Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 2 P35 pdf

conveyances. This history appears on public record so that title to land can be checked. CHAIN REFERRAL A type of sales plan that convinces individuals to make purchases based upon the promise that their payment will be reduced for each new purchaser they recommend to the seller. Referral sales in general are under close scrutiny by CONSUMER PROTECTION laws and are illegal in many states due to their FRAUDULENT and misleading nature. A chain referral is a type of pyramid sales scheme whereby an innocent consumer is lulled in to investing money based on the promise that he will eventually make money, which is usually highly unlikely, if not impossible. CROSS REFERENCE Ponzi Scheme. CHAMBERS A judge’s private room or office wherein he or she hears motions, signs papers, and performs other tasks pertaining to his or her office when a session of the court, such as a trial, is not being held. Business transacted in a private setting is said to be done “in chambers.” CHAMIZAL TRACT A description of the 1895 title dispute between the United States and Mexico that arose over a tract of land in El Paso, Texas, known as “El Chamizal.” The Boundary Commission was unable to agree on a boundary line and a convention was signed by the two governments on June 24, 1910, establishing another commission to decide the issue . Because the new commission departed from the terms of submission and because of disturbed conditions in Mexico, no further action was taken until the conclusion of a treaty in 1963 that divided the disputed territory between the two countries. CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE Champerty is the process whereby one person bargains with a party to a lawsuit to obtain a share in the proceeds of the suit. Maintenance is the support or promotion of another person’s suit initiated by intermeddling for personal gain. Both champerty and maintenance have been illegal for two basic PUBLIC POLICY reasons since early COMMON LAW: (1) It is considered desirable to curb excess LITIGATION for the operation of an efficient judicial system. The reasons for this are numerous and include problems of overcrowd- ing on court calendars, economic considera- tions, and the desirability of promoting a society that is not excessively litigious. Champerty and maintenance work contrary to this societal goal by stirring up litigation. (2) Champerty and maintenance bring money to an individual who was not personally harmed by the DEFENDANT. An attorney found guilty of either champerty or maintenance will be subject to the payment of any damages that may have been incurred by the parties to the lawsuit and to disciplinary proceedings, which can result in his or her disbarment. Whether or not champerty and mainte- nance exist in a particular instance depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. They apply specifically to cases wherein one person profits from ano ther person’s recovery in a lawsuit. If a licensed collection agency purchases a group of bad accounts from a store, the agency is buying the right to collect on the accounts rather than on a particular lawsuit and is therefore not guilty of champerty. An attorney who buys a CHOSE IN ACTION with the sole, SPECIFIC INTENT to initiate an action for his or her own benefit would be guilty of champerty provided the purchase was made with that intent. To lend money to an individual who would not otherwise be able to afford to bring a lawsuit is not maintenance unless the lender intends to gain substantially from his loan by being compensated with a portion of the recovery. In the early 2000, some states still recognize champerty and maintenance as offenses but in most states they have been replaced with the civil actions of ABUSE OF PROCESS and MALICIOUS PROSECUTION , both of which deal with the wrongful initiation of litigation and perversion of legal process. CHANCELLOR A secretary, secretary of state, or minister of a king or other high nobleman. The king’s chancellor in England during the Middle Ages was given a variety of duties, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 328 CHAIN REFERRAL including drawing up writs that permitted the initiation of a lawsuit in one of the COMMON-LAW COURTS and deciding disputes in a way that gave birth to the system of law called equity. His governmental department was called the Chancery. The Chan cellor of the Exchequer in England is like the secretary of the U.S. treasury, but in former times he also presided over a court called the Court of Exchequer, which at first heard disputes over money owed to the king but eventually heard a wide variety of cases involv- ing money. This jurisdiction was founded on the theory that a creditor who could not collect a debt would later be less able to pay whatever he owed to the king. Chancellor has also been used as the title for a judge who sits in a court of equity, for the president of a university, or for the public official in charge of higher education in some states. CHANCERY The old English court in which the monarch’s secretary, or Chancellor, began hearing lawsuits during the fourteenth century. The decisions rendered there were based on conscience and fairness rather than on the strict common-law FORMS OF ACTION. In the United States, courts like the old chancery have been called courts of chancery or courts of equity. CHARACTER EVIDENCE Proof or attestations about an individual’s moral standing, general nature, traits, and