C-SPAN is increasingly used in school classrooms as a teaching tool. The network offers the program “C-SPAN in the Classroom,” which includes free membership and resourc es to educators who use the network’s resources in the classroom. For classrooms that do not have cable access, C-SPAN offers videotapes and Web access so students can view the content. The network also offers a Teacher Fellowship Program through the C-SPAN Education Foun- dation to honor educat ors who have demon- strated creative use of the programming in the classroom. FURTHER READINGS C-SPAN Timeline: Cameras in the Court. Available online at http://www.c-span.org.html (accessed June 11, 2009). Frantzich, Stephen E., and John Sullivan. 1996. The C-SPAN Revolution. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. Frantzich, Stephen E., 2008. Founding Father: How C-SPAN’s Brian Lamb Changed Politics in America. Rowman & Littlefield. CROSS REFERENCE Broadcasting. CABINET A counsel or group of advisers to a king or other chief executive of a government. The group of executive department heads who advise the presi- dent of the United States. The president’s cabinet was created by custom and tradition (it is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution) and was first assembled by GEORGE WASHINGTON. The modern cabinet is composed of the heads of each of the fifteen executive departments of the government: n the Secretary of State n the Secretary of the Treasury n the Secretary of Defense n the Attorney General n the Secretary of the Interior n the Secretary of Agriculture n the Secretary of Commerce n the Secretary of Labor n the Secretary of Health and Human Services n the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development n the Secretary of Transportation n the Secretary of Energy n the Secretary of Education n the Secretary of Veterans Affairs n the Secretary of Homeland Security In addition to these, other officials have been granted cabinet status, including the U.S. ambassador to the UNITED NATIONS and the director of the Office of Management and the Budget. CROSS REFERENCE Executive Branch. CABLE TELEVISION The cable television industry exploded from modest beginnings in the 1950s into a service that by 2003 reached 69 percent of all U.S. households that had television. Cable was initially a response to a need for improved transmission in areas where signals were weak or nonexistent. By the 1960s consumers began to demand not only better reception but also more signals. This demand fueled the exponen- tial growth of the industry. In 2003 almost 10,000 cable systems provided services to 73 million household subscribers in the United States. The industry has faced many legal issues, including programming and rate regulation, lack of competition, and customer service complaints. In addition, deregulation of the industry in the late 1990s has led to the consolidation of major cable companies. The most contentious issue in cable televi- sion arises from FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM- MISSION (FCC) regulations that require cable operators to allot up to one-third of their channels to local broadcast stations. Known as must-carry rules, these were first enacted in the 1960s in an effort to protect the interests of local broadcasters. In 1985 and 1987, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that must-carry rules, as promulgated at the time, violated the FIRST AMENDMENT (Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 [1985], cert . denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S. Ct. 2889, 90 L. Ed. 2d 977 [1986]; Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 [1987], cert. denied sub nom. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 486 U.S. 1032, 108 S. Ct. 2014, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 [1988]). Congress addressed the must-carry issue in the Cable Television CONSUMER PROTECTION and Competition Act of 1992 (47 U.S.C.A. § 325 et seq.). The 1992 Cable Act, passed over GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 218 CABINET President GEORGE H. W. BUSH’s VETO, required cable systems to carry most local broadcast channels and prohibited cable operators from charging local broadcasters to carry their signal. These requirements were challenged on First Amendment grounds in Turner BROADCASTING System v. FCC (512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 [1994]). Turner Broadcasting asked the Supreme Court to apply a STRICT SCRUTINY test, similar to the one used to evaluate the constitutionality of restriction s on printed material, to determine whether the FCC regulations infringed the industry’s FREEDOM OF SPEECH . The FCC urged the Court to apply the same relaxed standard it had applied to broadcast media in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC (395 U.S. 367, 89 S. Ct. 1794, 23 L. Ed. 2d 371 [1969]). The Court took a middle ground on cable communications. Noting that cable television is neither strictly a broadcast medium nor a print medium, the Court held that the relaxed scrutiny test adopted in Red Lion was inappro- priate, but declined to adopt the strict scrutiny protection given to print publications. The Court held that any regulations that are content neutral—in other words, that do not dictate the content of programming and that have an incidental burden on free speech—will be judged by an “intermediate level of scrutiny.” Any regulations found to be content based—in other words, that attempt to restrict program- ming based on its content—will receive the strict scrutiny applied to print media. It returned the case to the district court for a full hearing under this ruling. The case returned to the Supreme Court in 1997. In Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission (520 U.S. 180, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 137 L. Ed. 2d 369 [1997 ]), the Court upheld the statute and rejected the cable operators’ First Amendment claims. The court found that the la w served an important and legitimate legislative purpose because it pro- tected noncable households from losing regular local broadcasting service due to competition from cable companies. In addition, there was a legitimate governmental purpose in seeking to ensure public access to a variety of information sources. Finally, the government had an interest in eliminating restraints on fair competition even when the regulated parties were engaged in protective expressive activity. The regulation of the rates charged by cable companies is another area of contention between the industry and the government. Before 1984, local franchising authorities regulated the rates charged by franchisees. The 1984 Cable Com- muni cations Policy Act (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 484- 487, 47 U.S.C.A. § 35, 152 et seq.), which was designed to promote competition and allow competitive market forc es to determi ne rates, deregulated rates for almost all franchisees. Although industry representatives had argued that competition w ould keep rates reasonable, after deregulation average monthly cable rates increased far faster than the rate of inflation, in some cases as much as three times faster. During the same period, the average cable subscriber received only six additional chan- nels, and competition from other operators was almost non existent. In 1991 only 53 of the more than 9,600 cable systems in the United States had a direct competitor in their service area. The 1992 Cable Act provided a regulatory structure for basic and expanded programming, but exempted individually sold premium chan- nels, such as HBO and the Disney Channel, and pay-per-view programming. The 1992 act authorized local governments to regulate Cable Television Subscribers and Monthly Basic Rates, 1975 to 2007 Cable TV subscribers Premium cable TV subscribers Monthly basic cable rate 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1975 1985 1995 2000 2007 Year Number of subscribers (in millions) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Average monthly basic cable rate (in dollars) SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2009. ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION CABLE TELEVISION 219 programming, equipment, and service rates charged by companies in areas where there is no competition. Basic rates could be regulated but only under prescribed circumstances that indicate a lack of competition in the area. According to figures gathered in 1994, the new regulations led to average rate reductions of more than 8 percent. When Congress deregulated the cable industry with the 1984 Cable Act, its primary intent was to promote competition. The 1984 act sought to balance the government’sdual goals of providing cable access to all areas and deregulating rates. The industry had argued that competitive market forces would produce competition and stabilize rates. However, com- petition did not occur in the ensuing years, and cable operators continued to en joy a MONOPOLY in virtually all service areas. Before 1992, exclusive c able franchises were granted to the bidders who promised the widest access and most balanced programming. The government felt that this was the best way to ensure that cable’s new and expensive technology was available to people in poor and rural areas as well as more affluent areas. As a result, bidders who promised more than they delivered were protected from competition. The 1992 Cable Act eliminated many of the barriers to competition that existed before. Most impor- tant, it abolished the exclusive FRANCHISE agreement, which had been a powerful mo- nopolistic tool. Although the 1992 act did much to encour- age competition, it did not address the 1984 act’s ban on ownership of cable companies by local telephone utilities. This ban was chal- lenged in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States (42 F.3d 181 [1994]), in which the Fourth CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals held that it violated the telephone companies’ First Amend- ment right to free speech. The ban was removed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 56), which President BILL CLINTON signed in February 1996. The 1996 act marked a return to the pre- 1992 act philosophy, as the FCC was again directed to deregulate the cable television industry. The industry, which lobbied hard for the changes, contended that deregulation would produce more competition and lower prices. In addition, cable operators believed they could move into the areas of broadband INTERNET service and local phone service. Critics raised concerns that deregulation would produce less competition, high prices, and the consolidation of cable services into the hands of a few powerful companies. By 2009 the cable landscape had changed, with four companies controlling 80 percent of the national cable market. In addition, cable subscriber costs rose steadily. The FCC contin- ued to advocate for a d eregulated cable market and has permitted companies to pass on external costs (those unrelated to the delivery of programming and maintenance of infra- structure) to their subscribers. Competition from satellite television providers also grew, but not enough to pose a serious threat to the cable industry. In 2009 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated an FCC rule that banned cable companies from controlling more than 30 percent of the U.S. cable market, leading some experts to predict that the largest providers will acquire their