examinations. Typically, law students are tested only once in each class. They face enormous pressure to perform well on this examination since their single score on it usually constitutes their entire grade for the class. It is difficult to test analysis skills, so often these examinations test the students’ ability to spot legal issues and apply legal rules. Therefore, although professors try to teach case analysis skills, students tend to focus on simply learning rules of law in the hope of getting good grades. This diminishes the case method’s intended result. The case method may be unpopular with law students owing to the amount of reading it requires. It is not uncommon for law professors to assign 20 to 30 pages of reading, containing excerpts from four or five cases, each night for each class. Some law professors have argued that pupils learn to analyze cases within the first few months of law school, and that thereafter the case method becomes ineffective because students lose enthusiasm and interest in reading cases. Another complaint concerns the role of casebooks. Casebooks commonly contain cases or case excerpts as well as some explanatory text. They are most often compiled by law professors, who arrange the cases to show legal development or illustrate the meaning of legal principles. These casebooks provide only a small sample of cases, the vast majority of them appellate-level decisions. Thus, law students usually receive little or no exposure to decisions of trial courts. Some commentators suggest that students therefore miss critical elements of a lawyer’s initial role: discovering and shaping facts and determining legal strategies to present to the court at the tri al level. Frequently, students do not see legal con- flicts in their undeveloped form until they graduate and begin practicing law. Law schools increasingly are trying to remedy that problem by offering instruction in basic lawyering skills. For example, classes in trial advocacy allow students to conduct mock jury trials. Other courses teach client-counseling skills, document- drafting skills, and oral argument skills. The idea is not to abandon the case method entirely but to balance it with other teaching methods. FURTHER READINGS Marks, Thomas C., Jr. 2000. “Understanding the Process of Judicial Policymaking through Case Analysis.” Stetson Law Review 29 (spring). Rand, Joseph W. 2003. “Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making.” Clinical Law Review 9 (spring). Weaver, Russell. 1991. “Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method.” Villanova Law Review 36. CROSS REFERENCES Case Law; Court Opinion; Legal Education; Precedent. CASE OR CONTROVERSY A term used in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution to describe the structure by which actual, conflictin g claims of individuals must be brought before a federal court for resolution if the court is to exercise its jurisdiction to consider the questions and provide relief . A case or controversy, also referred to as a JUSTICIABLE controversy, must consist of an actual dispute between parties over their legal rights that remain in conflict at the time the case is presented and mu st be a proper matter for judicial determination. A dispute between parties that is MOOT is not a case or controversy because it no longer involves an actual conflict. CASE STATED An action that is brought upon the agreement of the parties who submit a stat ement of undisputed facts to the court but who take adversary positions as to the legal ramifications of the facts, thereby requiring a judge to decide the question of law presented. A case stated is also called an AMICABLE ACTION ,aCASE AGREED ON,oraFRIENDLY SUIT. CASEBOOK A printed compilation of judicial decisions illustrating the application of particular principles of a specific field of law, such as torts, that is used in legal education to teach students under the case method system. v CASEMENT SIR, ROGER DAVID Sir Roger David Casement pursued an illustri- ous career in the British Foreign Service. His achievements were overshadowed by his cam- paign for Irish nationalism, which eventually led to his trial and execution. Casement was born September 1, 1864, in Dublin, Ireland. From 1892 to 1904 and from 1906 to 1911, Casement made several LOYALTY IS A SENTIMENT , NOT A LAW . —SIR ROGER CASEMENT GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 278 CASE OR CONTROVERSY noteworthy contributions to the field of British consular service. His investigation of the brutal working conditions of the Congolese on rubber plantations owned by Belgium led to drastic reforms in Africa. He subsequently performed a similar service for workers on British rubber plantations in South America. In 1911 he was knighted for his humanitarian efforts and in 1912 he resigned from foreign service due to illnesses contracte d during his work in foreign countries. Casement returned to Ireland and became interested in the movement for Irish freedom from British rule. He journeyed to Germany and the United States seeking support for an Irish insurrection. In April 1916 Casement received a pledge of aid from Germany but it proved inadequate. He returned to Ireland hoping to curtail the planned