Cimons, Lene. 1991. “A Look at Possible Supreme Court Candidates.” Los Angeles Times. June 29. Richey, Warren. 1999. “Fraud Case Probes Limits of Whistle-Blowing.” Christian Science Monitor (Novem- ber 29). Smith, Jessie Carney, ed. 2003. Notable Black American Women, Book III. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale. KEFAUVER INVESTIGATION AND KNAPP COMMISSION The pervasive reach of ORGANIZED CRIME in the United States has made it a target of investiga- tions and legal action since the nineteenth century. Two of the most noteworthy attacks were the Kefauver investigation in the 1950s and the Knapp Commission hearings in the 1970s. Both investigations brought a new focus to this fight; the Kefauver hearings gave it national prominence, and the Knapp hearings underscored what can happen when corrupt law enforcement officials ignore the criminal element. Estes Kefauver, a U.S. senator from Ten- nessee, introduced Senate Resolution 202 in January 1950, which called for a national investigation of organized crime. The rapid growth of crime syndicates in major cities across the United States meant an increase in illegal gambling, drug trafficking, extortion, and PROSTITUTION. Many of the syndicate leaders had set up legitimate business fronts to hide their illegal operations. Kefauver believed that the syndicates had grown so strong that local law enforcement was unable to exert any control. In May 1950 Kefauver and four other senators were named to a Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. Because the committee’s focus was interstate commerce, the hearings were held across the United States—14 cities in 15 months. Suspected and known organized crim e leaders in these cities were interrogated by the five senators, which generated local interest. In Detroit, a local television station broadcast part of the hearings in that city. The Kefauver committee voiced disapproval of legalized gam- bling operations in Nevada and that disapproval was credited in part for helping defeat legalized gambling proposals on the ballot in Arizona, California, Massachusetts, and Montana. When the Kefauver committee began hear- ings in New York City on March 12, 1951, a New York City firemen watch William O’Dwyer, the city’ s former mayor, testify before the Kefauver Senate Crime Investigating Committee. These first major televised Senate hearings had an audience of 30 million. BETTMANN/CORBIS. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 128 KEFAUVER INVESTIGATION AND KNAPP COMMISSION local station provided live broadcast feed to the major networks. The hearings were televised in 20 cities, ultimately generating an audience of 30 million. The Kefauver investigation marked the first time a major Senate hearing had been covered on national television, and it made a strong impression on the public. One of the most dramatic broadcasts was the testimony of syndicate leader Frank Costello. Costello, argu- ably the most important organized crime figure in the United States, did not want his face shown on television. The broadcasters complied and showed his hands instead. Costello’s nervous hand movem ents were ultimately much more telling to viewers than his facial expres- sions would have been. While the hearings did not eliminate organized crime, they did weaken its hold; a number of syndicate figures were ultimately prosecuted by state and local author- ities, many of whom were convicted and sentenced to prison. Because many of the organized crime syn- dicates had ties to local Democratic politicians, many Democrats wanted Kefauver (himself a Democrat) to conduct a less ambitious investi- gation. Kefauver refused, and many well-known Democrats (including Senate majority leader Scott Lucas) were defeated in their bids for re- election during and even after the hearings had ended. Television made Kefauver a popular and easily recognizable figure, and he ran (albeit unsuccessfully) for president in 1952 and 1956. Meanwhile, organized crime continued to flourish through the 1950s and into the 1960s. Part of the organized crime establishment in New York was thought to be bribing members of the city’s police force, and in April 1970 the New York Times ran an article that alleged police corruption was widespread among the officers. According to the article, members of the force were accepting bribes from gamblers and illegal drug dealers and extorting money from local businesses. Almost immediately, New York mayor John V. Lindsay organized a five-member Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Cor- ruption. Whitman Knapp, a federal judge, came on board to replace a departing member, and he became the group’s chairman. It soon became known as the Knapp Commission. The Knapp Commission took testimony from numerous police officers and civilians and discovered that there was systematic corruption throughout the force. The bribes, kickbacks, and extortion reported in the New York Times was indeed widespread and went through the ranks. Although clearly not all police officers were corrupt, some of those who were not nonetheless knew corruption was going on but chose not to do anything about it. The testimony of