reputation in the general community. A character witness is an individual who testifies as to the habits and reputation of another person. In criminal cases, a DEFENDANT might attempt to reduce the possibility that he or she will be convicted of committing the crime as charged by exhibiting his or her good character or propensity for not committing the offense. Ordinarily, this is limited to TESTIMONY concerning the particular character trait that is in issue. For example, evidence concerning the defendant’s trustworthiness with property might be relevant in an embezzlement case. The character witness must be a person who is familiar with the defendant’s reputation in the community fairly close to the time the crime was committed. In federal trials the admissibility of character evidence and the use of character witnesses are governed by the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. CHARGE-OFF Eliminate or write off. The term charge-off is used to describe the process of removing from the records of a company something that was once regarded as an asset but has subsequently become worthless. A classic case is the bad debt, which is an uncollectible debt. A bad debt is a permissible business tax deduction, and a non-business bad debt may also be claimed as a charge-off in the year the debt becomes entirely worthless. Charge-off is generally used in reference to a charge or debt that is not paid when due. CHARGE To impose a burden, duty, obligation, or lien; to create a claim against property; to assess; to demand; to accuse; to instruct a jury on matters of law. To impose a tax, duty, or trust. To entrust with responsibilities and duties (e.g., care of another). In commercial transactions, to bill or invoice; to purchase on credit. In CRIMINAL LAW,to indict or formally accuse. An encumbrance, lien, or claim; a burden or load; an obligation or duty; a liability; an accusation. A person or thing committed to the care of another. The price of, or rate for, something. A retail store may attach a FINANCE CHARGE to money owed by a customer on a store account. A charge to the jury is the process whereby a judge addresses the jury before the VERDICT. During the charge, the judge summarizes the case and gives instructions to the jury concern- ing such matters as the rules of law that are applicable to various issues in the case. A public charge is a person who has been made a ward of the state who requires public support due to illness or poverty. CHARITABLE TRUST The arrangement by which real or personal property given by one person is held by another to be used for the benefit of a class of persons or the general public. The law favors charitable trusts, sometimes called public trusts, by according them certain privileges, such as an advantageous tax status. Before a court will enforce a charitable trust, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CHARITABLE TRUST 329 however, it must examine the charity and evaluate its social benefits. The court cannot rely on the view of the settlor, the one who establishes the trust, that the trust is charitable. In order to be valid, a charitable trust must fulfill certain requirements. The settlor must intend to create this type of trust. There must be a trustee to administer the trust, which must consist of some res or trust property. The charitable purpose must be expressly designat- ed. A definite class of persons comprised of indefinite beneficiaries within it must actually receive the benefit. The requirements of inten- tion, the trustee, and the res are the same in a charitable trust as they are in any other trust. Charitable Purposes A charitable purpose is one designed to benefit, ameliorate, or uplift mankind mentally, morally, or physically. The relief of poverty, the improve- ment of government, and the advancement of religion, education, and health are some exam- ples of charitable purposes. Trusts to prevent cruelty to animals, to erect a monument in honor of a famous historical figure, and to beautify a designated village are charitable purposes aimed, respectively, at fostering kind- ness to animals, patriotism, and community well-being. The definition of charitable purposes is derived from an old ENGLISH LAW, the Statute of Charitable Uses, but has been expanded throughout the years as new public needs developed. Beneficiaries The class to be benefited in a charitable trust must be a definite segment of the public. It must be large enough so that the community in general is affected by, and interested in, the enforcement of the trust, yet it cannot encom- pass the entire human race. Within the class, however, the specific persons to benefit from the trust must be indefinite. A trust “for the benefit of the orphans of American veterans of the Vietnam conflict” is charitable. The orphans of such veterans constitute a definite class. The indefinite persons within the class are the ones who are ultimately chosen by the trustee to be paid the benefits. The class is large enough so that the community is interested in the enforcement of the trust. A trust for named persons or a trust for profit cannot be a charitable trust. A trust “to construct and maintain a hospital” might be charitable, even though the hospital charges the patients who are treated, provided that any profits realized are used solely to continue the charitable services rendered and are not paid to private persons. A trust that serves both charitable and noncharitable purposes will fail if the two are inseparable. For