juveniles could appeal to the New Hampshire Superior Court and then to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In 1996 the state legislature changed the law to allow only one appeal by a juvenile to the state supreme court (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:29). The period of time spent in a secure reformatory can vary. In many cases, a juvenile committed to a reformatory must remain there until reaching the age of 18. However, most states allow juvenile courts to retain jurisdiction over certain juveniles past the age of 18 at the request of a prosecutor or state agency repre- sentative. These holdovers are usually juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent for a violent crime or have been adjudicated delin- quent several times in separate proceedings. Some states also allow a juvenile court to order incarceration in adult prison for juveniles who are found to be delinquent past a certain age. In New Hampshire, for example, a juvenile found to be delinquent based on a petition filed after the juvenile’s sixteenth birthday may be sent to prison. If prison time is ordered, it cannot extend beyond the maximum term allowed for adults or beyond the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:19). Some juveniles may be waived, or trans- ferred, into adult court. In this procedure, the juvenile court relinquishes its jurisdiction over the juvenile. Waiver is usually reserved for juveniles over a certain age (varying from 13 to 15) who are accused of violent or other serious crimes. On the federal level, for example, a juvenile accused of committing a violent crime that is a FELONY may be tried in adult federal court. Waiver in federal court is also authorized for a juvenile accused of violating federal firearms laws or laws prohibiting the sale of controlled substances (18 U.S.C.A. § 5032). The decision regarding relinquishing juris- diction is usually made by the juvenile court. However, most jurisdictions have statutes that automatically exclude from juvenile court juveniles charged with violent or other serious crimes. In such cases, an adult court prosecutor is required to certify to the adult court that the juvenile should, by law, appear in adult court. This certification takes place in a hearing before the adult trial court. Juveniles have the right to an attorney at this hearing and the right to present any evidence that militates against transfer. Waiver into adult court has serious con- sequences for juveniles. In adult court, juveniles face nearly all the punishments that may be inflicted on adults, including long-term impris- onment, life in prison, and in some cases, death. However, in 1988 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that no state may execute a juvenile who was under the age of 16 at the time of the crime (Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702 [1988]). The treatment of juveniles who have committed SEX OFFENSES has stirred a national debate. Each state has passed a law referred to generally as Megan’s Law, which requires convicted sex offenders to register with local police and allows communities to be notified that the offender resides in the area. A growing number of states now require juvenile sex offenders to register with law enforcement officers. Statistics suggest that the number of sex offenses committed by juvenile offenders is on the rise. However, whether these offenders should register with local law enforcement upon their release from juvenile detention facilities remains highly co ntroversial. Those individuals who oppose required registration for juvenile sex offenders argue that such registration undermines the very principals behind juvenile justice in the United States. These individuals assert that requiring juvenile sex offenders to register subverts attempts they make to live a normal life. They contend that registration reduces the possibility that the juvenile sex offender could become rehabilitated. But other individuals argue that the trend of increasingly violent crimes being committed by juveniles warrants that children accused of a crimebetreatedthesameasadults.Thatis, proponents of extending the registration re- quirement to juvenile sex offenders argue that public safety, proper punishment, and individ- ual accountability mandate that these indivi- duals continue to be tracked and watched. In addition, some argue that sex offenders, juvenile or otherwise, are untreatable, because various well-known studies demonstrate a high recidivism rate. That is, individuals who have a propensity to commit such crimes persist in perpetrating them. States such as Oklahoma and Texas have enacted bills extending their versions of Megan’s Law to juvenile sex offenders. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 118 JUVENILE LAW FURTHER READINGS Bernard, Thomas J. 1992. The Cycle of Juvenile Justice. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Burke, Michael K. 1995. “This Old Court: Abolitionists Once Again Line Up the Wrecking Ball on the Juvenile Court When All It Needs Is a Few Alterations.” University of Toledo Law Review 26. Clark, J. David. 1990. “Juveniles and the Death Penalty: A Square Peg in a Round Hole.” Mississippi College Law Review 10. Feld, Barry C. 1991. “The Transformation of the Juvenile Court.” Minnesota Law Review 75. Gardner, Martin R. 2009. Understanding Juvenile Law. Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis. Knauerhase, Evelyn C. 1990. “The Federal Circle Game: The Precarious Constitutional Status of Status Offenders.” Cooley Law Review 7. Martin, D. Ross. 1994. “Conspiratorial Children? The Intersection of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and Federal Conspiracy Law.” Boston University Law Review 74. Mills, Deborah L. 1996. “United States v. Johnson: Acknowl- edging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System from Rehabilitation to Punishment.” DePaul Law Review 45. Stetzer, William T. 1996. “The Worst of Both Worlds.” Washburn Law Journal 35. CROSS REFERENCES Child Abuse; Child Care; Child Labor Laws; Children’s Rights; Due Process; Family Law; Gault, In re; Infants; Parent and Child; Right to Counsel. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JUVENILE LAW 119 KANGAROO COURT [Slang of U.S. origin.] An unfair, biased, or hasty judicial proceeding that ends in a harsh punish- ment; an unauthorized trial conducted by indivi- duals who have taken the law into their own hands, such as those put on by vigilantes or prison inmates; a proceeding and its leaders who are considered sham, corrupt, and without regard for the law. The concept of kangaroo court dates to the early nineteenth century. Scholars trace its origin to the historical practice of itinerant judges on the U.S. frontier. These roving judges were paid on the basis of how many trials they conducted, and in some instances their salary depended on the fines from the defen- dants they convicted. The term kangaroo court comes from the image of these judges hopping from place to place, guided less by concern for justice than by the desire to wrap up as many trials as the day allowed. The term is still in common usage by defendants, writers, and scholars critical of a court or a trial. The U.S. Supreme Court has also used it. In IN RE GAULT, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), a case that established that children in juvenile court have the right to due process, the Court reasoned, “Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.” Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS once wrote, “[W]here police take matters in their own hands, seize victims, beat and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the poli ce have deprived the victim of a right under the Constitution. It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court” (Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S. Ct. 576, 95 L. Ed. 774 [1951]). KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 (10 Stat. 277) was a significant piece of legislation because it dealt with several controversial issues, including SLAVERY, weste rn expansion, and the construc- tion of a transcontinental railroad. Slavery was a widely debated divisive issue for many years preceding the Civil War and there were several attempts at conciliation. The first of these was the MISSOURI COMPROMISE OF 1820 (3 Stat. 545), which decided the slavery question in regard to the creation of two new states, Missouri and Maine. The compromise declared that Maine was to be admitted as a free state, whereas Missouri was allowed to enter the Union with no restrictions regarding slavery. Subsequently, however, Missouri entered as a slave state. The compromise also prohibited the extension of slavery north of the 36 30` latitude which established the southern border of Missouri. The COMPROMISE OF 1850 (9 Stat. 452) settled another controversy concerning slavery and K 121 instituted the doctrine of popular sovereignty, which permitted the residents of the area to decide the question. When Texas and other new territories were acquired as a result of the Mexican War in 1848, and California sought admission to the Union in 1849, the question again arose concerning the slave status of the new areas. The Compromise of 1850 provided that California be admitted as a free state and that the citizens of the new territories of New Mexico and Utah decide whether their states favored or opposed slavery, pursuant to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. In 1854 the Kansas and Nebraska territo- ries were the next areas subjected to a d ispute over slavery. Senator STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS of Illinois drafted a bill calling for the creation of two states, Kansas and Nebraska, areas he f elt were vital to the construction of a railroad to the Pacific coast. The question of slavery in these states would be decided by popular sovereignty. The reasons for Douglas’s exces- sive concern are speculative but include his support of western expansion and his belief that the popular sovereignty doctrine would cause the least disp ute; h is hope that his business interests would profit by the con- struction of a transcontinen tal railroad with a Chicago terminus and a route through the new territories; and his desire to gain favor in the South to garner support for his future presidential aspirations. In order for the Kansas-Nebraska Act to be effective, it was n ecessary to repeal the MISSOUR I COMPROMISE and its boundary restrictions on the territorial extension of slavery. The new act was opposed by antislavery forces and subject to bitter dispute in Congress. President FRANK- LIN PIERCE and a faction of Southern congress- men supported the bill and influenced its passage. The provisions of the Kansas-Nebraska Act did not lead to the peaceful settlement of the issue as intended. In Kansas, the antislavery and proslavery proponents disagreed violently, undermining the effectiveness of the popular sovereignty doctrine. Two opposing govern- ments were established, and acts of destruction NEW MEXICO TERRITORY KANSAS TERRITORY NEBRASKA TERRITORY UTAH TERRITORY WASHINGTON TERRITORY OREGON TERRITORY MINNESOTA TERRITORY Pacific Ocean Atlantic Ocean Gulf of Mexico Territory closed to slave holding Territory open to slave holding Indian Territory Slave States Free States 0 0 400 kilometers 400 miles THE LAND DIVISION OF THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT, 1854 Map of the continental United States labelled The Land Division of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 1854. ILLUSTRATION BY CHRISTINE O’BRYAN. GALE GROUP. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 122 KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT and violence ensued, including an ASSAULT on the antislavery town of Lawrence. In retaliation, abolitionist JOHN BROWN and his followers killed five settlers who advocated slavery. The phrase Bleeding Kansas was derived from this violence. The Lecompton Constitution of 1857 was drafted based upon the results of a Kansas election that offered the voters the choice of limited or unlimited slavery. This angered the abolitionists, who refused to vote. President JAMES BUCHANAN approved the Lecompton Con- stitution and encouraged its acceptance by Congress, but Douglas and his supporters vehemently opposed the admission of Kansas as a slave state. Another election was held in 1858, and the people of Kansas voted against the Lecompton document; three years later, Kansas entered the Union as a free state. FURTHER READINGS Etcheson, Nicole. 2004. Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. Nichols, Roy F. 1956. “The Kansas-Nebraska Act: A Century of Historiography.” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43 (September). SenGupta, Gunja. 2001–2002. “Bellding Kansas: A Review Essay.” Kansas History 24 (Winter). Available online at http://www.kshs.org/publicat/history/2001winter_sengupta .pdf; website home page: http://www.kshs.org (accessed September 5, 2009). CROSS REFERENCE “Kansas-Nebraska Act” (Ap pendix, Primary Document); Railroad. v KANT, IMMANUEL Immanuel Kant shook the foundations of Western ph ilosophy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This author and professor did his most important writing between 1781 and 1790 while working at the University of Königsberg, where he spent most of his life. Kant’s philosophical model not only swept aside the ideas of the so-called empiricists and rationalists who came before him, it also had a lasting effect outside of philosophy, especially in the areas of ethics and the law. In the early twent y-first century, legal scholars still debate his ideas—and their sometimes startling implications—in relation to contemporary issues. Kant was born into a lower-middle-class family in East Prussia in 1724. A gifted student, he studied in a Latin school from age eight until age sixteen, when he entered the University of Königsberg to take up theology, natural science, and philosophy. The death of his father forced him to abandon his studies in order to work as a Immanuel Kant 1724–1804 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17251725 18001800 17751775 17501750 ❖ 1724 Born, Königsberg, East Prussia ◆ 1740 Entered University of Königsberg, ◆ 1770 Appointed professor of logic and metaphysics at University of Königsberg 1781 The Critique of Pure Reason published 1775–83 American Revolution ◆◆ 1785 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals published ◆ ◆ ◆ 1789 French Revolution began 1790 Critique of Judgment published 1793 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone published 1804 Died, Königsberg, East Prussia ❖ Immanuel Kant. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION KANT, IMMANUEL 123 private tutor, and he had to wait several years before returning to complete his education. By that time he was already writing serious books. From what is called Kant’s precritical period, these early works are primarily scientific. In recognition of his talents, the university made him a lecturer and eventually a professor. He taught logic and metaphysics. Twenty years later Kant attacked the reign- ing schools of thought. In this so-called critical period, he wrote his most famous book, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Kant’s work examined the relation of experience and percep- tion: He was concerned with how people know what they know, and just as important, the proper uses of the powers of reasoning. He argued that reality can be perceived only to the extent that it complies with the aptitude of the mind that is doing the perceiving. This places one kind of limitation on what can be known. Kant saw another limitation, too: Only phenomena— things that can be experienced—are capable of being understood; everything else is unknown. The human senses, therefore, take supreme precedence in determining what is real. These theories have implications for con- ventional morality. Kant viewed God, freedom, and immortality as incomprehensible: they can only be contemplated; their existence can never be proved. Nonetheless, he argued, all three of them are important as the basis for morality. Kant believed that reason is insuffi- cient to justify moral behavior. The justification for behaving morally has to come from people’s sense of duty, which he called the categorical imperative. Kant continued to develop his philosop hy in subsequent books including Critique of Judg- ment (1790) and RELIGION within the Limits of Reasons Alone (1793). The latter enraged the government, resulting in its CENSORSHIP and an official order to Kant to write no more books about religion. Philosophers have studied Kant’s work for over two centuries, but legal thinkers outside of Europe have only widely treated it in recent years. In the late twentieth century, when many U.S. scholars of law turned to interdisciplinary studies that involved the fields of economics and textual analysis, Kant provided another model for argument. Kant’s ideas cover the foundation of law while specifically addressing property, contracts, and criminal punishment. Kant proposed that punishment should be meted out strictly without exception—because of society’s duty to seek retribution. “[I]f justice goes,” Kant wrote in 1797, “there is no longer any value in men’s living on the earth.” FURTHER READINGS Fletcher, George P. 1987. “Why Kant.” Columbia Law Review 87 (April). Gillroy, John Martin. 2002. Justice & Nature: Kantian Philosophy, Environmental Policy & the Law. Washing- ton, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press. Goodrich, Peter. 2001. “Barron’s Complaint: A Response to ‘Feminism, Aestheticism and the Limits of Law.’” Feminist Legal Studies 9 (August). Kant, Immanuel. 1991. “Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right.” In The Metaphysics of Morals. Mary Gregor, trans. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. Tunick, Mark. 2000. Practices and Principles: Approaches to Ethical and Legal Judgment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. Waldron, Jeremy. 1996. “Kant’s Legal Positivism.” Harvard Law Review 109 (May). Wright, R. George. 2002. “Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves; the Legal Implications of a Kantian Principle.” Univ. of Richmond Law Review 36 (March). CROSS REFERENCES Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Jurisprudence. v KATZENBACH, NICHOLAS DEBELLEVILLE Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach served as U.S . attorney general from 1965 to 1966, during the administration of Presid ent LYNDON B. JOHNSON. A distinguished lawyer and law professor before joining the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT in 1961, Katzen- bach played a key role in federal efforts to end racial segregation in the South. Katzenbach was born January 17, 1922, in Philadelphia and was raised in New Jersey. His father, Edward L. Katzenbach, was a lawyer who served as attorney general of New Jersey and ran unsuccessfully for governor of New Jersey. Katzenbach graduated from a private high school and in 1941 enlisted in the Army Air Force. During WORLD WAR II his bomber was shot down over north Africa, and he became a prisoner of war. He read so many books while a prisoner that following