Detective Frank Serpico in partic- ular drew considerable attention both inside and outside the police department. Serpico, who had been a member of the police force since 1960, had reported incidences of corrup- tion to his commanding officers on numerous occasions, but no one had acted on them. He told the Knapp Commission that he had even met with key city officials, who also ignored his reports of corruption. It was Serpico and a fellow officer, David Durk, who had provided the Times with the information that led to its April 1970 story. Serpico, who would later become the sub- ject of a book and a motion picture, was ostracized by the police department because he was considered a “rat.” Others believed that his charges were more a means of seeking publicity than exposing police corruption. Nevertheless, it was clear by the time the Knapp Commission made its final report that there were serious problems in the New York Police Department. Knapp blamed not only the police hierarchy but also the administration of Mayor Lindsay. Although Lindsay himself was never blamed for corruption, key officials in his administra- tion who had the power to step in had done nothing. Police Commissioner Frank Leary stepped down and was replaced by Patrick Murphy, who brought major reforms into the department. He made supervisors and inspectors more account- able for their officers, and he implemented preventive measures to ensure that corruption could be thwarted before it was allowed to take hold. Murphy, who stepped down in 1973, was credited with turning the police department around, improving morale among the officers, and regaining the public’s trust in the police. FURTHER READINGS Burnham, David. “Graft Paid to Police Here Said to Run in Millions.” The New York Times (April 25, 1970). ———. “Knapp Says Mayor Shares Blame for Corrupt Police,” The New York Times (July 2, 1971). ———. “Serpico Tells of Delay on Police Inquiry,” The New York Times (December 15, 1971). Halberstam, David. 1994. The Fifties. New York: Ballantine. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION KEFAUVER INVESTIGATION AND KNAPP COMMISSION 129 Moore, William Howard, 1974. The Kefauver Committee and the Politics of Crime, 1950–1952. Columbia, MO: Univ. of Missouri Press. CROSS REFERENCES Congress of the United States; Organized Crime; Police Corruption and Misconduct. KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT The KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT, also known as the Pact of Paris, was a treaty that attemp ted to outlaw war (46 Stat . 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57). The treaty was drafted by France and the United States, and on August 27, 1928, was signed by fifteen nations. By 1933 65 nations had pledged to observe its provisions. Kellogg-Briand contained no sanctions against countries that might breach its provi- sions. Instead, the treaty was based on the hope that diplomacy and the weight of world opinion would be powerful enough to prevent nations from resorting to the use of force. This soon proved to be a false hope; though Germany, Italy, and Japan were all signatories, the treaty did not prevent them from committing aggres- sions that led to WORLD WAR II. The origin of the Kellogg-Briand Pact was a message that the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, addressed to the citizens of the United States on April 6, 1927, the tenth anniversary of the United States’ entrance into WORLD WAR I. In this message Briand announced France’s willingness to join the United States in an agreement mutually outlawing war. Such an agreement, Briand stated, would “greatly con- tribute in the eyes of the world to enlarge and fortify the foundation on which the interna- tional policy of peace is being erected.” Briand’s overture to the United States was part of a larger campaign that France was waging to form strategic alliances that would improve its national security. In addition, Briand was influenced by recent conversations with Nicho- las Murray Butler and James Thomson Shot- well, U.S. academics who were leaders in the burgeoning U.S. political movement to outlaw war, also known as the OUTLAWRY movement. Initially, Briand’s offer generated little reac- tion in the United States. The U.S. State Department made no response, apparently considering Briand’s statement to be simply an expression of friendship. Not until certain leaders in the peace movement, notably Butler, began to generate widespread public support for Briand’s proposal did the government become involved. But by the middle of June 1927, France and the United States had begun diplomatic conversations aimed at reaching the sort of agreement Briand had proposed in his address. On June 20 the State Department received the Draft Pact of Perpetual Friendship between France and the United States, written by Briand and transmitted through the U.S. ambass ador in Paris. The draft contained just two articles: The first declared that France and the United States renounced war “as an instru ment of their national policy towards each other,” and the second declared that all conflicts between the two nations would be settled only by “pacific