A joint stock company differs from a corporation in certain respects. A corporation exists under a state charter, while a joint stock company is formed by an agreement among the members. The existence of a joint stock company is based upon the right of individuals to contract with each other and, unlike a corporation, does not require a grant of authority from the state before it can organize. Whereas members of a corporation are generally not held liable for debts of a corpora- tion, the members of a joint stock company are held liable as partners. In a legal action, a corporation sues and is sued in its corporate name, but a joint stock company sues and defends in the name of a designated officer. JOINT TENANCY A type of ownership of real or personal property by two or more persons in which each owns an undivided interest in the whole. In estate law, joint tenancy is a special form of ownership by two or more persons of the same property. The individuals, who are called joint tenants, share equal ownership of the property and have the equal, undivided right to keep or dispose of the property. Joint tenancy creates a RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP.Thisright provides that if any one of the joint tenants dies, the remainder of the property is transferred to the survivors. Descended from common-law tradition, joint tena ncy is closely related to two other forms of concurrent property owner- ship: TENANCY IN COMMON, a less restrictive form of ownership that sometimes results when joint tenancies cease to exist, and TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY , a special form of joint tenancy for married couples. Joint tenants usually share ownership of land, but the property may instead be money or other items. Four main features mark this type of ownership: (1) The joint tenants own an undivided interest in the property as a whole; each share is equal, and no one joint tenant can Anxious investors wait for news about the South Sea Company, a joint stock company formed in London in 1711. Joint stock companies are a form of partnership in which each member, or stockholder, is financially responsible for acts of the company. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 48 JOINT TENANCY ever have a larger share. (2) The estates of the joint tenants are vested (meaning fixed and unalterable by any condition) for exactly the same period of time—in this case, the tenants’ lifetime. (3) The joint tenants hold their property under the same title. (4) The joint tenants all enjoy the same rights until one of them dies. Under the right of survivorship, the death of one joint tenant automatically transfers the remainder of the property in equal parts to the survivors. When only one joint tenant is left alive, he or she receives the entire estate. If the joint tenants mutually agree to sell the property, they must equally divide the proce eds of the sale. Because disagreement over the disposition of property is common, courts sometimes intervene to divide the property equally among the owners. If one joint tenant decides to convey her or his interest in the property to a new owner, the joint tenancy is broken and the new owner has a tenancy in common. Tenancy in common is a form of concurrent ownership that can be created by deed, will, or OPERATION OF LAW. Several features distinguish it from joint tenancy: A tenant in common may have a larger share of property than the other tenants. The tenant is also free to dispose of his or her share without the restrictive conditions placed on a joint tenancy. Unlike joint tenan cy, tenancy in common has no right of survivor- ship. Thus, no other tenant in commo n is entitled to receive a share of the property upon a tenant in common’s death; instead, the property goes to the deceased’s heirs. Tenancy by the entirety is a form of joint tenancy that is available only to a husband and wife. It can be created only by will or by deed. As a form of joint tenancy that also creates a right of survivorship, it allows the property to pass automatically to the surviving spouse when a spouse dies. In addition, tenancy by the entirety protects a spou se’s interest in the property from the other spouse’s creditors. It differs from joint tenancy in one major respect: Neither party can voluntarily dispose of her or his interest in the property. In the event of divorce, the tenancy by the entirety becomes a tenancy in common, and the right of survivor- ship is lost. CROSS REFERENCE Real Property. JOINT TORTFEASOR Two or more individuals with joint and several liability in a to rt action for the same injury to the same person or property. To be considered joint tortfeasors, the parties must act together in committing the wrong, or their acts, if independent of each other, must unite in causing a single injury. All who actively participate in the commission of a civil wrong are joint tortfeasors. Persons responsible for separate acts of NEGLIGENCE that combine in causing an injury are joint tortfeasors. The PLAINTIFF has the option of suing one or more of the tortfeasors, either individually or as a group. If the plaintiff is awarded damages, each JOINT TORTFEASOR is responsible for paying a portion of the damages, based on the percentage of the injury caused by his or her negligent act. The DEFENDANT who pays more than his or her share of the damages, or who