his repatriation in 1944, Princeton University allowed him to graduate two years early. After graduating in 1945, he earned a law degree at Yale Law School. In 1947 Katzenbach was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University in England. Katzenbach returned to the United States in 1949 and was admitted to the New Jersey bar in THE GREATEST PROBLEM FOR THE HUMAN SPECIES , THE SOLUTION OF WHICH NATURE COMPELS HIM TO SEEK , IS THAT OF ATTAINING A CIVIL SOCIETY WHICH CAN ADMINISTER JUSTICE UNIVERSALLY . —IMMANUEL KANT GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 124 KATZENBACH, NICHOLAS DEBELLEVILLE 1950. He was briefly an associate in his father’s law firm before becoming in 1950 an attorney- adviser in the Office of General Counsel to the Secretary of the Air Force. During this period, Katzenbach first became acquainted with Johnson, then a senator from Texas. In 1952 Katzenbach left Washington, D.C., to teach law at Yale. In 1956 he moved to the University of Chicago Law School as a professor of law. Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY ap- pointed Katzenbach as assistant attorney general of the Office of Legal Counsel in 1961 and promoted him to deputy attorney general in 1962. Katzenbach soon became a national figure, playing a prominent role in federal desegregation efforts in the South. In October 1962 JAMES H. MEREDITH, an African American, attempted to register for classes at the all-white University of Mississippi, in Oxford. Governor Ross Barnett pledged defiance of a federal court order mandating that Meredith be allowed to register. Katzenbach went to Oxford and directed U.S. marshals to protect Meredith as he registered. Riots erupted, and before federal troops arrived to restore order, Katzenbach ordered the marshals to fire tear gas into the unruly crowds. In 1963 Alabama Governor GEORGE WALLACE pledged to resist the integration of the Univer- sity of Alabama. Wallace confronted Katzen- bach at the university and refused to allow him to register James Hood and Vivian Malone. The nationally televised scene was a symbolic last stand for Wallace and other advocates of racial segregation. Once President JOHN F. KENNEDY ordered that state troops were to come under federal control to enforce the court order, Wallace ended his defiance. Following the ASSASSINATION of John F. Kennedy, President Johnson announced his determination to pass a strong CIVIL RIGHTS act that would end racial discrimination in employ- ment, education, and other spheres of life. Katzenbach was Johnson’s congressional liaison, working with Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY (D-Minn.) and Senate minority leader Everett M. Dirksen (R-Ill.) to achieve a compromise that would ensure the act’s final passage. The result was the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a et seq.). The following year Katzenbach drafted the VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973 et seq.), which prohibits states from imposing voting qualifica- tions based on race, color, or membership in a language minority group. This legislation changed the South, as thousands of African Americans were allowed to register to vote for the first time. Nicholas Katzenbach. AP IMAGES Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach 1922– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1925 2000 1975 1950 ❖ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1922 Born, Philadelphia, Pa. 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 1941–44 Served in Army Air Force 1947 Graduated from Yale Law School 1952–61 Taught at Yale and Univ. of Chicago Law Schools 1961 Joined U.S. attorney general’s office 1964 Served as Johnson’s congressional liaison on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 1966–69 Served as undersecretary of state 1965–66 Served as U.S. attorney general 1965 Drafted Voting Rights Act of 1965 1986 Returned to private practice in Morristown, N.J. 2002 Joined board of WorldCom in rebuilding effort following bankruptcy 2002 WorldCom filed largest bankruptcy in U.S. history; Bruce Willis movie Hart’s War based on Katzenbach’s war experiences 2008 Some of It Was Fun published I OBJECT TO SAYING WE ARE AT WAR HERE [IN VIETNAM], ALTHOUGH I REALIZE IN THE POPULAR SENSE THAT MAKES ME PERHAPS LOOK FOOLISH . —NICHOLAS KATZENBACH GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION KATZENBACH, NICHOLAS DEBELLEVILLE 125 President Johnson appointed Katzenbach as attorney general in February 1965. Katzen- bach continued his work on civil rights legis- lation and enforcement. In October 1966, Johnson, who was increasingly preoccupied with the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, named Katzenbach as undersecretary of state. In that position, Katzenbach became an admin- istration spokesperson for Johnson’s