Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 65 [1997]), three terminally ill patients, four physicians, and a nonprofit organization brought action against the state of Washington for DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, that a statute banning assisted suicide violated due process clause. On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right of states to prohibit assisted suicide, holding: (1) asserted right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process clause, and (2) Washington’sbanon assisted suicide is rationally related to legitimate government interests. In Vacco v. Quill (521 U.S. 793, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 [1997]), physicians challenged the constitutionality of New York statutes making it a crime to aid a person in committing suicide or attempting to commit suicide. The Supreme Court held that New York’s prohibition on a ssisting suicide did not violate the EQUAL PROTECTION clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. Involuntary Euthanasia The term involuntary euthanasia is used to describe the killing of a person who has not explicitly requested aid in dying. This term is most often used with respect to patients who are in a persistent vegetative state and who probably will never recover consciousness. Euthanasia Considerations Euthanasia is a divisive topic, and different interpretations of its meaning, practice, and morality abound. Those who favor active eutha- nasia and a patient’s right to die do not acknowledge a distinction between active and passive euthanasia. They assert that the with- drawal of life-sustaining treatment cannot be distinguished in principle from affirmative steps to hasten a patient’s death. In both situations, they argue, a person intends to cause the patient’s death, acts out of compassionate motives, and causes that single outcome. In their view, turning off a life-sustaining respirator switch and giving a lethal injection are morally equivalent actions. Opponents of active euthanasia argue that it undermines the value of, and respect for, all human life; erodes trust in physicians; desensi- tizes society to killing; and contradicts many people’s religious beliefs. Moreover, they main- tain that the intentions and natures of active and passive euthanasia are not essentially the same. In active euthanasia, a person directly intends to cause death and uses available means to achieve this end. In passive euthanasia, a person decides against using a certain form of treatment and then directs that such treatment be withdrawn or withheld, accepting but not intending the patient’s death, which is caused by the underlying illness. Whilepeoplecitedifferingreasonsfor choosing to end their own lives, those suffering from a terminal illness typically state that a serious disorder or disease has adversely affected their quality of life to the point where they no longer wish to continue living. Under such circumstances, patients may have been diagnosed with a degenerative, progressive illness such as ALS, Huntington’sdisease, multiple sclerosis, AIDS, or Alzheimer’sdis- ease. Patients with such illnesses often fear, with good reason, a gradual loss of the quality of life in the future as the disease or disorder progresses, or they might already have lost a good deal of their independence and thus might require continuous care. Some feel that this loss of autonomy cause s an unacceptable loss of personal dignity. Others realize that they will b e dying in the near future and simply want to have total control over the process. Some point outthatinadditiontophysicalconsiderations, they do not want to diminish their assets by incurring large medical costs as their death approaches. They feel that they ought to have theoptiontodiesoonerandtopassontheir assets to their beneficiaries. Some patients who decide that they wish to commit suicide are unable or unwilling to accomplish the act without assistance from their physician. Physician-assisted suicide helps them to die under conditions, and at the time, that they choose. PAS is currently legal only in the state of Oregon, under severe restrictions. In other states, terminally ill individuals who want to die must continue living until their body eventually collapses or until a family member or friend commits a criminal act by helping the m to commit suicide. Historical Considerations Traditional Christian beliefs concerning all forms of suicide were addressed by Thomas Aquinas during the thirteenth century. He condemned all suicide (whether assisted or not) on the theory that it violated one’s natural desire to live. Among European writers, Michel de Montaigne was the first major dissenter on this issue. During the sixteenth century, he GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION EUTHANASIA 259 wrote a series of essays arguing that suicide should be a matter of personal choice, a human right. He asserted it is a rational option under certain circumstances. Attempting to commit suicide was once a criminal act. It has been decriminalized for many decades in most jurisdictions. However, assisted suicide remains a criminal act Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide E uthanasia (sometimes called mercy killing) and physician-assisted SUI- CIDE are much debated methods of ending the suffering of individuals who have painful, debilitating, and terminal diseases. These methods are much de- bated and involve complicated questions. One question concerns whether indivi- duals in such conditions have the right to die as they wish rather than live i n persistent agony. Other questions have to do with attending physicians’ roles, par- ticularly