the trust property will be given to the beneficiary and the kinds of transactions the trustee may conduct with the trust property. Unless the terms of the trust state otherwise, a trustee may invest trust property but must use reasonable skill and judgment in making the investments. In some states, a trustee is required by statute to make certain investments under certain conditions, but most states let trustees decide on their own whether to invest the trust property. However, a trustee may not invest property if it is prohibited by the terms of the trust. Bankruptcy In BANKRUPTCY cases, a court may appoint a trustee to manage the funds of the insolvent party. In the United States, when an individual or business files for bankruptcy, all property of the filer becomes property of a newly created entity, the bankruptcy estate. (11 U.S.C. § 541.) For all consumer and business bankruptcies filed under chapter 7 or chapter 13 of Title 11 of the United States Code (USC), a trustee or trustee in bankruptcy (TIB) is appoint ed by the U.S. Trustee. As an officer of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , they are charged with ensuring the integrity of the bankruptcy system. Along with representatives in each court, they help to manage the property of the bankruptcy estate, including bringing actions to avoid pre-bank- ruptcy transfers of property. In bankruptcies filed under chapter 11 or 12, the debtor continues to manage the property of the bankruptcy estate, as “debtor in possession,” subject to replacement for cause with a trustee. Chapter 7 trustees in bankruptcy are chosen by the U.S. Trustee from a panel and are known as “panel trustees.” Every judicial district has a permanent chapter 13 trustee, known as a “standing trustee.” Trustees who are appointed by bankruptcy courts are paid for their services from public funds. Trustees who manage trusts for private parties also are paid for their services, but their compensation comes from the creat or of the trust or from the trust’s funds. TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE V. WOODWARD The legal structure of the modern U.S. business corporation had its genesis in Trustees of Dart- mouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819), which held that private corporate charters are protected from state interference by the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution (art. I, § 10). Dartmouth College was founded in 1769 by Reverend Eleazer Wheelock as a school for missionaries and Native Americans. During the 1750s, Wheelock financed the school with his own money. He launched an extensive fund- raising effort in England and Scotland in the 1760s and received generous contributions. However, his benefactors wanted assurances that the money they were sending overseas would be properly spent. To allay their concerns, Wheelock instituted a man agement structure by which an English board controlled the school’s finances and a colonial board managed the everyday affairs of the school and its missions. In 1769 Wheelock obtained a corporate charter from the royal governor of New Hampshire. The charter outlined the governing structure of the school, including the English and colonial boards of trustees. After Wheelock’s death in 1779, his son, John Wheelock, assumed the presidency of Dartmouth College. During the ensuing years, various circumstances, including the American Revolution, brought severe hardships to the college. Funding was scarce, land titles were uncertain, and the value of the college’s assets diminished. Disputes arose between Wheelock and the colonial—now U.S.—board of trustees over the administration of the college, and in August 1815 a group of dissatisfied board members prepared resolutions to remove Wheel- ock from office. A struggle for control followed, and the dissident faction, composed of Repub- licans who wanted the state of New Hampshire to control the school, enlisted the support of the legislature. In December 1816 the legislature passed a law that renamed the college Dartmouth University and made it a public school controlled by a state-appointed governing board. The controlling faction on the old board, most of whom were Federalists who supported Wheelock, wanted to maintain Dartmouth College’s private, sectarian character. They maintained that the school’s charter was a contract between King George III and the trustees. Because Article I, Section 10, of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from passing any law that impairs contractual obligations, they argued that the legislature could not alter the governing method prescribed in the charter. The Republicans maintained that because the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 128 TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE V. WOODWARD charter was handed down by the English monarchy before the American Revolution, it had no legal effect in a U.S. court. Furthermore, they contended that even if the charter was valid, it was not a contract within the meaning of Article I, Section 10, but rather an amendable legislative act. In February 1817 the trustees filed a lawsuit against William H. Woodward, a former secre- tary of the old board who had transferred his allegiance and