eyewitnesses; all the reports were decidedly in support of the colonists. The pamphlet, how- ever, was not distributed in Boston, due to the belief that it might interfere with the fairness of the trial. The trial became a controversial issue with political aspects. In addition to the murder charge, the legal action intensified the struggle between the King’s men, who desired a verdict in their favor to counteract the tactics of Samuel Adams, and the colonists, who wanted the trial to be an example to Parliament against further use of the MILITIA to restrain their freedom. Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson believed that an immediate court hearing would be detrimental and unfair to the King’s men; he advocated a series of postponements and the trial finally began in the fall of 1770. ROBERT TREAT PAINE served as PROSECUTOR, and JOHN ADAMS (cousin to Samuel Adams) and Josiah Quincy were the defense counselors. The trial progressed and arguments were presented for both sides. The defense was determined to prove that the soldiers were acting in SELF-DEFENSE. The prosecution attempted to show that the soldiers were guilty of malice with intent to kill. Captain Preston was tried separately (there is evidence that the jury was packed in his favor). He was acquitted and he hastily left Boston. Eight soldiers were next brought to trial and six were acquitted. The remaining two soldiers were found guilty of MANSLAUGHTER (as opposed to murder). The method of pu nishment was branding on the thumb. The two soldiers, Matthew Killroy and Hugh Montgomery, re- ceived their penalty and were discharged from the military. The irony of the Boston tragedy is that it need never have occurred. Shortly before the night of the bloodshed Parliament had decided to repeal the TOWNSHEND ACTS that had so greatly agitated the colonists. Word of this decision did not reach Boston until later. The acts were revoked later in 1770, after the Boston Massacre; one tax remained, how- ever, and that was a minimal tax on tea. This tea tax would later precipitate the Boston Tea Party. BOTTOMRY A contract, in maritime law, by which money is borrowed for a specified term by the owner of a ship for its use, equipment, or repair for which the ship is pledged as collateral. If the ship is lost in the specified voyage or during the limited time, the lender will lose his or her money according to the provisions of the contract. A contract by which a ship or its freight is pledged as security for a loan, which is to be repaid only in the event that the ship survives a specific risk, voyage, or period. A bottomry bond is the instrument that embodies the contract or agreement of bottomry. v BOUDINOT, ELIAS The first lawyer admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court was New Jersey patriot ELIAS BOUDINOT. A good friend of President George Washington’s, Boudinot was a promi- nent public official who strongly supported the American Revolution. Boudinot held sever al key positions in the CONTINENTAL CONGRESS and signed the 1783 peace treaty with England after the United States’ victory in the WAR OF INDEPENDENCE . After the war he aligned himself with Federalists JOHN ADAMS and ALEXANDER HAMILTON . Like them, Boudinot supported a strong, centralized national government and distrusted many of the principles of participa- tory democracy. Born May 2, 1740 , in Philadelphia, Boudi- not studied law and was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1760. By 1770 he had risen to the prestigious level of SERJEANT AT LAW. Although Boudinot began his career as a political conser- vative, he eventually supported the colonies’ On March 5, 1770, English soldiers fired into a crowd of angry colonists, killing five. Two of the soldiers were later found guilty of manslaughter. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 88 BOTTOMRY efforts to break away from English domination. He joined the Revolutionary party after the U.S. War of Independence erupted and served as deputy of New Jersey’s provincial assembly. Boudinot was a representative to the Con- tinental Congress from 1777 to 1784. He was president of the Congress from 1782 to 1784 and was named secretary of foreign affairs. He became commissary general of prisoners in 1777 and donated a large sum of his own money to help improve prison conditions. In 1787 Boudinot played a key role in obtaining New Jersey’s RATIFICATION of the new U.S. Constitution. In 1789 Boudinot became a member of the House of Representatives from New Jersey, holding office during the first three sessions of Congress. Once the U.S. Supreme Court was officially established, Boudinot became the first lawyer admitted to practice before it, on February 5, 1790. He also served as a trustee of Princeton University and was director of the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia from 1795 to 1805. In the later years of his life, Boudinot’s interests turned from politics to evangelical theology. Founder and president of the Ameri- can Bible Association, Boudinot proposed a universal acceptance of RELIGION as a cure for society’s ills. Boudinot died in New Jersey on October 24, 1821, at age 81. BOUNDARIES Boundaries are natural or artificial separations or divisions between