books, including The Pew to the Pulpit, The Twentieth Century from Another Viewpoint, American Citizenship, and The United States: A Christian Nation. He felt strongly that judges have a moral obligation to use their lofty position to lead rather than simply observe. “It is one thing,” he once said, “to fail of reaching your ideal. It is an entirely different thing to deliberately turn your back on it.” Brewer died in Washington, D.C., on March 28, 1910. FURTHER READINGS Brodhead, Michael J. 1994. David J. Brewer: The Life of a Supreme Court Justice, 1837–1910. Carbondale: South- ern Illinois Univ. Press. Hylton, Joseph Gordon. 1994. “David Josiah Brewer: A Conservative Justice Reconsidered.” In Journal of Supreme Court History. 45–64. Schwartz, Bernard. 1995. A History of the Supreme Court. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. v BREWSTER, BENJAMIN HARRIS Benjamin Harris Brewster was the 37th attorney general of the United States, serving from 1881 to 1885 in the administration of President CHESTER ARTHUR. Previously, Brewster was appointed by President JAMES POLK as a special COMMISSIONER for the ADJUDICATION of claims by the members of the Cherokee Indian tribe against the U. S. government. Brewster was born in Salem County, New Jersey, on October 13, 1816. In 1834 he graduated from Princeton College. Like many other aspiring lawyers of the period, Brewster did not attend law school. Instead these aspirants “read law” by performing various clerical and administrative duties for a lawyer who had already been admitted to the bar. Brewster studied under a Philadelphia attorney named Eli Price. After mastering the necessary requirements, Brewster took and passed the bar exam in 1838. After his admittance to the Pennsylvania bar, he continued to practice law in Philadelphia. Although he had established a lucrative law practice, Brewster, like many other ambitious young lawyers his age, became interested in politics and government service. Brewster had a personal connection, his father-in-law, Robert J. Walker. In the decade between 1835 and 1845, Walker had served as the U.S. senator from Mississippi. In 1845, Walker was appointed by President James Polk to be secretary of the Treasury. Twelve years later, Walker would serve as governor of the Territory of Kansas. It was through Walker that Brewster became a special commissioner for the adjudication of claims by the Cherokee Indians against the federal government. In 1846 Walker convinced President Polk to appoint his son-in-law to the position. The Cherokee had established a republican form of government called the Cherokee Nation. In the years leading up to the early nineteenth century, the Cherokee tribe was one of the most progressive and well-to-do tribes in North America. The Cherokee lived in the southeastern part of the country on lands that subsequently whites came to define as the states of North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia and Alabama. As time went on, more and more white settlers moved into the area claiming land that belonged to the Cherokee Nation. Some Cherokee leaders signed the Treaty of New Enchola in 1835 that agreed to their removal to land west of the Mississippi River. A number of Cherokee opposed the relocation and under the leadership of Chief JOHN ROSS tried to resist. In 1838 President ANDREW JACKSON sent U.S. troops to forcibly move the Indians to the new land, the dry plains of the area that later ▼▼ ▼▼ Benjamin Harris Brewster 1816–1888 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1816 Born, Salem County, N.J. 1831–32 U.S. Supreme Court ruled on tribal sovereignty issues in Cherokee Cases 1834 Graduated from Princeton College 1846 Appointed to adjudicate Cherokee claims against U.S. government 1838 Admitted to Pennsylvania bar 1861–65 Civil War 1881–85 Served as U.S. attorney general 1888 Died, Philadelphia, Pa. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 118 BREWSTER, BENJAMIN HARRIS became Oklahoma. The brutal relocation jour- ney of between 13,000 and 17,000 people that became known as the Trail of Tears took place over winter and resulted in the deaths of thousands of Cherokee. The leaders of those who survived regrouped as the Cherokee Nation and sought to make claims against the federal government concern- ing the forced relocation and their losses. As special commissioner in 1846, Brewster reviewed the claims and granted some relief before returning to his law practice in Philadelphia. By now a prominent Pennsylvania attorney with strong connections to the REPUBLICAN PARTY, Brewster once again pursued political aspira- tions. In 1867 he was appointed by Governor Geary to be attorney general for the state of Pennsylvania. After a brief tenure, Brewster returned to private practice. In September of 1881, following the ASSASSI- NATION of JAMES GARFIELD, Vice-President Chester Arthur succeeded Garfield as president. In December of that year, Garfield’s attorney general, ISAAC MACVEAGH, resigned so that the new president could make his own appoint- ment. Arthur, who had practiced law in New York, appointed Brewster. Many had anticipated that Arthur would continue as a supporter of the spoils system, whereby loyal party workers were given appoin- tive office without attention to merit. Arthur surprised the analysts and the electorate by promoting government reform. Brewster backed the president, and in 1883, Congress enacted the Pendleton Act, which provided for CIVIL SERVICE reform and helped to reduce the primacy of the spoils system. Brewster also vigorously prosecuted the Star Route Trials, a group of cases involving several prominent Republicans who were found guilty of FRAUDULENT activities concerning the United States Post Office Department. Brewster continued his work as attorney general until Grover Cleveland was elected president in 1884. In 1885 Brewster returned to Pennsylvania. He died in Philadelphia on April 4, 1888. FURTHER READINGS Hall, Kermit L. 2008. The Magic Mirror: Law in American History. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Justice Department. 1985. Attorneys General of the United States, 1789–1985. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Offfice. Available online at http://www.usdoj. gov/ag/attygeneraldate.html; website home page: http:// www.usdoj.gov (accessed July 8, 2009). U.S. Department of State. “Indian Treaties and the Removal Act of 1830.” Available online at http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/ho/time/dwe/16338.htm; website home page: http://www.state.gov (accessed July 9, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Attorney General; Cherokee Cases; Native American Rights. v BREYER, STEPHEN GERALD As an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, STEPHEN BREYER is regarded as a judicial moderate. The former law professor and Senate counsel locates his approach to the law in a deep pragmatism: He distrusts broad legal theory, endorses judicial restraint, and wants his legal opinions to be clear enough for a high-school student to read. His reputation for forging consensus earned him a nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1980, on which he later served as chief of the court from 1990 to 1994. During the 1980s he also helped to shape a far-reaching and controversial revision of criminal SENTENCING guidelines. In April 1994 , President BILL CLINTON nominated Breyer to replace the outgoing U.S. Supreme Court associate justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN, and his appointment was confirmed in July 1994. Breyer was born on August 15, 1938, in San Francisco. His attorney father and politi- cally active mother set him on a course for achievement. He earned an A.B. from Stanford University in 1959, followed by a B.A. in philosophy and economics at Oxford University in England. He received a law degree from Harvard Law School in 1964, graduating magna cum laude. Breyer clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG III from 1964 to 1965 and helped to write the justice’s opinion in the landma rk right-to-privacy case, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965). In 1967 Breyer embarked on dual careers in academia and government. He taught courses in antitrust, administrative law, and economic regulation at his alma mater, Harvard Law School, while finishing a two-year appointment as a special assistant to the Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Antitrust. He gained further prominence in 1973 by serving on the WATERGATE Special Prosecution Force, which pursued the possibility of impeaching President AS AN APPELLATE JUDGE ,ISET A GOAL OF TRYING TO WRITE MY OPINIONS SO THAT A HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT [CAN] UNDER- STAND THE LAW , AS REVEALED IN THAT OPINION —BOTH IN TERMS OF BASIC FAIRNESS AND IN TERMS OF HELPING PEOPLE LEAD DECENT , PRODUCTIVE LIVES. —STEPHEN G. BREYER GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BREYER, STEPHEN GERALD 119 RICHARD M. NIXON. As a senior aide to Senator EDWARD M. KENNEDY (D-Mass.) in the 1970s and chief counsel to the SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE from 1979 to 1980, Breyer crafted deregulation of the airline and trucking industries while also working on prison reform, judicial confirma- tions, and fair-housing law. He became known for an empirical approach to law, one that was less swayed by ideology than by careful balanc- ing of facts. By 1980 Breyer was well respected by liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Although he had been an aide to the liberal Senator Kennedy, he was adept at promoting agreement between such political opposites as Kennedy and Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah). This record served Breyer well when President JIMMY CARTER nominated him to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. After Carter lost the 1980 election to RONALD REAGAN,the Republicans scrapped all but one of Carter’s pending judicial appointments, as is common in an incoming administration. Breyer’s appoint- ment was allowed to go through. Breyer’s record on the Court of Appeals was generally moderate. In a 1983 environmental regulatory case, he blocked the INTERIOR DEPART- MENT from auctioning oil-drilling rights in the North Atlantic without giving ample consider- ation to alternative proposals (Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F. 2d 946 [1st Cir. 1983]). In the area of ABORTION, he voted to uphold a Massachusetts parental-notification law (Planned Parenthood of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 868 F. 2d 459 [1st Cir. 1983]). But he joined the majority on the First Circuit in striking down the GEORGE H.W. BUSH Adminis- tration’s ban on abortion counseling at family planning clinics funded by the federal govern- ment (Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Secre- tary of Health and Human Services, 899 F. 2d 53 [1st Cir. 1990]). Appointed to the U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION in 1985, Breyer undertook the job of revising criminal-sentencing guidelines. Against strong opposition, he persuaded the other seven judges on the panel to base the guidelines on national averages. The changes, which took effect in 1987, have proven controversial. Critics charge Stephen Gerald Breyer 1938– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1930 2000 1975 1950 ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ 1938 Born, San Francisco, Calif. 