Easter Rebellion, but British authorities apprehended him upon his arrival. Accused of TREASON, Casement was put on trial. To add to the sensationalism of the proceedings and the case against him, several of Casement’s diaries were publicly distributed. These diaries contained accounts of practices considered to be homosexual in nature. Case- ment was not given the opportunity to confirm or DENY the validity of the diaries and the genuineness of the papers is still in question today. The evidence against Casement was suffi- cient for a conviction and he was sentenced to be executed. Originally a Protestant, Casement converted to Roman Catholicism shortly before his death. On August 3, 1916, he was hanged in Pentonville Jail in London, England. v CASEY, WILLIAM JOSEPH William Joseph Casey was a lawyer with a long and distinguished career in business and public service who later became the controversial director of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) durin g the Reagan administration. Casey was born March 13, 1913, in Elmhurst, New York. He received his bachelor’s degree from Fordham University in 1934, did graduate work at the Catholic University of America, and then entered St. John’s University Law School, graduating with a bachelor of laws degree in 1937. Following his admission to the New York state bar he moved to Washington, D.C., to work for the Research Institute of America, a private organization involved in Sir Roger David Casement 1864–1916 1864 Born, Dublin, Ireland 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1892 Appointed traveling commissioner to the Niger Coast Protectorate 1903 Report on rubber plantation working conditions in Upper Congo published; led to reforms in Africa 1913 Joined Irish National Volunteers 1911 Knighted for humanitarian efforts 1914–18 World War I ◆ ◆ ◆ 1922 Irish Free State born 1916 Easter Rebellion; Casement arrested, tried and convicted of treason; died, London, England 1895 Appointed British consul to Lourenço Marques 1898 Appointed British consul to Angola, then Congo 1906–11 Served as British consul to Brazil 1905 Received the C.M.G. ▼▼ ▼▼ 18751875 ❖ ❖ 19251925 19001900 18501850 Sir Roger Casement. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CASEY, WILLIAM JOSEPH 279 analyzing economic and political data concern- ing the NEW DEAL. During WORLD WAR II Casey served with Army Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and, from London, directed the activities of OSS spies. After the war Casey returned to Washington, D.C., and served for two years as special c ounsel to th e SMALL BUSINESS Committee of the U.S. Senate. He remained interested in international relations as a result of his wartime activities, however, and in 1948 he returned to Europe to become associate general counsel for the MARSHALL PLAN. Following his war-related service, he started practicing law and became a partner in a large New York law firm. He also began teaching at New York University, where he lectured on tax law from 1948 to 1962, and taught periodically at the Practicing Law Insti- tute. While practicing and teaching, he wrote a number of highly successful books on taxes, REAL ESTATE , and investments, including Tax Shelter Investments (1952) and Accounting Desk Book (1956), and a book on U.S. history titled Where and How the War Was Won: An Armchair Guide to the American Revolution (1976). The profits from his books, in addition to his income from his law practice and his investments, helped to make him a multimillionaire. In the 1960s Casey moved from business to politics, running in 1966 for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Though he lost the primary to a more conservative Republican opponent, Casey remained active in the REPUBLI- CAN PARTY , writing and conducting research for Richard M. Nixon’s 1968 presidential cam- paign. In 1969 he helped the new president set up the Citizens Committee for Peace with Security, which was organized to back Nixon’s policy on antimissile WEAPONS, and served on the advisory council of the ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT Agency. In 1971 Nixon appointed Casey chairman of the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC), where he quickly became known as a tough administrator who favored strict regulation of stockbrokers. Casey also became unpopular with his fellow securities lawyers when he named them as defendants in connection with their clients’ alleged frauds. While head of the SEC, he persuaded Congress to increase the agency’s William Joseph Casey. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS William Joseph Casey 1913–1987 ❖ ❖ 1913 Elmhurst, N.Y. ◆ 1941–46 Supervised spy missions for the Office of Strategic Services 1984 Congress voted to prohibit aid to the anti-communist Nicaraguan "contra" rebels 1980 Ran Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign 1914–18 World War I ◆ 1987 Resigned his post at CIA; died, Glen Cove, N.Y. 