become the secretary-treasurer of the new state-appointed board. The suit claimed that the legislature’s actions violated the old board’s constitutional freedom of contract and petitioned the court to compel Woodward to return the college’s records, books, and seal, and to pay $50,000 in damages. The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs, holding that Dartmouth College’s charter was not a contract entitled to constitutional protec- tion (Dartmouth College, 1N.H.111[1817]). The trustees appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and enlisted the brilliant lawyer and orator DANIEL WEBSTER to argue their cause. An 1801 graduate of Dartmouth, Webster made an impassioned plea to the Court to uphold the original charter and maintain the school’s private character. He argued that the school was created out of the bounty of its founder and that the founder conferred on the trustees certain rights. Although the institution may have some public characteristics, Webster con- tended that it was still a private enterprise whose trustees could not be deprived of their property, immunities, or privileges without DUE PROCESS OF LAW . He further argued that a charter constitutes a contract in the fullest sense of the law because it includes all the elements of a contract: competent parties, subject matter, mutual consideration, agreement of the parties, and mutual obligations. Webster reminded the justices of the dangers of unchecked legislative power. He argued that no less than the future of all private colleges hung in the balance of the Court’s decision and that if the New Hampshire statute were upheld, all colleges would be subject to the vagaries of politics. He concluded his arguments by addressing Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL : “It is, sir, as I have said, a small college. And yet there are those who love it.” Webster’s eloquence reportedly moved some observers, including Marshall, to tears. The parties completed their arguments near the end of the Court’s 1818 term. At the close of the term, Justice Marshall announced that the Court was undecided and would continue its consideration of the case to the 1819 term. On February 2, 1819, Marshall read the Court’s opinion, which he had written: “The opinion of the court is, that [the charter] is a contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired without violating the constitution.” The Court held that Wheelock and the college’s trustees had received the charter in return for their agreement to operate the school under the terms of the charter. This mutual obligation was the basis of the Court’s finding that a contract existed and that the contract fell within the Contracts Clause’s protection. Marshall’s opinion defined a corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.” Accord- ing to the Court, a corporation possesses only the properties and powers conferred upon it by law. Dartmouth College was a corporation and, as a party to the contract created by the charter, could enforce its constitutional right to be free from impairment of its obligation. The Dartmouth College case had far-reaching implications. By establishing that private corpo- rate charters are contracts protected by the Constitution, this decision enabled business corporations to operate under whatever terms are dictated in their charters, without fear of interference by the state. This freedom was an important agent in the enormous growth of corporations in the nineteenth and early twenti- eth centuries, a necessary adjunct to the development of the U.S. economy. In addition, the case was the first to recognize that a corporation is a “person” for legal purposes, able to sue and be sued. It also established the principle that vested property rights, such as those granted in a corporate charter, fall within the purview of the Contracts Clause. By so doing, the decision established that the Contracts Clause protects the right to acquire and dispose of property. This protection, in turn, encouraged economic venture and development. Although the Dartmouth College case is most often cited for its effect on the law of business corporations, it also significantly influ- enced the deve lopment of higher educ ation in the United States. By confirming the autonomy of Dartmouth College as a private institution, the Court ensured that other private colleges would operate free of state interference. The decision probably influenced the growth of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE V. WOODWARD 129 public colleges, as the only schools states could legally control were those founded by the states. Finally, by prohibiting the legislature from interfering with Dartmouth’s trustees , faculty, and students, the Court, perhaps inadvertently, bolstered the concepts of ACADEMIC FREEDOM and tenure for academic faculty. Webster, in his argument s before the justices, implored them to protect the Dartmouth faculty’s “sacred” property rights, to which they were entitled by virtue of their forgoing “the advantages of professional and pub lic employments, to devote themselves to science and literature, and the instruction of youth.” The Dartmouth College case was criticized by some as awarding free rein to corporations