Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 6 P50 pptx

Marshall was born July 2, 1908, in Balti- more, the son of a Pullman porter and a schoolteacher. He was a graduate of Lincoln University, a small, all-black college in Penn- sylvania, and Howard University Law School in Washington, D.C. At Howard, Marshall ex- celled under the guidance of Vice Dean CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON , the first African American to win a case before the U.S. Supreme Court. Houston encouraged his students to become not just lawyers but “social engineers” who could use the legal system to improve society. Marshall graduated first in his law class in 1933. Marshall’s attendance at predominantly black Howard University illustrates the barriers faced by African-Americans dur ing the early twentieth century. Although Marshall wished to attend law school at the University of Maryland (a public institution in his home town of Baltimore), he was prohibited by law from doing so because of his race. This injustice helped set Marshall on a course of opposing all forms of official segregation that denied equal opportunities to African-Americans. After law school, Marshall set up a practice in Baltimore, representing indigent clients in civil rights cases. In 1936 his mentor Houston offered him a position with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP), and in 1940 Marshall became director of the NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND,a position he held until 1961. Determined to eliminate segregation, Marshall coordinated a nationwide campaign to integrate higher educa- tion. He filed several successful lawsuits against public graduate and professional schools that refused to accept African American students. These suits paved the way for similar cases at the high school and elementary school levels. Marshall also journeyed throughout the deep South, traveling 50,000 miles per year to fight JIM CROW LAWS (a series of laws that provided for racial segregation in the South) and to represent criminal defendants. Marshall argued 32 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and won 29 of them. No doubt his most famous and far-reaching triumph Thurgood Marshall. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Thurgood Marshall 1908–1993 ❖ 1908 Born, Baltimore, Md. ◆ 1933 Graduated from Howard Law School 1936 Joined NAACP as special counsel 1993 Died, Bethesda, Md. 1914–18 World War I 1961–73 Vietnam War 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War ▼▼ ▼▼ 19001900 19501950 19751975 20002000 19251925 ❖ ◆ 1940–61 Served as director of NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund 1948 Argued Shelly v. Kraemer, in which the Court struck down racially restrictive land covenants 1978 Dissented in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 1965–67 Served as solicitor general for the United States 1950 Argued Sweatt v. Painter, in which the Court ruled that segregated law schools were unconstitutional 1961–65 Sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ◆◆ ◆ 1954 Argued Brown v. Board of Education before the Supreme Court 1973 Dissented in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 1967–91 Served as associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, the first African American to do so ◆◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 478 MARSHALL, THURGOOD before the High Court was BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA , KANSAS, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). In that case, the father of African American student Linda Brown sued the school board of Topeka, Kansas, over its segregation policy. Brown was required by law to attend an all African American school several blocks from her home even though an all white public school was located in her own neighborhood. Under Kansas law, cities of more than 15,000 people, such as Topeka, could choose to operate segregated schools. Marshall argued that these segregated schools, defended by officials as “separate but equal,” were unconstitutional. The SEPARATE-BUT-EQUAL doctrine originated in PLESSY V. FERGUSON , 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896), a case allowing segregated public accommodations for whites and blacks. In a plainspoken argument, Marshall dismissed as fallacy the notion that segregated schools offered the same educational experi- ences to black and white students. Sociological and psychological studies demonstrated that black children were in fact harmed by the policy of school segregation. The students’ self-esteem was damag ed and their future diminished when they were forced to accept inadequate facilities, equipment, and educational opportu- nities. Marshall argued that the only purpose segregation served was to perpetuate the myth of African Americans’ inferiority. A unanimous Court agreed and struck down the separate-but- equal doctrine, a momentous victory for Marshall, affecting public schools in twenty- one states. Marshall was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1961, and served there until 1965 when he was named SOLICITOR GENERAL for the United States. He was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967 by President LYNDON B. JOHNSON and served as an associate justice for 24 years. While on the Court, Marshall was known more for his impassioned dissents than for his majority opinions. In particular, as a staunch opponent of CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, he