their prescribing certain medica- tions and giving directions for taking a lethal dose. People wonder if there are certain circumstances in which a person ought to help another person commit suicide. These are just some of the questions that surround the issue of physician-assisted suicide, a widely debat- ed ethical issue in modern medicine. Physician-assisted suicide is a form of voluntary euthanasia. In other words, it involves a patient voluntarily acting to end his or her life. Physician-assisted suicide differs from conventional suicide in that it is facilitated by a physician who confirms the patient’s diagnosis, rules out condi- tions such as depression that may be affecting the patient’sjudgment,and finally provides the means for committing suicide. Such action usually consists of taking a lethal overdose of prescription medication. However, the over 130 patients who were assisted by Dr. JACK KEVORKIAN between 1990 and 1998 chose to press a button which delivered a lethal poison into their veins or to put on a mask that emitted carbon monoxide into their lungs. As of 2010 ASSISTED SUICIDE was a felony offense in most states and was also expressly forbidden in the AMERICAN MEDI- CAL ASSOCIATION (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics. In 1999, Kevorkian was found guilty of second-degree MURDER in an assisted suicide case. He was sentenced to serve10to25years,butwasparoledin 2007 after serving eight years in prison. The debate surrounding physician- assisted suicide in the United States has been influenced by medical practices in other countries, particularly the Nether- lands, which legalized both active eutha- nasia and physician-assisted suicide in 2002. Physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands is conducted within strict guidelines that include the following requirements: the patient’s request for assisted suicide must be voluntary, the patient must be experiencing intolerable suffering, all other alternatives for treat- ment must have been explored, and the physician must consult another indepen- dent physician before proceeding. A study commissioned by the Dutch gov- ernment indicated that, in 2001, about 3,500 deaths, or 2.5 percent of the 140,000 death cases that were reported in the Netherlands that year, occurred by active euthanasia. The study, known as the Remmelink Report, defined euthana- sia as the termination of life at the patient’s request. Figures also indicated that 300 deaths, or 0.2 percent, were caused by physician-assisted suicide. In the United States, the debate on legalizing assisted suicide began in ear- nest in the 1970s. On one side of the debate were patients’ rights groups who lobbied for what they call the right to die—or the right to choose to die, as some have clarified it—of terminally ill patients. The strongest opposition to the legalization of physician-assisted suicide has come from physicians’ groups such as the AMA and from religious groups that are morally opposed to the practice. One person who has done much to make the case for physician-assisted suicide is Derek Humphry, a former journalist who founded the Hemlock Society, in 1980, after witnessing his first wife’s suffering as she was dying from cancer. In 2003, the organization changed its name to End-of-Life Choices, which encompasses more clearly the issues supported by its members. With a new name and a new motto, “Dignity Com- passion Control,” the organization con- tinues to advocate for the right of terminally ill people to choose voluntary euthanasia or what Humphry has termed self-deliverance. Humphry has written several books on the subject of voluntary euthanasia, including Jean’sWay(1978), which recounts his struggle to assist his wife’s death in 1975; Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying (1991), a controversial book that gives detailed advice on how terminally ill people may take their own life; and Lawful Exit: The Limits of Freedom for Help in Dying (1993), which contains Humphry’s own recommendations for legislation that would legalize physician-assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia. In Humphry’s words, the “right to choose to die” is “the ultimate civil liberty.” Humphry presents physician- assisted suicide as a merciful, dignified option for people whose illness has eroded their quality of life beyond the limits of tolerance. He also points out that what he calls beneficent euthanasia occurs every day in medical facilities as physicians make decisions regarding the end of life. Others, including some medical ethicists, go so far as to claim that a decision to withhold antibiotics, oxygen, or nutrition from a terminally ill GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 260 EUTHANASIA throughout the United States, with the exception of the state of Oregon. In that state, it is permitted under tightly controlled conditions. Oregon’s Euthanasia Law In 1994 voters in the state of Oregon approved a ballot measure that would have legalized euthanasia under limited conditions. Under the patient is no less “active” a form of euthanasia than is administering a fatal dose of morphine. Indeed, they see the common practice of withholding life support as more open to potential abuse than the practice of physician-assisted suicide. The former, they argue, is a less visible, less easily regulated decision. Proponents of physician-assisted suicide also claim that diseases kill people in far more cruel ways than would any means of death that a physician might provide for an irreversibly ill patient. As a result, they see the action of assisting in suicide as entirely compatible with the physi- cian’s duty to the