example, suppose a settlor bequeaths $500,000 to a trustee “to hold in trust for the benefit of all the schools in a particular town.” The settlor’s daughter is the residuary LEGATEE of the estate, who will inherit the remainder of the estate after the TESTAMENTARY dispositions are satisfied. Some of the schools in the town are public and charitable institutions and some are private and operated for profit. The settlor has not apportioned the $500,000 between the public schools and the private schools. The valid part—to be given to public schools and charitable institutions—cannot be separated from the invalid part—the disposition to private or profit making institutions; therefore, the trust fails as a charitable trust. The trustee holds the $500,000 in a RESULTING TRUST for the settlor’s daughter, since the settlor’s disposition cannot be valid as a charitable trust because there is no indefinite BENEFICIARY. If a trust has both charitable and nonchari- table purposes and if the maximum amount to be used for noncharitable purposes can be determined, the trust fails only with respect to that amount pertaining to noncharitable pur- poses, which will be held in a resulting trust by the trustee for the settlor’s statutory heir or residuary legatee. The remainder is a valid charitable trust. As a general rule, a charitable trust can be eternal, unlike a private trust, which mus t comply with the RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, a principle limiting the duration of a trust. With respect to a private trust, the designated beneficiary is the proper person to enforce the trust, but in a charitable trust, the state attorney general is the one to enforce it. The settlor, his or her heirs or personal representatives, the members of the general public, and possible beneficiaries cannot maintain a lawsuit for the enforcement of the trust. Charitable trusts yield substantial tax ben- efits to donors, whether in the form of INCOME TAX deductions, tax shelters, or reduced inheri- tance taxes. Typically under charitable remainder trusts, immediate income tax deductions can also be matched with avoidance of capital gains taxes if the donor funds the trust using certain GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 330 CHARITABLE TRUST types of assets. The charitable lead trust,whichis often used in estate planning, commonly benefits heirs. After its duration, the principal assets return to the donor’s heirs subject to reduced gift and estate tax. FURTHER READINGS Archer, Jack H., et al. 1994. The Public Trust Doctrine and the Management of America’s Coasts. Amherst, MA: Univ. of Massachusetts Press. Teitell, Conrad. 2007. “Conrad Teitell’s Guide to Tax Benefits for Charitable Gifts.” Trusts & Estates (June). Available online at http://trustsandestates.com/June07 Teitell1.pdf; website home page: http://trustsandestates. com (accessed July 11, 2009). Wermuth, William Charles. 1914. Modern American Law. 2009, digitized. Abilene, TX: Blackstone Institute. CROSS REFERENCES Charities; Estate and Gift Taxes; Heir; Taxation. CHARITIES Organizations created for the purpose of philan- thropic rather than pecuniary pursuits. A charity is a group designed to benefit society or a specific group of people. Its purpose may be educational, humanitarian, or religious. A charity goes beyond giving relief to the indigent, extending to the promotion of happi- ness and the support of many worthy causes. The law favors charities because they pro- mote goodwill and lessen the government’s burdens. They are therefore ordinarily exempt from paying income or property taxes. Charitable Gifts and Trusts A charitable gift is something that is donated by an individual or organization with the intent to benefit the public or some segment of it as a whole. It is meant for use by an indefinite number of people. Similarly, charitable trusts or public trusts are trusts of religious, political, or general social interests, or for the relief of poverty or the advancement of education. Charities are ordinarily supported by gifts from donors and most states have set forth statutes controlling the manner in which funds are solicited for charities. In addition, the state will generally require charities to disclose their financial structure and condition. Charitable gifts are often TESTAMENTARY,or created by will. If there is a problem in determining the actual donative intent of the TESTATOR, the court might have to pass on his or her intent. CY PRES is a doctrine applied by a courtsothatitcancarryoutatrustmadeby will for charitable purposes even when the testator’s charitable purpose can not be accomplished in the precise manner specified by the testator. For example, if a testator wished to donate money to a certain hospital whosenamehadchanged,forexample,this would not defeat the gif t. With cy-pres the court would interpret the donor’s intent to be to give money to the hospital in spite of the change of name. SOURCE: Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Giving USA, annual. Charities Individuals $222.9 billion (75.5%) Charitable Bequests $22.9 billion (7.8%) Corporations $12.7 billion (4.3%) Foundations $36.5 billion (12.4%) PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2006 Allocation of Donations Sources of Donations Religion 32.8% Health 6.8% Education 13.9% Human services 10.0% Arts, culture, and humanities 10.0% Public/societal benefit 7.3% Environmental/wildlife 2.2% International 3.8% Gifts to foundations 10.0% ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION CHARITIES 331 Charitable Societies and Institutions To determine whether an institution is charita- ble, the test is whether its major purpose is to aid others or to make a profit. Charitable corporations are NONPROFIT cor- porations that have been created to minister to the physical needs of the indigent or to advance a particular goal, such as the aid of a particular religious group or country. In order to receive a tax-exempt status, such organizations must meet certain criteria. Ordinarily, charitable corporations have no CAPITAL STOCK and they obtain their funds primarily from private and public charity. These funds are held in trust to serve the charitable objects of the institutions. Beneficial associations also exist mainly for a charitable purpose and not for financial gain. Religious organizations, such as the Young Men’s and Women’s Christian Associations and the Salvation Army, are also considered to be charitable societies. The test for determining whether or not an educational institution is a charitable organization is the question of whether it exists for a public purpose or for a private gain. Whereas charities may charge a NOMINAL fee for some of their services and still be considered charitable societies, they are organized primarily for the public good and not for profit. CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE V. WARREN BRIDGE The 1837 landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 9 L. Ed. 773, illustrated the shift in politics brou ght about by the presidency of ANDREW JACKSON. Nineteenth- century FEDERALISM, a dominant political doc- trine from the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, favored the protection of private investments. The Charles River Bridge decision espoused newly popular Jacksonian political beliefs, which favored free enterprise. Arguably, the case altered the course of economic jurisprudence in the United States. The facts of Charles River Bridge began in 1650 when the state of Massachusetts granted a charter to Harvard College (now Harvard University) to operate for profit a ferry over the Charles River between Boston and Charles- town. Later, in 1785, the Massachusetts Legislature granted a charter to a group of Charlestown businessmen to build the Charles River Bridge. These entrepreneurs were to fund the bridge’s construction and in return the state would allow them to collect revenue from a specified toll for the next forty years. As part of the agreement, the entrepreneurs were to pay an ANNUITY to Harvard College to replace ferry profits lost by the building of the new bridge. The bridge was immediately successful and immensely profitable. Prompted by its popular- ity, the Massachusetts Legislature in 1792 chartered the building of a second bridge, known as the West Boston Bridge. To appease the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, who faced competition from the West Boston Bridge, the state of Massachusetts extended the Charles River Bridge charter from forty to seventy years. In 1828 Massachusetts chartered a third bridge, the Warren Bridge, which was to be constructed within a few rods of the Charles River Bridge. The Charles River Bridge proprie- tors strongly objected to this third bridge because the competition would diminish their profits. But Massachusetts citizens viewed the Charles River Bridge as monopolistic and welcomed competition and reduced tolls. The Warren Bridge was completed as planned. Within a year the Charles River Bridge suffered a 40 percent drop in revenues. The bridge’s proprietors, represented by DANIEL WEB- STER and LEMUEL SHAW, went to court, seeking an INJUNCTION against the Warren Bridge. Webster and Shaw argued that the Warren Bridge’s charter with the state violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution by interfering with the state’s separate obligations under its charter with the Charles River Bridge proprie- tors. They maintained that as successors to the original ferry service charter held by Harvard College, the Charles River Bridge proprietors had an implied exclusive right to tolls charged for crossing the Charles River. Moreover, they said that judicial policy should protect investments; without security in investments, entrepreneurs would not be willing to take risks in technologi- cal developments such as bridges and railroads. And this reluctance to take risks would only prove detrimental to the public. Lawyers for the Warren Bridge proprietors countered that no exclusive rights existed for transportation over the Charles River and that GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 332 CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE V. WARREN BRIDGE judicial policy should favor technological prog- ress and free enterprise over the rights of those investing in private property. After hearing oral arguments in October 1829, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in favor of the Warren Bridge proprietors. The Charles River Bridge group appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. In March 1831 the Supreme Court first heard arguments in the case. At that time JOHN MARSHALL was chief justice and the Court was dominated by Federalists. But several justices were absent during that argument, so the Court scheduled a second argument. This action had a significant consequence: several justices resigned or died prior to the second argument, and, taking advantage of his privilege of appointing new justices, President