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 1959 Began two years as Marshall Scholar at Oxford University in England 1964–65 Clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg 1965–67 Served as special assistant to assistant U.S. attorney general 1967 Joined Harvard Law School faculty 1973 Served as assistant special prosecutor, Watergate Special Prosecution Force 1974–75 Served as special counsel, U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices 1980 Appointed to U.S. Court of Appeals for First Circuit 1979–80 Served as chief counsel, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee 1985–89 Served as member of U.S. Sentencing Commission 1990 Became chief justice of the First Circuit 1994 Nominated to Supreme Court by President Clinton 2000 Wrote dissent in Bush v. Gore, argued for new Florida recount 2002 Wrote dissent in landmark school vouchers decision Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 2000 Presidential election result uncertain due to disputed Florida vote count, recount halted by U.S. Supreme Court with 5–4 vote in Bush v. Gore 2005 Active Liberty published ◆ Stephen G. Breyer. STEVE PETTEWAY, COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 120 BREYER, STEPHEN GERALD that they have too tightly bound judges and produced inequitable results for minority defendants. In response, Breyer has argued that the guidelines have built-in flexibility that allows judges to influence the Sentencing Com- mission in future revisions. President Clinton twice sought Breyer for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although close to choosing him in 1993, Clinton instead selected RUTH BADER GINSBURG after Breyer became the target of criticism for late payments on SOCIAL SECURITY taxes for a part-time housekeeper. When a second vacancy on the Court opened in 1994, Clinton returned to Breyer. The president compared his intellectual vigor to that of Judge Learned Hand, the renowned appellate judge of the 1920s and 1930s. Minor opposition met the nomination. Critics questioned whether Breyer’s 1993 book Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation went too far in attacking govern- ment regulation. Others raised doubts about his investment judgment in losing money in the early 1990s in the Lloyd’s of London scandal, Britain’s largest insurance disaster ever. At the same time, however, he received praise for his past achievements and for a strong commitment to FIRST AMENDMENT rights. The Senate easily confirmed his appointment on July 29, 1994, by a vote of 87–9. After two years on the Court, Breyer had aligned himself with the Court’s moderates. He disse nted when the majority struck down a 1990 federal law that prohibited the carrying of handguns outside schools, arguing that protect- ing schools should fall under Congress’s power to regulate interstate COMMERCE (United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 [1995]). He also dissented from the Court’s ruling in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996), which struck down the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act for violating states’ rights. In a major victory for GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS , Breyer joined the majority in overturning Colorado’s Amendment 2, which would have removed all legal protection for homosexuals against discrimination ( ROMER V. EVANS, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 [1996]). And in a significant First Amendment decision, Breyer wrote the PLURALITY opinion declaring that the government may not require cable TV operators to segregate and block leased access channels that feature offensive or inde- cent programming (Denver Area CONSORTIUM v. Federal Communications Commission, 116 S. Ct. 2374 [1996]). Recent Opinions Justice Breyer’s opinions have defied labels such as “conservative” or “liberal.” Instead, his opinions continue to reflect his rather centrist approach to most issues. In fact, some observers believe that Breyer represents the ideological center of the court, notwithstanding statistics showing that Breyer tends to side most often with the more “liberal” members of the Court (associate justices JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and DAVID SOUTER) and least often with the more “conservative” members of the Court (Chief Justice WILLIAM REHNQUIST and associate justices ANTONIN SCALIA, Sandra Day O’Connor, and ANTHONY KENNEDY). Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L. Ed. 2d 365 (2000), surprised many observers who tend to classify Breyer as “liberal” justice who consistently votes in favor of criminal defen- dants’ rights. In Bond the Court examined the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches was violated when a Border Patrol agent, while checking the IMMIGRATION status of passengers on a bus, squeezed a canvas bag that was located in the compartment above a bus passenger’s seat. The passenger admitted that the bag was his and allowed the agent to open it, revealing a “brick” of methamphetamine. A majority of the court ruled that the search was illegal, noting that the traveler’s luggage was a personal “effect” as defined in the FOURTH AMENDMENT , and that the passenger exhibited an actual expectation of privacy in that “effect” by using an opaque bag and placing the bag directly over his seat. In his dissent, Justice Breyer criticized what he perceived as the shortsightedness of the majority’s opinion, arguing that the court’s ruling would lead to a constitutional jurisprudence of “squeezes,” thereby complicating further already complex Fourth Amendment law. A few days later, Breyer wrote a 5–4 majority opinion that overturned a Nebraska statute criminalizing “partial birth abortions,” a second-trimester procedure in which, according to the statute, a physician “partially delivers GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BREYER, STEPHEN GERALD 121 vaginally a living unborn child before killing it.