patient. However, Humphry has been an open critic of Kevorkian’s work. He has described Kevorkian’s theory and prac- tice of assisted suicide as open-ended euthanasia. Noting Kevorkian’s lack of precautionary measures such as the use of waiting periods and second opinions, Humphry sees any wider application of Kevorkian’s methods as potentially lead- ing to abuse and tragedy. “The thinking people in our movement are appalled by it,” Humphry said. “If you have Kevor- kian’s type of euthanasia, it will be a slippery slope. Kevorkian’s is a recipe for skiing down a glacier.” Detractors of physician-assisted sui- cide also use the familiar “slippery slope” argument, proposing that once physi- cian-assisted suicide is legalized, other forms of euthanasia will more likely be practiced as well. They see assisted suicide as potentially leading to situations in which elderly, chronically ill, and handicapped people, along with others, are killed through active, nonvoluntary euthanasia. Related to this idea is the view that widespread practice of physician- assisted suicide might claim the lives of those whose intolerable suffering is caused by treatable depression. They point out that terminally ill people or others in pain are often also suffering from depression and that despite their illness, their feelings of hopelessness can often be addressed through means such as counseling and antidepressant medi- cation. The Catholic Church opposes eutha- nasia and assisted suicide. Basing its arguments on passages from the Bible, Catholic theology has for many centuries opposed all forms of suicide. Catholicism argues that innocent human life may not be destroyed for any reason whatsoever. The debate over physician-assisted suicide eventually reached the Supreme Court. In 1994 an advocacy group known as Compassion in Dying filed two lawsuits (Compassion in Dying et al v. Washington and Quill et al v. Vacco) challenging the constitutionality of state laws banning assisted dying in Washing- ton and New York. Compassion in Dying won in the district court in Washington. Chief Judge Barbara Rothstein wrote, “There is no more profoundly personal decision, nor one which is closer to the heart of personal liberty, than the choice which a terminally ill person makes to end his or her suffering and hasten an inevitable death.” In New York, Com- passion in Dying lost and filed an appeal in the Second Circuit. In 1995 Washington’s Compassion ruling was overturned by the Ninth CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals, reinstating the anti- suicide law. In 1996, however, after reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a reversal decision in Compassion v. Washington. That decision held that assisted dying was protected by liberty and privacy provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The majority wrote that “Those who believe strongly that death must come without physician assistance are free to follow that creed, be they doctors or patients. They are not free, however, to force their views, their reli- gious convictions, or their philosophies on all the other members of a democratic society, and to compel those whose values differ with theirs to die painful, protracted, and agonizing deaths.” In April 1996 the Second Circuit joined the Ninth in recognizing constitu- tional protection for assisted dying in the Quill case, holding that the New York statutes criminalizing assisted suicide vio- late the EQUAL PROTECTION clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.However,onJune 26, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed both the Ninth and Second Circuit Court in WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG (521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 [1997])andVacco v. Quill (521 U.S. 743, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 [1997]). The Court ruled that state laws against assisting a suicide are not unconstitution- al, but it also stated that patients have a right to aggressive treatment of pain and other symptoms, even if the treatment hastens death. The Court wrote, “Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality and practicality of physician assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.” However, in Gonzales v. Oregon (546 U.S. 243, 126 S. Ct. 904, L. Ed. [2006]), the Court agreed with the state of Oregon that the federal government could not prosecute doctors who prescribe medications to help their patients commit suicide. Ultimately, then, the voters and representatives of the states and the legal system itself will have to decide whether physician-assisted suicide will be legal- ized. Regardless of what side prevails in the debate, the exchange of ideas that it creates may lead to a greater understand- ing of the difficult choices surrounding death in modern times. FURTHER READINGS Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. 2001. The Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. Hendin, Herbert. 2002. “The Dutch Experi- ence.” Issues in Law & Medicine (spring). CROSS REFERENCES Death and Dying; Physicians and Surgeons. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION EUTHANASIA 261 Death with Dignity law, a person who sought physician-assisted suicide would have to meet certain criteria: n Thepersonmustbeterminallyill. n Thepersonmusthavesixmonthsorless to live. n Thepersonmustmaketwooralrequests for assistance in dying. n Thepersonmustmakeonewrittenrequest for assistance in dying. n The person must convince two physicians that he or she is sincere and not acting on a whim and that the decision is voluntary. n The person m ust not have been influenced by depression. n Thepersonmustbeinformedof“the feasible alternatives,” including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control. n Thepersonmustwaitfor15days. Under the proposed law, a person who met all requirements could receive a prescription of a barbiturate that would be sufficient to cause death. Physicians would be prohibited from inducing death by injection or carbon monoxide. The NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, supported by the Roman Catholic Church, obtained a court injunction to delay implemen- tation of the measure. The law stalled in the appeals process. In the meantime, the measure was not enacted. In 1997 there was a second public referendum, and the law was enacted. Within 24 hours of the announcement of the results, state officials had forms for physicians to record instances of assisted suicide. These were later distributed to physicians in the state. The form is entitled “Request for Medication to End My Life in a Humane and Dignified Manner.” Immediately after the law was affirmed, Thomas Constantine, the administrator of the federal DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DEA), wrote a policy statement that said that prescribing drugs to help terminally ill patients kill themselves would be a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Nevertheless, on March 26, 1998, a woman in her mid-eighties died from a lethal dose of barbiturates, which had been prescribed by her doctor under the Oregon law. She was the first person to publicly use the law to commit suicide. She had been fighting breast cancer for 20 years and recently had been told by her doctor that she had less than two months to live. She had been experiencing increased difficulty breathing. She made a tape recording in which she stated, “I’m looking forward to it. I will be relieved of all the stress I have.” Her personal doctor would not help her end her life, so she turned to an advocacy group, Compassion in Dying. That group located a doctor to assist her. She fell into a deep sleep about five minutes after taking the lethal dose of pills, and she died peacefully about 25 minutes later. Attorney General JANET RENO officially reversed Constantine’s ruling a few weeks later, stating that doctors who use the law to prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill patients will not be prosecuted and that drug laws were intended to block illegal trafficking in drugs, not to cover situations like the Oregon suicide law. Despite significant controversy, by the end of 1998, one prediction of the anti-choice forces had not materialized: There was no rush of people to Oregon to seek an easy end to life. While it was predicted that many would take advantage of the law, of the 23 terminally ill individuals who applied to end their own lives in 1998, 15 committed suicide, usually within a day of receiving the prescription. Six died from their illnesses without using the medication. Two remained alive at the end of 1998. From 1998 to 2002, 129 people chose physician assisted suicide. In early 2001 Oregon state senator Ron Wyden wrote Attorney General JOHN ASHCROFT asking that the GEORGE W. BUSH administration not mount an attack on the state law permitting assistance in suicide. Ashcroft wrote a letter to Asa Hutchinson, chief of the Drug Enforcement Administration. He declared that assisting a terminally ill patient to commit suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” for federally con- trolled drugs. He said that physicians who use drugs to help patients die face suspension or revocation of their licenses to prescribe federally controlled drugs. This position was contrary to the position taken by Janet Reno, his predeces- sor. The attorney general of Oregon, Hardy Myers, quickly initiated a lawsuit to have the Ashcroft directive declared unconstitutional. The federal district court in Oregon issued a tempo- rary injunction, which prevents the federal government from enforcing Ashcroft’s GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 262 EUTHANASIA interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The state of Oregon requested that the court block the federal DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE from taking legal action against Oregon doctors who prescribe medication to help their patients commit suicide. A federal judge ruled in favor of the state law in 2002, and the Department of Justice appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appeals court upheld the Oregon law, as did the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Oregon (546 U.S. 243, 126 S. Ct. 904, L. Ed. [2006]). The Court acknowledged the federal government has the right to regulate drugs but stated that the attorney general does not have the power to regulate the proper uses of legal medications. Moreover, prior CASE LAW limited the power of the federal government to regulate medical practice. Other States According to the online website, Euthanasia. com, 35 states have legislated aga inst assisted suicide, while nine other states have cited it as a crime under common law. Still more states have introduced or passed statut es criminalizing assisted suicide. These statutes forbid a person to knowingly assist or aid another in commit- ting suicide. Some also prohibit soliciting, advising, or encouraging another to commit suicide. Some statutes penalize assisted suicide under guidelines established for murder or MANSLAUGHTER, whereas others make it a unique offense with separate penalties. Few courts have interpreted the assisted-suicide statutes, because prosecutions for assisted suicide are rare. In cases of assisted suicide, a state usually prose- cutes individuals for murder or manslaughter. The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, ruled in 1996 that assisted suicide is not a crime. FURTHER READINGS Behuniak, Susan M. 2003. Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Issue. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Dyck, Arthur J. 2001. When Killing Is Wrong: Physician- Assisted Suicide and the Courts. Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim Press. Euthanasia.com. Available online at www.euthanasia.com (accessed October 11, 2009). Palmer, Larry I. 2000. Endings and Beginnings: Law, Medicine, and Society in Assisted Life and Death. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. CROSS REFERENCE Death and Dying v EVARTS, WILLIAM MAXWELL William Maxwell Evarts served as attorney general of the United States during the last year of the administration of President ANDREW JOHNSON . Evarts was a distinguished and power- ful New York attorney who successfully defended President Johnson at his IMPEACHMENT trial, represented the REPUBLICAN PARTY before an electoral commission during the disputed presidential election of 1876, served as SECRETARY OF STATE during the administration of President RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, and ended his public career as a U.S. senator. Evarts was born February 16, 1818, in Boston. He graduated from Yale University in 1837 and then attended Harvar d Law School. He was admitted to the New York bar in 1841 and subsequently established a successful legal practice. From 1849 to 1853, Evarts acted as assistant district attorney for the New York District. Evarts entered public service during the U.S. CIVIL WAR. He participated in diplomatic activi- ties as a member of the Secretary of Defense Committee for the Union. In 1863 he went to England as a Union delegate to convince England to stop providing war vessels and equipment to the CONFEDERACY. Following the end of the Civil War, Evarts returned to his law practice. He was drawn back to Washington, D.C., in 1868 to help defend President Johnson at his impeachment trial. The charges against Johnson were weak and politically motivated, yet the mood in the Senate appeared to favor conviction. Evarts proved instrumental in obtaining an acquittal, though by a margin of only one vote. Johnson rewarded Evarts by appointing him attorney general. Evarts served in that position until the end of the Johnson administration in March 1869. Evarts then returned to New York govern- ment. He led the New York City BAR ASSOCIATION for ten years and was an advocate for political reform in the city, which was dominated by the corrupt Democratic political machine led by the “Tweed Ring.” The ring was named after William Marcy “Boss” Tweed, the New York City DEMOCRATIC PARTY leader who ran the party organization popularly known as TAMMANY H ALL. Tweed and his associates used their political connections and political offices to gain a foothold in city and county government. Once formed, the Tweed Ring misappropriated GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION EVARTS, WILLIAM MAXWELL 263 government funds through such devices as faked leases, padded bills, false vouchers, unnecessary repairs, and overpriced goods and services bought from suppliers controlled by the ring. In 1876 Evarts reentered the national political arena, this time as the chief counsel of the national Republican party. The presiden- tial election of 1876 between Democrat SAMUEL J. TILDEN and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes ended in disputes involving the voting returns of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina. Two sets of returns were submitted from each of these states, one favoring Tilden, the other Hayes. If Hayes were awarded the electoral votes from these states, and one more from a disputed Oregon elector, he would defeat Tilden in a vote of 185–184. Congress appointed an electoral commis- sion to decide which returns to accept. In the end Evarts and the Republican members of the commission were able to convince commission member and Supreme Court Justice JOSEPH P. BRADLEY to cast his vote, which was the deciding vote, for the Hayes electors and Hayes was awarded the presidency. Tilden agreed to the result out of fear that violence would ensue if he disputed it. In return the Republicans made a side agreement with southern Democrats that led to President Hayes in 1877 removing federal occupation troops from the former states of the Confederacy. Evarts was also a key player in these affairs. President Hayes, like President Johnson before him, reward ed Evarts, appointing him secretary of state in 1877. Evarts served in this capacity during the four years of the Hayes administration. In 1885 he was elected a U.S. senator from New York. He served in the Senate until 1889. In failing health he retired from politics and the law in 1891. Evarts died February 28, 1901, in New York City. v EVERS, MEDGAR WILEY Shortly before his death, CIVIL RIGHTS activist MEDGAR WILEY EVERS was described in the New York Times as the movement’s “quiet integrationist.” Although his contemporary MARTIN LUTHER KING, William M. Evarts. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS William Maxwell Evarts 1818–1901 ❖ ❖ ◆ 1818 Born, Boston, Mass. ◆ 1837 Graduated from Yale University 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1863–64 Served as Union delegate to England 1841 Admitted to New York bar ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 1876 Acted as chief counsel for the Republicans in the Hayes-Tilden electoral battle 1868–69 Served as U.S. attorney general 1849–53 Served as assistant district attorney for the New York District ◆ 1868 Defended President Andrew Johnson at impeachment trial 1901 Died, New York City ◆ ◆ 1870–80 Headed the Association of the Bar of New York City 1873 William "Boss" Tweed convicted of stealing public funds 1877–81 Served as secretary of state 1885–89 Represented New York in the U.S. Senate GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 264 EVERS, MEDGAR WILEY JR., achieved greater fame for organizing nonvio- lent demonstrations and boycotts, Evers was an equally dedicated reformer, whose reports of civil rights abuses in Mississippi helped to force social and political changes in the Deep South. From 1954 to 1963, Ev ers was state field secretary for the National Association for the ADVANCEMENT of Colored People (NAACP). Cou- rageous, methodical, and devoted to his work, Evers sought to dismantle a decades-old system of SEGREGATION. His approach was to create public outrage over the treatment of African Americans by documenting cases of brutality and injustice. Although Evers fought tirelessly against discriminatory laws and conduct, he rejected violence as a means of improving the plight of his people. By antagonizing powerful white suprema- cists, Evers put himself in constant danger in his home state. When he was shot and killed by a sniper on June 12, 1963, many Mississippians were not surprised. Upon his death, Eve rs became an early martyr in the African- American struggle for equal rights. More than 30 years later, when Byron de la Beckwith finally was convicted of Evers’s ASSASSINATION, Evers became a symbol of U.S. justice—delayed, but not denied. Evers was born July 2, 1925, in Decatur, Mississippi, the younger of two sons born to James Evers, a sawmill worker, and Jessie Evers, a devout Christian who encouraged young Medgar to succeed. The Evers family was hardworking but poor. Townspeople remember Evers as an upright, sympathetic young man who chafed under the inequities of segregation. During WORLD WAR II, Evers served in an all– African-American unit of the U.S. Army. Although the military’s racial policies infuriated him, he fought with distinction and was decorated for his bravery in the Normandy Invasion. During his tour of duty, Evers experienced in Europe a more tolerant, racially integrated society, which inspired his hope for changes in his native Mississippi. After the war, Evers attended Mississippi’s Alcorn A&M College, where he participated in football, track, debate, and choir. He also met YOU CAN KILL A MAN BUT YOU CAN ’T KILL AN IDEA . —MEDGAR EVERS Medgar Evers. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Medgar Wiley Evers 1925–1963 ❖ 1925 Born, Decatur, Miss. ◆ 1944 Decorated for bravery after Normandy Invasion 1962 Aided James Meredith in his successful attempt to register at University of Mississippi 1963 Assassinated, Jackson, Miss.; Byron de la Beckwith charged with murder, but two trials resulted in hung juries ◆◆ ◆ ◆ 1952 Graduated from Alcorn Agricultural and Mechanical College 1995 Myrlie Evers Williams, Evers's widow, elected head of NAACP 1961–73 Vietnam War 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War ▼▼ ▼▼ 19501950 19751975 20002000 19251925 1954–63 Served as NAACP field representative in Miss. 1967 Thurgood Marshall became first African American U.S. Supreme Court justice ◆ ◆ ◆ 1958 Arrested for sitting in a "white" bus seat in Meridian, Mississippi ❖ 1971 Public school busing to achieve integration began 1994 Beckwith convicted of Evers's death 1990 Beckwith reindicted ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION EVERS, MEDGAR WILEY 265 his future wife, Myrlie Evers, with whom he had three children. After graduation, Evers worked as a sales agent for Magnolia Mutual, an African-American–owned life insurance com- pany. Assigned a rural territory, Evers witnessed African-American poverty and debasement on such a large scale that he could no longer abide Mississippi’s racial discrimination. He took a job with the NAACP in 1954, determined to make a difference. As an NAACP field representative, Evers handled routine administrative duties such as setting up chapters, recruiting new members, and collecting dues. But more importantly, Evers filed detailed public reports of lynchings, beatings, and other race-related atrocities in Mississippi. His work attracted national atten- tion. Evers also encouraged voter registration for African Americans and, in some instances, boycotts. Because he signaled the end of the era of white power, Evers was despised by southern bigots. He bravely endured their taunts and death threats. Org anizations opposed to inte- gration, such as the White Citizens Council, branded Evers an enemy. Ironically, as African Americans became impatient with the slow pace of social change, Evers’s work was oversha- dowed by more militant civil rights strategies. On the night of his MURDER, Evers attended a local rally. Around midnight, he returned to his Jackson, Mississippi, home, where an assassin waited for him in nearby honeysuckle bushes. Evers got out of his car and walked up the driveway, carrying shirts that read Jim Crow Must Go, a reference to laws conferring second- class citizenship on African Americans. The assassin shot him in the back with an Enfield 30.06 rifle. Evers’s wife and their young children, Darrell, Reena, and James, heard the gunshot and rushed to his side. Evers could not be saved. As news of Evers’s death spread, riots erupted in Jackson. The nation was stunned by the killing. President JOHN F. KENNEDY denounced the assassi- nation, sending Evers’s wife his condolences and praising Evers’s devotion to civil rights. The FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) was called in to conduct a criminal