Jackson changed the member- ship of the Court to primarily Democratic. Following a second argument in 1837 the Court held that the Warren Bridge charter did not violate the Contracts Clause of the Constitu- tion. Chief Justice ROGER B. TANEY,whoauthored the opinion, held that any state legislation that chartered a private entity to provide a public service, such as a bridge, turnpike, or ferry, was to be strictly construed (interpreted) in favor of the state and against the private entity. The Court found that no implied rights had passed from the Harvard College ferry charter to the Charles River Bridge charter. Chief Justice Taney further observed the harm in ruling for the Charles River Bridge proprietors simply because they faced competi- tion and reduced profits owing to the Warren Bridge. He suggested that such a holding would encourage turnpike proprietors to sue the railroads for destroying turnpike profits. In Taney’s view, economic development was better served by public improvements than by protec- tions for monopolies. The Charles River Bridge decision received widespread attention. Hard-line Federalists disputed the Court’s rationale, insisting that only by protecting vested property rights would future financing for transportatio n technology be ensured. And although railroads were not at issue in Charles River Bridge, many historians believe that the Taney Court placed great faith in the future of railroads in the United States, and in rendering its opinion was attempting to facilitate their growth. There is little doubt among legal scholars that Charles River Bridge signified the in troduction of Jacksonian politics into U.S. jurisprudence. FURTHER READINGS Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (13 U.S.) 420 (1837). 2005. Michaelariens.com Web site. Available online at http://www.michaelariens.com/ConLaw/ cases/charlesriver.htm; website home page: http:// www.michaelariens.com (accessed August 29, 2009). McBride, Alex. 2006. “Supreme Court History: The First Hundred Years, Landmark Cases,” The Supreme Court. New York: Educational Broadcasting Corporation. Available online at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supreme court/antebellum/landmark_charles.htm; website home page: http://www.pbs.org (accessed August 29, 2009). Mensel, Robert E. 1994. “Privilege Against Public Right: A Reappraisal of the Charles River Bridge Case.” Duquesne Law Review 3. CHARTER A grant from the government of ownership rights in land to a person, a group of people, or an organization such as a corporation. A basic document of law of a MUNICIPAL CORPORATION granted by the state, defining its rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of self- government. A document embodying a grant of authority from the legislature or the authority itself, such as a corporate charter. The leasing of a mode of transportation, such as a bus, ship, or plane. A charter-party is a contract formed to lease a ship to a merchant in order to facilitate the conveyance of goods. v CHASE, SALMON PORTLAND Salmon Portland Chase served from 1864 to 1873 as the sixth chief justice of the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES .Hewasalsoa distinguished lawyer and politician, serving as U.S. senator from Ohio (1849–55 and 1860–61), governor of Ohio (1855–59), and secretary of the treasury (1861–64). Chase also sought the presidential nomination in every election be- tween 1856 and 1872, even while sitting as chief justice. As a result, many criticized him for neglecting his judicial responsibilities in favor of his political ambitions. Despite his EXTRAJUDICIAL activities, Chase helped to navigate the Supreme Court through the dangerous political waters of Reconstruction, the period following the Civil War when the country attempted to rebuild itself and readmit the Southern states to the Union, preserving the Court’spowerswhena Republican–dominated Congress sought to con- trol both the presidency and the Supreme Court. As chief justice, Chase presided over the 1868 IMPEACHMENT trial of President ANDREW JOHNSON. NO MORE SLAVE STATES , AND NO MORE SLAVE TERRITORY .LET THE SOIL OF OUR EXTENSIVE DOMAIN BE KEPT FREE . —SALMON PORTLAND CHASE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CHASE, SALMON PORTLAND 333 Chase was an ardent opponent of SLAVERY his entire life, and in his last years on the Court he fought against a narrow interpretation of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT , an interpretation that he surmised would allow future state legislatures to rescind the newly won rights of African Americans. Chase was born January 13, 1808, in Cornish, New Hampshire, the eighth of 11 children in a family that had lived in New England since the 1600s. His father operated a tavern as well as a glass factory and distillery near Keene, New Hampshire, and died when Chase was nine years old. Chase had two prominent uncles who aided him in his father’s absence: Dudley Chase, who served two terms as U.S. senator from Vermont (1813–17 and 1825–31), and Philander Chase, who became bishop of Ohio for the Episcopal Church and president of Cincinnati College. When he was 12 years old, Chase moved to Ohio to help on Philander Chase’s farm. In return for his work, his uncle taught him Greek, Latin, and mathematics in his church school. Chase attended Cincinnati College for a year then eventually returned to his family in New Hampshire and entered Dartmouth College, graduating Phi Beta Kappa in 1826. After college, Chase