Vietnam policies, defending them before Congress on a regular basis. Katzenbach left government at the end of the Johnson administration in January 1969, and joined International Business Machines (IBM), a large manufacturer that dominated the U.S. computer market. The DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE had filed an antitrust lawsuit against IBM, and Katzenbach was brought into the corporation to lead the fight against it. For the next 13 years, Katzenbach and a host of attorneys fought the lawsuit, which ultimately was dismissed. In 1986 Katzenbach left IBM and returned to the PRACTICE OF LAW in Morristown, New Jersey. Katzenbach has remained active in matters relating to law and politics. In the 1990s Katzenbach and former attorney general RICHARD THORNBURGH advocated for the release of Chinese dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan. He was a witness in the IMPEACHMENT trial of President BILL CLINTON in 1998. In 2000 Katzenbach filed an amicus brief supporting Microsoft in its defense of an antitrust lawsuit brought by the Department of Justice. In 2002 Katzenbach was named to the board of directors and to a special investigative committee of tele- communications giant WorldCom, which was reorganizing after f iling for Chap ter 11 BANKRUPTC Y. In 2004 Ka tzenbach was named non-executive chairman of telecommunications company MCI (which later merged with Verizon). In 2008 Katzenbach’s book, Some of It Was Fun: Working with RFK and LBJ was published. In its review, Publisher’s Weekly stated that the tales, most of which had never been told, were “worth the price of admission.” FURTHER READINGS Branch, Taylor. 1988. Parting the Waters. New York: Simon & Schuster. O’Neill, William L. 1971. Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960s. New York: Quadrangle Books. “WorldCom Appoints Directors to Oversee Investigation.” 2002. InfoWorld Media. (July 22). v KEARSE, AMALYA LYLE Amalya Lyle Kearse is a judge with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Kearse was born June 11, 1937, in Vauxhall, New Jersey. Her parents encouraged Kearse to develop her considerable intellect. Her father, the postmaster in her hometown, wanted to become a lawyer, but the Depression prevented him from pursuing his dream. Her mother was a medical doctor who later became an adminis- trator in an antipoverty program. Kearse at- tended Wellesley College, where she earned her bachelor’s degree in philosophy in 1959. “I can trace [the decision to become a litigator] back to a course in INTERNATIONAL LAW at Wellesley,” she Amalya Lyle Kearse 1937– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1935 2000 1975 1950 ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1937 Born, Vauxhall, N.J. 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1962 Earned J.D.; joined Hughes Hubbard & Reed 1959 Earned B.A. degree from Wellesley College 1969 Made partner at HHR; first African American woman to be made partner of a major Wall Street firm 1977–79 Served on board of directors of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 1980 Wrote majority opinion in U.S. v. Taborda; joined majority in overturning lower court's ruling in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation 1991 Considered for U.S. Supreme Court nomination to replace Thurgood Marshall 1998 Wrote majority opinion upholding use of False Claims Act by citizen whistleblowers to sue states for cheating the federal government, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens 1978–79 Served on board of directors of National Urban League 2002 Took senior status on U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2004 Inducted into American Contract Bridge League Hall of Fame 2000 Supreme Court overturned decision in Stevens, narrowing citizen use of False Claims Act 1979– Served on U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 126 KEARSE, AMALYA LYLE said. “There was a MOOT COURT, and I found that very enjoyable.” Kearse then enrolled at the University of Michigan Law School, and she graduated cum laude in 1962. Kearse began her legal career with the Wall Street firm of Hughes, Hubbard, and Reed. After seven years of distinguished and diligent work, she was named a partner, becoming the first black female partner in a major Wall Street firm. Her colleagues have praised her for her incisive analytical skills. When asked about Kearse’s qualifications, a senior partner at the Hughes, Hubbard firm said, “She became a partner here not because she is a woman, not because she is a black, but because she is just so damned good—no question about it.” Kearse’s outstanding talents eventually came to the attention of President JIMMY CARTER,who named her to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1979. She is the first black woman to serve on that