investigation. Evers was buried in Arlington National Cemetery, in Washington, D.C. The trail of the FBI ’s investigation led quickly to white supremacist Byron de la Beckwith, a fertilizer sales representative affiliated with the KU KLUX KLAN. Charged with murder, de la Beckwith appeared guilty to most observers, but the racial climate in Mississippi prevented a sure conviction. During his trial, de la Beckwith acted clownish and unrepentant. At one point, Mississippi governor Ross Barnett entered the courtroom and hugged the DEFEN- DANT in full view of the all-white jury. Despite compelling evidence from the prosecution—de la Beckwith’s public boasting about the murder, his FINGERPRINTS on the rifle scope, his well- known ability as a marksman, and reports that his white Plymouth Valiant was parked near Evers’s home at the time of the killing—the trial resulted in a hung jury. Astonishingly, a second trial also ended in a hung jury. Evers’s widow, who had remarried, refused to let the matter drop. MYRLIE EVERS-WILLIAMS lobbied long and hard to have de la Beckwith tried for a third time for Evers’s killing. A third prosecution was possible in this case for two reasons. First, there is no STATUTE OF L IMITATIONS for murder, so the passage of time was not a consideration. Second, de la Beckwith had not been exonerated (with a hung jury, the defendant is neither acquitted nor convicted), so DOUBLE JEOPARDY, the constitutional guaran- tee against multiple prosecutions, was not an issue. Evers-Williams’s d etermination to see justice done, as well as a change in Mississippi politics, made a third trial of de la Beckwith possible. Facing testimony from new and former witnesses, de la Beckwith was reindicted in 1990. A trial was conducted by District Attorney Ed Peters. On February 21, 1994, a jury of eight African Americans and four whites in Hinds County, Mississippi , found de la Beckwith, by then 73 years old, guilty of the 1963 murder of Evers. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld his conviction in 1997. De la Beckwith died in prison in 2001. Although the third trial was a painful experience for Evers-Williams, she was relieved that the Mississippi criminal justice system had finally brought closure to a personal and public tragedy. In life and death, Evers played an impor- tant role in the fight f or racial equality. He inspired in others, including his family, a commitment to the same social, political, and economic goals for African Americans. Eve rs’s brother, Charles Evers, was elected mayor of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 266 EVERS, MEDGAR WILEY Fayette, Mississippi, in 1969, and ran unsuc- cessfully for governor of the state in 1971. In 1995, Evers-Williams was elected to head the NAACP, the organization to which Evers had dedicated his life. FURTHER READINGS Evers, Myrlie, with William Peters. 1967. For Us, the Living. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. Evers-Williams, Myrlie and Manning Marable. 2005. The Autobiography of Medgar Evers: A Hero’s Life and Legacy Revealed Through His Writings, Letters, and Speeches. New York: Basic Civitas Books. Massengill, Reed. 1994. Portrait of a Racist: The Man Who Killed Medgar Evers? New York: St. Martin’s Press. Nossiter, Adam. 1994. Of Long Memory: Mississippi and the Murder of Medgar Evers. Reading, Mass.: Addison- Wesley. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights Movement. v EVERS-WILLIAMS, MYRLIE MYRLIE EVERS-WILLIAMS achieved national promi- nence as the chairwoman of the National Association for the ADVANCEMENT of Colored People ( NAACP). She was narrowly elected to the post in 1995 as part of an effort to reform an organization rocked by scandal and allegations of financial mismanagement. Evers-Williams was born March 17, 1933, in Vicksburg, Mississippi. She became part of the modern CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT through her marriage to MEDGAR EVERS, who was the state field secretary for the Mississippi NAACP. Her world changed dramatically on June 12, 1963, when her husband was shot to death outside their home in Jackson, Mississippi. White supremacist Byron de la Beckwith was charged with the MURDER,buttwo trials in the 1960s ended in hung juries. After the second trial, Evers-Williams vowed to bring de la Beckwith to justice. Following her husband’s ASSASSINATION, Evers-Williams assumed his position as NAACP field secretary. Then in 1964 she decided to move with her three young children to Claremont, Californ ia, and begin a new life. In 1967, she published For Us the Living, a memoir of her life with her late husband. She earned a Myrlie Evers-Williams. AP IMAGES Myrlie Evers-Williams 1933– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1930 2000 1975 1950 ❖ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1999 Watch Me Fly: What I Learned on the Way to Becoming the Woman I Was Meant to Be published 1995 Evers-Williams elected chair of NAACP 2005 Published The Autobiography of Medgar Evers, comprised of Medgar’s writings and speeches 1994 De la Beckwith convicted of Medgar Evers's death; sentenced to life 1987–89 Appointed first African American woman to serve as commissioner on L.A. Board of Public Works 1990 De la Beckwith reindicted 1976 Married Walter Williams 1970 Ran for seat in Congress 1968 Graduated from Pomona College; became director of planning at the Claremont Colleges 1967 For Us the Living published 1954–63 Medgar served as Mississippi's state field secretary of the NAACP 1963 Medgar assassinated in front of their home in Jackson, Miss.; Byron de la Beckwith charged 1964 Two trials resulted in hung juries; Evers family moved to California 1951 Married Medgar Evers 1933 Born, Vicksburg, Miss. 