means.” SECRETARY OF STATE FRANK B. KELLOGG and other officials in the U.S. State Department were uncomfortable about entering into such an agreement with France alone, fearing that it would amount to an indirect alliance that would deprive the United States of the freedom to act if France were to go to war with another country. Instead , U.S. officials preferred to expand the agreement into a multilateral treaty involving all the world powers except Russia. On December 28, therefore, Kellogg told Briand that the United States was prepared to enter into negotiations with France to construct a treaty that would condemn war and renounce it as an instrument of national policy; when concluded, the treaty would be open to signature by all nations. France accepted the United States’ offer, and treaty negotiations began in January 1928. By early April the four other Great Powers— Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan—were invited to enter the discussions. Soon after, the invitation was extended to Belgium; Czechoslo- vakia; Poland; India; and the five British dominions, Australia, Canada, Irish Free State, New Zealand, and South Africa. Several of the parties wanted specific conditions and reserva- tions included in the treaty. These issues were resolved, and on August 27, 1928, diplomats from the 15 countries met in Paris to sign the treaty. By 1933 50 additional countries had agreed to observe the treaty’s provisions. The final text of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, like the original draft, was extremely simple and contained just two principal articles. The first stated that the contracting parties “condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 130 KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT controversies, and renounce[d] it as an instru- ment of national policy in their relations with one another.” In the second the parties agreed that “the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise between them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.” The treaty therefore outlawed war entirely, providing no exceptions to this general prohibition. The parties, however, generally recognized that war would be permissible in the case of SELF-DEFENSE; several signatories, including the United States, had subm itted diplomatic notes prior to the treaty’s ratification indicating their understanding that wars entered into in self-defense would be lawful. When it was signed, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was considered a tremendous milestone in the effort to advance the cause of international peace. In 1929 Kellogg received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the treaty. Events soon showed, however, that the pact did not prevent or limit war between the nations. The primary problem was that the treaty provided for no means of enforcement or sanctions against parties who violated its provisions. In addition, it did not address the issues of what constituted self-defense and when self-defense could law- fully be claimed. Because of these large loop- holes, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was ultimately an ineffective method for achieving the ambitious and idealistic goal of outlawing war. FURTHER READINGS Arend, Anthony C., and Robert J. Beck. 1993. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the U.N.Charter Paradigm. London: Routledge. Ferrell, Robert H. 1969. Peace in Their Time. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. Lunardini, Christine A. 1994. The ABC-CLIO Companion to the American Peace Movement in the Twentieth Century. Denver, CO: ABC-CLIO. Miller, David H. 1928. The Peace Pact of Paris. New York: Putnam. Pauling, Linus, E. Laszlo, and Jong Youl Yoo, eds. 1986. World Encyclopedia of Peace. 4 vols. Oxford: Pergamon. v KELLOGG, FRANK BILLINGS Frank Billings Kellogg was born December 22, 1856, in Potsdam, New York. He moved to Minnesota at age nine, received an education in law, and w as admitted to the bar in 1877. Kellogg subsequently received numerous doctor of laws degrees from various institutions, including McGill University, Montreal, 1913; New York University, 1927; Harvard, 1929; Brown University, 1930; and Occidental Uni- versity, 1931. He also received two doctor of civil law degrees in 1929, from Trinity College in Connecticut and Oxford University. After his ADMISSION TO THE BAR, Kellogg performed the duties of city and county attorney for St. Paul, Minnesota, and estab- lished a legal practice, specializing in corpora- tion law. His expertise earned him the position of special counsel for the United States, and he participated in the case against the General Paper and Standard Oil trusts (United States v. Standard Oil Co., 212 U.S. 579, 29 S.Ct. 689, 53 L.Ed. 259 [1909]). He served as special counsel of the INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION to probe into the speculative dealings concerning the Harriman railroads. Kellogg began a phase of government and diplomatic service in 1917, when he became U.S. Senator from Minnesota for a six-year term. He followed this with a one-year appointment as minister to Great Britain. From 1925 to 1929, he ▼▼ ▼▼ Frank Billings Kellogg 1856–1937 18501850 19001900 19251925 19501950 18751875 ❖ 1856 Born, Potsdam, N.Y. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1865 Family moved to southern Minn. ◆◆ 1877 Admitted to Minn. bar ◆ 1887 Joined Cushman Davis as partner in his Minneapolis law firm ◆ 1909 Served as special counsel for the prosecution in United States v. Standard Oil 1912–13 Served as president of the American Bar Association 1914–18 World War I 1917–23 Served in U.S. Senate 1923–24 Served as Minister to Great Britain ◆◆ 1929 Won Nobel Peace Prize 1928 Collaborated with Aristide Briand in formulating the Kellogg-Briand Pact 1925–29 Served as secretary of state under Calvin Coolidge ❖ 1937 Died, St. Paul, Minn. 1939–45 World War II THERE ARE ONLY TWO MEANS OF ENFORCING A TREATY .ONE IS BY WAR , THE OTHER IS BY THE OVERPOWERING STRENGTH OF PUBLIC OPINION . —FRANK KELLOGG GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION KELLOGG, FRANK BILLINGS 131 performed the duties of secretary of state and negotiated treaties. In 1928 Kellogg achieved international acclaim for his collaboration with Aristide Briand in the formulation of the KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT , which denounced war as a solution to international disagreements. The pact was sub- sequently ratified by 63 nations. In 1929, the Nobel Peace Prize was bestowed upon Kellogg for his contribution to world peace. During the latter part of his life, Kellogg acted as judge of the Permanent Court of Inter- national Justice. He died December 21, 1937, in St. Paul, Minnesota. CROSS REFERENCE Kellogg-Briand Pact. v KELLY, SHARON PRATT DIXON From 1991 to 1994, the difficult job of running Washington, D.C., belonged to Mayor SHARON PRATT DIXON KELLY , a successful utilities attorney who had had no previous experience in city government. Kelly was voted mayor in the wake of Marion Barry’s fall from political grace. During her uphill campaign, Kelly portrayed herself as a squeaky-clean political outsider, even though she had strong connections to the national DEMOCRATIC PARTY. Kelly, a middle-class African American who was born and raised in the District of Columbia, promised to reduce crime, cut the city’s bloated budget, and clean up corrupt government. Although she was turned out of office after just one term, Kelly earned herself a permanent place in history by becoming the first female mayor of the nation’s capital. Kelly was born January 30, 1944, in Washington, D.C. She was the first child of Mildred Petticord Pratt, who died of cancer when Kelly was just four years old, and Carlisle E. Pratt, who was a lawyer and superior court judge. Family expectations were high for Kelly, whose father gave her a copy of Black’s Law Dictionary as a birthday gift when she was very young. Kelly did not disappoint her father, graduating from Howard University with a bachelor’s degree in political scienc e in 1965 and a law degree in 1968. While in college, Kelly met her first husband, Arrington Dixon, who later became a member of the Washington, D.C., City Council. The couple married in 1967, had two daughters, and divorced in 1982. In 1991 Kelly married entrepreneur James Kelly III. Although she had won the mayoral race as Sharon Pratt Dixon, she changed her la st name to Kelly shortly after her 1991 wedding. Kelly began her legal career as an attorney in her father’s law firm. She also taught courses at Antioch School of Law, before joining the Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO) as associate counsel in 1976. Kelly eventually became the first African American woman to be named vice president at PEPCO. As a decisive, hardworking executive, Kelly was involved in lobbying, policy making, and regulatory matters for the utility company. At the same time, she developed a strong interest in local Democratic politics. Kelly became the Democratic national committeewoman from the District of Colum- bia in 1977 and eventually was the first African American woman to serve as national party treasurer. Kelly entered politics to try to halt the social and economic deterioration of Washington, D.C. In 1989 she announced her longshot candidacy for mayor. Soon afterward, Barry’s career im- ploded with his arrest and subsequ ent convic- tion for crack cocaine possession and use. After Barry had withdrawn from the race, Kelly faced three city council members, each of whom had greater name recognition. Kelly was a political unknown whose mid dle-class background made Frank B. Kellogg. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS DIVISIVENESS HAS NO PLACE IN OUR POLITICS SPITEFULNESS AND HATRED ONLY ERODE THAT WHICH IS TRULY MAGNIFICENT ABOUT OUR COUNTRY . —SHARON PRATT DIXON KELLY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 132 KELLY, SHARON PRATT DIXON her suspect to residents in the poorest sections of Washington, D.C. Until then, she had been on the political sidelines, never in the spotlight. To set herself apart from her opponents, Kelly made a rather rash promise to cut Washington’s MURDER rate, which was the highest in the nation. She also pledged to shrink the city’s budget by eliminating 2,000 government jobs. On her lapel, Kelly wore a pin shaped like a shovel, to symbolize her campaign promise to “clean house with a shovel, not a broom.” On September 11, 199 0, Kelly achieved her first victory at the polls, winning the mayoral primary election by an impressive margin. In that year’s general election, she handily de- feated her Republican opponent, Maurice T. Turner, a former D.C. police chief. Kelly won the mayor’s race with 86 percent of the vote, a new district record. Her administration’s slogan became “Yes We Will,” a vow to overhaul city government. During the early days of her administration, Kelly enjoyed successes. She coaxed $100 million in emergency aid from the U.S. Congress, helped to convince the owners of the Washington Redskins football team to remain in town, and handled riots in the Mount Pleasant neighborhood with consider- able aplomb. But problems arose, including political squabbling with city council members and serious budget cuts from Congress. Despite her campaign pledges, Kelly still faced a high homicide rate and an overextended city budget. Although her call for deficit reduction was popular, government workers who were affected by proposed layoffs were openly hostile to her plans. As Kelly’s ratings in public-opinion polls plummeted, the political fortunes of former mayor Barry rose. In 1992 Barry staged a remarkable political comebac k when he was elected to the D.C. City Council, shortly after his release from federal prison. Despite his well- publicized drug problem, Barry remained popular with many voters, particularly those in poor and working-class neighborhoods. Barry was credited with developing the downtown area, attracting new businesses, and focusing Sharon Pratt Dixon Kelly 1944– ▼▼ ▼▼ 19501950 20002000 19751975 ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ 1944 Born, Washington, D.C. 1968 Earned J.D. from Howard University 1973–74 D.C. citizens gained right to limited home rule 1976 Joined PEPCO as associate counsel 1977 Became Democratic national committeewoman for Washington,D.C. 1989 Announced bid for mayor of Washington, D.C. 1990 Marion Barry arrested after FBI sting operation, sentenced to prison; Kelly elected as first female mayor of Washington, D.C. 1992 Barry reelected to D.C. City Council 1994 Defeated for reelection in primary; Barry went on to win reelection as mayor 1995 Due to long-term fiscal mismanagement by mayor and city council, Congress placed primary governance of D.C. in hands of appointed Financial Control Board 2002 Formed own firm, Pratt Consulting 1999 Served on board of Village Foundation 1997 Launched Spirit For America, a political discussion website 1995 Fellow, Institute of Politics, Harvard University ◆ Sharon Pratt. ª LARRY DOWNING/ SYGMA/CORBIS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION KELLY, SHARON PRATT DIXON 133 national attention on the capital’s plight during his 12 years as mayor. He criticized Kelly, focusing on her inability to improve schools, crime rates, and public housing. In the primary election on September 13, 1994, Kelly was handed a stunning defeat. Barry and D.C. City Council member John Ray finished in a virtual dead heat for first place in the Democratic mayoral primary. A massive voter registration drive brought new supporters into Barry’s camp. As a result, many voters turned to candidate Ray as the only realistic alternative to Barry. Kelly received the unmis- takable message that her brand of government did not work in the nation’s capital. Voters returned Barry to the mayor’s office in the November general election. Among those who were appointed to Barry’s mayoral transition team was Kelly’s ex-husband, businessman Arrington Dixon. In 1998 Barry was replaced by Anthony (“Tony”) Williams, who, like Kelly, pledged to reform District of Columbia politics. In 2002, Williams ran for re-election and was supported by both Sharon Pratt Kelly and Marion Barry. As of 2010, Kelly was head of her own consulting firm, Pratt Consultin g, which worked with corporations and governments on design- ing Homeland Security and Emergency Manage- ment plans. FURTHER READINGS Brown, Janice Frink. 1994. “Barry Transition Team Set to Go.” Washington African American (December 3). Fisher, Marc. 2003. “D.C.’s Network of Inept Cronies Still Thrives.” Washington Post (January 28). “Kelly, Sharon Pratt Dixon (1944–)” 2007–2008. BlackPast. org. Available online at http://www.blackpast.org/? q=aah/kelly-sharon-pratt-dixon-1944; website home page: http://www.blackpast.org (accessed September 5, 2009). “Sharon Pratt.” Pratt Consulting. Available online at http:// www.prattconsulting.com/leadership/index.html (accessed December 30, 2009). KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON Governmental entities have the power to take private property for public use, with the law requiring the governmental entity to pay JUST COMPENSATION to the landowner. In 2005 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a case in which a municipal government took private property for the purpose of economic development. In Kelo v. City of New London (545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439 [2005]), the Court determined