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ ◆ 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1948–62 Lectured on tax law at New York University 1971–73 Served as chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission 1973–74 Served as undersecretary of state for economic affairs 1981 Appointed director of the CIA by President Reagan 1986 Iran-Contra Affair hearings began ▼▼ ▼▼ 19001900 19501950 19751975 20002000 19251925 AFFINITIES BETWEEN THE PROFESSION OF LAW AND INTELLIGENCE - GATHERING [INCLUDE] CONFRONTING THE PARADOX OF BEING AT THE SAME TIME SEEKERS OF TRUTH AND PARTISANS IN A CAUSE . —WILLIAM CASEY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 280 CASEY, WILLIAM JOSEPH budget by $1.5 million, which he used to hire more lawyers, accountants, and other specialists to improve the agency’s efficiency. In 1973 Casey moved from the SEC to the STATE DEPARTMENT, where he served as undersecretary of state for economic affairs for two years. He then became president and chairman of the Export-Import Bank, an independent government agency charged with facilitating the export of U.S. goods and services. In 1976 he left government to return to PRIVATE LAW practice in New York and Washington, D.C., though he did return to accept an appointment to President Gerald R. Ford’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In 1981 Casey embarked on what was to be the final and most controversial chapter of his career when President RONALD REAGAN appointed him director of the CIA. The nomination was criticized by some members of Congress as blatantly poli tical because Casey had run Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign. Neverthe- less, Casey eventually won congressional ap- proval and became the first director of the agency to be given cabinet-level rank. Known for his hard-driving and sometimes confrontational management style, Casey won early praise for improving the CIA’s analytical work. But he also drew heavy criticism for the agency’s political activity outside the United States when the CIA stepped up its support for anti-Communist organizations in developing countries. Under Casey the agency engaged in intelligence operations in Central America, where it mined Nicaraguan harbors and provided textbooks for the Nicaraguan contras (the rebels fighting the Marxist government of Nicaragua) on how to use violence against civilian officials. Congress, angered by reports of the opera- tions, voted in 1984 to make aid to the contras illegal. When a diversion of funds to the contras from arms sales to Iran came to light—in a scandal that became known as the Iran-Contra Affair—Casey denied that he had any knowl- edge or involvement of such sales. Critics charged that as CIA director, Casey should have known about the affair, and suspected that Casey had played a larger role than he acknowledged. In addition, members of Con- gress criticized Casey for allowing CIA staff members wide latitude to circumvent the prohibition against giving aid to the contras. Casey was to testify before a Sena te panel about the CIA’s role in the sale of arms to Iran in December 1986 but became ill and was hospitalized the day before he was to appear. He then underwent surgery for removal of a malignant brain tumor and it was also reported that he was suffering from prostate cancer. In February 1987, after several weeks in the hospital, Casey resigned his post at the CIA. Later that spring congressional hearings on the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR commenced. The first witness, retired Air Force major general Richard V. Secord, testified that Casey was involved in providing arms to the Nicaraguan rebels after Congress had outlawed such activity. Howe ver, the nature and extent of any involvement by Casey remained unclear. On May 7, 1987, Casey died of pneumonia. Casey’s death left many unanswered ques- tions about the Iran-Contra Affair. However, both Republicans and Democrats praised Casey for his patriotism, intellect, and commitment to public service. CASH BASIS A method of accounting that considers only money actually received as income and only money actually paid out as expense. For INCOME TAX purposes, TAXABLE INCOME is computed under cash basis accounting as the difference between income received and expenses paid out within the tax year. Cash basis accounting is not the same as ACCRUAL BASIS accounting. CASH SURRENDER VALUE The amount of money that an insurance company pays an insured upon cancellation of a life insurance policy before death and which is a specific figure assigned to the policy at that particular time, reduced by a charge for adminis- trative expenses. The cash surrender value of an insurance policy is not based upon its actual value, but upon its reserve value—the face amount of the contract discounted at a specific rate of interest according to the insured’s life expectancy. Not all life insurance policies have cash surrender values; the term s of the policy must so provide. CASUAL Irregular, occasional, or accidental; happening without being planned or foreseen. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CASUAL 281 The term is used to describe an event that is unanticipated or unusual. A casual sale is one that is not customary, or done in the usual course of business—such as a jeweler occasion- ally selling vacuum cleaners. Casual employment is irregular, periodic, or seasonal employment, such as someone selling ice cream only during the summer. Workers’ compensation laws in many states do not apply to casual em ployment. CASUAL EJECTOR A fictitious and nominal defendant in an action of ejectment. EJECTMENT was one of the old common-law FORMS OF ACTION. It could be used to oust an intruder on the plain tiff ’s land, such as a holdover tenant. It could also be used when there was no intruder, but the owner wished to remove any doubt about his or her right to the land without waiting for someone to sue him or her. In such a case, the strict form of procedure required that the PLAINTIFF name a DEFENDANT even when none actually existed. The action was brought against a fictitious person called the casual ejector. The name John Doe was used often for this nonexistent defendant. CASUALTY A serious or fatal accident. A person or thing injured, lost, or destroyed. A disastrous occurrence due to sudden, unexpected, or unusual cause. Accident; misfortu ne or mishap; that which comes by chance or without design. A loss from such an event or cause, as by fire, shipwreck, lightning, etc. An inevitable casualty is one that occurs through NO FAULT of anyone. It happens totally without design, as in the case of an ACCIDENT resulting from an ACT OF GOD, such as a house struck by lightning or flo oded by a storm. A casualty loss is a tax deduction that can be taken for an accident that is incurred in a trade or business, in a transaction entered into for profit, or for the complete or partial loss or destruction of property owned by the taxpayer. It arises from certain specific events such as a fire, an auto accident, or a flood. Casualty losses are computed subject to special rules and are treated as itemized deductions. Many people purchase casualty insurance so that they will be protected or covered in the event of specific misfortune or accident. It is a type of insurance that covers losses resulting from injuries to people. CASUS BELLI [Latin, Cause of war.] A term used in interna- tional law to describe an event or occurrence giving rise to or justifying war. CROSS REFERENCE War. CATEGORICAL That which is unqualified or unconditional. A categorical imperative is a rule, command, or moral obligation that is absolutely and universally binding. Categorical is also used to describe pro- grams limited to or designed for certain classes of people. Categori cal assistance plans are social WELFARE programs extending benefits to mem- bers of a particular group, such as Aid to the Elderly, Aid to the Blind, or Aid to Families with Dependent Children. v CATON, JOHN DEAN John Dean Caton was born March 19, 1812, in Monroe, New York. He was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1835. He achieved success in various fields of public service and received an honorary doctor of laws degree from Hamilton College in 1866. In 1834 the first political convention was held in Illinois and Caton participated as its secretary as well as a member. He served on the Illinois Supreme Court, beginning as an ASSOCI- ATE JUSTICE from 1842 to 1864, and acting as chief justice in 1855 and again from 1857 to 1864. In addi tion to his legal and political careers, Caton served as president of the Illinois and Mississippi Telegraphic Company from 1852 to 1867, performed the duties of JUSTICE OF THE PEACE in Ottawa, and gained recognition as an author. His most famous works are A Summer in Norway, written in 1875, and The Antelope and Deer of America, published in 1877. Caton also contributed numerous articles on nature to the Ottawa Academy of Science. Caton died July 30, 1895, in Chicago, Illinois. THE LAW IS A GREAT AND GROWING SCIENCE , WHICH MUST ENLARGE AND EXPAND WITH THE ADVANCEMENT OF SOCIETY . —JOHN CATON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 282 CASUAL EJECTOR v CATRON, JOHN John Catron served as an ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the U.S. Su preme Court from 1836 to 1865. During his career on the Court, Catron was a stau nch defender of st ates’ rights and the INSTITU TION of SLAVERY.Heparticipatedinthe LANDMARK decisions uph olding the power of state governments to regulate local aspects of interstate commerce and, in DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD,60U.S.(19How.)393,15L.Ed.691 (1856), he voted with the Court in deciding that an ex-slave had no rights as a citizen. Despite personal Southern affiliations and his own support of slavery, Catron backed the Union during the CIVIL WAR. A close friend of Andrew Jackson’s as early as the WAR OF 1812 and a fellow resident of Nashvi lle, Catron was a true Jacksonian in his outl ook. His judicial career and opinions—from a suspicion of large corporations to a fervent support of states’ rights—bear all the marks of Jacksonian democracy. Catron was the descendant of poor, German immigrants. He was probably born in Penn syl- vania around 1786—some sources cite his birth as early as 1779, however. His father, Peter Catron, worked with horses in Pennsylvania and Virginia, and moved to Kentucky in 1804, hoping to establish his own horse farm. Catron grew up with little formal education. He supported hims elf and his family by herding cattle and grooming horses, but he found time to read the classics as well. Around 1812, Catron moved to Sparta, in Tennessee’s Cumberland Mountains region. At