and usurping state regulatory power. However, the case was interpreted not to prevent states from re gulating businesses but rather to restrict states from inte rfering with a corpora- tion’s charter provisions. In fact, states have always regulated business corporations to benefit the public interest. The Court made it clear through subsequent decisions that Dart- mouth College was not to be interpreted as corporate carte blanche. For example, in Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pe t.) 514, 7 L. Ed. 939 (1830), the plaintiff argued that its charter implied an exemption from taxation and that a ge neral tax on banks would be a burden on its freedom of contract. The CourtheldthattheDartmouth College doctrine did not prohibit states from taxing banks. Corporations have the legal characteristics of any individual, and all individuals are obligated to share in the public burden of taxation. A further refinement of the doctrine came in West River B ridge v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 12 L. Ed. 535 (1 848), in which the Court held that all contracts are subject to the superseding power of EMINENT D OM AI N and “the preexisting and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community.” That higher authority gives states the right to tax and regulate corporations. FURTHER READINGS Hart, Benjamin. 1984. Poisoned Ivy. New York: Stein & Day. Lee, Mordecai. 2007. “Revisiting the Dartmouth Court Decision: Why the US Has Private Nonprofit Agencies Instead of Public Non-Governmental Organizations.” Public Organization Review 7 (June). Mark, Gregory A. 1987. “The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law.” 1987. Univ. of Chicago Law Review 54 (fall). McGarvie, Mark D. 1999. “Creating Roles for Religion and Philanthropy in a Secular Nation: The Dartmouth College Case and the Design of Civil Society in the Early Republic.” Journal of College and University Law 25 (winter). Shribman, David, and Edward Connery Lathem, eds. 1999. Miraculously Builded in Our Hearts: A Dartmouth Reader. Hanover, N.H.: Univ. Press of New England. Stites, Francis N. 1972. Private Interest and Public Gain: The Dartmouth College Case, 1819. Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press. Widmayer, Charles E. 1977. Hopkins at Dartmouth. Hanover, N.H.: Univ. Press of New England. CROSS REFERENCES Academic Freedom; Colleges and Universities; Corporations. TRUSTIES Prison inmates who through their good conduct earn a certain measure of freedom in and around the prison in exchange for assuming certain responsibilities. A prison trusty might, for example, be charged with the responsibility of maintaining order among fellow inmates. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT The TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (TILA) of 1968 is contained in Title I of the CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT (CCPA) (15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq.). The CCPA is designed to ensure that every customer who needs CONSUMER CREDIT is given meaningful information concerning the cost of such credit. The Truth in Lending Act requires that the terms in transactions involv- ing consumer credit be fully explained to the prospective debtors. It sets forth three basic rules: (1) a creditor may not advertise a deal that ordinarily is not available to anyone except a preferred borrower; (2) advertisements must contain either all of the terms of a credit transaction or none of them; and (3) if the credit is to be repaid in more than four payments, the agreement must indicate, in clear and co nspicuous print, that “the cost of credit is included in the price quoted for the goods and services.” This law does not impose regu- lations upon the advertising media, only upon the prospective creditor. The Truth in Lending Act al so grants consumers the right to cancel certain credit transactions that involve a LIEN on their principal dwelling; regulates certain credit card practices; and provides a means for a fair and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 130 TRUSTIES timely resolution of credit billing disputes. With the exception of certain types of high-cost mortgage loans, TILA does not regulate the charges that may be imposed for consumer credit. Instead, it requires standardized disclo- sure of costs and charges so that consumers can shop. It also imposes limitations on home equity plans that are subject to the requirements of 12 CFR 226.5b and various higher-cost mortgages that are subject to the requirements of 12 CFR 226.32. The regulation prohibits certain acts or practices in connection with credit secured by a consumer’s principal dwelling. The Credit Card Act of 2009 On May 22, 2009, the Credit Card Act of 2009 was enacted and made extensive revisions to the Truth in Lending Act. The FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD announced that it plans to issue amend- ments to Regulation Z to implement those revisions in accordance with the requirements of the Credit Card Act. The Act requires many of the amendments in the board’s January 2009 Regulation Z (effective July 1, 2010) to be changed, but the board is not rescinding any of those requirements as of October of 2009. CROSS