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743 (2000). The Nebraska statute violated the Constit ution for at least two independent reasons, Breyer wrote. First, the statute lacked any exception for the preservation of the health of the mother. The Court had previously made clear that a state may promote, but not endanger, a woman’s health when it regulates the methods of abortion. Second, Justice Breyer stated, the statute imposed an undue burden on a woman’s ability to have an abortion, finding that the Nebraska statute banned an abortion procedure that was used as many as 5,000 times per year in the United States. (Breyer made no finding as to how often the procedure is used in Nebraska.) Breyer refused to revisit the Court’s earlier determinations and redeterminations that the federal Constitution offers basic protection guaranteeing women’s right to procreative freedom. In 2002 Breyer wrote a majority opinion clarifying an earlier U.S. Supreme Court deci- sion concerning the constitutionality of civil- commitment procedures for so-called “sexual predators.” In Kansas v. Hendr icks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997), the Court had ruled that a convicted sex offender who satisfies the statutory definition of a sexual predator could be involuntarily committed to a mental-health institution fol- lowing his or her release from prison for the sex offense without violating the DOUBLE JEOPARDY Clause to the FIFTH AMENDMENT of the U.S. Constitution, even if the sex offender is committed based on some of the same evidence that was used earlier to convict him or her. In Hendricks, the Court wrote that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to subsequent prosecutions or punishments in criminal pro- ceedings, and the sexual-predator law contem- plated commitment by civil proceedings. In Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S. Ct. 867, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2002), Breyer wrote a majority opinion that qualified Hendricks by ruling that before a convicted sex offender may be civilly committed as a sexual predator following his or her release from prison, the state must prove that the sex offender lacks some control over his or her behavior. The lack- of-control element, Breyer said, would allow the state to better distinguish between dangerous sexual offenders, whom it seeks to commit through civil proceedings, and other dangerous persons who are more appropriately dealt with through criminal proceedings. The federal Constitution prohibits civil commitment pro- ceedings from becoming a “mechanism” for retribution or general deterrence, Breyer em- phasized. One of Breyer’s most well-known opinions came in a dissenting role in one of the most controversial cases in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court. In BUSH V. GORE, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525, 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2000), seven justices (including Breyer) concluded that the process devised by the Florida Supreme Court to recount the popular vote in the 2000 presidential election violated the EQUAL PROTEC- TION Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. However, only five justices agreed that there was insufficient time to fashion a remedy that would fairly and lawfully allow the votes of Florida residents to be accurately counted for either Republican Presidential candidate GEORGE W . BUSH of Texas and Democratic candidate ALBERT GORE of Tennessee. As a result, the nation’s high court effectively ordered the Florida recount to stop, which meant that Bush would be become the forty-third PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES , as he was leading in Florida when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion, and Florida’s 25 electoral votes were enough for him to win in the ELECTORAL COLLEGE. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer proposed sending the case back to Florida’s Supreme Court so that it could devise an order for “a constitutionally proper contest” by which to decide the winner. The majority’s opinion, Breyer wrote, placed too much emphasis on equal protection and not enough emphasis on the right to vote. Breyer chastised the majority for finding an equal protection violation but offering no remedy to correct it. “An appropri- ate remedy,” Breyer wrote, “would be to remand this case with instructions that, even at this late date, would permit the Florida Supreme Court to require recounting all under- counted votes in Florida and to do so in accordance with a single uniform standard.” In public speeches, Breyer often refers to his grandfather, who immigrated to St. Paul, Minnesota, from Poland, and their Jewish heritage. Breyer delivered an address at the Capital Rotunda marking Yom Hashoah 1996, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 122 BREYER, STEPHEN GERALD and spoke stirringly of the historic significance of the Nuremberg trial half a century earlier and the participation as PROSECUTOR of then Supreme Court Justice ROBERT JACKSON. Under the influence of Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, the Supreme Court for the first time in its history took an official holiday for Yom Kippur on October 6, 2003, delaying the formal opening of the Court from that date, which was the first Monday in October. Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, Breyer’s latest book, was published in 2005. FURTHER READINGS Breyer, Stephen G. 2005. Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution. New York: Knopf. ———. 1992. Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. “Court: ‘Animus’ in Colo. Gay Law.” 1996. National Law Journal 18 (June 3). “Court Decisions.” 1996. National Law Journal 18 (July 15). Joyce, Walter E. 1996. “The Early Constitutional Jurispru- dence of Justice Stephen G. Breyer: A Study of the Justice’s First Year on the United States Supreme Court.” Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal 7. Kersch, Ken I. 2003. “The Synthetic Progressivism of Stephen G. Breyer.” Rehnquist Justice: Understanding the Court Dynamic. Edited by Earl M. Maltz. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. Lenine, Eric J., and Richard J. Williams Jr. 1994. “Justice Stephen G. Breyer.” Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal 5. Noble, Kenneth B. 1987. “Same Crime, Same Time (United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines).” Los Angeles Daily Journal 100. Pierce, Richard J. 1995. “Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist.” Administrative Law Journal of the American University (winter). BRIBERY The offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of influencing the action of an official in the discharge of his or her public or legal duties. The expectation of a particular voluntary action in return is w hat makes the difference between a bribe and a private demonstration of goodwill. To offer or provide payment in order to persuade someone with a responsibility to betray that responsibility is known as seeking UNDUE INFLUENCE over that person’s actions. When someone with power seeks payment in exchange for certain actions, that person is said to be peddling influence. Regardle ss of who initiates the deal, either party to an act of bribery can be found guilty of the crime independently of the other. A bribe can consist of immediate cash or of personal favors, a promise of later payment, or anything else the recipient views as valuable. When the U.S. military threatened to cancel a Texas relocation company’s contracts to move families to and from military bases, the company allegedly gave four representatives in Congress an all-expenses-paid weekend in Las Vegas in January 1989, and $2,500 in speaking fees. The former president of the company was indicted by a federal GRAND JURY in 1994 on bribery charges for both gifts. No written agreement is necessary to prove the crime of bribery, but usually a PROSECUTOR must show corrupt intent. Bribery charges may involve public officials or private individuals. In the world of professional sports, for example, one boxer might offer another a payoff to deliberately lose an important fight. In the corporate arena, a company could bribe employ- ees of a rival company for recruitment services or other actions at odds with their employer’s interests. Even when public officials are in- volved, a bribe does not need to be harmful to the PUBLIC INTEREST in order to be illegal. When a public official accepts a bribe, he or she creates a CONFLICT OF INTEREST. That is, the official cann ot accommodate the interests of another party without compromising the re- sponsibilities of her or his position. This principle was illustrated in the case of former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich. In 2008, Blagojevich was investigated and charged by federal authorities for soliciting money in exchange for influence in the appointment of the former U.S. Senate seat vacated by BARACK OBAMA after Obama was elected as president. Blagojevich became the focus of intense media scrutiny, and the Illinois Senate in 2009 voted unanimously to remove him from office. There is not always consensus over what counts as a bribe. In many states and at the federal level, certain gifts and campaign con- tributions are not considered bribes and do not draw prosecution unless they can be linked to evidence of undue influence. In this regard, negative public perception of private contribu- tions to elected officials as payola has caused most states to establish legislative ethics com- mittees to review the public-private relationships of house and senate members. Furthe rmore, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BRIBERY 123 both houses of the U.S. Congress passed legislation in 1994 restricting gifts to no more than $20 in value. The Supreme Court further clarified the law by setting standards for federal bribery statutes in United States v. Sun Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 119 S. Ct. 1402, 143 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999). This case grew out of the prosecution of Mike Espy, Secretary of Agriculture in the Clinton administration, for allegedly accepting bribes. After Espy was acquitted of all charges, the INDEPENDENT COUNSEL charged Sun Diamond Growers, a trade association for a large agricultural cooperative, with violating a federal gratuities law that prohibits giving gifts to public officials in exchange for favorable government actions. After Sun Diamond was convicted of the charges it took its case to the Supreme Court. The court concluded that a person did not violate the law merely by giving a GIFT to a public official. Prosecutors must show that there was a connection between a specific official act in the past or future and the gift. Justice ANTONIN SCALIA noted that if the government did not have to prove this linkage then a token gift such as the presentation of a sports jersey by a championship team to the president could be regarded as a criminal act. The court also noted differences in various federal bribery statutes that included broad prohibitions. The language of the gratuities statute did not reveal a similar intent by Congress; instead, the