about the same time, he married Matilda Childress; the couple had no children. Catron read law briefly in Sparta and then joined the Second Tenn essee Regiment, a group of local volunteers who sought to avenge the massacre of Fort Mims by the Creek Indians. This unit eventually joined General Andrew Jackson’s army in Alabama and fought in the War of 1812. Catron became friendly with Jackson, who had passed the bar exam and served as a judge, and the two corresponded frequently in subsequent years. After the war, Catron returned to the Cumberland Mountains and resumed his legal studies. He was admitted to the Tennessee bar in 1815 and worked both as an attorney in a general legal practice and as a PROSECUTOR in a CIRCUIT COURT. In 1818 Jackson sugges ted that Catron move to Nashville, then a growing frontier town, where Jackson himself lived and had a plantation. Catron took his advice and developed a lucrative practice in Nashville, with much of his work involving land titles, a busy area of the law on the rapidly growing frontier. By 1824 he was elected to the bench of Tennessee’s highest court, the Court of Errors and Appeals. In 1831 the Tennessee legislature created the office of chief justice of the Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals and elected Catron to serve in it. Catron held the position until 1834. As a judge, Catron worked principally to resolve the morass of conflicting land claims then before the courts, but he addressed other issues as well. In separate 1829 rulings, Catron denounced both gambling and dueling, calling the latter no more than “honorable homicide.” “The law knows it as a wicked and willful MURDER, and it is our duty to treat it as such,” wrote Catron in his decision for Smith v. State, 9 Tenn. 228. “We are placed here firmly and fearlessly to execute the l aws of the land, not visionary codes of honor, framed to subserve the purposes of destruction.” In an 1834 case, Fisher’s Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. 119, Catron John Dean Caton 1812–1895 1812 Born, Monroe, N.Y. 1818 Illinois admitted to the Union 1833 Moved to Chicago, population 300 with no lawyers 1855 Became chief justice of Illinois Supreme Court 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates made Illinois the center of the slavery debate 1864 Retired from bench 1875 A Summer in Norway published 1893 The Early Bench and Bar of Illinois published 1895 Died, Chicago, Ill. ❖ ◆ ◆ ❖ ◆ ◆ 1842 Appointed associate justice on Illinois Supreme Court ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ▼▼ ▼▼ 1800 1850 1875 1900 1825 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CATRON, JOHN 283 ruled on the issue of freeing slaves. Slave owners would often grant manumission, or freedom, to their slaves through their wills. Catron argued that the state must approve such instruments before they can be valid, because, he wrote, “free negroes are a very dangerous and most objectionable population where slaves are numerous.” N or would it do to send freed slaves to states where slavery was not practiced, according to Catron. Whether in a slaveholding or nonslaveholding society, the freed African American is “a degraded outcast, and his fancied freedom a delusion.” Slaves could only be freed, Catron wrote, if they were sent to the African nation of Liberia. American Indian affairs, particularly relating to the Cherokee nation, were also were pressing issues during Catron’s tenure on the Tennessee high court. In 1833, the state legislature, following the earlier example of Georgia’s general assembly, passed laws giving itself jurisdiction over Cherokee land within its boundaries. In State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, it was charged that these laws were unconstitu- tional. Catron upheld the state laws in a long opinion that is notable for its brutal attitude toward the Indians. “It was more just,” Catron wrote, “that the country should be peopled by Europeans, than continue the haunts of savage beasts, and of men yet more fierce and savage.” The Indians were, in his mind, “mere wander- ing tribes of savages” who “deserve to be exterminated as savage and pernicious beasts.” Furthermore, it was simply by right of power that whites could exert their dominance: “Our claim is based on the right to coerce obedience. The claim may be denounced by the moralist. We answer, it is the LAW OF THE LAND. Without its assertion and vigorous execution, this continent never could have been inhabited by our ancestors.” The issue resurfaced a few years later during Martin Van Buren’s presidency when the Cherokee were forced to give up their land and make a long march on what was called the Trail of Tears to land west of the Mississippi. In 1836 Catron directed Van Buren’s presidential campaign in Tennessee. Van Buren won the election, succeeding fellow Democrat Jackson. On his last day in office, March 3, 1837, Jackson appointed two new members— Catron and John McKinley—to the U.S. Supreme Court as required by the Judiciary Act of 1837, which increased the size of the John Catron. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES John Catron 1786?–1865 ❖ ◆ 1786 Born, Pa. ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1812 Moved to Sparta, Tenn. 1829 Andrew Jackson inaugurated as president 1824 Elected to Tennessee's Court of Errors and Appeals 1837 Nominated to U.S. Supreme Court by Jackson 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford decision held that ex-slaves did not have U.S. citizenship rights 1831 Appointed chief justice of Tennessee's Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals 1961 Catron's support of the Union led to loss of his Nashville estate 1775–83 American Revolution ◆ ◆ 1813–14 Fought under Andrew Jackson in War of 1812 in Second Tennessee Regiment 1838 Cherokee Indians forcibly removed from Georgia to Oklahoma, trek known as "Trail of Tears" 1865 Died, Nashville, Tenn. ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18001800 18251825 18751875 18501850 ❖ 1861–65 Civil War GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 284 CATRON, JOHN Court from seven to nine members. Catron was confirmed five days later, and at age 51 he became a sitting justice with ROGER B. TANEY serving as chief justice. Catron was a strong advocate of states’ rights during his tenure on the Court. In the cases considered in Thurlow v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 12 L. Ed. 256 (1847), Catron wrote two opinions upholding the rights of states to regulate the importation of liquor from other states and countries. The cases touched on interpretation of the COMMERCE CLAUSE,thepartofthe Constitution—Article I, Section 8, Clause 3— that gives Congress power “[t]oregulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ” Catron argued that the federal government does not have exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce and that where it does not act to regulate commerce, the states are free to do so. The state laws in question had encroached on no laws passed by Congress and were therefore valid. According to Catron, “the POLICE POWER was not touched by the Constitu- tion, but left to the States as the Constitution found it.” C atron and the Court ru led similarly in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851), again upholding the ability of states to regulate local aspects of interstate commerce. Catron dissented from the Court’s opinion in several cases involving the states’ ability to regulate corporations. In one case in which the Court had ruled in favor of a large corporation, Catron expressed concern regarding “the un- paralleled increase of corporations throughout the Union …; the ease with which charters containing exclusive privileges and exemptions are obtained; the vast amount of property, power, and exclusive benefits, prejudicial to other classes of society that are vested in and held by these numerous bodies of associated wealth” (Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. [16 How.] 416, 14 L. Ed. 997 [1853]). Catron played an important role in the famous Dred Scott case, which concerned the highly controversial issue of slavery in the territories. Dred Scott was a slave from Missouri whose owner took him into Illinois, where slavery had been outlawed, and the Louisiana Territory, where it had been forbidden as well by the Missouri Compromise, the 1820 agreement that attempted to resolve the dispute as to whether new states would be admitted to the Union as free or slave states. When Scott returned to Missouri, he brought suit against his owner, claiming that he was free because he had resided in free territory. In its decision, the Court, with Catron writing a concurring opinion, held that a slave could not become a citizen under the U.S. Constitution. Scott, the Court wrote, was not a citizen and therefore could not sue in federal courts. Chief Justice Taney went further and declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, denying the au- thority of Congress to exclude slavery from the territories. This was only the second time the U. S. Supreme Court had found an act of Congress unconstitutional, the first having been the 1803 decision MARBURY V. MADISON 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 [1803]. Many viewed Dred Scott as a pro-slavery ruling from a Court dominated by a Southern majority. The ruling may very well have hastened the coming of the Civil War. In his concurring opinion, Catron empha- sized that Congress could not abridge the property rights of slave-owning citizens in the Louisiana Territory by outlawing slavery. He also argued that the Missouri Compromise violated the constitutional guarantee of equal PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES to citizens of all states, a guarantee that was, Catr on wrote, a “leading feature of the constitution—a feature on which the Union depends, and which secures to the respective States and their citizens an entire equality of rights” (60 U.S. at 529). Three of the seven concurring justices argued that an African American descended from slaves had no rights as a U.S. citizen and no standing in court. Catron was one of four justices who did not address this last question of whether a freed slave was a citizen or not. Despite his pro-Southern leanings and the subsequent loss of his estate, Catron supported the Union during the Civil War. As hostilities began to mount and war neared in March 1861, Catron returned to Nashville to try to keep the border states of his judicial circuit—Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri—in the Union. Of these, only Tennessee would eventually join the CON- FEDERACY . After an angry mob confronted him when he tried to hold federal court in Nashville, Catron was forced to leave for Washington, D.C., accompanied by a military escort, leaving behind an estate worth more than $100,000. During the war, Catron continued to support the Union by broadly interpreting the federal government’s POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY , IN ITS TRUE SENSE , EXISTS ONLY WITH THE PEOPLE .