that the City of New London, Connecticut, was within its constitutional rights to condemn private property for economic development, even though a private company would own much of the land once it was developed. The case sparked a nation al contro- versy that led most state legislatures to limit the power of EMINENT DOMAIN. New London suffered an economic setback in 1996, when the Naval Undersea Warfare Center closed and about 1,000 of its employees transferred to Newport, Rhode Island. In January 1998 the state bond commission in Connecticut authorized the issuance of bonds that would be used for economic development of the New London’s Fort Trumbull area. About one month later, Pfizer, Inc., a pharmaceutical giant, announced that it would open a global research facility in the city. In anticipation of the opening of this center, the city considered development plans created by the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private entity that serves as the city’s development agency. The Pfizer facility opened in June 2001. The NLDC development plan focused on an area of about 90 acres. Included within this land were 115 individual land parcels. The development plans would divide this property into seven new parcels, which would be used for a hotel and conference center, marinas along the Thames River, new upscale residences, office space, and parking. The NLDC, in the preface to the development plan, stated that the development would benefit the public, due to increased tax revenue, more jobs, and improved use of the city’s waterfront. The city council of New London approved the development plan in 1998. In 2000, state agencies in Connecticut and the city council of New London approved a Municipal Develop- ment Plan (MDP). In that plan, the city authorized the NLDC to acquire properties located within the development plan’s area. Under authority granted to it by the city, the NLDC voted to use the power of eminent domain to acquire properties of those residents who were unwilling to sell their property. The NLDC initiated a series of condemnation actions against several residents in the Fort Trumbull area in November 2000. Some of the homeowners objected to the condemnation. Most asserted that they wanted GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 134 KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON to remain in their homes for personal reasons. Some of these residents had invested consider- able work in their property. Other residents said that their families had lived in the homes for generations. Susette Kelo, who appeared as the named PLAINTIFF in the case, testified that she enjoyed the view from her home. All of the residents who objected to the condemnation said that they were not opposed to the economic development but that they did not believe that the taking of their property was necessary in order to develop the land. Several of the residents in the Fort Trumbull area filed suit against the city, seeking a permanent injunction that would bar the city from condemning their homes. The Superior Court of Connecticut reviewed the case in a seven-day bench trial. The court recognized the “conflicting dreams” of the residents and the city. “The plaintiffs wish to live out the typical American dream of abiding and owning in peace homes and property that they have chosen,” the court wrote. “Any threat to that dream is understandably forcefully and emo- tionally opposed as it should be in a free society.” In addition, the court recognized that the city’s desire in these plans was to improve the city’s economic and social wellbeing (Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238 [Conn. Super. Mar. 13, 2002]). Section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Connecticut provides: “The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation therefor.” The plaintiffs argued that the city’s exercise of eminent domain violated the Connecticut Constitution, state statutory provisions, and New London’s city charter. Additionally, the plaintiffs main- tained that the plan violated their EQUAL PROTECTION and due process rights. The trial court rejected each of these arguments as they pertained to a parcel, named Parcel 3, which would contain office space and parking. How- ever, the court enjoined the city’s taking of another parcel, named Parcel 4A, which would be used for parking space, because plans for that parcel were “too vague and uncertain to allow the court to conclude the takings here are necessary and would not be unreasonable.” The parties cross-appealed the trial court’s decision to the Connecticut Supreme Court. In a 4-3 decision, the court rejected all of the plaintiffs’ arguments. The court held that the city’s plans were primarily intended to benefit the public and that this plan was permissible under the state’s constitution and statutes. Moreover, the court found that the trial court had failed to give proper deference to the legislative decisions of the city. The court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief and reversed the trial court’s decis ion to grant the injunction related to Parcel 4A (Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 [Conn. 2004]). The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of CERTIORARI with the U.S. Supreme Court on July 19, 2004. The Court granted the petition on September 28. Commentators suggested that the Court’s decision “will determine whether private ownership has any meaning left or whether we really live in a command economy, like the old Soviet Unio n, where government can expropriate property whenever it is pro- fitable to do so.” Supreme Court precedent has given wide latitude to municipalities to Susette Kelo, shown, challenged the law of eminent domain when her house and others in her neighborhood were seized for the purpose of economic development. The Supreme Court ruled against Kelo, 5–4, though Kelo’s home was eventually relocated. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON 135 determine whether taking of property is “nec- essary.” In a 1954 decision, Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 2d 27 [1954]), the Court concluded that a city could consider aesthetic reasons in determining whether to condemn property. Twenty-five amicus curiae briefs supported the plaintiffs’ position in the case. Organizations that filed these briefs included such traditionally liberal entities as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS,along with such traditionally conservative groups as the Cato Institute and the Pacific Legal Founda- tion. Many of these organizations generally expressed concern that property owned by certain groups, such as minorities or churches, could be targeted by cities for condemnation with- outanyrestraintonthegovernment’spower. In an opinion written by Justice JOHN PAUL STEVENS , the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision. Accord- ing to Stevens, even though the city could not take the plaintiffs’ land in order to confer a private benefit on a particular private party, the city could take the property pursuant to a carefully considered development plan. The Court noted that it has applied the term “public purpose” broadly, and even though much of the property in question would not be open to the general public, the term is sufficiently broad to include a development plan that would add jobs and revenue to the city. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that it would show deference to the city’s decisions regarding the property. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice WILLIAM REHNQUIST and Justices ANTONIN SCALIA and CLARENCE THOMAS attacked the majority’s decision. According to O’Connor, the Court abandoned long-established princi- ples that the government cannot take property from one private person and give it to another. “Under the banner of economic development,” O’Connor wrote, “all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in the process.” The case sparked controversy on a national scale. The public generally decried the practice of taking private property to benefit other private entities. The vast majority of state legislatures considered legislation that would limit the effect of the Kelo decision. For instance, in 2005, the Texas Legislature passed a statute directly in response to Kelo. Under this statute, a governmental entity may not take property if the taking “confers a private benefit on a particular private party through the use of the property” or if the taking is for econom ic development purposes. In 2008 the City of New London agreed to move Kelo’s house to a new location. The land where her house once stood remained vacant as of 2009. Moreover, in November 2009 Pfizer announced that it would close the plant in New London, meaning that the city would los e the main focus of the redevelopment plan. FURTHER READINGS Callies, David L. Public Use and Public Purpose after Kelo v. City of New London. Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis. Roosevelt, Kermit III. 2006. The Myth of Judicial Activism: Making Sense of Supreme Court Decisions. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Scott, Kyle. 2010. The Price of Politics: Lessons from Kelo v. City of New London. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Education. CROSS REFERENCE Eminent Domain; Fifth Amendment v KELSEN, HANS Hans Kelsen was a Europe an legal philosopher and teacher who emigrated to the United States in 1940 after leaving Nazi Germany. Kelsen is most famous for his studies on law and especially for his idea known as the pure theory of the law. Kelsen was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on October 11, 1881. He studied at several universities, including Berlin, Heidelberg, and Vienna. He received a doctor of laws degree from Vienna in 1906 and began teaching at the school in 1911. He taught PUBLIC LAW and jurisprudence at Vienna until 1930, when he moved to Germany to teach at the University of Cologne. There he taught INTERNATIONAL LAW and jurisprudence and served as dean for two years. With the rise of the Nazi government, he left Germany and emigrated to Switzerland in 1933. He taught at the Graduate Institute of Interna- tional Studies of the University of Geneva until 1940. He accepted a position as lecturer at the Harvard University Law School the same