adjoining properties that show their limits. Boundaries are used to establish private and public ownership by determining the exact location of the points at which one piece of land is distinguishable from another. They are also used to mark the functional and jurisdictional limits of political subdivisions. For example, in the United States, boundaries are used to define villages, towns, cities, counties, and states. The setting of boundaries is a characteristic of the modern era of history during which centralized states emerged that required both protection against attacks and definition of their populations. Historically, natural objects such as rivers and mountains served this purpose. Accurate determination of boundaries requires surveying and cartography, which were not widely used until the early nineteenth century. But even in the early 2000s, with scientific information methods available, mapmakers occasionally are forced to turn to ancient landmarks and memories when attempting to set boundaries. For example, for centuries the borders within the Arabian peninsula had been loosely defined by tribes’ grazing patterns. Following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and subsequent defeat in 1991, UNITED NATIONS mapmakers attempted to det ermine the exact border between Iraq and Kuwa it. The United Nations enlisted the help of British border expert Julian Walker, who sought out elderly guides who could describe the locations of landmarks referred to in earlier records and provide a starting place for demarcation of the border. Several types of maritime boundaries exist, such as the territorial sea, which is a belt of coastal waters—controlled by the adjacent state and subject to rights such as those of foreign ships to passage—whose boundary is a line measured three miles from the low-water mark along the shore; contiguous zones, which extend beyond the territorial sea to a maximum THERE ARE NO EXPRESS WORDS ; AND THIS IS THE CASE WITH MOST OF THE POWERS EXERCISED BY CONGRESS. —ELIAS BOUDINOT Elias Boudinot 1740–1821 ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1740 Born, Philadelphia, Pa. 1760 Admitted to New Jersey bar 1775 American Revolution began 1777–84 Served as representative to the Continental Congress 1787 Helped obtain New Jersey's ratification of new U.S. Constitution 1795–1805 Served as director of the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia 1790 Became first lawyer admitted to practice before U.S. Supreme Court 1788 Elected from New Jersey to U.S. House of Representatives 1816 Founded the American Bible Association 1821 Died, Burlington, N.J. ▼▼ ▼▼ 17501750 17251725 17751775 18001800 18251825 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BOUNDARIES 89 of twelve miles, within which the controlling state may act to prevent or punish violations of its regulations; and a two-hundred-mile exclu- sive economic zone, subject to a nation’s rights of exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of marine life, which was autho- rized by the Third United Nations Conf erence on the LAW OF THE SEA. Marine boundaries provide fertile ground for international conflict. In June 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement resolving a 1,600-mile-lon g maritime boundary dispute that began in 1977. The area at issue, some 21,000 square nautical miles, contained valuable fishing grounds and possible oil and gas fields. The conflict had its origins in 1867, when czarist Russia sold Alaska to the United States. It was not until more than 100 years later, while establishing their respective 200-mile fisheries zones off the coasts of Alaska and Siberia in the Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea, and Arctic Ocean, that the two countries realized they had each set a different boundary for Alaska. Even marine boundaries that have been widely accepted for years can be suddenly ignored. For example, in March 1995 Canada seized a Spanish trawler fishing for halibut in international waters just beyond Canada’s 200- mile boundary. Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet of Canada claimed that a catastrophic decline in fishing stock in recent years gave Canada moral authority to extend its jurisdic- tion beyond the internationally recognized 200- mile maritime limit. Boundaries in INLAND WATERS, such as the Canadian-U.S. boundary through the Great Lakes, follow a median line equidistant from the opposite shores. Boundaries in navigable rivers are set at the middle of the thalweg, which is the deepest or most navigable channel, as distinguished from the geographic center or a line midway between the banks (United States v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 105 S. Ct. 1074, 84 L. Ed. 2d 73 [1985]). As the thalweg shifts owing to the accumulation of sediment in the river, the geographic boundary also shifts. The island exception to the rule of thalweg provides that if there is a divided river flow around an island, a boundary once established on one side of the island remains there, even if the main down- stream navigation channel shifts to the island’s other side (Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 116 S. Ct. 290, 133 L. Ed. 2d 265 [1995]). Boundary disputes between states often