REFERENCE Consumer Protection. v TRUTH, SOJOURNER SOJOURNER TRUTH was a nineteenth-century African American evangelist who embraced abolitionism and WOMEN’S RIGHTS. A charismatic speaker, she became one of the best-known abolitionists of her day. Born a slave around 1797 in Ulster County, New York, Isabella Baumfree, as she was originally named, was the second youngest of thirteen children born in SLAVERY to Elizabeth (called Mau-Mau Bett) and James Bomefree. The other siblings were either sold or given away before her birth. The family was owned by Johannes Hardenbergh, a patroon and Revolu- tionary War patriot, the head of one of the most prominent Dutch families in late eighteenth- century New York. After the colonel’s death, his son Charles Hardenberg inherited hownership of the family’s slaves. Truth was sold to and served two more masters before escaping and Sojourner Truth. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ▼▼ ▼▼ Sojourner Truth c.1797–1883 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ❖ c. 1797 Born Isabella Baumfree, Ulster County, N.Y. ◆ 1812–14 War of 1812 1828 Freed from slavery by New York law ◆ ◆ 1843 Changed her name to Sojoumer Truth 1850 Toured Midwest on speaking tour; published The Narrative of Sojoumer Truth 1846–48 Mexican War ◆ 1854 Settled in Battle Creek, Mich. ◆◆ 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ◆ 1875 Retired from public speaking 1865 Joined national Freedmen's Relief Association 1864 Met with President Lincoln ❖ 1883 Died, Battle Creek, Mich. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TRUTH, SOJOURNER 131 ultimately being freed. She bore at least five children to a fellow slave named Thomas and took the name of her last master, Isaac Van Wagener, in 1827. In late 1826 Truth and her young daughter Sophia escaped. She was forced to depart without other children, because they were not legally freed under the terms of the emancipation order. She was freed in 1828 when a New York law abolished SLAVERY within the state, and with the help of Quaker friends, she recovered a young son who had been illegally sold into slavery in the South. In 1829 she moved to New York City and worked as a domestic servant. Since childhood she had experienced visions and heard voices, which she attributed to God. Her mystic bent led her to become associated with Elijah Person, a New York religious missionary. She worked and preached with Person in the streets of the city, and in 1843 she had a religious experience in which she believed that God commanded her to travel beyond New York to spread the Christian gospel. She took the name Sojourner Truth and traveled throughout the eastern states as an evangelist. Truth soon became acquainted with the abolitionist movement and its leaders. She adopted their message, speaking out against slavery. Her speaking tours expanded as aboli- tionists realized her effectiveness as a lecturer. In 1850 she toured the Midwest and drew large, enthusiastic crowds. Because she was illiterate, she dictated her life story, The Narrative of Sojourner Truth, and sold the book at her lectures as a means of supporting herself. In the early 1850s, she met leaders of the emerging women’s rights movement, most notably Lucretia Mott. Truth recognized the connection between the inferior legal status of African Americans and women in general. Soon she was speaking before women’s rights groups, advocating the right to vote. Her most famous speech was entitled Ain’t I a Woman? During the 1850s Truth settled in Battle Creek, Michigan, but went to Washington, D.C., in 1864 to meet with President ABRAHAM LINCOLN . She remained in Washington to help the war effort, collecting supplies for black volunteer regiments serving in the Union army and helping escaped slaves find jobs and homes. After the war she joined the National Freedmen’s Relief Association, working with former slaves to prepare them for a different type of life. Truth believed that former slaves should be given free land in the West, but her “Negro State” proposal failed to interest Congress. Nevertheless, during the 1870s she encouraged African Americans to resettle in Kansas and Missouri. Truth remained on the public speaking circuit until 1875, when she retired to Battle Creek. She died there on November 26, 1883. FURTHER READINGS Davis, Peggy Cooper. 1996. “’So Tall Within’—The Legacy of Sojourner Truth.” Cardozo Law Review 18 (November). Painter, Nell Irvin, ed. 1998. Narrative of Sojourner Truth: A Bondswoman of Olden Time, with a History of Her Labors and Correspondence Drawn from Her Book of Life. New York: Penguin Books. Whalin, W. Terry. 