court viewed this law as one strand of a complicated web of laws and regulations addre ssing official behavior. It is common for both the recipient and the provider of a bribe to be accused, although bribery is not a joint offense—that is, one person’s guilt does not affect the other’s. Such was the case when a popular Massachusetts state senator allegedly accepted monthly payments from an investment BROKER in exchange for trying to persuade state officials to send state PENSION business to the broker. The legislator and the broker were both indicted on MISDE- MEANOR charges in early 1995. U.S. companies that engage in international bribery can become targets of investigation at home. In January 1995, a former sales director of Lockheed Corporation pleaded guilty to violating the federal Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 et seq. Allen R. Love told a U.S. district court that he had paid and helped to cover up a bribe to an Egyptian politician for arranging Egypt’s 1989 purchase of three Lockheed transport planes. Congress adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 to outlaw payments that are intended to win contracts from foreign officials. Ironically, the law’s passage was trig- gered by TESTIMONY from a former vice president of the same Lockheed Corporation at a U.S. congressional hearing in 1976. In that case, the company’s vice president admitted to bribing the prime minister of Japan with more than $1.9 million in the early 1970s, so that Japan would buy Lockheed’s TriStar wide-body jets. The severity of bribery can reach the FELONY level, punishable by a fine, IMPRISONMENT,orboth. Charges are sometimes reduced in exchange for helping to convict accomplices. For instance, in June 1994, Love pleaded innocent to felony charges of bribery and CONSPIRACY.Later,he pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor count of “indirectly” conspiring, as part of a PLEA agreement in which he agreed to testify against the corpora- tion itself, which was also a DEFENDANT. The international sports community was rocked by a bribery scandal involving the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah. Two officials of the Utah committee that secured the games were indicted in 2000 on charges of wire and MAIL FRAUD, conspiracy, and interstate travel in aid of RACKETEERING. They were charged with paying an official of the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) to help influence the selection of Salt Lake City by the Interna- tional Olympic Committee (IOC). The USOC official who received the bribes later pleaded guilty to several criminal charges including the accepting of a bribe. Federal prosecutors contended that the two officials had paid $1 million to influence votes of several IOC members. In addition, the y had allegedly diverted some $130,000 of the bid committee’s income and had altered books and created false contracts to conceal their actions. The two officials denied that they had done anything wrong, contending that the payments were intended as grants and scholarships for poor athletes. Following the indictments, t en members of the IOC either resigned or were expelled from the organization, and many reforms were undertaken to prevent bribery. The USOC also authorized an independent review of its practices. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 124 BRIBERY The two Utah officials successfully challenged the bribery charges. In July 2001, a federal judge dismissed the bribery charges, finding that a Utah bribery statute could not be applied to the defendants’ actions. In December 2001, the judge dismissed the remaining criminal counts. FURTHER READINGS Hornick, Ed. “Illinois Senators Vote to Oust Blagojevich from Office.” CNN.com. Available online at http:// edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/29/illinois.gover- nor/index.html; website homepage: http://edition.cnn. com/POLITICS/index.html (accessed June 14, 2009). McChesney, Fred S. 1997. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, MA: University of Harvard Press. Noonan, John Thomas. 1984. Bribes. New York: Macmillan. Ponce, Phil. “Cleaning House.” PBS: the Online NewsHour. February 11, 1999. Available online at http://www.pbs. org/newshour/bb/sports/jan-june99/olympics_2-11. html; website home page: http://www.pbs.org/news- hour/home.html (accessed June 14, 2009). v BRICKELL, ROBERT COMAN Robert Coman Brickell was born April 4, 1824, in Tuscumbia, Alabama. He was admitted to the bar in 1843, began his law practice in Huntsville, Alabama, in 1851, and soon became a respected name in the legal system of that state. He gained a reputation as a supporter of states’ rights and believed in SECESSION from the Union prior to the onset of the Civil War. In 1873, Brickell served as associate justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama. He was selected to act as chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court in 1874, an appointment he again accepted in 1880. He held this office until 1884. Brickell resumed his law practice in Alabama in 1884 but in 1894 returned to the bench of the Alabama Supreme Court. He died November 20, 1900, in Huntsville. BRIDGES Bridges are structures constructed over obstruc- tions to highways or waterways, such as canals or rivers, in order to provide continuous and conve- nient passages for purposes of land transportation. A bridge includes the necessary abutments and approaches that make it accessible. A public bridge that spans obstructions to a public highway is built on land owned by the state government for public use, whereas a private bridge is built on private property for the use of particular individuals who own it. The construction of public bridges is a function