pays more than he or she is at fault for, may bring an action to recover from the other culpable defendants under the principle of contribution. JOINT VENTURE An association of two or more individuals or companies engaged in a solitary business enter- prise for profit without actual partnership or incorporation; also called a joint adventure. A joint venture is a contractual busine ss undertaking between two or more parties. It is similar to a business partnership, with one key difference: a partnership generally involves an ongoing, long-term business relationship, where- as a joint venture is based on a single business transaction. Individuals or companies choose to enter joint ventures in order to share strengths, minimize risks, and increase competitive advan- tages in the marketplace. Joint ventures can be distinct business units (a new business entity may be created for the joint venture) or collaborations between businesses. In a collabo- ration, for example, a high-technology firm may contract with a manufacturer to bring its idea for a product to market; the former provides the know-how, the latter the means. All joint ventures are initiated by the parties’ entering a contract or an agreement that specifies their mutual responsibilities and goals. The contract is crucial for avoiding trouble later; the parties must be specific about the intent of their joint venture as well as aware of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JOINT VENTURE 49 its limitations. All joint ventures also involve certain rights and duties. The parties have a mutual right to control the enterprise, a right to share in the profits, and a duty to share in any losses incurred. Each joint venturer has a FIDUCIARY responsibility, owes a standard of care to the other members, and has the duty to act in GOOD FAITH in matters that concern the common interest or the enterprise . A fiduciary responsi- bility is a duty to act for someone else’s benefit while subordinating one’s personal interests to those of the other person. A joint venture can terminate at a time specified in the contract, upon the accomplishment of its purpose, upon the death of an active member, or if a court decides that serious disagreements between the members make its continuation impractical. Joint ventures have existed for centuries. In the United States, their use began with the railroads in the late 1800s. Throughout the middle part of the twentieth century they were common in the manufacturing sector. By the late 1980s, joint ventures increasingly appeared in the service industries as businesses looked for new, competitive strategies. This expansion of joint venture s was particularly interesting to regulators and lawmakers. The chief concern with joint ventures is that they can restrict competition, especially when they are formed by businesses that are otherwise competitors or potential competitors. Another concern is that joint ventures can reduce the entry of others into a given market. Regulators in the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT and the FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION routinely evaluate joint ventures for violations of ANTITRUST LAW; in addition, injured private parties may bring antitrust suits. In 1982 Congress amended the SHERMAN ANTI -TRUST ACT of 1890 (15 U.S.C.A. § 6a)—the statutory basis of antitrust law—to ease restric- tions on joint ventures that involve exports. At the same time, it passed the Export Trading Company Act (U.S.C.A. § 4013) to grant exporters limited immunity to antitrust prosecu- tion. Two years later the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-462) permitted venturers involved in joint research and development to notify the government of their joint venture and thus limit their liability in the event of prosecution for antitrust violations. This protection against liability was expanded in 1993 to include some joint ventures involving production (Pub. L. No. 103-42). FURTHER READINGS Bomse, Steven V. 1996. Joint Ventures: Practices in Search of Principles. Practising Law Institute. Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook series, PLI order no. B4-7134, January–February. Harrigan, Kathryn Rudie. 1986. Managing for Joint Venture Success. Lanham, MD: Lexington. Levins, Cary, and James S. Lawlor. 1988. “Legal Considera- tions of Joint Ventures.” In The Handbook of Joint Venturing. Edited by John D. Carter, Robert F. Cush- man, and C. Scott Hartz. New York: McGraw-Hill. Lifland, William T. 1996. Monopolies and Joint Ventures. Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook series, PLI order no. B4-7128, May–July. JONES ACT Enacted in 1920 (46 U.S.C.A. § 688), the JONES ACT provides a remedy to sailors for injuries or death resulting from the NEGLIGENCE of an owner, a master, or a fellow sailor of a vessel. The federal Jones Act defines the legal rights of seamen who are injured or killed in the course of maritime service. It entitles them, or their survivors, to sue their employer in the event that their fellow workers or shipmasters are negligent (unreasonably careless), and to receive a trial by jury. Prior to the law’s passage, sailors did not enjoy these rights, largely because of antiquated legal concepts and court opinions that tended to protect employers. A milestone in liability law, the Jones Act was intended to demolish