rivals. The growth of cable television led to other issues, including LITIGATION over the distribution of sexually explicit content on cable systems. For example, United States v. Playboy Entertain- ment Group Inc. (529 U.S. 803, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 [2000]) involved a provision in the 1996 Cable Act that required cable TV systems to restrict sexually oriented channels to overnight hours if they did not fully scramble their signal to nonsubscribers. Even before the enactment of the 1996 provision, cable TV operators scrambled the signals of their programming so nonsubscribers could not view the channels. In addition, so- called premium channels are scrambled so only those cable subscribers who pay an additional fee have access to the programming. However, scrambling techno logy is imperfect. A phenom- enon known as signal bleed allows audio and video portions of scrambled programs to be heard and seen for brief periods. The federal law sought to prevent children from hearing or seeing sexually explicit content because of signal bleed. If a cable operator could not completely scramble the signal, it could only transmit sexually explicit programming between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Playboy Entertainment Group, which owns and prepares programming for adult television networks, filed a lawsuit alleging the law was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, although GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 220 CABLE TELEVISION it acknowledged that many adults would find the material offensive, ruled that the law did violate the First Amendment becaus e it sought to ban indecent rather than OBSCENE material. Adults had a right to view such material. Moreover, the law only restricted signal bleed to sexually explicit content, which meant that the law was not content neutral and had to be judged using the strict scrutiny test. Although Congress had a compelling interest in prevent- ing children from viewing sexually explicit cable programming, the method it had prescribed was too restrictive to the rights of adult subscribers. Therefore, the government had failed to justify a nationwide daytime speech ban. In so ruling, the Court found that another provision of the act, which permits cable customers to request complete channel blocking, was a better and legal alternative. FURTHER READINGS Arnesen, David W., and Marlin Blizinsky. “Cable Television: Will Federal Regulation Protect the Public Interest?” American Business Law Journal 32. Gustafson, Madie D. “Transfers of Cable Television Systems: Regulatory Concerns at Federal, State, and Local Levels.” Practising Law Institute/Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series 380. Lay, Tillman L., and J. Darrell Peterson. “Federal, State, and Local Regulation of Cable Television Franchise Trans- fers.” Practising Law Institute/Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series 405. Markey, Edward J. “Cable Television Regulation: Promoting Competition in a Rapidly Changing World.” Federal Communications Law Journal 46. National Cable and Telecommunications Association. Available online at www.ncta.com (accessed November 23, 2009). Parsons, Patrick. 2008. Blue Skies: A History of Cable Television. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press. Parsons, Patrick, and Robert Frieden. 1997. The Cable and Satellite Television Industries. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Peritz, Marc. “Turner Broadcasting v. FCC: A First Amendment Challenge to Cable Television Must-Carry Rules.” William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 3. Robichaux, Mark. 2002. Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the Rise of the Modern Cable Business. New York: Wiley. CROSS REFERENCES Broadcasting; Telecommunicatio ns; Television v CAHN, EDMOND NATHANIEL Edmond Nathaniel Cahn was the author of numerous publications including The Sense of Injustice (1949), The Moral Decision (1955), and The Edmond Cahn Reader (1966). Cahn was born January 17, 1906, in New Orleans, Louisiana. He received a bachelor of arts degree in 1925 and a doctor of jurispru- dence degree in 1927 from Tulane University. He also received a doctor of laws degree from the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, located in New York City, in 1962. After his admission to the Louisiana bar in 1927 and the New York bar in 1928, Cahn established a law firm in New York City where he practiced law from 1927 to 1950. He extended his career interests to the field of education and taught at New York University in 1945, accepting a professorship of law in 1948. In 1958 and 1962 he lectured on the philosophy of law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and on ethics at the Jewish Theological Semi- nary of America in New York City in 1961. From 1948 to 1951 he was the director of the Conference on Social Meaning of Legal Concepts. He was awarded the Phillips Prize in Edmond Nathaniel Cahn 1906–1964 ❖ 1906 Born, New Orleans, La. 1914–18 World War I ◆ 1927 Earned J.D. from Tulane University Law School; moved to New York City ◆ 1939–45 World War II 1950 Became full-time member of NYU School of Law faculty 1948–51 Served as director of Conference on Social Meaning of Legal Concepts 1949 The Sense of Injustice published 1950–53 Korean War 1955 Awarded Phillips Prize in Jurisprudence; The Moral Decision published 1961 The Predicament of Democratic Man published 1964 Died, New York City 1966 The Edmond Cahn Reader published posthumously 1961-73 Vietnam War ▼▼ ▼▼ 19751975 19501950 19001900 19251925 ◆ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ IN EVERY MATURE SOCIETY , THERE IS CONSIDERABLE OVERLAP BETWEEN LEGAL QUESTIONS AND MORAL QUESTIONS . —EDMOND CAHN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CAHN, EDMOND NATHANIEL 221 Jurisprudence by the American Philosophical Society in 1955. Cahn died August 9, 1964, in New York City. CALENDAR A list of cases that are awaiting trial or other settlement, often called a trial list or docket. A special calendar is an all-inclusive listing of cases awaiting trial; it c ontains dates for t rial, names of counsel, and the estimated t ime required for trial. It is maintained by a trial judge in some states and by a court clerk in others. Calendar call is a court session during which the cases that await trial are called in order to determine the current status of each case and to assign a trial date. v CALHOUN, JOHN CALDWELL John Caldwell Calhoun achieved prominence as a U.S. vice president, Southern politician, and a staunch defender of states’ rights. Calhoun was born March 18, 1782, in Abbeville County, South Carolina. After gradu- ating from Yale University in 1804 and LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL in 1806, Calhoun was admitted to the South Carolina bar in 1807 and established a successful legal practice there. In 1808 Calhoun entered politics, beginning as a member of the South Carolina Legislature. Three years later, he began his career in federal government, representing South Carolina in the House of Representatives until 1817. During his tenure, he performed the duties of acting chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in 1811 was a member of the War Hawks, a group that advocated war with England in 1812. CalhounresignedfromtheHousein1817and assumed the duties of secretary of war for the next eightyears.In1825,hebeganhisfirsttermasvice PRESIDENT OF T HE UNITED STATES,servingunder President JOHN QUINCY ADAMS forfouryears.He remained in this office during the presidency of ANDREW JACKSON, but relinquished his p ost in 1832 after a disagreement with Jackson c oncerning states’ rights. The d ispute bet ween Jackson and Calhoun r esulted in the Nullification Controversy of 1832 and 1833. Calh oun w as a proponent of the right o f a sta te to d eclare a federal law null and void if the state deemed such a law unc onstitutional. His attitude was a result of the passage of protective tariffs that Calhoun believed favored the interests of the North over those of the South. Calhoun expressed his beliefs in his work, South Carolina Exposition, in which h e discussed his views of sovereignty o f t he states. He believed t hat a state John Caldwell Calhoun 1782–1850 ❖ ◆ 1782 Born, Abbeville County, S.C. ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1808 Elected to South Carolina legislature 1825 Became vice president under John Quincy Adams 1817 Resigned from House to become secretary of war 1828 Reelected vice president under Andrew Jackson 1843 Appointed U.S. secretary of state 1845 Returned to U.S. Senate 1832 Resigned as v.p.; elected to U.S. Senate 1850 Died, Washington, D.C. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1775–83 American Revolution ◆ ◆ 1811 Elected to U.S. House of Representatives ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 ❖ ◆ 1850 Compromise of 1850 passed John Caldwell Calhoun. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE IS THE INDISPENSABLE AND PRIMARY PRINCIPLE IN THE FOUNDATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT . —JOHN CALHOUN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 222 CALENDAR had the right to secede from the Union in order to keep the powers of the federal government in check. T he Nullification Controversy finally ended with a compromise, and Calhoun emerged as the foremost speaker for the Sou th during t hat era. Calhoun represented South Carolina in the U.S. Senate from 1832 to 1843, and again from 1845 to 1850. He continued his campaign for states’ rights, supported SLAVERY, and introduced a policy of “concurrent majorities,” wherein every area of the United States would participate equally in the exercise of federal power. During the period between his two senatorial terms, Calhoun served as U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE from 1843 to 1845. Calhoun died March 31, 1850, in Washington, D.C. As an author Calhoun wrote many publica- tions, including Disquisition on Government and Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States. A compilation of his works from 1851 to 1855 was published posthumously by R. K. Crallé in a six-volume set. CALL To convoke or summon by public announcement; to request the appearance and participation of several people—such as a call of a jury to serve, a roll call, a call of public election, or a call of names of the members of a legislative body. In contract law, the demand for the payment of money acc ording to the contract terms, usually by formal notice. As applied to corporation law, the demand of the board of directors that subscribers pay an installment or portion of the amount that is still owed on shares that they have agreed to buy. A call price is the price paid by a corporation for the redemption of its own SECURITIES. In securities, a contract that gives a person the right to demand payment of a certain specified number of shares of stock at a stated price or upon a fixed date. CALVO CLAUSE A provision in an agreement between a private individual and a foreign state that says, in effect, that “aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges not accorded to nationa ls, and that, therefore, they may seek redress for grievances only before local authorities.” Under the Calvo Clause, a claimant waives the right to apply to his or her government or to another forum for protection if a claim is denied by local authorities. CALVO DOCTRINE The principle set forth by an