regularly voiced his disagreement with the majority in death penalty cases. He was also a firm backer of AFFIRMATIVE ACTION and contributed one of his most famous dissents in REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V . BAKKE, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978). In that case, Marshall criticized the high court’sruling that a public medical school’spolicyof reserving 16 of 100 spots for minority students was unconstitution al. Marshall also disse nted in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), disagreeing with the majority view that a Texas property tax system used to fund public education was acceptable, even though it allowed wealthier districts to pro- vide a better school system for students in those districts than less wealthy districts could provide. Marshall objected strongly to the property tax arrangement, claiming that it deprived poor children of an equal education. Marshall wrote the majority opinion in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 88 S. Ct. 1601, 20 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1968), in which the Court declared that a shopping center was a public forum from which picketers could not be barred by private owners. Marshall retired from the Court in 1991, but continued his criticism of government policies that were detrimental to African Americans or other disenfranchised groups. Marshall died on January 24, 1993, in Bethesda, Maryland. Upon Marshall’s death, nearly 20,000 mourners filed by his casket during the 12 hours it lay in state in the Great Hall of the U.S. Supreme Court. FURTHER READINGS Bland, Randall Walton. 2001. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Crusader for Liberalism: His Judicial Biography (1908– 1993). Bethesda, MD: Academica. Clemon, U.W., and Bryan K. Fair. 2003. “Lawyers, Civil Disobedience, and Equality in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Two American Heroes. Alabama Law Review 54 (spring). Kennedy, Randall. 1999. “Thurgood’s Coming.” American Prospect 21 (December). Maloy, Richard H.W. 1999. “Thurgood Marshall and the Holy Grail—the Due Process Jurisprudence of a Con- summate Jurist.” Pepperdine Law Review 26 (January). Tushnet, Mark V. 1997. Making Constitutional Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1961–1991. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Williams, Juan. Thurgood Marshall: American Revolutionary. 2000. New York: Three Rivers. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights Movement; Integration; S chool Desegregation. THE GOVERNMENT [THAT THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION] DEVISED REQUIRED SEVERAL AMENDMENTS , A CIVIL WAR , AND MOMENTOUS SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION TO ATTAIN THE SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT , AND ITS RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS , THAT WE HOLD AS FUNDAMENTAL TODAY . —THURGOOD MARSHALL GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MARSHALL, THURGOOD 479 MARTIAL LAW The exercise of government and control by military authorities over the civilian population of a designated territory. Martial law is an extreme and rare measure used to control society during war or periods of civil unrest or chaos. According to the Supreme Court, the term martial law carries no precise meaning (Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 66 S. Ct. 606, 90 L. Ed. 688 [1946]). However, most declarations of martial law have some common features. Generally, the institution of martial law contemplates some use of military force. To a varying extent, depending on the martial law order, government military personnel have the authority to make and enforce civil and criminal laws. Certain civil liberties may be suspended, such as the right to be free from unreasonable SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION , and freedom of movement. And the writ of HABEAS CORPUS may be suspended (this writ allows persons who are unlawfully imprisoned to gain freedom through a court proceeding). In the United States, martial law has been instituted on the national level only once, during the Civil War, and on a regional level only once, during WORLD WAR II. Otherwise, it has been limited to the states. Uprisings, political protests, labor strikes, and riots have, at various times, caused several state governors to declare some measure of martial law. Martial law on the national level may be declared by Congress or the president. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, of the Constitu- tion, Congress has the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel Invasions.” Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution declares that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” Neither constitu- tional provision includes a direct reference to martial law. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted both to allow the declaration of martial law by the president or Congress. On the state level, a governor may declare martial law within her or his own state. The power to do so usually is granted in the state constitution. Congress has never declared martial law. However, at the outset of the Civil War, in July 1861, Congress ratified most of the martial law measures declared by President ABRAHAM LINCOLN. Its martial law declaration gave the Union military forces the authority to arrest persons and conduct trials. However, Congress initially refused to ratify Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. This refusal created friction between Congress and the president and raised the question of whether unilateral suspension of the writ under martial law was within the president’s power. The Supreme Court reviewed the issue and ruled in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861) (No. 487), that only Congress had the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. After Congress approved Lincoln’s suspension of the writ in 1863, Union forces were authorized to arrest and detain Confeder- ate soldiers and sympathizers, but only until they could be tried by a court of law. The martial law dec lared by Lincoln during the Civil War spawned another legal challenge, this one to the military courts: EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866). Lamdin Milligan, a civilian resident of Indiana, was arrested on October 5, 1864, by the Union military forces. Milligan was charged with five offenses: conspiring against the United States, affording AID AND COMFORT to rebels, inciting insurrection, engaging in disloyal practices, and violating the laws of war. Milligan was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to prison by a military court. Although the habeas corpus petition had been suspended, the Supreme Court accepted Milligan’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court held that neither the president nor Congress could give federal military forces the power to try a civilian who lived in a state that had federal courts. Milligan firmly established the right of the U.S. Supreme Court to review the propriety of mar tial la w declarations. The next large-scale martial law declaration took place 80 years later. On December 7, 1941, the day that Japanese warplanes bombed Pearl Harbor in what was then the territory of Hawaii, Governor Joseph B. Poindexter, of Hawaii, declared martial law on the Hawaiian Islands. The governor also suspended the writ of habeas corpus. The commanding general of the Hawaiian military assumed the position of military governor. All courts were closed by order of the military governor, and the military was authorized to arrest, try, and convict GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 480 MARTIAL LAW persons. Under Poindexter’s martial law order, approved by the president, the military courts were given the power to decide cases without following the RULES OF EVIDENCE of the courts of law, and were not limited by sentencing law s in determining penalties. In February 1942 the Department of War appointed General John L. DeWitt to carry out martial law in California, Oregon, Washington, and the southern part of Arizona. In March 1942 DeWitt announced that the entire Pacific Coast of the United States would be subject to additional martial law measures. Later that month he declared that al l alien Japanese, Germans, and Italians, and all persons of Japanese descent, on the Pacific Coast were to remain inside their home between 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. These martial law measures were challenged by criminal defendants shortly after they were put in force. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 66 S. Ct. 606, 90 L. Ed. 688 (1946), the Supreme Court held that the military tribunals established under martial law in Hawaii did not have jurisdiction over common criminal cases because the Hawaiian Organic Act (31 Stat. 141 [48 U.S.C.A. § 532]) did not authorize the governor to close the courts of law when they were capable of functioning. In Duncan the Court ordered the release of two prisoners who had been tried and convicted of EMBEZZLEMENT and assault by military courts. In other cases the High Court was more tolerant of CIVIL RIGHTS deprivations under martial law. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 87 L. Ed. 1774 (1943), the Court upheld a curfew placed on Japanese Americans during the war, on the ground of military necessity, and in KOREMATSU V. UNITED STATES, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944), the Court justified the random internment (imprisonment) of over 110,000 Japanese Americans during the war. At least one governor has used martial law to enforce state agency regulations. In 1931 Governor Ross S. Sterling, of Texas, sent Texas NATIONAL GUARD troops into east Texas oil fields to force compliance with limits on the produc- tion of oil and an increase in the minimum number of acres required between oil wells. The regulations had been drawn up by the Texas Railroad Commission with the approval of the Texas Legislature, but similar regulations had been enjoined (stopped) by a federal court just four months earlier. In 1932 the Supreme Court invalidated Sterling’s use of martial law, holding that it violated the constitutional DUE PROCESS rights of the property owners (Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53 S. Ct. 190, 77 L. Ed. 375 [1932]). Another governor declared martial law in response to an assassination and rumors of political corruption. In June 1954 Albert Patterson, a nominee for state attorney general in Alabama, was shot to death on a street in Phenix City. Alabama governor Gordon Persons declared martial law in Phenix City and dispatched General Walter J. (“Crack”) Hanna and the Alabama National Guard to take over the city. Hanna appointed a military mayor, and the troops took control of the county court- house and city hall. The