such barriers in recog nition of the special risks taken by sailors. Interpreting the law has been a long and difficult challenge for the federal courts, which have exclusive juris- diction over Jones Act claims. The crux of the problem is the Jones Act’s failure to define the term seaman, which courts have generally, but not always, construed to mean “a shipmas- ter or crew member.” Until the early twentieth century, the right s of sailors were limited. If a sailor was injured through the negligence of another sailor or the master of the ship, the injured party could not hope to win a suit against the employer. Nor could survivors of a sailor who died in the line of service win such a suit. Under general maritime law, sailors were entitled to “mainte- nance and cure”—a form of contractual com- pensation that provided a living allowance for food, lodging, and medical expenses. Only when a ship was proved to be unseaworthy could sailors recover damages from their employer. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 50 JONES ACT The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized these limitations in 1903 in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S. Ct. 483, 47 L. Ed. 760. In that case the Court ruled that the owner of a ship was not responsible for a sailor’s injuries simply because those injuries were caused by the negligent order of the ship’s master. The decision had its roots in a common-law doctrine known as the FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. This now outdated con- cept shifted blame partly, and sometimes entirely, from employers to fellow workers. If sued because a worker was injured on the job, employers could avert liability by blaming the accident on the negligence of fellow employees. In Osceola the Court based its reasoning on a so-called fellow-seaman doctrine, thus curtail- ing the legal remedies available to an injured sailor. Several historical developments motivated Congress to give sailors greater legal rights. The sinking of the Titanic in 1912 heightened public awareness of the perils of service at sea, and it was soon followed by concerns about merchant marines at the onset of WORLD WAR I. In 1915 Congress enacted safety requirements for vessels through the Act to Promote the Welfare of American Seamen in the Merchant Marine of the United States (Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164). This act overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in Osceola, explicitly stating that the fellow-seaman doctrine could not be used as a defense. But the law had little force. In 1918 the Court ruled that Congress had failed to provide a remedy for negligent acts, and therefore allowed a lower court’s dismissal of a sailor’s negligence suit to stand (Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S. Ct. 501, 62 L. Ed. 1171). Federal lawmakers viewed the decision as undermining their will. Two years later Congress responded by passing the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (46 App. U.S.C.A. § 861 et seq.), section 33 of which has come to be known as the Jones Act. Lawmakers defined the rights of sailors to sue in explicit language: Any seaman who shall suffer PERSONAL INJURY in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury…. and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury. Though Congress had eliminated the bar- riers that the Supreme Court had erected, a key question remained: Who qualified as a seaman? In 1927 Congress provided a partial answer through the passage of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHCA) (33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.). The LHCA provided workers’ compensation benefits to dockhands, who by that time had replaced sailors in the tasks of loading and unloading ships. But the LHCA specifically excluded any crew member of a vessel from its coverage; thus, by extension, sailors were not eligible for the benefits afforded dockworkers. Because Congress did not see a need in 1920 to define seaman, it remained ambiguous who qualified to bring a suit under the Jones Act. Nevertheless, the courts had little trouble decid- ing until 1940, when the Supreme Court ruled that a crew member was not a seaman if his duties did not pertain to navigation (South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 60 S. Ct. 544, 84 L. Ed. 732). Yet, over the next several decades, some courts liberally con- strued both who constituted a sailor and what constituted a vessel. More confusion followed as a result of the Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879, 76 S. Ct. 141, 100 L. Ed. 775, which reinst ated the district court’s ruling that the determination of a sailor’s status belonged to the jury. The definition of seaman came to include workers on dredges and floating oil drilling platforms. Still, no precise test existed, and the result was an explosion of Jones Act litigation. Between 1975 and 1985, nearly one hundred thousand Jones Act suits were filed in southern states. During the 1980s critics of the Jones Act called for reform. They asked Congress to limit the act’s scope, and the Supreme Court to define whom the act covered. Although Congress did not act, the Court returned a partial answer in 1995 in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 132 L. Ed. 2d 314. The decision established two elements that must be met by a PLAINTIFF in order for the plaintiff to qualify as a sailor: the worker’s duties “must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accom plish- ment of its mission,” and the worker “must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an iden tifiable group of vessels) that is substan- tial in both its duration and its nature.” One key result of the decision w as that sailors could GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JONES ACT 51 now sue under the Jones Act even if their work required going ashore. But scholars did not believe Chandris was a conclusive ruling on all matters of interpretation in the law. FURTHER READINGS Beer, Peter. 