year, and relocated to the United States. Later in 1940 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 136 KELSEN, HANS he accepted a teaching position at the University of California at Berkeley. He remained at Berkeley until his retirement in 1952. Kelsen’s pure theory of the law is fairly abstract. Its objective is knowledge of that which is essential to law; therefore, the theory does not deal with that which is changing and accidental, such as ideals of justice. Kelsen believed that law is a science that deals not with the actual events of the world (what is) but with norms (what ought to be). The legal relation contains the threat of a sanction from an authority in response to a certain act. The legal norm is a relation of condition and consequence: if a certain act is done, a certain consequence ought to follow. In this theory a legal system is made of a hierarchy of norms. Each norm is derived from its superior norm. The ultimate norm from which every legal norm deduces its validity is the Grundnorm, the highest basic norm. The Grundnorm is not deduced from anything else but is assumed as an initial hypothesis. A norm is a valid legal norm only because it has been created according to a definite rule. The theory is independent of morality. It does not matter which particular Grundnorm is adopted by a legal order. All that matters is that th is basic norm has a minimum effectiv e- ness: It must command a certain amount of obedience, because the effectiveness of the total legal order is necessary for the validity of its norms. Kelsen received acclaim for authoring many publications, including General Theory of Law and State (1945), The Law of the United Nations (1950–51), Principles of International Law (1952), and What Is Justice? (1957). He died April 20, 1973, in Berkeley, California. v KENNEDY, ANTHONY MCLEOD Anthony McLeod Kennedy was appointed as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988. Kennedy was the third person nominated by President RONALD REAGAN to fill the vacancy created by the retirement of Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. As a judicial conservative, Kennedy has generally voted with the conservative justices on the Court, yet he has split from them in significant rulings on ABORTION rights and gay rights. Kennedy was born in Sacramento, Califor- nia, on July 28, 1936. He graduated from Stanford University in 1958 and from Harvard Law School in 1961. He practiced law in San Francisco and Sacramento and taught CONSTITU- TIONAL LAW at the McGeorge School of Law of the University of the Pacific from 1965 to 1988. His conservative philosophy and his REPUBLI- CAN PARTY affiliation led to Kennedy’s first judicial appointment. In 1975, President GERALD R. FORD appointed him to the Ninth CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals. Kennedy served on the federal appeals court for thirteen years and wrote over four hundred opinions. A well-respected jurist, Kennedy entered the national limelight after the Senate rejected President Reagan’s first nominee for Powell’s seat on the Court, Judge ROBERT H. BORK, and Reagan’s second nominee, Judge DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG, withdrew following his admission that he had smoked marijuana. Kennedy’s confir- mation hearings were filled with questions that sought to compare his philosophy to Bork’s. Bork had embraced the doctrine of original intent—the idea that a judge should apply the Constitution only in the exact manner intended by the Constitution’s Framers—as the only ▼▼ ▼▼ Hans Kelsen 1881–1973 18751875 19251925 19501950 19751975 19001900 ❖ ❖ 1881 Born, Prague, Austria-Hungary (now Czech Republic) ◆◆◆ 1906 Received LL.D. from University of Vienna 1911 Began teaching public law and jurisprudence at University of Vienna 1914–18 World War I ◆ 1930 Joined faculty at University of Cologne 1933 Immigrated to Geneva, Switzerland, and joined University of Geneva faculty 1933 Hitler elected Chancellor of Germany ◆ 1939–45 World War II ◆ 1940 Immigrated to United States and joined University of California, Berkeley, faculty 1950–53 Korean War ◆ 1945 General Theory of Law and State published ◆ 1957 What Is Justice? published 1961–73 Vietnam War 1973 Died, Berkeley, Calif. THE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW PRECEDENT BEGINS WITH NECESSITY , AND A CONTRARY NECESSITY MARKS ITS OUTER LIMIT . —ANTHONY M. K ENNEDY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION KENNEDY, ANTHONY MCLEOD 137 . to war for the solution of international GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 130 KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT controversies, and renounce[d] it as an instru- ment of national policy in their. THE OVERPOWERING STRENGTH OF PUBLIC OPINION . —FRANK KELLOGG GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION KELLOGG, FRANK BILLINGS 131 performed the duties of secretary of state and negotiated treaties. In 1928. in November 2000. Some of the homeowners objected to the condemnation. Most asserted that they wanted GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 134 KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON to remain