of the state government by virtue of statute and is limited only by contractual or constitutional provisions. A state may exercise its power directly or delegate it to governmental agencies, such as a state HIGHWAY commission. Cities and municipalities may erect bridges within their borders if authorized to do so by the state legislature. If a bridge is to be built within the borders of a state, the state has control of the project; however, if the bridge connects two states, both states share involve- ment in the venture and must yield to the power of the federal government to supervise matters that have an effect on interstate COMMERCE. The state determines the location of a bridge subject to public safety and convenience con- siderations. It may grant a franchise (special privilege) to erect the bridge to a private bridge company that is chartered to build and maintain bridges. Such a corporation is considered a BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST. A state agency may be organized to receive a franchise to construct a bridge. The money needed to finance the construc- tion of a bridge is usually raised by appropria- tions designed for the project—the sale of BONDS Robert Coman Brickell 1824–1900 ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1819 Alabama became a state 1824 Born, Tuscumbia, Ala. 1843 Admitted to Alabama bar 1851 Became junior partner at the law firm of Cabaniss & Brickell 1854 Formed partnership of Walker & Brickell 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1873 Appointed associate justice of the Alabama Supreme Court 1874 Became chief justice of Alabama Supreme Court 1884 Resumed private law practice 1894 Returned to the bench of the Alabama Supreme Court 1900 Died, Huntsville, Ala. ▼▼ ▼▼ 18251825 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BRIDGES 125 pursuant to statute, special assessments, or TAXATION. The legislature decides whether con- struction expenses will be borne by the entire state or apportioned among its various subdivi- sions. It may create special taxing districts to finance the project as long as the district receives a proportional benefit from the bridge. State taxes cannot be used to defray the expense of purely local bridge obligations. A reasonable toll may be charged for using the bridge when authorized by statute. The revenue collected can be used for governmental purposes as well as for the operating and maintenance expenses of the bridge. The duty to maintain and repair bridges rests with the government agency or private company charged with their operation and maintenance. Statutes frequently require warn- ing signs on guardrails and bridge approaches to caution drivers against known dangers. Civil or criminal LIABILITY may be imposed for damages resulting from the failure to maintain a bridge properly. No liability generally, exists, however, for any damages incurred by an adjoining landowner from NEGLIGENCE or other wrongful conduct in the construction or maintenance of a bridge by a municipality or government agency unless provided by statute. A gover nment entity is often shielded from liability for general harm to persons or property caused by negligent construction, repair, or maintenance of bridges under the theory of SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY pursuant to statute. For example, in the case of Hansen v. State Dept. of Transportation (1998 S.D. 109 [1998 ]), PLAINTIFF Hansen was seriously injured after driving her vehicle into an unmarked construction hole on an interstate highway bridge. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s deci- sion to dismiss the case on the basis that sovereign IMMUNITY barred Hansen from suing the state’s DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.Many states have modified their immunity statutes to permit claims premised on GROSS NEGLIGENCE; others draw a distinction between MINISTERIAL (bound by judicial command) and discretionary duties, allowing claims only for negligence in the performance of ministerial duties or functions. The collapse of the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on August 1, 2007, provides an example of liability and compensation for victims of a bridge disaster. Thirteen people were killed and 145 injured in the collapse. The state of Minnesota limited its liability for tort actions to $300,000 per victim and $1 million total for an incident, regardless of the number of victims. The state was entitled to do so because it voluntarily surrendered its sovereign immunity for such incidents. Lawyers who wished to sue some entity for compensation (architects, engineers, constructors, and private inspectors) faced an uncertain legal case because the bridge had been built in 1967 and statutes of limita- tions would likely prevent claims. The state legislature responded by creating a $38 million compensation FUND, which was administered by three lawyers appointed by the chief justice of Minnesota. The lawyers had distributed the funds to the victims and their families by February 2009. Those who accepted the money agreed not to sue the state, but they could proceed with claims against private parties. By June 2009, 80 victims or survivors had filed suit against an engineering firm and a construction firm, claiming negligence. FURTHER READING Foti, Jim. 2009. “More 35W Bridge Lawsuits on Tap.” Minneapolis Star Tribune (June 18). BRIEF A summary of the important points of a longer document. An abstract of a published judicial opinion prepared by a law student as part of an assignment in the case method study of law. A written document drawn up by an attorney for a party in a lawsuit or by a party himself or herself appearing pro se that concisely states the following: (1) issues of a lawsuit; (2) facts that bring the parties to court; (3) relevant laws that can affect the subject of the dispute; and (4) arguments that explain how the law ap plies to the particular facts so that the case will be decided in the party’s favor. A brief may also contain a synopsis of the evidence and name the witnesses to be pre- sented during the trial. Copies of briefs must be submitted to the court where the case will be heard and to the opposing party. An APPELLATE brie f is a writing that must be filed with an appellate court so that the court may evaluate whether the decision of the lower court should be reversed because of some error or impropriety that occurred during the trial. A statement of the issues presented for review, a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 126 BRIEF summary of how pertinent laws affect the facts, and a statement of the relief being requested are essential elements of an appellate brief. The appellee’s brief will argue that the lower court acted properly in its judgment and request its AFFIRMANCE, while the appellant’s brief will attempt to convince the court to reverse or vacate the lower court’s judgment because it acted improperly. See also the Milestones in the Law and Appendix volumes for examples. v BRIGGS, HERBERT WHITTAKER Herbert Whittaker Briggs was a prominent figure in the field of INTERNATIONAL LAW where he made important contributions as a scholar and educator and served on the UNITED NATIONS International Law Commission. Born in Wilmington, Delaware, in 1900, Briggs was one of a small group of American international lawyers in the twentieth century who did not hold a law degree. He received an A.B. from West Virginia University in Morgan- town, West Virginia, in 1921 and a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Mary- land, in 1925. Over the next four years, he studied international law in Brussels, Belgium, and at the Hague Academy of International Law; served as a research associate at the Foreign Policy Association; and taught at Oberlin College in Oberlin, Ohio , and Johns Hopkins. In 1929, he joined the faculty at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, where he remained until his retirement in 1969. At Cornell, Briggs taught international law, inter- national organization, and international politics as a member of both the Department of Government and the law faculty. Briggs had a distinguished career as a scholar and editor. His best-known work was The LAW OF NATIONS: Cases, Documents and Notes (first published in 1938), which became a standard text in international law courses throughout the country. In addition, he was the author of The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage (1926), The International Law Commission (1965), two sets of lectures at the Ha gue Academy, and more than eighty articles on international law topics. Throughout most of his career, Brigg s was closely associated with the American Journal of International Law, serving on the journal’s board of editors from 1939 until his dea th and as editor in chief from 1955 to 1962. He was president of the American Society of International Law in 1959 and 1960. In addition to his work as an educator and scholar, Briggs also had an active career as an international lawyer. From 1962 to 1966, he was a member of the United Nations International Law Commission. In 1968, he was named to the U.S. DELEGATION to the United Nations Confer- ence on the Law of Treaties, held in Vienna. In addition, he served as counsel for Honduras, Spain, and Libya in four cases before the INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. He also served as counsel for Canada and Chile in international arbitral proceedings. In 1975, he was one of five persons appointed by the governments of Great Britain and France to serve as a co urt of ARBITRATION to delimit a portion of the continental shelf in the English Channel. Com- menting on Brigg’s career, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel of the International Court of Justice said that in all these activities “he was very much the ADVOCATE and architect of a more effective international law.” Briggs died January 6, 1990, in Ithaca. Herbert Whittaker Briggs 1900–1990 ❖ ❖ ◆ 1900 Born, Wilmington, Del. 1914–18 World War I 1921 Received A.B. from West Virginia University 1938 The Law of Nations: Cases, Documents and Notes published 1939–45 World War II 1945 United Nations founded 1950–53 Korean War 1955–62 Served as editor in chief of American Journal of International Law 1962–66 Served as member of United Nations International Law Commission 1961–73 Vietnam War 1969 Retired; became professor emeritus of international law 1968 Named to U.S delegation to United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties 1990 Died, Ithaca, N.Y. ▼▼ ▼▼ 1925 1900 1950 1975 2000 ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ THE OPINION THAT ‘POLITICAL’ TREATIES SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO RIGID JUDICIAL ANALYSIS RESTS UPON MISCONCEPTION AND IS BELIED BY PRACTICE . GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BRIGGS, HERBERT WHITTAKER 127 . Bush v. Gore 20 05 Active Liberty published ◆ Stephen G. Breyer. STEVE PETTEWAY, COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 120 BREYER,. delivers GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION BREYER, STEPHEN GERALD 121 vaginally a living unborn child before killing it.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct. 25 97, 147 L. Ed. 2d. independent review of its practices. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 124 BRIBERY The two Utah officials successfully challenged the bribery charges. In July 20 01, a federal judge dismissed