1986. “Keeping Up with the Jones Act.” Tulane Law Review 61 (December). Buckley, William F. 1995. “The Jones Act: Its Applicability Clarified.” Rhode Island Bar Journal 44 (October). Dripps, Roy. 2001. “The Seaman’s ‘Election’ under the Jones Act.” Univ. of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 14, no. 1 (fall). Kelly, Wendy A. 1995. “Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis: The Supreme Court Addresses the Vessel Connection Requirement for Seaman Status under The Jones Act.” Tulane Law Review 70 (December). Peltz, Robert D., and Vincent J. Warger. 2003. “Medicine on the Seas.” Tulane Maritime Law Journal 27 (summer). Robertson, David W. 1985. “A New Approach to Determin- ing Seaman Status.” Texas Law Review 64 (August). CROSS REFERENCE Admiralty and Maritime Law. v JONES, ELAINE RUTH A leading African American attorney, ELAINE RUTH JONES has devoted her career to the cause of CIVIL RIGHTS . From 1993 to 2004, she served as director-counsel of the NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND (LDF). Known for her eloquence and tenacity as well as for her creative approach to the cause of civil rights, Jones heads the LDF’s 80-member staff while frequently speaking out on legal, social, and political issues. When Jones was born on March 2, 1944, in Norfolk, Virginia, opportunities for blacks in her birthplace were limited. Her father was a Pullman porter who had been taught to read by her college-educated mother. Jones, her brother, and her parents felt the sting of being turned away from whites-only facilities. Yet the family believed in success throu gh hard work and especially in education. Jones graduated third in her class from BOOKER T. WASHINGTON High School, in Norfolk, in 1961, and then attended Howard University, from which she graduated cum laude with a political science degree in 1965. Jones served in the Peace Corps in Turkey between 1965 and 1967. She returned to the United States determined to pursue social change through the law. Particularly inspiring to her was the career of THURGOOD MARSHALL, founder of the LDF and later a U.S. Supreme Court justice. In 1970 she became the first black woman to graduate from the University of Virginia Law School. Jones’s distinction in law school earned her a lucrative offer from the New York-based law firm of Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, and Alexander, at that time the firm that represented President RICHARD M. NIXON. At the last minute, she chose not to accept the offer; she wanted to pursue Marshall’swork. Jones joined the LDF as an attorney. As the NAACP’s litigation and public education arm, the LDF provides legal assistance to African Americans and has brought more cases before the U.S. Supreme Court than any other legal body except the solicitor general’s office. Assi- gned to death-penalty cases, Jones represented numerous black defendants in state and federal court. Only two years into her career, she worked on the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), in which the Court struck down death penalty statutes in 39 states after finding that the death penalty violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the EIGHTH AMENDMENT. The ruling held up hundreds of executions until states could rewrite their laws. Starting in 1975, Jones spent two years working for the federal government. As a special assistant to the U.S. secretary of transportation, she helped to formulate official policies on a broad range of transportation issues. Among other accomplishments, she helped to open the doors of the U.S. Coast Guard to women. Bu t she longed to return to her former job at the LDF. “Once you get started doing civil rights work, it is hard to put it aside and move on to something else,” she said. “I believe that is because there is still so much injustice. You see it everywhere and you want to do everything possible to stop it.” Jones returned to the LDF in 1977 to work in its Washington, D.C., office as an assistant counsel. She again litigated CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, but the new position also required her to review government actions and poli cies. She monitored civil rights enforcement activities of executive branch agencies and legislative initiatives of Congress. In 1988 she became deputy director and counsel for policy and planning, devoting herself to determining new areas in which the LDF could pursue its civil rights agenda. In 1989 Jones became the first African American to be elected to the American Bar Association’s Board of Governors. WE FIND IT EMOTIONAL , WE FIND IT UNCOMFORTABLE , WE FIND IT HARD AS A NATION TO HAVE A CALM , RATIONAL DISCUSSION ABOUT THE