1997. Sojourner Truth: American Abolitionist. Uhrichsville, Ohio: Barbour & Co. CROSS REFERENCES Abolition; “Ain’t I a Woman?” (Appendix, Primary Document). TRY To litigate a legal controversy; to argue a lawsuit in court as an attorney; to sit in the role of a judge or jury to investigate and decide upon QUESTIONS OF LAW and fact presented in such an action. TUCKER ACT Enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1887 to remedy inadequacies in the original statutory measures that created the COURT OF CLAIMS (now the U.S. Claims Court) in 1855, the TUCKER ACT (28 U.S. C.A. § 1346) extended the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to claims founded upon the Constitution, acts of Congress, or regulations of executive departments. The court was also empowered to entertain claims for liquidated and unliquidated damages in nontort actions. It retained jurisdiction to hear contract cases, which it was given under the 1855 measure. The Tucker Act has been amended to cover other arcane claims issues. For example, the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act amend- ments to the Tucker Act specifically provide for the payment of “bid preparation and proposal costs. ” TURPITUDE See MORAL TURPITUDE. THERE IS A GREAT STIR ABOUT COLORED MEN GETTING THEIR RIGHTS , BUT NOT A WORD ABOUT COLORED WOMEN ; IF COLORED MEN GET THEIR RIGHTS AND NOT COLORED WOMEN THEIRS , YOU SEE THE COLORED MEN WILL BE MASTERS OVER THE WOMEN , AND IT WILL BE JUST AS HARD AS IT WAS BEFORE . —SOJOURNER TRUTH GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 132 TRY TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY The Tuskegee Syphilis Study constituted one of the most shameful acts in the history of American medicine. The repercussions of this study, which allowed 400 African American men afflicted with syphilis to go untreated for a period of almost 40 years, are still felt in the early 2000s. It resulted in new laws requiring informed consent for medical experiments on humans. Some argue that the study left a legacy of suspicion of the medical community that continues among many African Americans. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study began in 1932, at the hospital of the prestigious Tuskegee Institute, a traditionally African American college located in Alabama. The U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE sponsored the study, and white physicians within the public health service administered it. The purpose of the study was to determine the effects of syphilis in African American men. At the time the study began, there was no cure for syphilis, a sexually transmitted disease that causes sores and rashes in its early stages and serious blood vessel and heart problems, mental dis- orders, blindness, nerve system problems, and even death in its latter stages. There were treatments for syphilis available when the study began, but it was decided to withhold even those from participants without their knowledge and chart the course of untreated syphilis in African American males. Four hun- dred men with syphilis were initially enrolled in the project, mostly poor uneducated African American tenant farmers from the surrounding area, along with 200 uninfected men who served as controls. The first published report of the study was issued in 1936, and reports were issued every four to six years after that. In the late 1940s, penicillin first became available to the general public as a cure for syphilis. However, the decision was made not to make it available to study participants, who were allowed to continue in the study without any treatment for their disease. They were continu- ally supplied with placebos, and no attempt was made to inform them of possible alternatives to the so-called medicine that they were being given. As late as 1969, the Centers for Disease Control recommended the study continue. Finally in 1972, following unflattering news reports, the study was finally shut down, and those subjects who were still part of the study received penicillin. A report was issued by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that stated that the study was “scientifically unsound and its results are disproportionately meager compared with known risks to the human subjects involved.” The U.S. Congress, led by Senator EDWARD KENNEDY, held hearings in 1973 on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Those hearings resulted in the 1974 passage of the National Research Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.), which established institutional review and an ethic guidance program for all future research studies done under the auspices of the U.S. government. It stated in part “that each entity which applies for a grant, contract, or cooperative agreement under this chapter for any project or program which involves the conduct of biomedical or behavioral research involving human subjects submit in or with its application for such grant, contract, or cooperative agree- ment assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that it has established a board (to be known as an Institutional Review Board) to review biomedical and behavioral research involving human sub- jects conducted at or supported by such entity in order to protect the rights of the human subjects of such research.” In the meantime, a lawsuit was filed in 1973, on behalf of the survivors of the study and the heirs and representatives of the participants who had since died, against the various federal government agencies, the State of Alabama, the private foundation that provided original fund- ing, and individual physicians working for the U.S. Public Health Service. Eventually, a mone- tary settlement of $10 million was reached with the parties. Each surviving subject was to be paid $37,500, each heir or representative of a diseased subject receive d $15,000, each