Argentine jurist, Carlos Calvo, that a government has no duty to compensate aliens for losses or injuries that they incur as a result of domestic disturbances or a civil war, in cases where the state is not at fault, and, therefore, no justification exists for foreign nations to intervene to secure the settlements of the claims made by their citizens due to such losses or injuries. CAMERA A chamber, room, or apartment in old English law. A judge’s chamber. Treasury, chest, or coffer. To be in camera is to be in private or in chambers. CAMERAS IN COURT The debate over whether courts should permit cameras in courtrooms during trials began in the 1930s and has continued in the 2000s. Cameras and courtrooms have long had an uneasy relationship. Blaming cameras for dis- rupting trials, the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) led the drive for their removal in the mid-1930s. The effort succeeded: All but two state courts banned them, and Congress prohib- ited them from all federal trials. But the television era ushered in new problems, and courts eventually were forced to grapple with the constitutional question of whether TV cameras are injurious to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. In 1965 the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to say they are. In Estes v. Texas (381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543), the Court overturned a conviction because cameras had denied a DEFENDANT his due process rights. But the Court changed its mind in the 1981 case of Chandler v. Florida (449 U.S. 560, 101 S. Ct. 802, 66 L. Ed. 2d 740). Reacting to the permissiveness of Chandler, many states passed legislation allowing televised trials. Moreover, from 1991 to 1994, some federal courts conducted an experiment with cameras. Photographers lost their place in court in the early 1930s thanks to a highly sensational trial, and it took four decades for them to regain it. In 1934, nearly 700 reporters and photo- graphers descended on the New Jersey town where Bruno Hauptmann was on trial for KIDNAPPING and murdering the baby of famous aviator Charles A. Lindbergh and author Anne Morrow Lindbergh. The trial judge allowed still photography but was unprepared for the barrage of flashbulbs and the presence of a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CAMERAS IN COURT 223 newsreel camera that was smuggled inside the court. Decrying the media circus that resulted, the ABA in 1937 called for prohibiting photo- graphy in its Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics. At the same time, the U.S. Congress amended the Federal Rules of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE to ban cameras and any form of BROADCASTING from federa l courts. All but two states—Texas and Colorado—gradually adopted the ABA ban. Later, Texas permitted “Raise Your Right Hand and Try to Look Natural”: The Courtroom Camera Debate I s allowing television ca meras in courtrooms a good idea? U.S. law never tires of debating the question. Widely banned after the sensational 1934 Bruno Hauptmann KIDNAPPING and MURDER trial, cameras i n the court- room have fluctuated for decades in their acceptability. The courts, the media, lawye rs, and scholars have often heralded the camera as if it were democracy’sowneye—or railed at it as a leering Peeping Tom. S upporters claim that cameras enlighten the public, whereas opponents counter that cam- eras corrupt the trial process and yield bad journalism. Only since the mid- 1970s has the pro- camera lo bby been ascendant. By 2009 all 50 states permit- tedsometypeoftelevisioncoverageof trial or appellate proceedings, though some states limit or prohibit cameras in trial courts. The rise of cable television network Court TV (renamed in 2007 as truTV) in the 1990s soon made televised trials routine affairs. But despite com- plaints, federal trials remained largely off-limits. Moreover, controversy over the media’streatmentofthe O. J. SIMPSON mur der trial brought new ca lls for pulling the plug altogether. In 1934 Hauptmann was tried for kidnapping and murdering the young son of aviator Charles A. Lindberg h and author Anne Morrow Lindbergh. The trial excited the nation , obsessed the news media, and created a circus atmosphere of “expert” commentators, tabloid interviews, souvenir hawkers, and courtroom grandstanding. In 1995 the trial of Simpson, who was accused and ultimately acquitted of the murders of his former wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ronald Lyle Goldman, caused similar excitement, obsession, and atmospherics. Of course, the camera’s role i n each case was quite different. One hundred and forty-five journalists crammed i nto the Haupt- mann courtroom, and flashbulbs popped and a smuggled newsreel cam- era turned up, all in violation of the trial judge’s orders. Afterward, critics deplored the media’s behavior. Sixty- one years later, a single television camera was permitted to follow the Simpson trial. Critics decried the media “circus,”“frenzy,”“orgy,” an d so for th. In both in stances, it was said that cameras skewed t he proceedings and gave a distorted view of the justice system. Some said the media got Hauptmann convicted; some believe the media got Simpson off. On the simplest level, then, the debate is about the press. Critics believe journal- ists are only barely capable of behaving themselves in court. After the Hauptmann experience, the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) reacted furiously. It swiftly passed judicial canon 35 of its Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics: Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the BROADCASTING of court pro- ceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted. This 1937 rule led