IMPACT OF RACE ON INSTITUTIONS IN OUR SOCIETY . —ELAINE JONES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 52 JONES, ELAINE RUTH These positions gave Jones a political educa- tion that broadened her public visibility and her view of the LDF mission. When an opening for the organization’s highest position, director- counsel, appeared in 1993, she was the board of directors’ obvious choice. “[She] was precisely the kind of person whom Justice Marshall no doubt envisioned to take up the leadership position,” commented LDF president Robert H. Preiskel. “Elaine shared a good many of the characteristics that made him such a powerful leader.” Jones soon began pursuing a broader agenda for the LDF. She identified new civil rights issues, including environmental disparities as evidenced by the dumping of toxic waste in minority communities and the presence of dangerous lead-based paint in buildings in which black families lived and the need for health care reform. She also used the LDF public-education function to address traditional issues, advocating continued support for AFFIR- MATIVE ACTION programs and opposing racial inequity in death-penalty cases. Jones supported the Racial Justice Act (H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. [1994] §§ 601–611), legislation— ultimately stripped from President BILL CLINTON’S 1994 crime bill—that would have prohibited executions that fit a racially discriminatory pattern. In 1994, she received the Washington Bar Association’s prestigious CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON Medallion of Merit, an award given to leaders who use the law for social change. In 2000, President Clinton presented her with the Eleanor Roosevelt HUMAN RIGHTS Award. In 2004, after 11 years as president and director/counsel for the LDF, Jones announced her resignation. She said that while she would no longer run the LDF, she would continue to litigate for it as needed. FURTHER READINGS Blannon, Nancy. 1995. “Affirmative Action in Action: Its Past and Its Future.” Human Rights 22 (fall). Jones, Elaine R., et al. 1994. “The Death of Fairness?” Panel discussion. Houston Law Review 31 (winter). Kluger, Richard. 1976. Simple Justice. New York: Random House. Orfield, Gary, Susan E. Eaton, and Elaine R. Jones. 1997. Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education. New York: New Press. Rhode, Deborah L., ed. 2003. The Difference “Difference” Makes: Women and Leadership. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford Law and Politics. Schwartz, Bernard. 1986. Swann’s Way: The School Busing Case and the Supreme Court. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCE Capital Punishment. Elaine Ruth Jones 1944– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1950 2000 1975 ◆◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ ◆ 1944 Born, Norfolk, Va. 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decided by Supreme Court 1965 Graduated from Howard University 1965–67 Served in Peace Corps 1972 Helped prepare Furman v. Georgia 1970 Became first African American female graduate of Virginia Law School; joined NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) 1977 Rejoined LDF as an assistant counsel 1975–77 Served as special assistant to U.S. secretary of transportation 1988 Became deputy director and counsel for policy and planning at LDF 1993 Appointed director counsel of LDF 1994 Received Charles Hamilton Houston Medallion of Merit 1999 Received American Bar Association Spirit of Excellence Inspirational Award 2004 Resigned as director counsel of LDF 2001 Attended World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa 2000 Received federal government's Eleanor Roosevelt Award for Human Rights ◆ Elaine Jones. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JONES, ELAINE RUTH 53 v JORDAN, BARBARA CHARLINE Barbara Charline Jordan, attorney, legislator, and educator, was the first African American woman from a Southern state to win election to the U.S. Congress. Jordan was born on February 21, 1936, in Houston, Texas, the third and youngest daugh- ter of the Reverend Benjamin Jordan and Arlyne Jordan. In 1952, she graduated at the top of her class from Phyllis Wheatley High School and enrolled in Texas Southern University (TSU), an all-black college, where she joined the debate team and traveled to competitions throughout the United States. The team was restricted to blacks-only motels and restaurants in many of the states bordering Texas. In 1956, Jordan graduated magna cum laude from TSU with a bachelor’s degree in history and political science. She enrolled in Boston University, in Massachusetts—one of six women, including two black women, i n the law school’s first-year class. During her first year of law school, Jordan realized how inadequate her prior education in Houston had been. But she was successful at Boston, and, she returned to Houston and opened a law practice after her graduation in 1959. Jordan was also drawn to politics. She became involved in the 1960 presidential campaign and went to work for JOHN F. KENNEDY and for fellow Texan LYNDON B. JOHNSON,bothDEMOCRATIC PARTY nominees. In 1962 she made her first unsuccessful bid for a seat in the Texas House of Representa- tives, running from Harris County. She ran again in 1964, and again was defeated. Jordan decided to make a third attempt at winning public