member of the control group received $16,000, and the heir or a representative of each control subject received $5,000. In 1997, in a White House ceremony, President BILL CLINTON apologized for the federal government’s role in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. He spoke of the mistrust and racial animus that resulted from the study to a group of survivors of the study and their families. He added: “We can look you in the eye and finally say on behalf of the American people, what the United States govern- ment did was shameful, and I am sorry.” FURTHER READINGS Herman, Donald H. J. 2000–2001. “Lessons Taught by Miss Evers’ Boys: The Inadequacy of Benevolence and the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 133 Need for Legal Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Research.” Journal of Law and Health 15. Jones, James H. 1993. Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. New York: Free Press. Palmer, Larry I. 1997. “Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation.” Maryland Law Review 56. Proctor, Margaret, Michael Cook, and Caroline Williams, eds. 2005. Political Pressure and Archival Record. Chicago: Society of American Archivists. Reverby, Susan M., ed. 2000. Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. CROSS REFE RENCES Informed Consent; Patients’ Rights. v TUTTLE, ELBERT PARR Elbert Parr Tuttle will be remembered as an influential jurist of the CIVIL RIGHTS era. As judge, and later chief judge, of the old Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, he ruled on cases from six southern states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) through the storm of civil rights litigation following BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954)—the landmark 1954 Supreme Court decision that held racial SEGRE- GATION in public education to be against the law. Because racial segregation was law through- out most of the South, the Fifth Circuit became the United States’ proving ground for civil rights in the late 1950s and 1960s. Tuttle and fellow judges John R. Brown, of Houston, Texas, Richard T. Rives, of Montgomery, Alabama, and JOHN MINOR WISDOM, of New Orleans— known derisively as the Four—faced delaying tactics, political pressures, and all manner of threats as they worked to make the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling a reality in key states of the old Confederacy. The judges of the Fifth Circuit changed the South, and therefore the nation. Under their gavels, JIM CROW LAWS were declared unconstitu- tional, African Americans were granted VOTING RIGHTS , RACIAL DISCRIMINATION in jury selection was curbed, state universities and colleges were desegregated, and equal opportunity in educa- tion became a reality. Tuttle probably reflected on his own schooling when championing equal education for all. He was born July 17, 1897, in Pasadena, California. In 1906, Tuttle’s father, Guy Har- mon Tuttle, moved his family to Hawaii so that he could accept a position as bookkeeper on a sugar plantation. Young Tuttle, and his older brother Malcolm, were enrolled at the Punahou Academy, in Honolulu, where they were the minority students among classmates of native Hawaiian, Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese descent. Tuttle returned to the mainland in 1914 to enter college. He received his bachelor of arts degree in 1918 and bachelor of law degree in 1923 from Cornell University. Following law school, Tuttle and his brother-in-law, William Sutherland, started to look for a promising location to establish a law practice. After investigating several locations in the South, they settled on Atlanta. Also in 1923, after being admitted to the Georgia bar, they opened the firm of Sutherland, Tuttle, and Brennan. Though Tuttle spe cialized in tax litigation, he also tried several CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, including a battle to win a new trial for a black man convicted of raping a white woman, and a challenge to a Georgia statute under which a black man had been sentenced to 20 years on a ▼▼ ▼▼ Elbert Parr Tuttle 1897–1996 1900 1950 1975 2000 1925 ❖ 1897 Born, Pasadena, Calif. ◆ 1914–18 World War I 1918 Received B.A. from Cornell University ◆ 1923 Admitted to Ga. bar; opened firm of Sutherland, Tuttle, and Brennan 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War ◆ 1953 Named to general counsel post in the Treasury Department by President Eisenhower 1961–73 Vietnam War 1954–68 Sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ 1996 Died, Atlanta, Ga. 1981 Continued on as senior judge in the new Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 1968 Took senior (semiretired) status on the Fifth Circuit 1962 Found process of appointment to the Georgia Legislature unconstitutional in Toombs v. Fortson; wrote dissent in Wesberry v. Vandiver 1960 Appointed chief judge of the Fifth Circuit LIKE LOVE, TALENT IS ONLY USEFUL IN ITS EXPENDITURE , AND IT IS NEVER EXHAUSTED . —ELBERT TUTTLE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 134 TUTTLE, ELBERT PARR chain gang for distributing Communist party literature. At a time when PRO BONO work (work donated for the public good) was unusual, Tuttle frequently represented people