… AND IS [THE] POLITICAL AXIOM UPON WHICH THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT [HAS] BEEN BASED. —JOHN CATRON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CATRON, JOHN 285 war powers. In one case, he wrote an opinion refusing to release a prisoner if evidence showed that he was a Confederate sympathizer. After 1862 Catron also worked hard to keep order in the states forming his new circuit: Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and Kentucky. He stayed in close touch with President ABRAHAM LINCOLN and worked hard to keep the federal judiciary effective during the war. On May 30, 1865, Catron, one of the last embodiments of Jacksonian democracy to leave the national scene, died in his adopted city of Nashville. FURTHER READINGS Anderson, Burnet. 1996. “John Catron.” In The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies, 1789–1995, 2d ed. Claire Cushman. Washington, D.C.: Congres- sional Quarterly. Gatell, Frank O. 1995. “John Catron.” In The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789–1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions, Volumes I–V. New York: Chelsea House. Tennessee Dept. of State. “Catron, John (1786–1865) Papers 1833–[1833–1862]–1918.” Nashville: Tennessee State Library and Archives. CROSS REFERENCES Judicial Review; Native American Rights. CAUSA MORTIS [Latin, In contemplation of approaching death.] A phrase sometimes used in reference to a deathbed gift, or a gift causa mortis, since the giving of the gift is made in expectation of approaching death. A gift causa mortis is distinguishable from a gift inter vivos, which is a gift made during the donor’s (the giver’s) lifetime. The donor of the gift of PERSONAL PROPERTY must expect to die imminently from a particular ailment or event. This has important conse- quences in terms of the donor’s ability to revoke the gift. For example, an elderly man is suffering from pneumonia and believes he is going to die as a result of the sickness. He tells his grandson that if he dies, he will give the grandson his pocket watch. If the man recovers and wants to retain his watch, he will be able to do so, because a gift causa mortis is effective only if made in CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH due to a known condition and the donor actually dies as a result of that condition. Agiftcausa mortis is taxed under federal estate tax law in the same way as a gift bequeathed by a will. CAUSE Each separate antecedent of an event. Something that precedes and brings about an effect or a result. A reason for an action or condition. A ground of a legal action. An agent that brings something about. That which in some manner is accountable for a condition that brings about an effect or that produces a cause for the resultant action or state. A suit, litigation, or action. Any question, civil or criminal, litigated or contested before a court of justice. Cause and Causality in American Law If an individual is fired from a job at the bank for embezzlement, he or she is fired for cause— as distinguished from dec isions or actions considered to be arbitrary or capricious. In CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROBABLE CAUSE is the reasonable basis for the belief that someone has committed a particular crime. Before someone may be arrested or searched by a police officer without a warrant, probable cause must exist. This requirement is imposed to protect people from unreasonable or unrestricted invasions or intrusions by the government. In the law of torts, the concept of causality is essential to a person’s ability to successfully bring an action for injury against another person. The injured party must establish that the other person brought about the alleged harm. A defendant’s liability is contingent upon the connection between his or her conduct and the injury to the PLAINTIFF. The plaintiff must prove that his or her injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s NEGLIGENCE or intentional conduct. Actual, Concurrent, and Intervening Cause The actual cause is the event directly responsible for an injury. If one person shoves another, thereby knocking the other person out an open window and he or she breaks a leg as a result of the fall, the shove is the actual cause of the injury. The IMMEDIATE CAUSE of the injury in this case would be the fall, because it is the cause that came right before the injury, with no intermediate causes. In some cases the actual cause and the immediate cause of an injury may be the sam e. Concurrent causes are events occurring simultaneously to prod uce a given result. They are