office and in 1966 she was elected to the Texas Senate. She was the first black state senator elected in Texas since 1883. Shortly after her election, Jordan was invited to the White Hou se by President Johnson to Barbara Charline Jordan 1936–1996 ▼▼ ▼▼ 19251925 20002000 19751975 19501950 ❖ 1936 Born, Houston, Tex. 1939–45 World War II 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decided by Supreme Court 1956 Graduated from Texas Southern University ◆◆ 1962 Ran first (unsuccessful) bid for public office ◆ 1966 Elected to Texas Senate, first African American state senator since 1883 ◆ 1972 Elected to U.S. House, first African American woman from a southern state ◆ 1976 Gave keynote address at Democratic National Convention ◆◆ 1982 Appointed to University of Texas's Lyndon B. Johnson Centennial Chair in National Policy 1978 Retired from House; became professor at University of Tex. ◆ 1990 Appointed special advisor to Texas Governor Ann Richards ❖ 1996 Died, Austin, Tex. Barbara Jordan. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WHAT PEOPLE WANT IS VERY SIMPLE .THEY WANT AN AMERICA AS GOOD AS ITS PROMISE . —BARBARA JORDAN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 54 JORDAN, BARBARA CHARLINE discuss his upcoming CIVIL RIGHTS legislation. In 1972 she was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, becoming the first black wom- an from a Southern state to serve in Congress. She immediately enlisted former president Johnson’s assistance in winning an appointment to the House Judiciary Committee, where she gained national recognition for her remarks at the impeachment proceedings against President RICHARD NIXON. Jordan gained additional prominence in July 1976 when she gave a keynote address at the Democratic National Convention. Her speech about the Democratic Party and the meaning of democracy in the United States brought her a standing ovation. A movement to put Jordan on the ticket as vice president gained tremendous support, but Jordan held a press conference to announce that she did not wish to be nominated. Jordan served three terms in the House of Representatives and sponsored landmark legisla- tion to expand the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq., to require printing of bilingual ballots, and to toughen enforcement of civil rights laws. She resigned from Congress in 1978 and became a professor at the LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. In 1982, she was appointed to the university’s Lyndon B. Johnson Centennial Chair in National Policy, where she taught courses on ethics and national policy issues. In December 1990 Texas Governor Ann W. Richards appoin ted Jordan as a special adviser to her administration on ethics in government. Richards had made ethics a primary focu s of her campaign, and she asked Jordan to author ethics legislation and work with gubernatorial appointees on guidelines for ethical behavior in their public service. Jordan died in Austin, Texas on January 17, 1996. FURTHER READINGS Holmes, Barbara Ann. 2000. A Private Woman in Public Spaces: Barbara Jordan’s Speeches on Ethics, Public Religion, and Law. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press Universal. Jordan, Barbara, and Shelby Hearon. 1979. Barbara Jordan: A Self-Portrait. New York: Doubleday. Rogers, Mary Beth. 2000. Barbara Jordan: American Hero. New York: Bantam. CROSS REFERENCES Apportionm ent; Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas; School Desegregation. JOURNAL A book or log in which entries are made to record events on a daily basis. A book where transactions or events are recorded as they occur. A legislative journal is kept by the clerk and is a daily record of the l egislative proceedings. Typical entries include actions taken by various committees and a chronological accounting of bills introduced on the floor. J.P. An abbreviation for justice of the peace, a minor ranking judicial officer with limited statutory jurisdiction over preservation of the peace, civil cases, and lesser criminal offenses. J.S.D. An abbreviation for Doctor of Juridical Science, a degree awarded to highly qualified individuals who have successfully completed a prescribed course of advanced study in law after having earned J.D. and LL.M. degrees. The standards for admission to J.S.D. programs are stringent. Although specific aca- demic requirements for acceptance into a J.S.D. program vary from one law school to another, ordinarily applicants must hold J.D. and LL.M. degrees. They must have completed their courses of study with a certain minimum grade average in order to qualify for this advanced program. Once accepted, each student generally has a full-time faculty member who acts as research advisor concerning the preparation of the student’s thesis, which is a requirement for obtaining the J.S.D. degree. It is often mandatory that all work required for a J.S.D. degree must be completed within five years of the commen- cement of the student’s program of study. J.S.D. is also commonly abbreviated as S.J.D. JUDGE To make a decision or reach a conclusion after examining all the factual evidence presented. To form an opinion after evaluating the facts and applying the law. A public officer chosen or elected to preside over and to administer the law in a court of justice; one who controls the proceedings in a courtroom and decides questions of law or