who could not afford an attorney. Tuttle began organizing support for REPUBLI- CAN PARTY candidates in Georgia and was acknowledged as a state Republican leader by the late 1940s. He said he allied himself with the Republican party because he was appalled at the whites-only policies of Georgia’s DEMO- CRATIC PARTY . In 1953 President DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER named Tuttle to a general counsel post in the TREASURY DEPARTMENT. In 1954, just three months after SCHOOL DESEGREGATION was struck down by the Supreme Court’s Brown decision, the president asked Tuttle to sit on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It was not easy for Tuttle to decide whether to accept the president’s offer. Neverthe less, mindful of the social and legal upheaval that would follow the Supreme Court’s decision, he chose to take on the challenge. Though he received threats and hate mail for following the Brown decision, Tuttle faced frustrated segrega- tionists head on—and in the process helped to change the course of a nation. Two of Tuttle’s early opinions on the Fifth Circuit helped to shape the political history of the state of Georgia. In Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (1962), Tuttle found the process of appointment to the Georgia legislature to be unconstitutional and ordered it changed. In Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Su pp. 276 (1962), Tuttle wrote a dissenting opinion concerning congressional district reapportionment; on ap- peal, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with his dissent. Although Tuttle was in favor of correct- ing the malapportionment that diminished the power of black votes, he believed that such action should arise from the states, not the courts. By 1961 Tuttle had become the Fifth Circuit’s chief judge. During his tenure, he decided many landmark cases involving Jim Crow laws, voting rights, jury discrimination, employment discrimination, reapportionment, and school desegregation—including the order to admit JAMES MEREDITH, an African American, to the then all-white University of Mississippi in 1962. Tuttle stepped down as chief judge in 1968, taking senior (or semiretired) status. He died June 23, 1996, in Atlanta, Georgia. RESOURCES Bass, Jack. “The ‘Fifth Circuit Four’.” The Nation (May 3, 2004). “Excerpts from the Elbert Tuttle Portrait Ceremony and Eleventh Circuit Historical Society Ceremony.” 1983. Cornell Law Review (January 24). Tuttle, Elbert P. “To My Dear Friend, John R. Brown.” 1993. Texas Law Review 71 (April). CROSS REFERENCES Apportionment; Integration. TWELFTH AMENDMENT The Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu- tion reads: The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice- President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the SENATE shall, in the presence of the Senate and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES , open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose im- mediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representa- tives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next follow- ing, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.— The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice- President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TWELFTH AMENDMENT 135 two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person con- stitutionally ineligible to the office of Presi- dent shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. The Twelfth Amendment was proposed on December 9, 1803, and ratified on July 27, 1804. It superseded Article 2, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution and changed the method used to select the president and vice president in the Electoral College. The amendment resulted from the emergence of the two-party system and the presidential election of 1800. The Twelfth Amendment was the first CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT that corrected a mistake made at the Constitutional Convention. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution provided for an indirect method of presidential selection. Under this arrangement, each state was autho- rized to appoint as many electors as it had senators and representatives in Congress. This ELECTORAL COLLEGE, as it came to be called, was empowered to choose the president, and the person receiving the second highest number of votes served as vice president. Each elector voted for two individuals without specifying which he wanted for president. It was assumed that the electors would act independently of the people in making their selections. In the 1790s, however, the two-party sys- tem developed, and the FEDERALIST PARTY and the DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY became bitter rivals. The two parties selected their slates of electors, which reduced the independent role of the electors. In 1796 JOHN ADAMS, a Federa- list, defeated THOMAS JEFFERSON, a Democratic- Republican, for pre sident, but Jefferson served as Adams’s vice president because he had the second highest vote total. The antagonism bet- ween the two men and their parties meant that there was no certainty that a president and vice- president could serve as a