troops physically removed certain officials from the courthouse and city hall, seized gambling equipment, and revoked liquor licenses. Martial law usually is used to try to restore and maintain peace during civil unrest. It does not always yield the desired results. In May 1970, for example, Ohio governor James Rhodes declared limited martial law by sending in National Guard troops to contain a Kent State University protest against the VIETNAM WAR. Four protestors were shot and killed by the troops. In a case brought by their survivors, the Supreme Court held that the governor and other state officials could be sued if they acted beyond the scope of state laws and the federal Constitution (Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 [1974]). Martial law is generally an act of last resort. Courts will upho ld a decision to use troops only if it is necessary and proper. FURTHER READINGS Anthony, J. Garner. 1975. Hawaii under Army Rule. Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press. Currie, David P. 1987. “The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second World War, 1941–1946.” Catholic Univ. Law Review 37. Davies, Kirk L. 2000. “The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States.” Air Force Law Review (spring). Available online at http://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/Bio terrorism/8Military/MaritalLaw01c.htm; website home page: http://academic.udayton.edu (accessed August 13, 2009). Finder, Joseph. 1999. High Crimes. New York: Harper. Houston, James A., James D. Houston, and Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston. 2002. Farewell to Manzanar: A True Story of Japanese American Experience during and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MARTIAL LAW 481 after the World War II Internment. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Koh, Harold Hongju. 1994. “America’s Offshore Refugee Camps.” Univ. of Richmond Law Review 29. McCleskey, Robert A. 1994. “Maybe Oil and Water Should Mix—At Least in Texas Law: An Analysis of Current Problems with Texas Ground Water Law and How Established Oil and Gas Law Could Provide Appropri- ate Solutions.” Texas Wesleyan Law Review 1. Mello, Michael A., and Donna Duffy. 1990–91. “Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six- Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates.” New York Univ. Law Review 18. Rumore, Samuel A., Jr. 1996. “Building Alabama’s Courthouses: Russell County Courthouse.” Alabama Lawyer 57. Scheiber, Harry N., and Jane L. Scheiber. 1997. “Bayonets in Paradise: A Half-Century Retrospect on Martial Law in Hawaii, 1941–1946.” Univ. of Hawai’i Law Review 19 (fall). Tateishi, John. 1999. And Justice for All: An Oral History of the Japanese American Detention Camps. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press. CROSS REFERENCES Habeas Corpus; Japanese American Evacuation Cases; Kent State Student Killings; Militar y Law; Military Occupation; Militia; National Guard. v MARTIN, LUTHER Luther Martin was a distinguished lawyer and statesman who played an influential role in U.S. law and politics during the early years of the republic. During most of his legal career, he served as Maryland’s attorney general. Most sources cite Martin’s birth as being on February 9, 1748, near New Brunswick, New Jersey. He graduated from the College of New Jersey (now known as Princeton University) in 1766 and then taught school in Maryland for three years. In 1770, he began studying law and was admitted to the Virginia bar in 1771. He established a successful law practice in Mary- land and Virginia and became known for his superior legal talents. In 1774 Martin entered politics as a member of the Annapolis Convention, which was convened to formulate a list of grievances against the British government. In 1778, he was appointed to be Maryland’s first attorney general, a position he would retain for most of the next 40 years. He attended the CONTINENTAL CONGRESS in 1785 and the Constitutional Con- vention in 1787. Martin opposed the idea of a strong federal government, preferring that power reside in the states. Unhappy with the Luther Martin 1748–1826 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17501750 18251825 18001800 17751775 ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1826 Died, New York City 1819 Argued McCulloch v. Maryland before Supreme Court 1810 Argued Fletcher v. Peck before Supreme Court 1804 Successfully defended Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase against impeachment charges 1807 Successfully defended Aaron Burr during Burr's treason trial 1787 Attended Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 1778 Appointed Maryland's first attorney general 1771 Admitted to Virginia bar 1766 Graduated from the College of New Jersey (now Princeton) 1748 Born, New Brunswick, N.J. 1775–83 American Revolution 1785 Attended Continental Congress IN A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT , THE PARTIES TO THE COMPACT ARE NOT THE PEOPLE , AS INDIVIDUALS , BUT THE STATES, AS STATES; AND [IT IS] BY THE STATES AS STATES, THAT THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO BE RATIFIED , AND NOT BY THE PEOPLE , AS INDIVIDUALS. —LUTHER MARTIN Luther Martin. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 482 MARTIN, LUTHER final version of the Constitution, he opposed its ratification. As an attorney, Martin achieved a presti- gious reputation and argued several landmark cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. In FLETCHER V. PECK, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 3 L. Ed. 162 (1810), the Court for the first time invalidated a state law as contrary to the U.S. Constitution. The Georgia legislature had re- voked a land grant that originally had been permitted by a contract. The Court ruled that public grants were contractual obligations and that they could no t be abrogated without fair compensation. Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL based the decision on the Contract Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 1), which provides that no state shall impair the obliga- tions of contract. Martin also appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court in MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND,17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), where he argued that Maryland had the right to impose a tax on a federally chartered bank. Chief Justice Marshall ruled against Maryland, finding that the state had no authority under the Constitution to tax any agency that has been auth orized by the federal government. In Marshall’s words, “the power to tax is the power to destroy.” Such a power did not comport with the allocation of powers under the Constitution. Martin also served as counsel in two politically charged cases. In 1804 he successfully helped to defend U.S. Supreme Court Justice SAMUEL CHASE against IMPEACHMENT. Chase, a Federalist judge who had outraged Democrats with several decisions that appeared to be based as much on politics as on law, was acquitted at his Senate trial after Martin convinced senators that the impeachment itself was politically motivated. In 1807 Martin represented AARON BURR , who w as accused of TREASON. Martin argued that the charge was bas eless and that it was motivated by President Thomas Jefferson’s per- sonal and political dislike of Burr. His indict- ment of the Jefferson administration helped to convince the jury to acquit Burr. Martin suffered a stroke in 1820, shortly after arguing McCulloch v. Maryland. Despite his stature and his successful law practice, Martin was insolvent. The Maryland legislature levied a $5 license fee on every attorney to help support Martin. In 1823 Aaron Burr took Martin into his home, where Martin lived for three years. Martin died on July 10, 1826, in New York City. FURTHER READINGS Dillenberger, J., ed. 1961. Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Lehman, H.T., and J. Pelikan, eds. 2002. Luther’s Works, 55 vols. Minneapolis and St. Louis: Fortress and Concordia. Marty, Martin E. 2008. Martin Luther: A Life. New York: Penguin. CROSS REFERENCES Bank of the United States; Constitution of the United States. MARTIN V. HUNTER’S LESSEE The framing of the U.S. Constitution came after the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION failed to create a viable national government. The 13 former colonies had retained most of their political power, and the resulting national government was impotent. In contrast, the U.S. Constitution allocated powers between the national govern- ment and state governments. Moreover, the three branches of the national government were given specific grants of power. Despite these provisions and the history of the confederation era, some states were outraged that the U.S. Supreme Court could review and reverse state court decisions. The high court issued such rulings and asserted its jurisdiction without incident until 1813, when the Virginia Court of Appeals refused to enforce the high court’s judgment. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1816 and led to a landmark decision, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). In a lengthy and magisterial opinion, Justice JOSEPH STORY reaffirmed the Court’s jurisdiction and set to rest the idea that state courts could decide whether or not to honor federal court decisions. In addition, the Court raised for the first time that the federal government wielded implied powers as well as enumerated powers. The legal dispute in question reached back to the Revolutionary War. Following the Declaration of Independence, Virginia passed a law that authorized the confiscation of property held by Loyalists to the British regime. Thomas Lord Fairfax, a Loyalist, held substan- tial property in Northern Neck, Virginia. After his death, his heir, Denny Martin, sought to claim this property but discovered that it had been confiscated and sold to a private party by GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MARTIN V. HUNTER’ S LESSEE 483 the state of Virginia. Martin filed suit in Virgin ia court, asking the co urt to eject the current owner and to restore title to him. He based his claim on the TREATY OF PARIS (1783) and Jay’s Treaty (1794), which the U.S. had signed with Great Britain. The Treaty of Paris ended the War for Independence, and Jay’s Treaty re- solved lingering disputes over parts of the peace treaty. Both treaties contained provisions that forbade the confiscation of Loyalist property. Martin pointed to Article III of the Constitu- tion, which grants the judicial power of the U.S. to the U.S. Supreme Court and gives it jurisdiction to hear disputes involving treaties. He contended that federal treaty provisions trumped state laws. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed in 1813 and ordered Virginia to enforce the Court’s judgment restoring title to Martin. Martin was to be disappointed, as the Virginia Court of Appeals, the commonwealth’s highest court, refused to enforce the judgment. It claimed that the U.S. Supreme Court had no power to review state court decisions. Several other states were sympathetic to this viewpoint, signaling a looming crisis over the judicial powers of the national government. It was in this light that the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in March 1816. Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL , a Virginian with financial and other conflicts of interests, did not participate in the decision, leaving it in the hands of Justice Story and the five other justices. The Court, in a unanimous decision, rejected Virginia’s argument and held that the U.S. Supreme Court had the constitutional and statutory authority to review state court deci- sions. Justice Story, writing for the Court, conducted a lengthy review of the language of the constitutional and statutory provisions, but he also looked at the historical factors that had led to the framing of Article III. Story, one of the great legal thinkers of the nineteenth century, bluntly dismissed Virginia’s claim that the states, in agreeing to the Constitution, had retained their absolute sovereignty. This com- pact theory of government was, in Story’s view, the basis for the Articles of Confederation but not the Constitution. He noted that the Constitution’s preamble states that the docu- ment was ordained and established “by the people of the United States” and not by the states in their sovereign capacities. The Consti- tution was not “carved out of existing state sovereignties, nor a surrender of powers already existing in state institutions.” In essence, the people had drawn up their government on a clean slate and had allocated powers to the states, the federal government, and to the three branches of the federal government. This clean slate was evidenced in the allocation of judicial power. Article III laid heavy emphasis on the superiority of the national judicial power in its statement that “the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in such inferior courts as the Congres may from time to time ordain and establish.” Story reviewed the text of this provision, using the “natural and obvious sense” of each word. It was illogical to grant the judicial power to a supreme court and then to argue that inferior state courts could take away such power. Therefore, Story concluded that Congress had the duty to vest the “whole judicial power” to the U.S. Supreme Court. The word “shall” loomed large in this discussion, as it signified that Congress did not have discretion to vest less than absolute judicial power. Story also sug- gested that the federal government held implied powers to execute the commands of the Con- stitution as well as the enumerated powers contained in the document. Without such implied powe rs, the government could be hamstrung by pinched readings of its authority to carry out policies for the good of the people. Having established the constitutional grounds for the right to review state-court decisions, Story turned to Virginia’s statutory challenge. Section 25 of the JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, one of the first acts passed by the first Congress, gave the U.S. Supreme Court the authority to issue judgments involving treaty- based lawsuits. Virginia claimed that this violated Article III and the TENTH AMENDMENT, which in essence states that all powers not delegated to the three branches of the federal government are reserved to the states. Justice Story rejected this claim. The U.S. Supreme Court needed to retain jurisdiction over treaties as well as other types of lawsuits named in the Judiciary Act. Story was frank in his criticism. The Constitution had been drafted , in part, to prevent “state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests.” Without a manifestly supreme court, states could “ob- struct, or control the regular administra- tion of justice.” Moreover, the uniformity of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 484 MARTIN V. HUNTER’ S LESSEE decisions was an important goal. Great mischief would take place if each state could interpret laws, treaties, and the U.S. Constitution. Finally, Story noted that if Virginia’s interpretation were to be adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court would have no power to review any state criminal case. Such an interpretation made no sense when the intent of the Framers was reviewed. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court had the power to review state-court decisions, and federal judicial supremacy was affirmed. FURTHER READINGS Hall, Kermit L. 2008. The Magic Mirror: Law in American History. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Sloan, Cliff, and David McKean. 2009. The Great Decision: Jefferson, Adams, Marshall, and the Battle for the Supreme Court. New York: Public Affairs. Stephens, Otis H., Jr., and John M. Scheb II. 2002. American Constitutional Law. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY A database containing information about attor- neys and law firms around the world. Primarily lawyers use the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory to assist them in the practice of their profession. An attorney may use the directory, for example, to find out more information about a lawyer or law firm that has filed a lawsuit against her client or to find an attorney in another jurisdiction to assist in a case. James B. Martindale published his first legal directory in 1868. In 1874 he published Martin- dale’s Un ited States Law Directory, a selective listing of attorneys that made no attempt to include complete information on all attorneys. The 1885–1886 biannual edition was renamed Martindale’s American Law Directory. The first attempt to publish a complete roster of all attorneys in the United States and Canada, this edition listed each attorney and law firm in alphabetical order by state and city and the laws of each state and all Canadian provinces. In 1896 annual publication of the directory began, and a section listing foreign attorneys and law firms was added. The 1896 edition also intro- duced the basic information format for attor- neys that continues to the present: date of birth, date of ADMISSION TO THE BAR, and a rating, if any, of legal ability. In 1930 the Martindale Company purchased the publishing rights of Hubbell’s Legal Directory issued by J. H. Hubbell & Company from 1870 to 1930. The company was purchased from Edwin Powell Hubble (a variant spelling of the family name), the astronomer for whom the Hubble Space Telescope is named. The merged publi- cations, renamed the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, appeared as a two-volume set in 1931. The size of the directory has grown steadily as more attorneys have joined the profession. In 1948 the directory went to three volumes. By 1968 it had increased to five volumes. The first eight-volume set was published in 1987, and the 1991 edition was made up of 16 smaller volumes. In 1996 the directory consisted of 25 volumes and contained listings for more than 900,000 attorneys and law firms in the United States, Canada, and throughout the world. The directory is now available on CD-ROM, through LEXIS-NEXIS, and through the Mar- tindale-Hubbell site on the World Wide Web. It has become a standard reference publication for law libraries. The Martindale Company was purchased by Reed Elsevier in 1990 and is part of Reed Reference Publishing. FURTHER READING LexisNexis Martindale.com website. Available online at http:// www.martindale.com (accessed August 13, 2009). MARX, KARL HEINRICH Karl Heinrich Marx was a nineteenth-century German intellectual whose works have had great influence on the world. Largely ignored during his lifetime, Marx’swritingsoneconomics, politics, social science, and revolution eventually led to the founding of two political movements, SOCIALISM and COMMUNISM. In addition, his views have influenced many legal philosophers. Marx was born May 5, 1818, in Trier, in what was then the state of Prussia. His father was a successful lawyer. A bright student, Marx studied law at the University of Bonn in 1835. The following year he transferred to the University of Berlin, where he studied philosophy. While at Berlin, Marx joined a group of students and teachers who were opposed to the Prussian government. At that time citizens of Prussia enjoyed few civil liberties and were prevented from participating fully in public affairs. Marx’s political activity proved harmful for his academic career. After obtaining his doctor- ate in philosophy in 1841, he tried to get a teaching job. The Prussian government barred GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MARX, KARL HEINRICH 485 him from teaching. He then became a freelance journalist. Following his marriage to Jenny von Westphalen in 1843, Marx moved to Paris. In 1845 he moved to Brussels, where he remained until 1848. In 1848 he returned to German y to become the editor of a radical paper in Cologne. He used the newspaper to rail against the Prussian government, and he encouraged the German Revolution of 1848, which failed to topple the regime. During the days leading up to the revolu- tion, Marx first articulated his political and historical theories. In the Communist Manifesto (1848), a pamphlet written with his friend Friedrich Engels, Marx argued that history is a series of conflicts between economic classes. He predicted that the ruling middle class would be overthrown by the working class, and a classless society would be created. This classless society would be characterized by the public ownership of all means of economic production. Marx and Engels had previously written The German Ideology (1845–46), a 700-page book that dealt in more philosophic terms with economics and politics. Marx’s participation in the failed revolution forced him to flee Germany. In 1849 he settled in London, where he remained for the rest of his life. He and his family lived in abject poverty. He refused to work, except for a stint as a political reporter for the New York Tribune. Instead, he spent his time researching at the British Museum library. Friends contributed to his support, especially Engels, who owned a textile manufacturing plant in England. In 1864 Marx founded the International Workingmen’s Association, a group dedicated to preparing the way for a socialist revolution. He died in London on March 14, 1883. Marx spent most of his life in England working on Das Kapital (Capital). The first volume was published in 1867, the second and third volumes after his death. He considered Das Kapital to be his major work, because it described the functioning of industrial capitalism. Marx saw capitalism as an efficient way of producing wealth, but also saw a fatal flaw in how this wealth was distributed: those who owned the means of production retained most of the wealth, whereas the