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War NEVER LOSE SIGHT OF YOUR GOALS .WE ARE LIVING IN A TIME WHEN WE MUST TAKE INTO OUR HANDS OUR DESTINIES AND OUR FUTURES . —MYRLIE EVERS-WILLIAMS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION EVERS-WILLIAMS, MYRLIE 267 degree in sociology at Pomona College in 1968 and the n became director of planning for the Claremont Colleges system. In 1970 she ran for a seat in Congress in what was then the 24th congressional district in California. Though she lost the election, it was a turning point for Evers-Williams. She was publicly transformed from Mrs. Medgar Evers to Myrlie Evers. In the 1970s and 1980s, she worked in the corporate arena, serving as director of consumer affairs for the Atlantic Richfield Company. In 1976 she marrie d Walter Williams, a California longshoreman and CIVIL RIGHTS activist. In 1987 Evers-Willams became the first African American woman to serve on the Los Angeles Board of Public Works. She and her husband moved to Bend, Oregon, in 1989. When Mississippi prosecutors failed to try de la Beckwith a third time for the murder of Medgar Evers, Evers-Williams mounted a cam- paign to generate public opinion in favor of a retrial. When she was told that no transcripts of the original trial were to be found, she produced an original that she had held in a safe deposit box since the 1960s. In 1994 her efforts succeeded, anddelaBeckwithwasconvictedofthe1963 crime. He was sentenced to life in prison, where he died in 2001. In 1996, Evers-Williams served as a consultant to the movie Ghosts of Mississippi, which recounts the story of the retrial and conviction of de la Beckwith. Actress Whoopi Goldberg portrays Evers-Williams in the movie. Despite the many changes and activities in her life, Evers-Williams remained committed to the NAACP. Serving on the national board of directors in the 1990s, she observed firsthand the problems that were engulfing the once dominant civil rights organization. A growing dissatisfaction with the leadership of Executive Director Benjamin F. Chavis Jr. culminated in August 1994, when he was fired for committing more than $330,000 in NAACP funds, without the board’s approval, to settle a SEX DISCRIMINA- TION suit filed against him. The focus then shifted to Chairman William F. Gibson, who was also accused of misappropriating NAACP funds for personal use. Evers-Williams was approached to challenge Gibson at the 1995 board election. She hesitated to run because her husband was dying from prostate cance r. However, Walter Williams urged her to take up the fight. She was elected to the chair in February 1995, winning by a one- vote margin; Evers-Williams was the first woman elected to that position. Her husband died shortly after her election. The precarious state of the NAACP soon became clear to Evers-Williams. Membership had declined from 500,000 to 300,000, while the organization’s debt had risen to over $4 million. Corporate support had also dropped, forcing severe staff reductions at the national headquar- ters in Baltimore. Evers-Williams moved quickly to restore trust. The board hired an accounting firm to audit financial records and directed its attorney to seek restitution from Gibson. Evers-Williams renewed contact with financial contributors, crisscrossing the United States in search of support. By the end of 1995, she had substantially reduced the NAACP’s debt. New programs were started with the goal of reinvigorating the NAACP and attracting younger members. In December 1995, the board approved the appoint- ment of Representative Kweisi Mfume (D-Md.) as president and executive director, capping a frenetic year for Evers-Williams. Evers-Williams served as chair of the NAACP until 1998. She then began work on the M edgar Evers Institute, headquartered in Jackson, Mis- sissippi, which promotes c ivil rights and economic development. In 2003 the institute part nered w ith Oregon State U niversity t o e stablish a western regional office in Bend, home of Evers-Williams. Evers-Williams continued to be a well- received speaker and author. In 1999, she published a memoir, titled Watch Me Fly: What I Learned on the Way to Becoming the Woman I Was Meant to Be, with Melinda Blau. She received numerous honorary degrees and awards, includ- ing the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus Achieve- ment Award, the NAACP’s Image Award for Civil Rights, and the Woman of the Year Award from the state of California. In March 2003 Evers- Williams visited Mississippi in order to partici- pate in a tribute by the Mississippi Legislature to honor the accomplishments of the late Medgar Evers and Myrlie Evers-Williams. In 2005 Evers- Williams published The Autobiography of Medgar Evers: A Hero’s Life and Legacy Revealed Through His Writings, Letters, and Speeches.Asofearly 2010, she continued to serve on the board of the NAACP and to live in Bend, Oregon. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 268 EVERS-WILLIAMS, MYRLIE . federal government from enforcing Ashcroft’s GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 262 EUTHANASIA interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The state of Oregon requested that the court. or nutrition from a terminally ill GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 260 EUTHANASIA throughout the United States, with the exception of the state of Oregon. In that state, it is permitted. During the sixteenth century, he GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION EUTHANASIA 259 wrote a series of essays arguing that suicide should be a matter of personal choice, a human right.