contemporaneous, but either event alone would bring about the effect that occurs. If one GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 286 CAUSA MORTIS person stabs another person who is simulta- neously being shot by a third person, either act alone could cause the person’s injury. An INTERVENING CAUSE is one that interrupts the normal flow of events between the wrong and the injury. It comes between an expected sequence of occurre nces to produce an unan- ticipated result. If someone driving under the influence of alcohol grazes a telephone pole that is rotted and thus knocks it down, the condition of the pole would be the intervening cause of its collapse. This is important in determining the liability of the intoxicated driver. If the telephone company knew or should have known about the unsafe condition of the pole and negligently failed to replace it, the telephone company would be responsible for the harm caused by the falling pole. Depending upon how hard the driver hit the pole, the driver may be held contributorily negligent, or partially liable, for the accident that took place. An intervening EFFICIENT CAUSE is one that totally supersedes the original wrongful act or omission. For example, an intoxicated cabdriver transports a person in a cab with faulty brakes. An accident occurs, which is a direct result of the INTOXICATION rather than the faulty brakes. The injury resulting to the passenger is attributable to the driver’s condition. The intervening efficient cause thereby broke the causal connection between the original wrong of the faulty brakes and the injury. Proximate, Unforeseeable, and Remote Cause The PROXIMATE CAUSE of an injury is the act or omission of an act without which the harm would not have occurred. This is a concept in the law of torts and involves the question of whether a defendant’s conduct is so significant as to make him or her liable for a resulting injury. For example, a person throws a lighted match into a wastepaper basket that starts a fire that burns down a building. The wind carries the flames to the building next door. The act of throwing the match would be the proximate cause of the fire and the resulting damage; however, the person may not be held fully liable for all resulting consequences. An unforeseeable cause is one that unexpect- edly and unpredictably results from the proxi- mate cause. The degree of injury sustained is unanticipated or far removed from the negligent or intentional conduct that took place. For example, if a customer in a supermarket irritates a clerk and the clerk pushes the customer out of the way, which results in prolonged bleeding because the person is a hemophiliac, the bleeding is an unforeseeable consequence of the clerk’s action. Even if the clerk intentionally pushed the customer, the resulting injury is clearly far removed from the conduct. A remote cause is one that is removed or separate from the proximate cause of an injury. If the injuries suffered by a person admitted to a hospital after being hit by a truck are aggravated by MALPRACTICE, the malpractice is a remote cause of injury to that person. The fact that the cause of an injury is remote does not relieve a DEFENDANT of liability for the act or omission, but there may be an apportionment of liability between the defendants. CROSS REFERENCES Action; Arbitrary; Arrest; “But For” Rule; Criminal Proce- dure; Probable Cause; Search and Seizure; Tort Law; Warrant. CAUSE CÉLÈBRE [French, famous case.] A trial or lawsuit in which the subject matter or a participant is particularly newsworthy, unusual, or sensational and that typically attracts a great deal of media attention. For example, the case of Scott Peterson, accused of the murder of his pregnant wife, Laci Peterson, was a cause célèbre in 2003. CAUSE OF ACTION The fact or combination of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial redress or relief against another. Also, the legal theory forming the basis of a lawsuit. The cause of action is the heart of the complaint, which is the PLEADING that initiates a lawsuit. Without an adequately stated cause of action the plaintiff’s case can be dismissed at the outset. It is not sufficient merely to state that certain events occurred that entitle the PLAINTIFF to relief. All the elements of each cause of action must be detailed in the complaint. The claims must be supported by the facts, the law, and a conclusion that flows from the application of the law to those facts. The cause of action is often stated in the form of a syllogism, a form of deductive GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CAUSE OF ACTION 287 . to those facts. The cause of action is often stated in the form of a syllogism, a form of deductive GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CAUSE OF ACTION 28 7 . WITH THE ADVANCEMENT OF SOCIETY . —JOHN CATON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 28 2 CASUAL EJECTOR v CATRON, JOHN John Catron served as an ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the U.S. Su preme. [INCLUDE] CONFRONTING THE PARADOX OF BEING AT THE SAME TIME SEEKERS OF TRUTH AND PARTISANS IN A CAUSE . —WILLIAM CASEY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 28 0 CASEY, WILLIAM JOSEPH budget