the majority of states to ban still cameras and was amended in 1952 to include TV cameras. Although the ABA has long since chan- ged its views, distrust of the media’s intentions survives in state rules govern- ing courtroom proceedings. These guide- lines strictly dictate how many cameras are allowed (usually one), what they may do (remain stationary), whom they may film (never jurors and sometimes not WITNESSES), who may operate them (one person), what that operator may wear (appropriate dress), and when she or he may leave the courtroom (only during RECESS). It is hardly accidental that the guidelines resemble a teacher’s orders to a class. While generally accepting limits as necessary to the proper administration of justic e, supporters of courtroom journalism chafe at the idea that cam- eras get in the way. In the Simpson trial, for example, when Judge Lance Ito threatened to have the camera removed, Floyd Abrams, a noted FIRST AMENDME NT attorney, entered a plea to have it remain: The camera, Abrams said, was “absolutely, positively, 100 percent not guilty.” Supporters note that states require shielding witnesses, children, and others from the camera. Exactly, respond opponents. “The first thing to note about such options is that their very existence affirms the adverse effects of cameras on witnesses,” wrote Profes- sor Rory K. Little, o f the Ha stings College of the Law. This aspect of the debate—the effect on a witness of being filmed—is conten- tious. Few people are perfectly comfort- able on television; even actors and reporters are prone to stage fright. But GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 224 CAMERAS IN COURT television cameras, and it was a Texas criminal case that led to the next stage of development in this area of U.S. law. In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court took up the constitutional issue in Estes. This case involved a claim by a convicted swindler that the televising of his heavily publicized trial had deprived him of his right to due process under the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. The counterargu- ment advanced by the state of Texas remains the trials themselves can be tense events. Proponents of cameras in the courtroom attribute nervousness to publicity and speaking in front of a group. They do not believe there is any evidence that shows witnesses would be less nervous if in their presence there were a bevy of print reporters taking notes. But even if the majority of states are satisfied, not every observer is. In 1993 the Washington, D. C., PUBLIC DEFENDER Service noted that a substantial percentage of witnesses feel uncomfortable on camera, and the dis- trict’s U.S. attorney’s office has expressed fears about cameras chill witness cooper- ation and even endanger witnesses. The media and tourists may hound witnesses who have appeared on television, and so may others with frightening motives. Lawyers and judges can also be aff- ected by the camera. Critics say the temp- tation to grandstand is overwhelming— lawyers will show off, aware that their reputation can be bolstered by flights of impressive speech. Supporters respond that lawyers had big egos long before cameras were there to record them. Yet, can judges keep order, let alone resist the temptation themselves? This old question in the debate drew comment by the U.S. Supreme Court in Estes v. Texas (381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543 [1965]). In his concurring opinion in that case, Chief Justice EARL WARREN looked scathingly on a Texas trial judge who said that he had sworn to uphold the state constitution— not the federal Constitution. (Of course, state judges must uphold both.) “One is entitled to wonder,” Warren wrote, “if such a statement would be made in a court of justice by any state trial judge except as an appeal calculated to gain the favor of his viewing audience.” In 1995, much commentary in the Simpson case asked whether Judge Ito had succumbed to the allure of the camera when he allowed prosecutors and defense attor- neys to bicker endlessly. No, said supporters, cameras can actually be a corrective for these problems. As attor- ney Abrams put it, “A single, silent courtroom camera serves as an antidote to such behavior by truthfully showing the public how attorneys and judges actually behave.” The effect on juries concerns critics in a special way. Because juries are not televised, there would seem to be little reason to worry about what they will do in the jury box. Not so. It is what they may do afterward—especially in high- profile cases—and how that may affect their performance in the box that bothers critics. “[W]orst of all,” wrote attorney, author, and camera-opponent Wendy Kaminer, “juries will play to the prospect of appearing on talk shows when the trial is over … we can’t expect jurors not to be corrupted by publicity.” Book deals present another problem. There is the real possibility that people will try to get on juries simply to make a profit from doing so; in fact, one person was dismissed from the Simpson jury for allegedly taking notes for this very reason. Thus, opponents argue, cameras can jeopardize the quality of justice: Not only can they result in bad juries, but the dismissal of jurors can threaten to sink an entire trial. Against this argument, supporters can say little except words of regret about human nature. Given its length, notoriety, and mul- tiple problems, the Simpson case pro- duced a backlash against televising trials. Afterward, some judges barred cameras, and others put new restrictions on them. Vowing that “nothing like t he O.J. Simpson case is going to happen in my courtroom,” Judge Lawrence Antolini of the California Superior Court limited filming to