moved to Washington, D.C., where he studied law under Attorn ey General WILLIAM WIRT. He passed the bar exam and returned to Cincinnati to set up a legal practice. In Cincinnati, Chase’s personal life was clouded by tragedy. He lost three wives between 1835 and 1852. He had one daughter by each of his last two wives. He remained single for the last part of his life and was a devoted father to his two daughters. Chase strongly opposed slavery from his early years, a position that owed much to his deeply religious outlook. In Ohio, he was nicknamed the Attorney General for Runaway Negroes for his LEGAL REPRESENTATION of aboli- tionists who had aided runaway slaves from Kentucky. He even took two of these cases to the U.S. Supreme Court—Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 215, 12 L. Ed. 122 (1847), and Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 14 L. Ed. 306 (1852)—both of which he lost. About his nickname, Chase commented that he “never refused … help to any person black or white, and that he liked the office nonetheless because there were neither fees nor salary connected with it.” In 1849 Chase was elected to the U.S. Senate as a member of the Free-Soil party, which Salmon P. Chase. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Salmon Portland Chase 1808–1873 1808 Born, Cornish, N.H. 1820 Moved to Ohio to help on his uncle Philander Chase's farm 1855 Elected governor of Ohio 1860 Reelected to U.S. Senate seat; sought presidential nomination 1864 Nominated as chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 1873 Died, New York City ❖ ◆ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1826 Graduated from Dartmouth College ◆ 1849 Elected to U.S. Senate, representing Ohio ◆ ◆ 1861 Appointed secretary of the U.S. treasury by President Lincoln 1865 Civil War ended; President Lincoln assassinated; Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery 1868 Presided over the impeachment trial of President Johnson; Texas v. White upheld the general aspects of Reconstruction ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 334 CHASE, SALMON PORTLAND sought to keep new states in the west free of slavery. In the Senate, he and CHARLES SUMNER became leading spokesme n for the antislavery movement. He gained renown through his opposition to the 1854 KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT, which allowed each territory to conduct a popular vote deciding w hether it would permit slavery. Shortly there after, he helped to found the antislavery REPUBLICAN PARTY, and in 1855 he was elected governor of Ohio. He was consid- ered for the 1856 Republican presidential nomination but was passed over, and in February 1860 he was reelected to the U.S. Senate. In May of the same year, he sought the presidential nomination at the Republican convention in Chicago. Chase and William H. Seward were considered the chief contenders for the nomination, but on the third ballot Chase’s supporters gave their votes to ABRAHAM LINCOLN , thus giving the man from Illinois the nomination. After his election, Lincoln offered Chase and Seward the respective posts of secretary of the treasury and SECRETARY OF STATE. Chase then gave up his seat as U.S. senator. At the Treasury, Chase faced the difficult task of financing a government that was engaged in a civil war. As part of this effort, he helped to establish a national banking system that gave the federal government its first effective national paper currency. Early in the war, Chase also advised military leaders who sought guidance from Washington, D.C. Chase was often unhappy with the decisions of Lincoln and other members of the cabinet and resolved that he could do better as president. He therefore opposed Lincoln for the Republican presidential nomination in 1864. Chase had the support of the more liberal wing of the Republican Party but he eventually withdrew his name from consideration, conceding to the more popular Lincoln. In June 1864, after several disagreements with Lincoln, Chase resigned from the cabinet. Despite their differences, Lincoln admired Chase, and in December 1864 he nominated Chase to succeed ROGER B. TANEY as chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. He nominated Chase with the expectation that Chase would sustain two extraordinary measures taken by the Union during the war—the EMANCIPATION of the slaves and the issuance of paper money to repay debt. Both measures had caused great contro- versy, and as a result many Americans had lost confidence in the federal government. Chase joined a Court with only three other justices who consistently supported Republican positions, Justices DAVID DAVIS, NOAH H. SWAYNE, and SAMUEL F. MILLER, all appointed by Lincoln. The Court was sharply divided over the various issues surrounding Reconstruction. The post– Civil War crisis deepened when Lincoln was assassinated on April 14, 1865, and Vice President Andrew Johnson became president. Chase urged a moderate, conciliatory stance toward the defeated South, a stance that eventually alienated him from the Radical Republicans, a faction of the Republican party that sought to impose strict military measures and punitive new laws on the states of the former CONFEDERACY. Like the Radical Repub- licans, Chase supported expanded freedoms for African Americans. Unlike them, however, he also supported such measures as ending MILITARY GOVERNMENT in the South, pardoning Confeder- ate leaders, and quickly restoring Southern states to the Union. Chase’s