence unions; to discriminate in hiring or firing because of an employee’s union membership; to discrimi- nate against an employee who avails himself or herselfoflegalrights;ortorefusetobargain collectively. The Wagner Act also established the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD , which has the power to investigate employees’ complaints and to issue cease and desist orders. If an employer were to defy such an order, the board may ask a federal court of appeals for an enforcement order, or it could ask the court to review the cease-and- desist order. The board could conduct elections to determine which union should represent the employees in a bargaining unit and certify the union as their agent, and it could designate the bargaining unit. The heart of the Wagner Act was section 7 (29 U.S.C.A. § 157), which stated the public policy that workers have the right to engage in self-organization, in collective bargaining, and in concerted activities in support of self- organization and collective bargaining. Armed with these rights, unions grew in membership and strength during the late 1930s and through WORLD WAR II. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 204 LABOR UNION A number of states reacted negatively to these legal changes by enacting laws that sought to restrict and lessen the power of unions. An antiunion backlash developed after WORLD WAR II, when strikes against the automobile industry and other large corporations reached record numbers. This reaction culminated in the passage of the LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT of 1947, also known as the TAFT-HARTLEY ACT (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141 et seq.). The Taft-Hartley Act amended section 7 of the Wagner Act, affirming the rights that had been formulated in 1935 but providing that workers shall have the right to refrain from any of the listed activities. Whereas the Wagner Act listed only employers’ unfair labor practices, Taft-Hartley added unions’ unfair labor practices. The act created the FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, which provides a method for addressing strikes that create a national emergency. It also banned the CLOSED SHOP, which requires an employer to hire only union members and to discharge any employee who drops union membership. Taft- Hartley effectively replaced the Wagner Act as the basic federal statute regulating labor relations. In 1955 the AFL and CIO merged into a single organization, the AFL-CIO. The staunchly anti-communist AFL agreed to the merger only after the CIO had purged its organization of communists and supporters of commun ist ideals. George Meany was appointed the first president of the new organization. In 1959 Congress enacted the Labor Man- agement Reporting and Disclosure Act, also known as the LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 401 et seq.). Title VII of the act contains many amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, of which two are especially important. First, Landrum-Griffin made peaceful picketing of organizational or recognitional objectives illegal under certain circumstances. Second, it closed loopholes in the provisions of Taft-Hartley that forbadesecondary boycotts. Other sections of Landrum-Griffin provid- ed for a BILL OF RIGHTS for union members, financial disclosure requirements for unions and their officers, and saf eguards in un ion elections. All of the se matters concerned internal union practices, strongly suggesting that union corruption had become a problem. In fact, a 1957 congressional investigation of the Teamsters union had uncovered widespread corruption and had much to d o with the introduction of these new statutory provisions. Labor unions continued to thrive in the 1960s, as a robust econom y relied on a large manufacturing industry to maintain growth. Although no comprehensive union legislation was enacted during that decade, the CIVIL RIGHTS Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employ- ment Opportunity Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a et seq.), made an important contribution to national labor policy. The act declared it an unfair labor practice for an employer or union to discriminate against a person by reason of race, RELIGION, color, sex, or national origin. Administration of this provision is vested in the EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC). Under the Civil Rights Act, if the EEOC is unable to achieve voluntary compli- ance, the person allegingdiscrimination is au- thorized to bring a CIVIL ACTION in federal district court. The 1972 amendment gave the EEOC the right to bring such an action. The effect of the law has been to desegregate many trade unions that maintained an all-white member- ship policy. The union movement considerably im- proved working conditions for migrant workers in the late 1960s and the 1970s. The United Farm Workers, under the leadership of CESAR CHAVEZ , led successful boycotts and strikes against California growers, most notably against the wine-grape growers. Many unions suffered, however, with an economic downturn in the 1970s and 1980s, and with the decline of well-paying manufacturing jobs. Automation of industrial processes re- duced the number of workers who were required on assembly lines. In addition, many U.S. companies moved either to states that did not have a strong union background or to developing countries where labor costs were significantly lower. Union members became more concerned about job security than about higher wages, particularly in the manufacturing industry, and they agreed to concede salary and benefit givebacks. In return, unions sought greater labor-management cooperation and a larger voice in the allocation of jobs and in the work environment. Union membership has also declined in response to a shift from blue-collar manufactur- ing jobs to white-c ollar service and technology GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LABOR UNION 205 jobs. By the end of 2002 just 13.2 percent of the U.S. workforce claimed union member- ship, compared with a high of 34.7 percent in 1954. FURTHER READINGS Bagchi, Aditi. 2003. “Unions and the Duty of Go od Faith In Employment Contracts.” Yale Law Journal 112 (May). Labor Department, Bureau of Labor Statistics Web site. Available online at http://www.bls.gov (accessed August 5, 2009). Lichtenstein, Nelson. 2003. State of the Union: A Century of American Labor. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Child Labor Laws; Craft Union; Employment Law; Hoffa, James Riddle; Labor Law; Right-To-Work Laws. LACHES A defense to an equitable action, that bars recovery by the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s undue delay in seeking relief. Laches is a defense to a proceeding in which a PLAINTIFF seeks equitable relief. Cases in equity are distinguished from cases at law by the type of remedy, or judicial relief, sought by the plaintiff. Generally, law cases involve a problem that can be solved by the payment of monetary damages. Equity cases involve remedies directed by the court against a party. Types of equitable relief include injunction, where the court orders a party to do or not to do something; declaratory relief, where the court declares the rights of the two parties to a controversy; and accounting, where the court orders a detailed written statement of money owed, paid, and held. Courts have complete discretion in equity, and weigh equitable principles against the facts of the case to determine whether relief is warranted. The rules of equity are built on a series of legal maxims, which serve as broad statements of principle, the truth and reasonableness of which are self-evident. The basis of equity is contained in the maxim “Equity will not suffer an injustice.” Other maxims present reasons for not granting equitable relief. Laches is one such defense. Laches is based on the legal maxim “Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” Laches recognizes that a party to an action can lose evidence, witnesses, and a fair chance to defend himself or herself after the passage of time from the date the wrong was committed. If the defendant can show dis- advantages because for a long time he or she relied on the fact that no lawsuit would be started, then the case should be dismissed in the interests of justice. The law encourages a speedy resolution for every dispute. Cases in law are governed by statutes of limitations, which are laws that determine how long a person has to file a lawsuit before the right to sue expires. Different types of injuries (e.g., tort and contract) have different time periods in which to file a lawsuit. Laches is the equitable equivalent of statutes of limitations. However, unlike statutes of limita- tions, laches leaves it up to the court to determine, based on the unique facts of the case, whether a plaintiff has waited too long to seek relief. Real estate boundary disputes are resolved in equity and may involve laches. For instance, if a person starts to build a garage that extends beyond the boundary line and into a neighbor’s property, and the neighbor immediately files a suit in equity and asks the court to issue an injunction to stop the construction, the neigh- bor will likely prevail. However, if the neighbor observes the construction of the garage on her property and does not file suit until the garage is completed, the defendant may plead laches, arguing that the neighbor had ample time to protect her property rights before the construction was completed, and the court may find it unfair to order that the garage be torn down. The laches defense, like most of equity law, is a general concept containing many variations on the maxim. Phrases used to describe laches include “delay that works to the disadvantage of another,”“inexcusable delay coupled with prejudice to the party raising the defense,” “failure to assert rights,”“lack of diligence,” and “neglect or omission to assert a right.” v LAMAR, JOSEPH RUCKER Joseph Rucker Lamar served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1911 to 1916. Unlike many appointees to the Court, Lamar was not selected on the basis of a long political career. As an attorney and Georgia GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 206 LACHES Supreme Court judge, Lamar was recognized for his legal abilities. Lamar was born in Ruckersville, Georgia, on October 14, 1857. His wealthy family provided generations of leadership in the community, and included Lucius Q. C. Lamar, who served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1888 to 1893. Lamar attended the University of Georgia and graduated from Bethany College in West Virginia in 1877. He then attended Washington and Lee Law School and was admitted to the Georgia bar in 1878. From 1880 to 1903, Lamar practiced law in Augusta, Georgia. He often represented corporations, including railroads, and argued several cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. He served in the Georgia House of Repre- sentatives from 1886 to 1889. His legal abilities were used more directly when he was appointed to serve on a commission revising the Georgia code of state laws. CODIFICATION is a process of revising and reorganizing legislative laws into a coherent whole. Lamar mastered the highly technical process and revised the civil-law volume himself. The code was approved by the legislature in 1895. In 1903 he was appoin ted to the Georgia Supreme Court. He resigned in 1905 to return to his law practice. Lamar was surprised when President WIL- LIAM HOWARD TAFT , a Republican, appointed him to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1910. Lamar had met Taft the year before when the president was visiting Augusta, but was not well acq uainted with him or his circle. In fact, Democrat WOODROW WILSON, who became president in 1912, was a childhood friend of Lamar’s. During Lamar’s brief term on the Court, interstate commerce and the growth of federal regulatory and administrative power were prime topics of legal dispute. Lamar adhered to the majority view in most cases. He wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563 (1911), which expanded the authority of the EXECUTIVE BRANCH to add details deliberately left open by congressional legislation. Lamar held that it was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to allow administrators to exercise their discretion in filling in the details of laws. Lamar died January 2, 1916, in Washington, D.C. Joseph Rucker Lamar 1857–1916 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18501850 19251925 19001900 18751875 ❖ 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1914–18 World War I 1857 Born, Ruckersville, Ga. ◆ ◆ 1877 Graduated from Bethany College (W. Va.) 1878 Admitted to Ga. bar 1880–1903 Worked in private practice in Augusta, Ga. 1886–89 Served in Georgia House ◆ 1895 Georgia legislature approved new Georgia code of state laws, which Lamar helped revise 1903–05 Served on Georgia Supreme Court 1911 Wrote majority opinion in United States v. Grimaud 1910–16 Served on U.S. Supreme Court 1916 Died, Washington, D.C. ◆ ❖ Joseph R. Lamar. PHOTOGRAPH BY JULIAN LAMAR. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION LAMAR, JOSEPH RUCKER 207 . a BILL OF RIGHTS for union GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LABOR LAW 199 members, requires certain financial disclosures by unions, prescribes procedures for the election of union officers,. affiliation with a LABOR UNION is an unfair labor practice. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 198 LABOR LAW The motive of an employer in discharging an employee may be a controlling. environ- ment. If a union successfully wins over GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 200 LABOR LAW ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union.” Unions have also had to