five minutes per day. Critics mocked supporters’ claims that cameras help educate the public. As attorney Kaminer quipped in the ABA Journal, “People who claim they watch the Simpson case to educate themselves remind me of people who say they buy Playboy for the articles.” Court TV took much of the blame for its choice of what to broadcast—not only the Simpson case, but the previous trials of Lorena Bobbitt for the castration of her husband and of brothers Erik Menendez and Lyle Menen- dez for the murder of their parents. News programs were criticized, too, for carrying too little footage during a brief experi- ment in broadcasting federal trials; the FEDERALJUDICIALCENTERdetermined th at the average length of coverage in a newscast was only 17 seconds. In the wake of the backlash, sup- porters backpedaled as quickly as possi- ble, waiting for the controversy to dissipate. By 2009 the Simpson trial was a distant memory and support for cameras in the courtroom remained strong. However, the renaming of Court TV to truTv reflected a change in viewer interest. Though the n etwork still tele- vises trials during the day, it has shifted to “reality” pro grams for its evening programming. The U.S. Supreme Court remains off limits to cameras. Over the years, justices have felt that such publicity could detract from the serious nature of the Court’s business. As of 2006, transcripts of proceedings are posted on the Court’s website the day of the argument. On rare occasions, the Court has allowed audio- tapes of proceedings to be released to the public on the day of argument. The hearings surrounding the 2000 presiden- tial contest between GEORGE W. BUSH and AL GORE were deemed sufficiently impor- tant by the Court to warrant this, as were the 2003 hearings for the University of Michigan Law School AFFIRMATIVE ACTION case and the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform law. CROSS REFERENCES Courtroom Television Network; Simpson, O. J. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CAMERAS IN COURT 225 one most pro-camera supporters continued to make into the 2000s: Cameras neither caused distractions nor prejudiced the trial. The sup- porters also argued that cameras in fact served the public’s right to know in a manner both educational and likely to promote respect for the courts. The Supreme Court sided with the defendant. Emphasizing the obtrusive techno- logy used in the courtroom, from fat cables to the red light on cameras, the Court decided that the trial had not been fair and overturned the conviction. Yet, to many observers, Estes appeared to stop short of announcing that all photographic or broadcast coverage of criminal trials is inherently a denial of due process; it focused narrowly on the particulars in Billie Sol Estes’s case. More important, observers noted, the decision looked to the future. “When the advances in these arts permit reporting by … television without their present hazards to a fair trial,” Justice TOM C. CLARK wrote for the majority in Estes, “we will have another case.” Developments in the 1970s changed the picture. Technology had improved, making TV cameras far less disruptive, and the electronic media was demanding the same access to trials enjoyed by the print media. The ABA became much more tentative about its hard-line posi- tion. Its Committee on Fair Trial-Free Press recommended that the ABA revise its standards. Judge Wapner and The People’sCourt B B efore televised trials became commonplace, there was The People’sCourt.This highly popular syndicated TV program ran from 1981 through 1993 and featured retired judge Joseph A. Wapner of the California Superior Court. Millions of viewers tuned in daily to watch Wapner hear actual cases from small-claims court. The parties agreed to submit to his judgment of their sometimes petty, and often quite funny, disputes, which included claims for fender benders, complaints about plumb- ingjobs,andevenaplaintiffwhosuedwhena liquor store that had sold him a flat can of beer refusedtogivehimafreshone.Theground- breaking People’s Court probably did more than any other program before i t to open the way for the reality p rogramming tide that swept civil and criminal trial s onto television. It also popularized understanding of at least one k ind of courtroom process, that of small claims. The genius of The People’ s Court was its verisimilitude. The program operated by the rules of California’s small-claims courts: No l awyers were allowed, aggrieved parties represented themselves, and the damage limit was $1,500 . To find partici- pants for the show, Ralph Edwards Productions combed court dockets for cases that were essen- tially matters of principle and then invited the parties to appear on the program. On the show, as in real life, both parties told their sides of the story tothejudge,whosedecisionwasfinal.Theshow’s 12-year run featured more than 5,000 cases. The affably grumpy, no-nonsense Wapner cer- tainly knew his profession. The former president of the California Judges Association had earned degrees in philosophy and the law from the University of Southern California in the late 1940s, had practiced law for a decade, and had tried civil and criminal cases for twenty years before retiring from the bench in 1979. His TV rulings were commonsensical, swift, and just. The victim of a bad can of beer, for instance, was awarded eighty cents. In another case, one man in a romantic love triangle had bitten off the ear of another rather than give up the woman in question; Wapner awarded the one-eared man $1,500 for pain and suffering. As part of the show’s terms, the production company paid all awards, and the aggrieved parties merely agreed to call it a day after the judge passed sentence. The effect of The People’sCourthas often been debated. The show may have encouraged litig ious- ness, according to such critics as noted attorney Alan M. Dershowitz and Judge Abner J. Mikva, of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. It is undoubtedly true that the use of small-claims courts increased in the 1980s after the show began airing. Others found in Wapner a traditional model of fairness: In a 1989 essay i n the University of Chicago Law Review, Justice Antonin GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 226 CAMERAS IN COURT Encouraged to experiment, a number of states tried short-term pilot programs as a first step toward changing their laws. Then, in 1978, the Conference of State Chief Justices voted 44–1to approve a resolution allowing the highest court of each state to set its own guidelines for radio, TV, and other photographic coverage. By 1980 19 states permitted cover age of trial and appellate courts, three permitted coverage of trial courts only, six permitted coverage of appellate courts only, and 12 others were considering the issue. The U.S. Supreme Court provided the decisive push in 1981 with its ruling in Chandler. Chandler revisited the Estes decision of 16 years earlier and on quite similar terms: In Florida, two men convicted of BURGLARY claimed that televis- ing their trial over their objections was a denial of due proce ss. At the time, Florida was following a pilot program for televising and permitting still photography at state trials under canon 3A(7) of the Florida CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. The parties in Chandler read Estes differently: The appellants argued that Estes meant that the televising of criminal trials is inherently a denial of due process, whereas the state claimed that Estes did not establish any such constitutional rule. Seeking to clarify the earlier ruling, which had comprised no less than six opinions, the Supreme Court agreed with Florida. It held that states could provide access to the electronic media Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court described Wapner as a descendant of Solomon and Louis IX of France. Wapner himself saw the program as educational. To the public, which made The People’ s Court the fifth-highest-rated syndicated show in the mid- 1980s, Wapner became the best-known judge in the United States. A 1989 Washington Post poll found that fewer than 10 percent of respondents knew the name of Justice William H. Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court but more than half could identify Wapner. Wapner p ublished the book AViewfrom the Bench in 1987. After the show’s cancellation in 1992, he served as president of the board of directors of the Brandeis-Bardin Institute, a Jewish cultural organization in California. As tastes in daytime television changed in the 1990s, Wapner’s descendants reflected the times. The era of no-holds-barred reality TV had dawned, and into it in 1996 barreled Judge Judy.Ifthe betrayed and the broken-hearted went on The Jerry Springer Show to smash chairs, Judge Judy was where they settled their legal di fferences for the price of a tongue-lashing from retired New York City judge Judy Sheindlin. Averaging 9 million viewers per day, Sheindlin rarely failed to remind disputing parties of their shortcomings. The huge success of Judge Judy spawned competition. In fact, a brief revival of The People’ s Court between 1998 and 1999 featured former New York City mayor Ed Koch hamming it up at the gavel. Similarly, Divorce Court, originally a 1960s show with actors, reappeared with real couples ready to untie the knot on camera. Other shows, such as Judge Mills Lane, covered the familiar territory of small claims cases being tried by humorous grumps. The 2000s breathed fresh air into the format with African American judges and new thematic approaches. Divorce Court and Judge Mathis featured attorney Mablean Ephriam and former state judge Greg Mathis, respectively. As a former teenage dropout and gang member who became a Michigan judge, Mathis promoted the theme of self- redemption while c iting his life as an example for young offenders. Following their lead was noted former Georgia juvenile court judge Glenda Hatch- ett, whose Judge Hatchett also sought to balance entertainment with a social message. As of 2009, there were ten syndicated courtroom shows, with Judge Judy still the number one rated program. FURTHER READINGS Frankel, Bruce. 2000. “Past Imperfect; In re jurisprudence, TV’s Judge Mathis Had Two Good Teachers: Law School and Jail.” People (October 2). Holston, Noel. 1999. “Fall TV Preview.” Minneapolis Star Tribune (September 13). “Judge Glenda Hatchett Bio.” 2003. Available online at www. sonypictures.com/tv/shows/judgehatchett/about4.phtml (accessed on November 20, 2003). “Judge Mills Lane TV Show Canceled.” 2001. AP Online (April 11). Zurawik, David. 1999. “Tough Justice: TV Judges Deal in Black and White.” Newsday (April 21): B3. CROSS REFERENCES Small Claims Court; Television. B GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CAMERAS IN COURT 227 . CONGRESS THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE IS THE INDISPENSABLE AND PRIMARY PRINCIPLE IN THE FOUNDATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT . —JOHN CALHOUN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 22 2 CALENDAR had. But GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 22 4 CAMERAS IN COURT television cameras, and it was a Texas criminal case that led to the next stage of development in this area of U.S. law. In. Wapner a traditional model of fairness: In a 1989 essay i n the University of Chicago Law Review, Justice Antonin GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 22 6 CAMERAS IN COURT Encouraged