attract attention from the media and from legal scholars because they invoke the U. S. Supreme Court’s seldom-used ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. The most typical path to the nation’s high court is by APPEAL, either from a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court. Article III, Section 2 gives the Court original jurisdiction to try cases “affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party.” In 1993 the state of New Jersey filed a complaint in the Supreme Court against the state of New York, alleging that filled portions of Ellis Island belonged to New Jersey. In 1834 a COMPACT between New York and New Jersey, Within the boundaries of an exclusive economic zone, a nation has the right to drill for oil, explore, and manage marine life. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 90 BOUNDARIES approved by Congress, established the boundary line between the states as the middle of the Hudson River. Ellis Island, then only three acres, became part of New York according to the compact. The United States in 1891 decided to use Ellis Island as a port to receive immi- grants. Over the next 42 years, the federal government added 24.5 acres to the island to facilitate its use as a portal for the more than 100 million immigrants who passed through the island facilities. Although the Ellis Island IMMIGRATION Center closed in 1954, the site has remained an important historical landmark. The Supreme Court in 1994 appointed a SPECIAL MASTER , Paul Verkuil, to determine whether the filled portion of the island belonge d to New York or to New Jersey (New Jersey v. New York, 513 U.S. 924, 115 S. Ct. 309, 130 L. Ed. 2d 273 [1994]). Verkuil found that, although the original 1834 compact designated the island as the property of New Jersey, the compact did not establish boun daries for the filled portions of the island. In a report filed with the Court in 1997 (520 U.S. 1273, 117 S. Ct. 2451, 138 L. Ed. 2d 209 [1997]), Verkuil concluded the filled portions belonged to New York according to the original compact, which set the boundary line as the middle of the Hudson River. In 1999, the Supreme Court concurred with the special master in its final order and decree (526 U.S. 589, 119 S. Ct. 1743, 143 L. Ed. 2d 774 [1999]). New Jersey also had recurrent issues with Delaware involving the shared boundary of the Delaware River separating the states. The first matter was settled in 1907 by a compact addressing respective fishing right s, but the compact did not address the interstate bound- ary line in the river (New Jersey v. Delaware I, 205 U.S. 550 [1907]). In 1934 the Supreme Court settled the second dispute by determining the location of the boundary (New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361 [1934]). In New Jersey v. Delaware III (128 S. Ct. 1410, 552 U.S. ___ [2008]), the Delaware Department of Natural Resources refused to let British Petroleum (BP) America construct a liquefied natural gas terminal projected to extend some 2,000 feet beyond the New Jersey shore into Delaware territory. The Supreme Court, by a 6-2 margin, sided with Delaware. It held that, while Delaware could not interfere with ordinary projects, it had the right to regulate industrial development that affected Delaware’s waters and coastline, even though the project was based, and began in, New Jersey. A prior Supreme Court decision involved the states of New Hampshire and Maine. New Hampshire officials filed a lawsuit asking the Supreme Court to decide whether the Ports- mouth Naval Shipyard is located in one state or the other. At stake in the case was approxi- mately $3 million per year in income taxes that Maine assesses against the nearly 1,400 New Hampshire residents who work at the shipyard. New Hampshire has no state INCOME TAX, and its residents who work at the shipyard asserted that the assessment constituted TAXATION with- out representation. The shipyard sits on Seavey Island, a 272- acre tract in the Piscataqua River between Kittery, Maine, and Portsmouth, New Hamp- shire. New Hampshire contended that the island’s border lies along the Maine bank of the river, putting the shipyard in Maine. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court set the ocean boundary between the two states at a point in the mouth of the Piscataqua (New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 371, 96 S. Ct. 2113, 2118, 48 L. Ed. 2d 701 [1976]). The 1976 decision left unclear how that boundary extends up river to Seavey Island. The Court nevertheless decided that the doctrine of judicial ESTOPPEL precluded New Hampshire from asserting a position that contradicted its position in the 1976 case (New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968 [2001]). The Court’s decision brought a conclusion to a controversy that began heating up in the early 1990s and that had involved a series of hearings in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in 1997. In Virginia v. Maryland (540 U.S. 56, 124 S. Ct. 598 [2003]), the issue was whether the state of Virginia could build a water intake pipe in the middle of the Potomac River to provide water to Virginia residents. In 1632 King Charles I, through CHARTER, had given the Potomac River to Lord Baltimore and