court. During her tenure she has decided many influential cases. In 1980 she wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980), a case that concluded that the use of a high-powered telescope to observe drug activity inside an apartment without a warrant consti- tuted an unreasonable search and violated the FOURTH AMENDMENT. In other cases, she joined the majority in upholding a New York state ban on school prayers (Brandon v. Board of Education of Guilderland Central School District, 635 F.2d 971 [2d Cir. 1980]) and helped overturn a lower court’s ruling that Vietnam veterans could sue the manufacturers of Agent Orange for alleged damage (In re “Agent Orange” PRODUCT LIABILITY Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 [2d Cir. 1980]). Kearse’s name has been on the list of potential nominees to fill vacancies on the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1991 she was consid- ered for the vacancy created by the retirement of Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL. After President George H. W. Bush’s controversial nomination of CLARENCE THOMAS, who was eventually con- firmed notwithstanding allegations that he had sexually harassed a former coworker, an opin- ion article in the New York Times urged Bush to nominate Kearse in Thoma s’s place. The article noted that, because of her years of distinguished service on the court of appeals, Kearse is “among the four or five persons most qualified for the High Court.” The article concluded that “what is needed is an appointment that can unify the country is the assurance that the next Supreme Court nominee is a person of unquestioned excellence. Judge Kearse is that person” (New York Times, October 10, 1991). Kearse was considered for the Supreme Court again in 1994 when President BILL CLINTON was evaluating possible replacements for retiring justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN. Earlier, in 1992, Clinton had considered her for the post of attorney general. Kearse is a member of the American Law Institute and a fellow in the American College of Trial Lawyers. She has been an adjunct lecturer at New York University Law School, a member of the Executive Committee of the Lawyers’ Committee for CIVIL RIGHTS under Law, and a member of the President’s Commission for Selection of Judges. She has also served on the boards of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s Legal Defense and Education Fund and the NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE . Kearse has received many awards and honors, including the ORDER OF THE COIF and the Jason L. Honigman Award for outstanding contribution to a LAW REVIEW editorial board. In 1999 Kearse wrote the majority opinion in a false claims case where a former Vermont Agency of Natural Resources attorney alleged that the agency had submitted false claims in regard to several grant programs. The court found that the ELEVENTH AMENDMENT did not bar the suit. The United States Supreme Court issued a 7–2 decision in the case, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), holding that private individuals have standing to bring so- called whistle-blower suits in federal court but that states cannot be included in the definition of person s who can be sued under the law. The Court did not explicitly decide whether the Eleventh Amendment protects states from being sued under the law. Kearse is a top-rated bridge player who has written several books about the game. She has won the Women’ s Pairs Bridge Championship twice, its World Division once, and was the National Women’s Teams Bridge Champion in 1987, 1990, and 1991. She was named Bridge Personality of the Year by the International Bridge Press Association in 1980. FURTHER READINGS Brune, Tom, and Elaine S. Povich. 2002. “Fight Looms over Judge Nominee.” 2002. Newsday (April 15). THE VERY FACT THAT A PERSON IS IN HIS OWN HOME RAISES A REASONABLE INFERENCE THAT HE INTENDS TO HAVE PRIVACY , AND IF THAT INFERENCE IS BORNE OUT BY HIS ACTIONS , SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO RESPECT HIS PRIVACY . —AMALYA LYLE KEARSE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION KEARSE, AMALYA LYLE 127 . liaison on the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 1 966 69 Served as undersecretary of state 1 965 66 Served as U.S. attorney general 1 965 Drafted Voting Rights Act of 1 965 19 86 Returned to private practice in. extending their versions of Megan’s Law to juvenile sex offenders. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 118 JUVENILE LAW FURTHER READINGS Bernard, Thomas J. 1992. The Cycle of Juvenile Justice teach law at Yale. In 19 56 he moved to the University of Chicago Law School as a professor of law. Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY ap- pointed Katzenbach as assistant attorney general of the Office