moderation helped to spare Jefferson Davis, president of the former Confederacy. After the war, Davis had been imprisoned in Virginia, part of Chase’s circuit, where the government hoped to try him for TREASON. Chase refused to hold a civil trial while the area was still under military rule. Although a GRAND JURY indicted Davis for treason, no action was taken against him, and eventually the government’s case was dismissed. Many of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions during Chase’s tenure involved the thorny issue of Reconstruction. In March 1867 Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts, which divided the South into five districts and imposed military rule. Reconstruction involved new problems of constitu tional interpretation as to the federal government’s powers over the states. At issue were questions not only of states’ rights but also of the status of freed slaves. In one early decision, EX PARTE Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 284 (1866), Chase voted with the Court in challenging Congress over Reconstruc- tion. The Court held that Congress could not authorize military trials where civil courts were still operating. The majority opinion warned of the military’s “gross USURPATION of power”—a direct challenge to the Reconstruction Acts passed by Congress. However, in later decisions Chase voted to uphold congressional laws pertaining to Reconstruction. In the 1867 Test OATH cases—Cummi ngs v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 356, and Ex parte GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CHASE, SALMON PORTLAND 335 Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366— Chase disagreed with the Court’s decision to strike down laws requiring that priests and lawyers swear oaths of loyalty to the Union. In his dissenting opinion, joined by Chase, Justice Miller declared that no punishment was inflicted by requiring such an oath and that Congress could impose such requirements. Chase considered TEXAS V. WHITE, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L. Ed. 227 (1868) to be the most important case of his Supreme Court career. Chase, writing the Court’s opinion, upheld the general principles of Reconstruction, asserting that Congress, and not the Supreme Court, possessed the authority to recognize state governments as legitimate. When Southern states sought to make cases in court against executives of the federal government—includ ing President Johnson and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton—Chase joined the majority in dismissing those cases, thereby aiding Congress in its Reconstruction fervor. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 18 L. Ed. 437 (1867), Mississippi, in the first court case ev er to name the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES as an individual party, attempted to prevent President Johnson from enforcing certain provisions of the Reconstruc- tion Acts. Chase dismissed the case, holding that preventing the president from acting on con- gressional legislation would cause a “collision … between the executive and legislative depart- ments of the government.” This, in turn, would give the House grounds to sue for the president’s impeachment. This opinion proved prophetic, of course, when Congress did attempt to IMPEACH President Johnson. Chase’s public standing improved when he ably handled the impeachment trial of President Johnson in March 1868. The Radical Republican–dominated Congress had voted to bring impeachment proceedings against John- son after he dismissed one of their favorite members of his cabinet, Secretary of War Stanton. The Senate sat as a court of impeach- ment with Chase presiding as judge. Chase frustrated Radical Republican aims by sticking to procedural rules and helping to bring about Johnson’s acquittal, which passed the Senate by one vote. The public acclaim occasioned by his handling of the impeachment trial led Chase to make ano ther try at the presidency in 1868. That time, however, Chase made known his desire to run as a Democratic candidate, largely because his moderate positions toward the South had endeared him to Democrats. His efforts failed. Although the Supreme Court under Chase’s leadership rarely questioned congressional Re- construction measures after 1867, it did declare other federal legislation unconstitutional. Whereas before 1864 the Court had overturned acts of Congress only twice—in MARBURY V. MADISON, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), and DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857)—between 1864 and 1873 it voided ten pieces of congressional legislation. These decisions included the first of the LEGAL TENDER Cases, Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 19 L. Ed. 513 (1870)—but reversed later by Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871), heard concurrently—in which Chase questioned much of his earlier work for the Treasury when he declared the Legal Tender Acts (12 Stat. 345, 532, 709) unconstitutional. This decision created a temporary crisis of confidence in the national currency. The Court reversed this decision in 1871 after a change in membership, with Chase sticking to his views of two years earlier. Despite his participation in such judicial activism, Chase at other times advocated judicial restraint. In his opinion for the Licence Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 18 L. Ed. 497 (1868), in which he upheld a law that taxed the sale of lottery tickets