the then- colony of Maryland. Virginia argued that in 1785 the two states entered into an agreement which gave each “the privilege of making and carrying out wharfs and other improvements” in the Potomac. The Supreme Court again appointed a special master to review the matter, and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BOUNDARIES 91 ultimately agreed with his decision in favor of Virginia. In a 7–2 opinion, the high court ruled that Virginia had sovereign authority, not compromised by the 1785 agreement, to build IMPROVEMENTS along the shore and withdraw water from the Potomac without interference from Maryland. Private boundary disputes have reached epic and dramatic proportions. On June 14, 2003, in Pikeville, Kentucky, representatives of the Hatfield and McCo y families signed a truce officially ending the most famous mountain clan feud of them all. Some 60-plus descendants of the two families, which engaged in a bloody dispute that claime d at least a dozen lives at its height in the 1870s and 1880s, signed a peace PROCLAMATION to place the feud in the history books once and for all. The Hatfields and McCoys belonged to a single rural community that was artificially separated by the boundary line between Kentucky and West Virginia. The interfamilial dispute escalated over competing claims to timber rights on both sides of the meandering body of water. Some observers believe that the traditional role of boundaries as buffer regions protecting the national security of nations began to change in the 1950s. Lawrence Herzog, professor of Mexican- American studies at San Diego State University, described the evolution of large-scale cities along the borders of nations, which he called transfron- tier metropolises, that share ecological resources such as water and environmental problems such as sewage control and AIR POLLUTION. Traditionally, divergent laws and customs in boundary areas have discouraged economic development by interfering with the movement of labor and commodities across borders. Bounty Hunter: Legitimate Law Enforcement or Dangerous Anachronism? M ost citizens do not realize bounty hunters still exist in modern society and that these agents have few limitations placed on them by state laws. Concerns have been raised about the failure of many states to regulate the actions of bounty hunters. In general, bounty hunters are not subject to civil LIABILITY for the injuries they may cause in recapturing a person who has been released on bond and fled. Critics contend that the legal privileges granted to bounty hunters in the nineteenth century make no sense today, and that it might be prudent to outlaw bounty hunters. Defen- ders reply that bounty hunters serve an important role i n the criminal justice system and should not be forced to follow regulations that will prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities. Defenders of bounty hunters note that the COMMON LAW right of recapture dates back to the constitutional beginnings of the United States. They contend that critics have ignored the underlying legal relationship between the BAIL bonding company and the principal, the person who is bailed out of jail. When the bonding company bails a DEFENDANT out of jail, the defendant waives his rights when he signs the BAIL BOND contract. Then, if a defendant fails to appear in court, the bail bond company may have to forfeit the bond it posted with the court. If this system were not available, many defendants would not be able to post bond themselves, and they would have to remain in jail, which would drive up the cost for local governments to house defendants awaiting trial. In addi- tion, the bail bonding company serves as guarantor that the defendant will appear in court. This system also removes from PUBLIC LA W enforcement the responsibility of tracking down many defendants who fail to appear in court. Defenders also point out the signifi- cant difference between freelance bounty hunters and agents who work directly for the bail bonding company. These agents, commonly known as bail agents, are involved from just after arrest to the disposition of the case. They are familiar with the workings of the local criminal courts and are trained by the bail bonding company. In contrast, freelance bounty hunters cause most of the problems. Defenders of bounty hunting believe that the occasional public outcries over violent recapture of a bail-skipper are the result of a few irresponsible freelancers. Defenders rely on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Taintor (83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 21 L. Ed. 287 [1872]). The Taylor ruling, which remains good law, gives bounty hunters authority to seize and imprison a principal at any time. The decision also allows bounty hunters to pursue a person to another state and arrest the pursued person without legal process. Taylor concludes that the bail bonding company has the “principal on a string,” and “may pull the string” whenever it pleases. Defenders conclude, therefore, that the Court has given bounty hunters authority under the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 92 BOUNDARIES FURTHER READINGS Epstein, Richard A. 2000. Private and Common Property. New York: Garland. Herzog, Lawrence. 