discretion. As a verb, the term judge describes a process of evaluation and decision. In a legal case, this process may be conducted by either a judge or a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JUDGE 55 jury. Decisions in any case must be based on applicable law. Where the case calls for a jury VERDICT, the judge tells the jury what law applies to the case. As a noun, judge refers to a person autho- rized to make decisions. A judge is a court officer authorized to decide legal cases. A judge presiding over a case may initiate investigations on related matters, but generally judges do not have the power to conduct investigations for other branches or agencies of government. Judges must decide cases based on the applicable law. In some cases, a judge may be asked to declare that a certain law is unconsti- tutional. Judges have the power to rule that a law is unconstitutio nal and therefore void, but they must give proper deference to the legisla- tive body that enacted the law. There are two types of judges: trial court and appellate. Trial court judges preside over trials, usually from beginning to end. They decide pretrial motions, define the scope of discovery, set the trial schedule, rule on oral motions during trial, control the behavior of participants and the pace of the trial, advise the jury of the law in a jury trial, and sentence a guilty DEFENDANT in a criminal case. Appellate judges hear appeals from deci- sions of the trial courts. They review trial court records, read briefs submitted by the parties, and listen to oral arguments by attorneys. The judges then decide whether error or injustice occurred in the trial court. Judges are also distinguished according to their jurisdiction. For example, federal court judges differ from state court judges. They operate in different courtrooms, and they hear different types of cases. A federal court judge hears cases that fall within federal jurisdiction. Generally, this means cases that involve a question of federal law or the U.S. Constitution, involve parties from different states, or name the United States as a party. State court judges hear cases involving state law, and they have jurisdic- tion over many cases involving federal law. Some judges can hear only certain cases in SPECIAL COURTS with limited SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION . For example, a federal BANKRUPTCY court judge may preside over only bankruptcy cases. Other special courts with limited subject matter jurisdiction include tax, probate, juve- nile, and traffic courts. Justices make up the upper echelon of appellate judges. The term justice describes judges serving on the highest court in a jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, a justice may be any appellate judge. Judges are either appointed or elected. On the federal level, district court judges, appellate court judges, and justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the president subject to the approval of Congress. On the state level, judges may be appointed by the governor, selected by a joint ballot of the two houses of the state legislature, or elected by the voters of the state. On the federal level, judges have lifetime tenure. Most state court judges hold their office for a specified number of years. If a state court judge is appointed by the governor, the judge’s term may be established by the governor. In some states, a judge’s term is fixed by statute. All state jurisdictions have a mandatory retire- ment age. In New Hampshire, for example, a judge must retire by age 70 (N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 78). There is no mandatory retirement age for justices and judges on the federal level. Judges’ retirement benefits are provided for by statute. On the federal level, a retiring judge may receive, for the remainder of the judge’s life, the salary that she or he was receiving at the time of retirement. To qualify for retirement benefits, a judge must meet minimum service requirements. For example, a judge who retires at age 65 must have served 15 years as a judge in the federal court system; at age 66, 14 years; and so on until age 70 (§ 371). If a judge is forced to retire because of disability and has not qualified for benefits under § 371, the judge may still receive a full salary for life, if she or he served 10 years. If the judge served less than 10 years, she or he may receive half of her or his salary for life (28 U.S.C.A. § 372). Judges must follow ethical rules. In all jurisdictions, statutes specify that a judge may hold office only during a time of GOOD BEHAVIOR. In addit ion, judges are guided by the standards set forth in the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) Model CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. The code, which underwent substan tial revisions in 2007 by an ABA Joint Commission, establishes ethical standards for judges and provides guidance to those seeking judicial office. If a judge violates the law or an ethical rule, the judge may be removed from office. In jurisdictions in which judges are elected, they GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 56 JUDGE may be removed from office by popular vote or impeached by act of the legislature. In states where judges are appointed, the legislature or the governor is authorized to remove them from office, but only for