throughout the United States, Chase wrote: This court can know nothing of PUBLIC POLICY except from the Constitution and the laws, and the course of administration and deci- sion. It has no legislative powers. It cannot amend or modify any LEGISLATIVE ACTS.It cannot examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. Consid- erations of that sort must, in general, be addressed to the legislature. Questions of policy determined there are concluded here. ULYSSES S. GRANT won the presidential election of 1868, and from that time onward, the power of Radical Republicanism began to wane. Grant’s appointments made the Court a more conservative body. In the SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873), Chase dissented from the Court’s narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was passed in 1868 and sought to protect the rights of African Americans against GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 336 CHASE, SALMON PORTLAND infringements by state legislation. In its Slaughter- House decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s PRIVILEGES AND IMMU- NITIES Clause protected only a few select rights of national citizenshi p, such as the right to travel. The Court did not interpret the amendment as guaranteeing more fundamental rights, such as the right to vote. Chase objected that the Court’s opinion jeopardized newly won free- doms for African Americans. It would take another century before the Court would reverse this narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chase suffered a series of crippling strokes beginning in 1870. Despite his failing health, his daughter Catherine Chase and other admirers put forth his name for the 1872 presidential nomination. As had happened each time before, his nomination came to nothing. He died May 7, 1873, after suffering a stroke while visiting his daughter in New York City, and he was interred in Spring Grove Cemetary in Cincinnati. Although Chase did not achieve his highest goal of becoming president, he nevertheless held more high offices during his life than did any other Supreme Court justice besides JAMES F. BYRNES and WILLIAM H. TAFT. More importantly, Chase successfully guided the Court through some of the most tumultuous years in the history of the nation. His actions as chief justice helped to preserve the powers of the Supreme Court in the face of serious congressional challenges during the extraordinary years fol- lowing the Civil War. FURTHER READINGS Blue, Frederick J. 1987. Salmon P. Chase: A Life in Politics. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press. Cushman, Claire, ed. 1996. The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies, 1789–1995. 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. Friedman, Leon, and Fred L. Israel, eds. 1995. The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, Volumes I–V. New York: Chelsea House. Hyman, Harold Melvin. 1997. The Reconstruction Justice of Salmon P. Chase. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. Niven, John. 1995. Salmon P. Chase: A Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCE Loyalty Oath. v CHASE, SAMUEL Samuel Chase served as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1796 to 1811. In 1804 the U.S. House of Representatives voted to IMPEACH Chase. However, the Senate did not uphold the House’s action and Chase continued to serve on the Court until his death. Chase remains the only justice who has been the subject of IMPEACHMENT proceedings. Chase’s decisions set several precedents for the Supreme Court, among them opinions establishing the suprem- acy of federal treaties over state laws and the establishment of JUDICIAL REVIEW, which is the Court’s power to void legislation it deems unconstitutional, a power that makes the judiciary one of the three primary branches of the federal government (the other two branches being Congress and the president). Known for his fiery and partisan manner, Chase was an active politician for most of his life. Before his career as a judge Chase served in the Maryland colonial and state legislatures. As a member of the CONTINENTAL CONGRESS in the 1770s, Chase was an outspoken advocate of American independence from Britain. He signed the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE in 1776. He opposed the Constitution as an Anti-Federalist (an opponent of federal govern- ment powers over the states) in the 1780s. Later, however, he became a member of the FEDERALIST PARTY and as a Supreme Court justice helped establish the powers of the federal judiciary. Chase generally favored a strong government ruled by an elite and he opposed the radical ideas of the French Revolution. Samuel Chase. INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK COLLECTION. I CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE OMNIPOTENCE OF A STATE LEGISLATURE. —SAMUEL CHASE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CHASE, SAMUEL 337 . variety of duties, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 328 CHAIN REFERRAL including drawing up writs that permitted the initiation of a lawsuit in one of the COMMON -LAW COURTS and deciding. 7.3% Environmental/wildlife 2. 2% International 3.8% Gifts to foundations 10.0% ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, . impeachment trial of President Johnson; Texas v. White upheld the general aspects of Reconstruction ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 1 825 1 825 ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 334