working class had to get by on fluctuating wages. Marx argued that this inequality would eventually lead the working class to revolt. Marx’s writings had a great effect on the socialist and Communist revolutionary move- ments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He cast his theories as historically inevitable, providing revolutionaries with a way of explain- ing the world that appeared to be scientific. Marxist ideas became the core intellectual tradition for Communist countries in the twentieth century. Social science, history, and philosophy were shaped by his views. U.S. intellectuals generally ignored Marxism until the 1960s, in part because many people believed that it was a subversive political doctrine. In law, the field of Marxist JURISPRUDENCE has grown significantly. A Marxist analysis of law places more importance on the power of economic forces in society rather than on the concept of an impartial, neutral RULE OF LAW. Marxists believe that the material forces of a society and those that control these forces shape the society’s legal system. FURTHER READINGS Brettschneider, Corey. 1998. “From Liberalism to the End of Juridical Language: An Examination of Marx’s Early Jurisprudence. Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 18 (annual): 173–215. Inverarity, James M., Pat Lauderdale, and Barry C. Feld. 1983. Law and Society: Sociological Perspectives on Criminal Law. Boston: Little, Brown. CROSS REFERENCES Cold War; Hegel , Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich; Stalin, Joseph. Karl Marx. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 486 MARX, KARL HEINRICH v MASON, GEORGE George Mason was an eighteenth-century statesperson who in 1776 wrote the Declaration of Rights for the State of Virginia and who later helped w rite the U.S. Constitution. Mason was a champion of liberty whose opposition to SLAVERY and a strong federal government led him to refuse to sign the Constitution. Mason was born on October 7, 1725, in Fairfax County, Virginia, the son of a wealthy commercial and agricultural family. Mason studied law but was primarily a plantation owner and real estate speculator. He was a neighbor of GEORGE WASHINGTON. Mason was deeply interested in western expansion, and in 1749 he became a member of the Ohio Company, which developed land and trade on the upper Ohio River. At about this time, Mason helped found the city of Alexandria, Virginia. Because he suffered from chronic poor health, Mason avoided public office, serving only a short time in the Virginia House of Burgesses. Yet he did not shun the political debate over British interference with the colonies. British attempts at taxing and control- ling the colonies through the STAMP ACT of 1765 and the TOWNSHEND ACTS led many colonial leaders to consider political independence. In 1775 Mason attended the Virginia con- vention, where he helped write most of the Virginia constitution. In June 1776 he wrote the VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. THOMAS JEFFERSON was probably familiar with Mason’s concepts and language when he wrote the Declaration of Independence later that year, and other states soon copied Mason’s work. French revolution- aries also showed they had been influenced by Mason’s declaration in their Declaration of the Rights of Man, which was composed in 1789. The Virginia Declaration of Rights stated that government derived from the people, that individuals were created equally free and independent, and that they had inalienable rights that the government could not legiti- mately deny them. As a delegate to the Constitutional Conven- tion of 1787, Mason was called on to write part of the first draft. By the end of the convention, George Mason. GETTY IMAGES George Mason 1725–1792 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17251725 18001800 17751775 17501750 ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1792 Died, Fairfax County, Va. 1787 Helped write first draft of U.S. Constitution 1791 Ratification of the Bill of Rights 1789 George Washington began term as first U.S. president; French Revolution began 1775–83 American Revolution 1767 Townshend Act levied taxes on glass, painter's lead, paper, and tea 1765 Stamp Act required revenue stamps to help defray cost of royal troops; repealed following year 1776 Wrote the Virginia Declaration of Rights 1775 Attended Virginia Convention; helped write Va. state constitution 1759 Appointed to Va. House of Burgesses 1754 Helped found Alexandria, Va. 1749 Joined Ohio Company 1752 Appointed treasurer of the Ohio Company 1725 Born, Fairfax County, Va. OUR ALL IS AT STAKE , AND THE LITTLE CONVENIENCES AND COMFORTS OF LIFE , WHEN SET IN COMPETITION WITH OUR LIBERTY , OUGHT TO BE REJECTED NOT WITH RELUCTANCE BUT WITH PLEASURE . —GEORGE MASON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MASON, GEORGE 487 . Houston. 2002. Farewell to Manzanar: A True Story of Japanese American Experience during and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MARTIAL LAW 481 after the World War II Internment. New. Joseph. Karl Marx. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 4 86 MARX, KARL HEINRICH v MASON, GEORGE George Mason was an eighteenth-century statesperson who in 17 76 wrote the Declaration of Rights. position of military governor. All courts were closed by order of the military governor, and the military was authorized to arrest, try, and convict GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 480