team. On the contrary, with the growth of the two major parties, there was a good chance that the Adams-Jefferson scenario would be repeated. The presidential election of 1800 revealed another problem with the election process and precipitated the Twelfth Amendment. The two Democratic-Republican candidates—Thomas Jefferson, the presidentia l candidate, and AARON BURR , the vice presidential candidate—received the same number of votes. The tie threw the election into the House of Representatives. After 35 ballots, the House chose Jefferson as pre- sident, but the divisive battle took so long that it aroused fears that there would be no president to take office on inauguration day. The amendment was quickly and over- whelmingly ratified. Opponents argued that the amendment would devalue the office of vice- president in the eyes of the citizenry and remove a check on presidential authority. Of the 16 states then admitted to the Union, only Delaware and Connecticut rejected the amendment. FURTHER READINGS Kuroda, Tadahisa. 1994. The Origins of the Twelfth Amendment: The Electoral College in the Early Republic, 1787–1804. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. Levinson, Sanford, and Ernest A. Young. 2002. “Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?” Florida State University Law Review 29 (winter). Palmer, Kris E. 2000.Constitutional Amendments: 1789 to the Present. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale. TWENTIETH AMENDMENT The Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Consti- tution reads: Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin. Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 136 TWENTIETH AMENDMENT Section 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them. Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article. Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission. The Twentieth Amendment was proposed on March 2, 1932, and ratified on January 23, 1933. The amendment moved the date on which new presidential and vice presidential terms begin as well as the date for beginning new congressional terms, ended the abbreviated congressional session that had formerly con- vened in even-numbered years, and fixed procedures for presidential succession if the president-elect dies before inauguration day. Senator GEORGE W. NORRIS of Nebraska was the primary sponsor of the Twentieth Amend- ment. He was concerned about the gap between the holding of federal elections on the first Tuesday in November and the installation of the newly elected officials in March of the following year. The Constitution specified that the presidential and vice presidential terms should begin on March 4 and the congressional terms on March 3. As a result, senators and repre- sentatives who were defeated in November could remain in office and vote on measures for four months, there by earning the name “lame ducks.” The Constitution also required Congress to hold an abbreviated session in even-numbered years from early December until the next Congress convened in March. These “lame duck” sessions were generally unproductive, as the members engaged in virtually no legislative activity. At the same time, however, these sessions provided the opportunity for defeated members to vote on measures without any accountability to the voters. Under the Twentieth Amendment, the presidential and vice presidential terms begin on January 20, and congressional terms begin on January 3. The lame duck session require- ment was also abolished. Another section of the amendment deals with presidential succession should the president- elect die before taking offi ce. The amendment provides that the vice president elect shall become the president-elect and take office on January 20; the amendment also authorizes Con- gress to legislate on other matters of presidential succession. RESOURCES Lewis, Anthony. Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biogrpahy of the First Amendment. New York: Basic. Nagle, John Copeland. 1997. “A Twentieth Amendment Parable.” New York Univ. Law Review 72 (May). Neustadt, Richard E. 2001. “The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidential ‘Hundred Days’: An Overview.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 31 (March). TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT The Twenty-fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President. Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress. Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa- tives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represen- tatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 137 . qualified. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 136 TWENTIETH AMENDMENT Section 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may. provides a means for a fair and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 130 TRUSTIES timely resolution of credit billing disputes. With the exception of certain types of high-cost mortgage loans,. BEFORE . —SOJOURNER TRUTH GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 132 TRY TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY The Tuskegee Syphilis Study constituted one of the most shameful acts in the history of American medicine.