1991. “International Boundary Cities: The Debate on Transfrontier Planning in Two Border Regions.” Natural Resources Journal 31. ———. 1990. Where North Meets South: Cities, Space, and Politics on the U.S Mexico Border. Austin, Tex.: CMAS Books. Robillard, Walter G. 2009. Brown’s Boundary Control and Legal Principles. 6th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Spranking, John G. 2000. Understanding Property Law. New York: Lexis. CROSS REFERENCES Estoppel; Fish and Fishing; International Waterways; Territorial Waters BOUNTY HUNTER A bounty hunter is a person who is offered a promised gratuity in return for “hunting” down and capturing or killing a designated target, usually a person or animal. Bounty hunters can be described broadly as a category of persons who track down someone or something for money. A bounty is a subsidy that is paid to a category of persons who have performed a public service. Bounty is the PROPER term to be applied when the services of several persons are sought, and each person who fulfills the offer is entitled to the promised compensa- tion. By contrast, a reward compensates a single service to be performed only once, such as in the capture of a fugitive. Therefore, it will be earned solely by the person who succeeds in this regard. In practice, bounty hunters usually track down criminal defendants who skip BAIL and fail to appear for court appointments. Bail skipping U.S. Constitution to practice their trade. This authority has never been revoked. Finally, defenders point out that defendants who skip bail do not want to be found and do not want to surrender, if discovered. Bounty hunters do not seek to inflict injuries on principals or damage property, but in many situations surprise entry into a dwelling is required to effect the arrest. Physical resistance by the principal leads to most of the violence associated with bounty hunters. Critics of bounty hunters contend that the time has long passed for bounty hunters. The Taylor decision was ren- dered a few years after the Civil War, at a time when the United States was rela- tively unpopulated and the West was just beginning to be settled. Moreover, police departments in urban areas were inade- quate, poorly equipped, and badly trained. Cooperation between jurisdic- tions was minimal, and there was no organization similar to the FEDERAL BU- REAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) with the power to cross state borders in pursuit of escaped felons. In addition, commu- nication between points separated by great distances was poor. At that time, therefore, it made sense to allow bounty hunters to track down persons who jumped bail. The critics argue that these considerations no longer make sense, when modern law enforcement has the benefit of the FBI, electronic communi- cation, and cooperation between juris- dictions. Critics believe that allowing bounty hunters to use questionable, and often violent, methods to recapture principals does not promote respect for the admin- istration of justice. In addition, since the 1960s the Supreme Court has recognized that criminal defendants are entitled to numerous constitutional rights. The “due process revolution” runs counter to the methods of bounty hunters, who can commit acts that law enforcement officers are prohibited from committing. Critics contend that it is unwise to allow PRIVATE LAW enforcement to run rough- shod over the rights of persons, merely because they have entered into a con- tractual relationship. While some critics believe bounty hunters should be banned, others believe that states should regulate bail agents. Some states, such as Florida, require bounty hunters to be licensed and to be employed by only one bail bonding company that will supervise and be responsible for the agents. Florida imposes age and residence requirements on licensed bounty hunters, who must also demonstrate they are of high moral character. Some states also require boun- ty hunters to complete a certification course in criminal justice within a few years of obtaining their license. Some jurisdictions mandate that bounty hun- ters take continuing education courses in their field every year. Many of these reforms have been proposed by the National INSTITUTE of Bail Enforcement, which seeks to professionalize its membership and enhance its public reputation. Critic s also believe it is essential that bounty hunters be held liable for inju- ries to persons and property. State laws must, they argue, be amended to impose civil liability. Such legislation would deter bounty hunters from taking dan- gerous actions that may injure innocent people. Congress has not addressed this issue on a national level. A bill that sought to make bounty hunters subject to both civil and criminal liability for violations of federal rights un der exist- ing federal CIVIL RIGHTS law died in 1999. As of 2009, the law governing bounty hunters is virtually the same as in the colonial era. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BOUNTY HUNTER 93 is a constant in the U.S. criminal justice system. In 2004, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE reported that one-fourth of FELONY defendants who had been released on their own recognizance had failed to appear at their trials. As of 2009, an estimated 14,000 licensed bounty hunters appre- hend between 25,000 and 35,000 fugitives in the United States each year. It has been estimated that they return to custody over 95 percent of the criminal defendants who skip bail. Courts have granted bounty hunters exten- sive powers for the purposes of returning fugitives to justice. These include the powers to pursue fugitives into another state, to arrest them at any time, and to break into fugitives’ houses in order to capture them. The powers of a bounty hunter are usually received vicariously, through powers that already are invested in a bail bondsman. Bounty hunters have existed since medieval times—the notion of bail predates written ENGLISH LAW. The foundation for bounty-hunter rights in the United States was laid down in the 1872 case of Taylor v. Taintor (83 U.S. [16 Wall.] 366, 21 L. Ed. 287 [1872]). “Where one charged with crime is released upon bail, he is regarded as being delivered to custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment,” wrote the U.S . Supreme Court, in a decision that as of 2009 had never been overruled. There has been increasing controversy in the United States over bounty hunters, with concern voiced over the lack of control that a state has over their behavior. In response, some states have taken to curbing the bounty hunter’s activities. For example, Arizona restricts bounty hunters from entering a resi- dence without the consent of an occupant, and it prohibits bou nty hunters from misrepresent- ing themselves as law enforcement agents or from working as a bounty hunter if convicted of certain crimes. FURTHER READINGS Drimmer, Jonathan. 1996. “When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System.”Houston Law Review Vol. 33 (fall). Helland, Eric, and Alexander Tabarrok. 2004. “The Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping.” Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 47. Patrick, Andrew DeForest. 1999. “Running from the Law: Should Bounty Hunters Be Considered State Actors and Thus Subject to Constitutional Restraints?” Vanderbilt Law Review Vol. 52 (January). BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (U.S. 2000), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a New Jersey anti-discrimination law that required the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) to admit an openly gay man as a scoutmaster violated the Boy Scouts’ FIRST AMENDMENT right of expressive association. James Dale joined the Cub Scouts in 1978 at the age of eight. Three years later he became a Boy Scout and remained one until he turned 18. By all accounts, Dale was an exemplary scout, eventually achieving the status of Eagle Scout, the highest rank to which a scout can aspire. In 1989 Dale applied for adult member- ship and was approved. He then served as an assistant troop scoutmaster in Matawan, New Jersey, during periods when he was not away attending Rutgers University. On August 5, 1990, Dale received a letter from the Monmouth Scout Council, informing him that his registration had been revoked. Registration was a prerequi- site for service as an adult volunteer. Asked to identify the grounds for the decision, Monmouth Council executive James Kay told Dale that the BSA forbids “membership to homosexuals.” Kay noted that Dale had been in a newspaper photograph taken at Rutgers, where he was co-president of the university’s gay and lesbian campus organization. The accompanying newspaper story reported that Dale “admit[ted] his homosexuality during his second year at Rutgers.” According to Kay, Dale had demonstrated his inability to live by the Scout OATH and Law by publicly avowing his homosexuality. Dale filed suit against the BSA in New Jersey state court, charging that his expulsion as an assistant scoutmaster violated New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5–1 et seq. LAD prohibits discrimination based on several categories, including affecti onal or sexual orientation, which encompasses male or female heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality. The suit sought money damages and a court order reinstating him as assistant scoutmaster. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 94 BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE The trial court d is missed his suit, ru ling that the BSA had consistently excluded any self-declared homosexuals. The court found that homosexuality, from a Biblical and historical perspective, was considered both morally wrong and criminal. The BSA had implicitly subscribed to this historical view since its inception, the court said. The LAD did not apply in Dale’scasebecausetheBSAwas not a place of public accommodation and because the BSA, as a private association, could not be compelled to accept a gay scoutmaster because this would violate the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amend- ment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial court’s decision was overturned on APPEAL by New Jersey Superior Court, which concluded that the BSA was a “place of public accommodation” under the LAD. There were more than 100,000 BSA members in New Jersey alone, the appeals court said, demonstrating the public nature of the organization. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999). The court found BSA had not demonstrated that it was a sufficiently private organization to warrant constitutional protection under the freedom of expression and association guarantees of the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In a 5–4 opinion writt en by Chief Justice WILLIAM REHNQUIST , the Court said that BSA enjoys a constitutionally protected right of “expressive association” that would be undermined if the organization were forced to accept the PLAINTIFF as an assistant scoutmaster. Describing the Boy Scouts as a private organization that “believes homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members,” Rehnquist wrote that “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organi- zation to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” As a basic principle, Rehnquist stressed, the forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expres- sive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to ADVOCATE public or private viewpoints. First, the Court said that the BSA engages in expressive activity by seeking to instill values in young people, and its expres sive freedom would be curtailed if it had to accept avowed homo- sexuals as members despite the organization’s policy to the contrary. Second, Rehnquist stated that the forced inclusion of an avowed gay rights activist as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to advocate public or private viewpoints, because application of the LAD in this manner would significantly burden the organization’s right to oppose or disfavor homosexual conduct. In a lengthy and spirited dissent, Justice JOHN PAUL STEVENS said the Boy Scouts had offered no evidence that it had any policy on homosexuality and that the absence of such a policy meant that the organization’s shared goals could not be undermined by the accep- tance of gay members and leaders. “The evidence before this Court makes it exception- ally clear that BSA has, at most, simply adopted an exclusionary membership policy and has no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality,” Stevens wrote. Stevens also chided the Court majority for what he said was its willingness to simply accept the BSA’s own claims about the Eagle Scout James Dale sued the Boy Scouts of America after he was removed from the Scouts because of his sexual orientation. The Court favored the BSA. GETTY IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE 95 organization’s views on homosexuality. “Unless one is prepared to turn the right to associate into a free pass out of discrimination laws, an independent inquiry is a necessity,” he wrote. Rehnquist w as joined in the majority opinion by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, ANTONIN SCALIA, ANTHONY M. KENNEDY,and CLARENCE THOMAS. Justices DAVID H. SOUTER, RUTH B ADER GINSBURG,andSTEPHE N G. BREYER joined Stevens in the dissent. In the wake of the Dale decision, some have speculated that states may face First Amendment restrictions in applying anti-discrimination laws to private organizations that, like the Boys Scouts, are engaging in what can be deemed to be expressive activity. The Dale ruling spurred many community organizations and governments to examine their relationships with the Boy Scouts. The Episcopal Diocese of Newark, New Jersey, which has 117 congregations, adopted a resolution deploring the BSA policy. In Montclair, Cub Scout Pack 5 circulated petitions rejecting the BSA’santi- gay stance. A Princeton scout troop was denied permission to use a borough parking lot for its Christmas tree sale, and numerous companies and CHARITIES, including more than two dozen local branches of the United Way, cut back or eliminated funding for the organization. Despite community organizations and governments ex- amining their relationships with the Boy Scouts after Dale, however, the BSA reported that revenues for the national operation rose from $91 million to $93 million in the year after the Supreme Court’sdecision. The elimination of support to the Boy Scouts was challenged in Evans v. Berkeley, 8 Cal. 4th 1, 129 P.3d 394 (2006). In that case, the California Supreme Court upheld the right of a governmental entity to deny a subsidy to a sub-group of the Boy Scouts, due to the fact that it practiced discrimination based upon sexual orientation. Hence, the court found that the entity’s refusal to subsidize the group’s discriminatory activities did not infringe upon the group’s exercise of speech or associational rights. FURTHER READINGS Lester, Martha L., and Julie Levinson Werner. 