ethical or legal violations. This is because the power of the judiciary is separate from and equal to the power of the legislative and executive branches, and unfet- tered control of the judiciary by the other two branches would upset the balance of power. Judges are distinct from magistrates. Magis- trates are court officers who are empowered by statute to decide pretrial issues and preside over minor cases. Their judicial powers are limited. In the federal court system, for example, magistrates may not preside over FELONY crimi- nal trials. They may preside over civil trials and MISDEMEANOR criminal trials, but only with the consent of all the parties (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 631–639). FURTHER READINGS ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Available online at http://www.abanet. org (accessed June 11, 2009). American Bar Association Center for Professional Respon- sibility. 2008. Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Chicago: American Bar Association. Branson, Robert D. 2009. Judges.Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill Press of Kansas City. Gunther, Gerald. 2010. Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge. New York: Oxford University Press. Posner, Richard A. 2010. The Quotable Judge Posner: Selections from Twenty-five Years of Judicial Opinions. Albany: State University of New York Press. Sunstein, Cass R., David Schadke, Lisa M. Ellman, and Andres Sawicki. 2006. Are Judges Political? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. CROSS REFERENCES Canons of Judicial Ethics; Code of Judicial Conduct; Court Opinion; Discretion in Decision Making; Judicial Action; Judicial Conduct; Judicial Review. JUDGE ADVOCATE A judge advocate is a legal adviser on the staff of a military command. A designated officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAGC) of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. The Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAGC) was created by GEORGE WASHINGTON on July 29, 1775, only 44 days after he took command of the Continental army. Since that time, the U.S. Army JAGC has grown into the largest govern- ment law firm, numbering 1,500 judge advo- cates on active duty. Judge advocates are attorneys who perform legal duties while serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. They provide legal services to their branch of the armed forces and LEGAL REPRESEN- TATION to members of the armed services. In addition, judge advocates practice international, labor, contract, environmental, tort, and administrative law. They practice in military, state, and federal courts. A judge advocate attorney does not need to be licensed to practice law in the state in which he or she practices because these individuals are part of a separate, military system of justice. Under the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, judge advocates are the central participants in a military COURT-MARTIAL (military criminal trial). A judge advocate administers the oath to other members of the court, advises the court, and acts either as a prosecutor or as a defense counsel for the accused. A judge advocate acting as defens e counsel advises the military prisoner on legal matters, protects the accused from making incriminating statements, and objects to irrelevant or improper questions asked at the military proceeding. All sentences with a penalty of dismissal, punitive discharge, confinement for a year or more, or death are subject to review by a court of military review in the office of the judge advocate general of the U.S. Army, Navy, or Air Force, depending on the branch of service to which the DEFENDANT belongs. A sentence imposed on a member of the Marine Corps is reviewed by the office of the judge advocate general of the U.S. Navy. A judge advocate is admitted to the armed services as an officer. Because the Uniform Code of Military Justice is different from civilian law in many respects, a judge advocate undergoes an orientation and then education in MILITARY LAW. The U.S. Army’s JAGC school, for example, at Charlottesville, Virginia, provides a ten-week academic course for new JAGC officers to learn about the mission of the corps and to receive an overview of military law. Each branch of the armed forces has a judge advocate general, an officer who is in charge of all judge advocates and who is responsible for all legal matters affecting that branch of the service. In the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, the judge advocate general holds the rank of major general. In the U.S. Navy this officer is a rear admiral. The judge advocate general serves as a legal adviser to the chief of staff of the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JUDGE ADVOCATE 57 . judicial office. If a judge violates the law or an ethical rule, the judge may be removed from office. In jurisdictions in which judges are elected, they GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E. trouble later; the parties must be specific about the intent of their joint venture as well as aware of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JOINT VENTURE 49 its limitations. All joint. stock companies are a form of partnership in which each member, or stockholder, is financially responsible for acts of the company. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 48