2000. “High Court Deserves No Merit Badge for Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.” New Jersey Law Journal 161 (July 17). Powers, Elizabeth A. 2001. “Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.” Florida Law Review 53 (April): 399. Smart, Christopher W. 2001. “Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.” Florida Law Review 53 (April): 389. Urbina, Ian. 2007. “Boy Scouts Lose Philadelphia Lease in Gay-Rights Fight.” New York Times (Dec. 6). CROSS REFERENCES Discrimination; First Amendment; Freedom of Association and Assembly; Gay and Lesbian Rights. BOYCOTT A lawful concerted attempt by a group of people to express displeasure with, or obtain concessions from, a particular person or company by refusing to do business with them. An unlawful attempt that is prohibited by the Sherman Anti-trust Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), to adversely affect a company through threat, coercion, or intimidation of its employees, or to prevent others from doing business with said company. A practice utilized in labor disputes whereby an organized group of employees bands together and refrains from dealing with an employer, the legality of which is determined by applicable provisions of statutes governing labor-management relations. A classic example of this is a consumer boycott whereby a group of customers refu ses to purchase a particular product in order to indicate their dissatisfaction with excessive prices or the offensive actions of a particular manufacturer or producer. CROSS REFERENCE Labor Law. v BOYLE, JOHN John Boyle was born October 28, 1774, near Tazewell in Botetourt County, Virginia. He was admitted to the Kentucky bar in 1797 and established a legal practice in Lancaster, Ken- tucky, before entering government service. In 1800 Boyle participated in the Kentucky House of Representatives. He served in the U.S. House of Representatives as a member from Kentucky from 1803 to 1809 and participated in the IMPEACHMENT hearings of Justice SAMUEL CHASE , who was accused but found not guilty of prejudice in certain rulings. Boyle presided over the Kentucky Court of Appeals from 1809 to 1810, acting as chief justice from 1810 to 1826. In that same year he became U.S. district judge for Kentucky GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 96 BOYCOTT and remained in that position until his death January 28, 1835, near Danville, Kentucky. v BRACKENRIDGE, HENRY MARIE Henry Marie Brackenridge was an eminent lawyer, statesman, and author. Brackenridge was born May 11, 1786. His LEGAL EDUCATION was varied, including the study of law in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, admiralty law in Baltimore, Maryland, and Spanish law in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was admitted to the Pennsylvania bar in 1806 and practiced law in Pennsylvania as well as Missouri and Louisiana from 1810 to 1814, and in Baltimore from 1814 to 1817. After serving as deputy attorney general and district judge in Louisiana, Brackenridge was a member of the Maryland legislature from 1814 to 1817 and from 1819 to 1821. He was a strong supporter of the South American nations, and in 1817 was sent to South America as part of a commission to study the political conditions of the area. Subsequently, he relocated to Florida where he worked for Governor ANDREW JACKSON from 1821 to 1832, serving as secretary and judge of the Florida Territory. As an author, Brackenridge wrote many publications, including Views of Louisiana (1814); History of the Late War (1816); Voyage to South America (1819); Letters to the Public, (1832); and History of the Western Insurrection in Western Pennsylvania (1859). Brackenridge died January 18, 1871, in Pittsburgh. BRACKET The category of the percentage of income tax found on the tax tables set by the Internal Revenue John Boyle 1774–1835 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18501850 18251825 18001800 ❖❖◆ ◆ ◆◆◆◆◆◆ 1774 Born, Tazewell, Va. 1775–83 American Revolution 1792 Kentucky admitted as a state to the Union 1803 Elected to U.S. House of Representatives 1804 Participated in impeachment hearings of Justice Samuel Chase 1800 Elected to Kentucky House of Representatives 1810 Became chief justice of Kentucky Court of Appeals 1809 Appointed to Kentucky Court of Appeals 1807 Declined U.S. Supreme Court justiceship offered by President Jefferson 1826 Appointed U.S. district judge for Kentucky 1835 Died, Danville, Ky. Henry Marie Brackenridge 1786–1871 ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1786 Born, Pittsburgh, Pa. 1803 President Jefferson "purchased" Louisiana Territory 1806 Admitted to Pennsylvania bar 1811–14 Helped frame judicial system; served as judge and deputy attorney general 1814 Views of Louisiana published 1821–32 Served as secretary and judge in Florida Territory 1819 Voyage to South America published 1817 Sent to South America to study political conditions 1834 Recollections of Persons and Places in the West published 1859 History of the Western Insurrection in Western Pennsylvania published 1845 Florida gained U.S. statehood 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1871 Died, Pittsburgh, Pa. ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BRACKET 97 . to U.S. House of Representatives 1816 Founded the American Bible Association 1 821 Died, Burlington, N.J. ▼▼ ▼▼ 17501750 1 725 1 725 17751775 18001800 1 825 1 825 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BOUNDARIES. authority under the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 92 BOUNDARIES FURTHER READINGS Epstein, Richard A. 20 00. Private and Common Property. New York: Garland. Herzog, Lawrence. 1991 for violations of federal rights un der exist- ing federal CIVIL RIGHTS law died in 1999. As of 20 09, the law governing bounty hunters is virtually the same as in the colonial era. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN