costs and discourage frivolous visits, most HMOs now require members to make a co- payment for most types of medical visits. HMOs also point to state laws that undercut their management of costs by giving members the right to go outside the HMO network of health providers for services. In addition, members can now take advantage of state laws that provide appeal rights when denied medical services. HMOs and health insurance companies have challenged these state laws, arguing that the 1974 federal EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) preempted these state laws. ERISA seeks to protect employee benefit programs, which include pension plans and health care plans, through a lengthy set of standards, rules, and regulatio ns. Health care providers have pointed to the comprehensive nature of ERI SA as demonstrating the intent of Congress to maintain a uniform national system. However, the U.S. SUPREME COURT has been unsympathetic to these arguments. In Moran v. Rush Pruden tial HMO, Inc. (536 U.S. 355, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 153 L. Ed. 2d 375 [2002]), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld an Illinois law that required HMOs to provide independent review of disputes between the primary care physician and the HMO. Debra Moran had complained of continued numbness, pain, and loss of function and mobility in her right shoulder. A nerve conduction test revealed that she had braxial plexopathy, which involves compression of the nerves. Moran researched this condition and found a doctor in Virginia who performed microsurgery to correct this type of problem. Because the doctor was “out-of-network,” Rush Prudential refused to pay for Moran’s consulta- tion with him. The doctor diagnosed Moran as suffering from a syndrome that could be corrected with surgery. Moran gave her Illinois primary physician the diagnosis, which was confirmed by two Rush-affiliated thoracic sur- geons. Moran was not satisfied with the surgical methods offered by these two doctors. Even though Rush denied her coverage, Moran elected to have the operation performed by the Virginia surgeon. The surgery was a success, but Moran faced medical bills of almost $95,000. She took advantage of the Illinois independent-review law. A year later, the judge determined, based on an independent medical examination, that the surgery performed by the Virginia doctor had been “medically necessary.” This conclusion led Moran to ask the state court to order Rush to reimburse her for the medical costs of the surgery. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Illinois review law, finding that the law was an insurance regulation rather than a benefit regulation. Therefore, ERISA did not preempt the state regulation. HMOs suffered an even greater defeat in their quest to manage services and costs when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld “any willing provider” laws passed by Kentucky. The laws permitted HMO members to obtain medical services from outside the designated list of HMO providers. HMOS again objected, con- tending that ERISA preempted the laws because they clearly dealt with health care benefits. The Court, in Kentucky Association of He alth Plans, Inc. v. Miller (538 U.S. 329, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 155 L. Ed. 2d 468 [2003]), unanimously rejected this argument. It again characterized the laws as insurance regulations, w hich are exempt from ERISA PREEMPTION. In 2009 Congress sought to enact major health reform legislation that would reduce costs, increase the number of individuals having health insurance, and protect consumers. The health insurance industry lobbied vigorously against many of the provisions, including a proposed public option that would make the federal government a health insurer beyond what it funds for Medicare and Medicaid. In March 2010, President Obama signed health insurance reform legislation (P.L. 111-148, the Patient Protection and Affordability Act of 2010). FURTHER READINGS Lee, Bryan. 2003. “Managed Care: Health Providers’ Bill of Rights Now Law in California.” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 31 (spring). Reid, T. R. 2009. The Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer Health Care. New York: Penguin. CROSS REFERENCES Health Care Law; Health Insurance; Physicians and Surgeons. MANAGER One who has charge of a corporation and control of its business, or of its branch establishments, divisions, or depar tments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent judgment. A person chosen or appointed to manage, direct, or administer the affairs of another person or of a business, sports team, or the like. The designation of manager implies general power and permits reasonable inferences that the employee so GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 448 MANAGER designated is invested with the general conduct and control of the employer’s business. MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of superior jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, or individual to perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act, the performance or omission of which is required by law as an obligation. A writ or order of mandamus is an extra- ordinary court order because it is made without the benefit of full judicial process, or before a case has concluded. It may be issued by a court at any time that it is appropriate, but it is usually issued in a case that has already begun. Generally, the decisions of a lower-court made in the course of a co ntinuing case will not be reviewed by higher courts until there is a final judgment in the case. On the federal level, for example, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 provides that appellate review of lower-court decisions should be postponed until after a final judgment has been made in the lower court. A writ of mandamus offers one exception to this rule. If a party to a case is dissatisfied with some decision of the trial court, the party may appeal the decision to a higher court with a petition for a writ of mandamus before the trial proceeds. The order will be issued only in exceptional circumstances. The writ of mandamus was first used by English courts in the early seventeenth century. It migrated to the courts in the American colonies, and the law on it has remained largely the same ever since. The remedy of mandamus is made available through court opinions, statutes, and court rules on both the federal and state levels. On the federal level, for example, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651(a) provides that courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” The Supreme Court set forth some guide- lines on writs of mandamus in Kerr v. United On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in this case, holding that greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to regulate under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S._______, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1459-62 (2007). The Court also struck down EPA’s alternative policy grounds for denying a rulemaking petition for regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles, and it ordered the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 1462-63. The Court’s ruling requires the Administrator to review the pending rulemaking petition based on proper statutory factors. As discussed below, this means that the agency has to make a formal determination—based solely on the science—as to whether these emissions contribute to “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” See 42 U.S.C. 7521(a). PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH MANDATE Petition for a Writ of Mandamus UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, et al. Petitioners, v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al. Respondents. Docket No. 03-1361 (& consolidated cases) A full year later, the EPA Administrator has not complied with the Supreme Court’s order and mandate issued by this Court to effectuate that order. As EPA’s own statements and a Congressional inquiry demonstrate: the Administrator publicly set a firm deadline for making the endangerment determination by the end of 2007; the agency has already completed all of its work on issues that, under the Supreme Court’s decision, are relevant to that determination; the Administrator has in fact made an internal decision in favor of endangerment; and the Administrator has forwarded the full formal write-up of that determination to the White House Office of Management and Budget. The publication of the endangerment determination, however, is now being withheld. The Administrator has refused to give the petitioners of Congress a timetable for action, and he has explained his delay by reference to considerations that are not legally relevant under the Supreme Court’s ruling. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court issue a writ of mandamus requiring EPA to issue within sixty days its determination on whether the air pollution to which greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles contribute “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” CONCLUSION A sample petition for a writ of mandamus ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION MANDAMUS 449 States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 96 S. Ct. 2119, 48 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1976). In Kerr, the Court upheld the denial of a writ of mandamus sought by prison officials to prevent the district court from compelling them to turn over personnel and inmate files to seven prisoners who had sued the prison over alleged constitu- tional violations. The officials argued that turning over the records would compromise prison communications and confidentiality. The Supreme Court observed in Kerr that the writ of mandamus was traditionally used by federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its jurisdiction, or to compel an inferior court to exercise its authority when it had a duty to do so. The Court also noted that mandamus is available only in exceptional cases because it is so disruptive of the judicial process, creating disorder and delay in the trial. The writ would have been appropriate, opined the Court, if the trial court had wrongly decided an issue, if failure to reverse that decision would irreparably injure a party, and if there was no other method for relief. Because the prison officials could claim a privilege to withhold certain documents, and had the right to have the documents reviewed by a judge prior to release to the opposing party, other remedies existed and the writ was inappropriate. Although traditionally writs of mandamus are rare, they have been issued in a growing number of situations. They have been issued by federal courts when a trial judge refused to dismiss a case even though it lacked jurisdiction; refused to reassign a case despite a conflict of interest; stopped a trial for ARBITRATION or an administrative remedy; denied a party the opportunity to intervene, to file a cross-claim, or to ame nd a PLEADING; denied a CLASS ACTION; denied or allowed the consolidation or sever- ance of two trials; refused to permit depositions; or entered an order limiting or denying dis- covery of evidence. The writ of man damus can also be issued in a mandamus proceeding, independent of any judicial proceeding. Generally, such a petition for a mandamus order is made to compel a judicial or government officer to perform a duty owed to the petitioner. For example, in Massachusetts each year the commonwealth’s attorney general and each district attorney must make available to the public a report on wiretaps and other interceptions of oral communications conducted by law enforcement officers. If the report is not made available, any person may compel its production by filing an action for mandamus (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 99 [West 1996]). If successful, a court would issue an order directing the attorney general and district attorneys to produce the information. The attorney general and district attorneys have a chance to defend their actions at a hearing on the action. If the parties fail to comply with a mandamus order, they may be held in CONTEMPT of court and fined or jailed. FURTHER READINGS Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr., et al. 2009. Pleading and Procedure, State and Federal: Cases and Materials. 10th ed. New York: Foundation. Willcock, John William. 2009. The Law of Municipal Corporations: Together with a Brief Sketch of Their History, and a Treatise on Mandamus and Quo Warranto. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Library. Wyler, Robert A. 2002. Legalines: Civil Procedures. 8th ed. Chicago: Harcourt. MANDATE A judicial command, order, or precept, written or oral, from a court; a direction that a court has the authority to give and an individual is bound to obey. A mandate might be issued upon the decision of an appea l, which directs that a particular action be taken, or upon a disposition made of a case by an inferior tribunal. The term mandate is also used in reference to an act by which one individual empowers another individual to conduct transactions for an individual in that person’s name. In this sense, it is used synonymously with POWER OF ATTORNEY . MANDATORY Peremptory; obligatory; required; that which must be subscribed to or obeyed. Mandatory statutes are those that require, as opposed to permit, a particular course of action. Their language is characterized by such directive terms as “shall” as opposed to “may.” A man- datory provision is one that must be observed, whereas a directory provision is optional. An example of a mandatory provision is a law that provides that an election judge must endorse his or her initials on a ballot. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 450 MANDATE MANDATORY AUTHORITY Precedents, in the form of prior decisions by a higher court of the same state on point, statutes, or other sources of law that must be considered by a judge in the determination of a legal controversy. Mandatory authority is synonymous with binding authority. MANN ACT The Mann Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 et seq.), also known as the White Slave Traffic Act, is a federal criminal statute that deals with prostitu- tion and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. Enacted in 1910 and named for its sponsor, Representative JAMES R . MANN, of Illinois, it also was used to prosecute men who took women across state lines for consensual sex. Representative Mann introduced the act in December 1909 at the request of Chicago prosecutors who claimed that girls and women were being forced into prostitution by unscru- pulous pimps and procurers. The term white slavery became popular to describe the predica- ment these females faced. It was alleged that men were tricking, coercing, and drugging females to get them involved in prostitution and then forcing them to stay in brothels. The legislation was intended to stop the interstate trafficking of women. Though federal criminal statutes were rare in 1910, and seen as an attack on state POLICE POWERS, the legislation encountered little opposition. The act made it a felony to transport knowingly any woman or girl in interstate commerce or foreign com- merce for prostitution, debauchery, or any other immoral purpose. It also made it a felony to coerce a woman or a girl into such immoral acts. President WILLIAM H. TAFT signed the bill in June 1910. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the consti- tutionality of the Mann Act in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523 (1913). The Court broadened the scope of the act in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917), when it ruled that the act applied to noncommercial acts of immorality. In Caminetti the Court seized on the phrase “any other immoral purpose,” concluding that Congress intended to prevent the use of interstate commerce to promote sexual immorality. This interpretation radically changed the scope of the act. The Mann Act was used by the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION to curtail commercial- ized vice. It was also often used to prosecute prominent persons who did not conform to conventional morality. Jack Johnson, a heavy- weight boxing champion, was charged with and convicted of a Mann Act violation in 1912, for taking his mistress across state lines. Over the years, similar charges were leveled against the architect Frank Lloyd Wright, the actor Charlie Chaplin, and the rock and roll singer Chuck Berry. Of these three, only Berry was convicted of a Mann Act violation. Congress amended the act in 1978 to attack the problem of child PORNOGRAPHY. The amend- ments made the act’s provisions regarding this issue gender neutral, so that both boys and girls who were sexually exploited were now protected (Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 8–9). In 1986 the law was further amended. The new amend- ments made the entire act gender neutral as to victims of sexual exploitation. More important, all references to debauchery and any other immoral purpose were replaced by the phrase “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense” (Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3511–3512.) This change took the federal government out of the business of defining immoral. Because most states have repealed criminal laws against fornication and ADULTERY, noncommercial, consensual sexual activity no longer is subject to prosecution. RESOURCES Grittner, Frederick K. 1990. White Slavery: Myth, Ideology, and American Law. New York: Garland. Langum, David J. 1994. Crossing over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. “The Mann Act.” Unforgivable Blackness, a film directed by Ken Burns for PBS. Available online at http://www.pbs. org/unforgivableblackness/knockout/mann.html; web- site home page: http://www.pbs.org (accessed Septem- ber 6, 2009). v MANN, HORACE Attorney, politician, and reformer of U.S. public education Horace Mann transformed the nation’s schools. Mann was a gust of wind blowing through the doldrums of nineteenth- century teaching. In 1837 he left a promising career in law and politics to become Massachu- setts’s first secretary of education. In this capacity, he reb uilt shoddy schools, instituted teacher training, and ensured widespread access EDUCATION THEN, BEYOND ALL OTHER DEVICES OF HUMAN ORIGIN , IS A GREAT EQUALIZER OF THE CONDITIONS OF MEN ,—THE BALANCE WHEEL OF THE SOCIAL MACHINERY . —HORACE MANN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MANN, HORACE 451 to education for children and adults. These reforms not on ly revived the state system but also inspired great national progress. The spirit of opportunity and the duty of citizenship guided Mann: “In a repub lic,” he said, “igno- rance is a crime.” Later, he served in the U.S. Congress before becoming a professor at and the president of Antioch College. Besides these contributions, his legacy to U.S. education is still felt in the contemporary debate over school prayer. He helped wean education from its religious origins in order to create a truly public system. Mann was born in poverty on May 4, 1796, in Franklin, Massachusetts. His father, Thomas Mann, was a farmer in Franklin. Neither his father nor his mother, Rebecca Mann, received much formal education, which was not widely available in the years following the American Revolution. Little opportunity existed for Mann, a sensitive boy driven to tears by hellfire-and- brimstone sermons on Sundays. Although an avid reader, Mann never attended school for more than ten weeks of the year. His extraordi- nary mind might have gone no further than the family’s ancestral farm were it not for a traveling Latin teacher who tutored him when Mann was 20. Provided with decent instruction, Mann’s gifts were revealed: He qualified for entrance as a sophomore to Brown University. He graduated with high honors in 1819; remained briefly as a tutor in Lat in and Greek; enrolled in LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL, in Connecti- cut, two years later; and was admitted to the bar of Norfolk County in 1823. Mann practiced law for 14 years while making his name in politics. He first won election to the Massachusetts House of Repre- sentatives in 1827; election to the state senate, where he served as president, followed in 1833. He left his mark on the legislature in two ways: by seeking state help for mentally ill persons and by passing the landmark education bill of 1837. The law created a board of education at a time when Massachusetts’s public schools were barely limping along. Buildings were crumbl- ing, teachers underpaid, and teaching methods erratic. Much the same could be said of the nation’s public schools. In Massachusetts, moreover, one-third of the children did not attend school at all, and one-sixth of all students Horace Mann. GETTY IMAGES Horace Mann 1796–1859 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 18751875 18501850 18251825 ❖ 1796 Born, Franklin, Mass. ◆ ◆ 1819 Graduated from Brown University 1823 Admitted to Norfolk County (Mass.) bar ◆ 1827 Elected to Mass. House; Mass. passed law banning sectarian instruction in public schools ◆ 1833 Elected to Mass. Senate ❖ 1859 Died, Yellow Springs, Ohio 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1837 Sponsored landmark education bill, creating board of education and state secretary of education in Mass. 1839 Established six-month school year in Mass. ◆ 1852 Appointed president of Antioch College (Ohio), a new multiracial school for men and women 1848 Elected to U.S. House 1845 Lectures on Education published 1843 Went on five-month tour studying the methods of European school systems ◆ ◆ 1837–48 Served as Mass. state secretary of education ◆ ◆ ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 452 MANN, HORACE attended private schools. To clean up this mess, the 1837 law called for the appointment of a state secretary of education. Mann, despite the promise of further success as a lawyer and politician, took the job. Over the next 12 years, Mann’s success was stunning. His efforts rebuilt Massachusetts’s education system from the ground up: he centralized control of its schools, invested in better facilities, established institutes for teacher training, revamped the curriculum, discouraged physical punishment, and held annual educa- tion conventions for teachers and the public. Educators nationwide sought out his ideas, published in a bimonthly magazine that he founded, called the Common School Journal, as well as in ANNUAL REPORTS. In 1843, pursuing new ideas for i mproving the quality of Massa- chusetts’s system, he toured schools in eight European countries. His praise for the rigors of the German model brought him into open conflict with schoolteachers back home, who thought him critical of their work. Man n stood his ground; he had not spent five months abroad only to be bullied by the status quo. Even more controversial was Mann’s posi- tion on Bible reading in public schools. In the mid–nineteenth century, the practice remained a leftover from the colonial period, when schools were each run by a church of an individual sect, or group. Mann thought Bible reading useful for teaching moral instruction, and he promoted it, but only so long as it was done without comment. As a Unitarian, he did not want teachers imposing views on students of different faiths; this had often led to bitter disagreements. (In the early 1840s, disputes over classroom Bible reading would cause Catholic- Protestant riots in New York and Philadelphia.) Under Mann’s influence, Massachusetts ad- hered to the law it had passed in 1827 banning sectarian instruction (instruction specific to or characteristic of a particular religious group) from public schools. Orthodox church leaders sharply attacked Mann, one calli ng his policy “a grand instrument in the hands of free thinkers, atheists and infidels.” History was on Mann’s side, however. The sectarian influence would continue to die out over the next half century, a historical trend culminating in the U.S. Su- preme Court’s landmark rulings banning school prayer in 1962 ( ENGEL V. VITALE, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S. Ct. 1261, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601 [1962]) and Bible reading in 1963 ( ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT V. SCHEMPP, 374 U.S . 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844 [1963]). Ironically, the prayer ban arose from an attempt by admi nistrators of education in New York to compose a bland, inoffensive prayer in the spirit of Mann’s anti-sectarianism. Mann spent the last decade of his life in public service and education. Resigning the education secretary’s post in 1848, he won election to the U.S. Congress and served there four years. A run for governor of Massachusetts failed in 1852, and he accepted the offer of the presidency of newly founded Antioch College, a multiracial school fo r men and women, where he also taught courses in philosophy and theo- logy. The college suffered financially. Mann’s health failed, and he died August 2, 1859, at the age of 63. Shortly before his death, at a commencement ceremony, he left the graduat- ing class to ponder this sterling ideal: “Be ashamed to die until you have won some victory for humanity.” FURTHER READINGS Blanshard, Paul. 1963. Religion and the Schools: The Great Controversy. Boston: Beacon Press. Mann, Horace. 2009. The Life and Works of Horace Mann. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Library. Morgan, Joy Elmer. 2008. Horace Mann: His Ideas and Ideals. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger. CROSS REFERENCES Education Law; Schools and School Districts. v MANN, JAMES ROBERT James Robert Mann served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1897 to 1922. Mann, an Illinois Republican, sponsored three pieces of legislation that enlarged the power of the federal government to regulate the economy and the nation’s morals. He is best remembered as the author of the MANN ACT (18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 et seq.), also known as the White Slave Traffic Act. Mann was born October 20, 1856, in McLean County, Illinois. He graduated from the Univer- sity of Illinois in 1876 and then attended the Union College of Law (now know n as the Northwestern University Law School). Following his admission to the Illinois bar in 1881, Mann joined a prominent Chicago law firm and achieved success as a business attorney. Mann became active in Chicago politics during the 1880s and was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1897. As a mod er- ate Republican, Mann believed that the federal ALL OF THE HORRORS WHICH HAVE EVER BEEN URGED , EITHER TRUTHFULLY OR FANCIFULLY , AGAINST THE BLACK -SLAVE TRADE PALE INTO INSIGNIFICANCE AS COMPARED TO THE HORRORS OF THE SO - CALLED ‘WHITE-SLAVE TRAFFIC .’ —JAMES MANN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MANN, JAMES ROBERT 453 government had a role to play in man aging the national economy. His interest in reform was heightened by the work of muckraking jour- nalists who produced sensational investigative articles exposing impure food processing and impure and often fraudulent drugs. In response to public concerns about the quality of food and medicine, Mann sponsored a major piece of federal legislation, the PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT OF 1906 (34 Stat. 768). This act invoked the Constitution’s COMMERCE CLAUSE for authority to regulate the interstate shipment of food and medicine. The law signaled a change in the state-federal power relationship, which had previously emphasized the right of states to regulate business. The inspection of food products and medicines by the federal government both reassured the public about the quality of what it consumed and served notice that a national economy required national regulation. Mann demonstrated his continuing interest in regula- tion with his sponsorship of the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 (36 Stat. 539). Mann-Elkins gave the INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION authority to regulate and set the rates for telegraph, telephone, and railroad companies. The law recognized that these modes of communication and transportation were a vital part of the interstate economy and that their rates needed to be regulated by the federal government rather than by the states. Mann was instrumental in the passage of the Mann Act in 1910. This act grew out of concerns of Chicago authorities that women and girls were being forced into prostitution through a variety of tricks and coercive tactics. The term white slavery came to symbolize the predicament of women who were kept i n houses of prostitution against their will. It was alleged that “white slaves” (pimps and pro- curers) lured females from rural states into large cities such as Chicago and then forced them into prostitution. Responding to pleas from Chicago prose- cutors that a federal CRIMINAL LAW was needed, Mann introduced the Mann Act. The act prohibited the transportation of women across state lines for prostitution or “any other immoral purpose.” Mann skillfully guided the legislation through the House of Representa- tives, overcoming congressional Democrats who argued that the act expanded federal POLICE James Robert Mann 1856–1922 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18501850 19251925 19001900 18751875 ❖❖ 1856 Born, McClean County, Ill. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ◆ 1876 Graduated from the University of Illinois ◆ 1881 Admitted to Illinois bar ◆ 1897 Elected to U.S. House ◆ 1906 Publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle led to passage of the Meat Inspection Act and Mann's Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 1922 Died, Washington, D.C. 1914–18 World War I ◆ 1910 The Mann Act outlawed the transportation of women across state lines for purposes of prostitution James R. Mann. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 454 MANN, JAMES ROBERT POWER. Once passed, the Mann Act became a central part of the work of the newly created FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Mann died in Washington, D.C., on November 30, 1922. FURTHER READINGS Ellis, L. Ethan. 1953. “James Robert Mann: Legislator Extraordinary.” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 46 (Spring). Grittner, Frederick K. 1990. White Slavery: Myth, Ideology, and American Law. New York: Garland. Margulies, Herbert F. 1996. Reconciliation and Revival: James R. Mann and the House Republicans in the Wilson Era. Westport, CT: Greenwood. MANOR A house, a dwelling, or a residence. Historically under ENGLISH LAW, a manor was a parcel of land granted by the king to a lord or other high ranking person. Incident to every manor was the right of the lord to hold a court called the court baron, which was organized to maintain and enforce the services and duties that were owed to the lord of the manor. The lands that constituted the manor holdings included terrae tenementales, Latin for “tene- mental lands,” and terrae dominicales, Latin for “demesne lands.” The lord gave the tenemental lands to his followers or retainers in freehold. He retained part of the demesne lands for his own use but gave part to tenants in copyhold— those who took possession of the land by virtue of the ev idence or copy in the records of the lord’s court. A portion of the demesne lands, called the lord’s waste, served as public roads and common pasture land for the lord and his tenants. The word manor also meant the privilege of having a manor with the jurisdiction of a court baron and the right to receive rents and services from the copyholders. CROSS REFERENCE Feudalism. v MANSFIELD, WILLIAM MURRAY, FIRST EARL OF William Murray, first earl of Mansfield, was an eighteenth-century Eng lish lawyer and judge who, along with SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE and SIR EDWARD COKE , played an important part in molding U.S. law. His revision of PROPERTY LAW and his formulation of basic principles of contract law provided the basis for modern COMMERCIAL LAW. Lord Mansfield also is remem- bered for his decision in Somerset’s Case, 1 Lofft’s Rep. 1, 20 Howell’s State Trials 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772), in which he held that there was no legal basis for SLAVERY in England. This case came to have great significance in the United States, as it presented a legal theory for those opposed to slavery. Mansfield was born March 2, 1705, in Scone, Scotland. He was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, and was called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn in 1730. From 1742 to 1754, Mansfield acted as SOLICITOR GENERAL of England, and from 1754 to 1756, he served as attorney general. In 1756 he became chief justice of the King’s Bench, and he served on the court until 1788. In recognition of these achievements, he was created first earl of Mansfield. ▼▼ ▼▼ William Murray, First Earl of Mansfield 1705–1793 17001700 17501750 17751775 18001800 17251725 ❖ 1705 Born, Scone, Scotland ◆ 1707 Act of Union created legislative union of Scotland and England ◆ 1730 Called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn 1742–54 Served as solicitor general of England 1754–56 Served as attorney general of England 1756–88 Served as chief justice of the King's Bench 1775–83 American Revolution 1759–61 Luke v. Lyde, Moses v. Macferlan and Edie v. East India Company served as major cases in Mansfield's modernization of English commercial law ◆ 1772 Somerset's Case ruled that only an act of Parliament could legitimize slavery in England ◆ ❖ 1793 Died, London, England 1787 U.S. Constitution side-stepped issue of slavery in compromise of Northern commercial interests versus Southern agricultural interests GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MANSFIELD, WILLIAM MURRAY, FIRST EARL OF 455 Mansfield departed from the traditional role of an English judge. He did not seek to formulate law solely on the basis of STARE DECISIS , which relies on the exact holdings of previous decisions. Instead, Mansfield sought to determine general principles inherent in the decisions reached by common-law courts and then to apply those principles to the case at hand. This gave Mansfield great flexibility in responding to new varieties of litigation that came with the development of English com- merce. Also, Mansfield educated himself about commercial practices. Because of his growing sensitivity to their interests, members of the English commercial classes were encouraged to bring more of their disputes to his court and to let their affairs be governed by his common-law principles. In deciding commercial-law cases, Mans- field adopted the guiding principle of GOOD FAITH , which demanded an adherence to moral obligations. In contract law he believed that the parties’ intentions—rather than out-of-date, rigid common-law rules—ought to be used to set the scope of agreements and to settle disputes. In the area of real property, Mansfield tried, against much resistance, to update and modify a species of law that was both archaic and arcane. Throughout his tenure on the bench, Mansfield demonstrated a consistent desire to modernize the law of commerce. Mansfield’s decision in Somerset’s Case dealt a fatal blow to English slaveholding interests. In this 1772 case, a slave brought to England by his master had escaped and had been recaptured. Antislavery activis ts demanded his release and sought a writ of HABEAS CORPUS (an order of protection against illegal imprisonment), argu- ing that England did not have a law permitting slavery. Mansfield ordered that the slave be released, holding that slavery was “so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law.” Mansfield did not rule that slavery was always illegal, only that it would take a positive law (an act of Parliament) to legitimate it. Absent a positive law that would recognize the powers of a slave owner over a slave, English courts would not uphold a slaveholder’sclaim to a slave. This decision was embraced by opponents of U.S. slavery in nonslaveholding states. Somerset’s Case ultimately shaped the federal system in the United States, making slavery there a product of state, not federal, statutory law. It also permitted runaway slaves in the United States to claim legal protection if they escaped to a nonslaveholding state. Mansfield died March 20, 1793, in London. MANSLAUGHTER The unjustifiable, inexcusable, and intentional killing of a human being without deliberation, premeditation, and malice. The unlawful killing of a human being without any deliberation, which may be involuntary, in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection. Manslaughter is a distinct crime and is not considered a lesser degree of murder. The essential distinction between the two offenses is that malice aforethought must be present for murder, whereas it must be absent for man- slaughter. Manslaughter is not as serious a crime as murder. On the other hand, it is not a justifiable or excusable killing for which little or no punishment is imposed. At COMMON LAW, as well as under current statutes, the offense can be either voluntary or INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. The main difference between the two is that voluntary manslaughter requires an intent to kill or caus e serious bodily harm while involuntary manslaughter does not. Premeditation or deliberation, however, are elements of murder and not of manslaugh- ter. Some states have abandoned the use of adjectives to describe different forms of the offense and, instead, simply divi de the offense into varying degrees. Voluntary Manslaughter In most jurisdictions, voluntary manslaughter consists of an intentional killing that is acc- ompanied by additional circumstances that mitigate, but do not excuse, the killing. The most common type of voluntary manslaughter occurs when a defendant is provoked to commit the HOMICIDE. It is sometimes described as a heat of passion killing. In most cases, the provoca- tion must induce rage or anger in the defendant, although some cases have held that fright, terror, or desperation will suffice. If adequate provocation is established, a murder charge may be reduced to manslaugh- ter. Generally there are four conditions that must be fulfilled to warrant the reduction: (1) the provocation must cause rage or fear in a reasonable person; (2) the defendant must have I DESIRE NOTHING SO MUCH AS THAT ALL QUESTIONS OF MERCANTILE LAW BE FULLY SETTLED AND ASCERTAINED ; AND IT IS OF MUCH MORE CONSEQUENCE THAT THEY SHOULD BE SO , THAN WHICH WAY THE DECISION IS . —WILLIAM,FIRST EARL OF MANSFIELD GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 456 MANSLAUGHTER actually been provoked; (3) there should not be a time period between the provocation and the killing within which a reasonable person would cool off; and (4) the defendant should not have cooled off during that period. Provocation is justifiable if a reasonable person under similar circumstances would be induced to act in the same manner as the defendant. It must be found that the degree of provocation was such that a reasonable person would lose self-control. In actual practice, there is no precise formula for determining reason- ableness. It is a matter that is determined by the trier of fact, either the jury or the judge in a nonjury trial, after a full consideration of the evidence. Certain forms of provocation that frequently arise have traditionally been considered reason- able or unreasonable by the courts. A killing that results from anger that is induced by a violent blow with a fist or weapon might constitute sufficient provocation, provided the accused did not incite the victim. It is not reasonable, however, to respond similarly to a light blow. A killing that results from mutual combat is often considered manslaughter, pro- vided it was caused by the heat of passion aroused by the combat. An illegal arrest of one who knows of or believes in his or her innocence may provoke a reasonable person, although cases are in dispute on the issue of whether such an arres t would justify a killing. An attempt to make a legal arrest in an unlawful manner by the use of unnecessary violence might also constitute a heat of passion killing that will mitigate an intentional killing. Some cases have held that a reasonable belief that one’s spouse is committing ADULTERY will suffice. An injury to persons in a close relationship to the accused, such as a spouse, child, or parent, is often held to constitute reasonable provocation, particu- larly when the injury occurs in the accused person’s presence. Mere words or gestures, althou gh extremely offensive and insulting, have traditionally been viewed as insufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. There is, however, a modern trend in some courts to hold that words alone will suffice under certain circumstances, such as instances in which a present intent and ability to cause harm is demonstrated. The reasonable person standard is generally applied in a purely objective manner. Unusual mental or physical characteristics are not taken into consideration. The fact that a defendant was more susceptible to provocation than an average person because he or she had a previous head injury is not relevant to a determination of whether the person’s conduct was reasonable. There has, however, been a trend in some cases that indicates a willingness to consider some subjective factors. If a reasonable period of time passed between the provocation and the killing so that the defendant had sufficient time to cool off, a homicide will not be reduced to manslaughter. Most courts will reduce the charge if a reasonable person would not have cooled off. Some, how- ever, look solely at the defendant’s temperament and make a subjective decision as to whether the person had sufficient time to regain self- control. In some states, there is a case-law trend in which a killing that is committed under a mistaken belief that one is justified constitutes voluntary manslaughter. It is reasoned that although the crime is not justifiable, it is not serious enough to be murder. It is a general rule that a defendant who acts in SELF-DEFENSE may only use force that is reasonably calculated to prevent harm to himself or herself. If the person honestly, but unreasonably, believes DEADLY FORCE is necessary and, therefore, causes another’s death, some courts will consider the crime voluntary man- slaughter. Similarly when a defendant acts under an honest but unreasonable belief that he or she has a right to kill another to prevent a felony, some courts will find the person guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Although it is generally considered a crime to kill another in order to save oneself, the justification of coercion or necessity may, likewise, reduce murder to manslaughter in some jurisdictions. Involuntary Manslaughter Involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another human being without intent. The absence of the intent element is the essential difference between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Also in most states, involuntary manslaughter does not result from a heat of passion but from an improper use of reasonable care or skill while in the commission of a lawful act or while in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MANSLAUGHTER 457 . ALL OTHER DEVICES OF HUMAN ORIGIN , IS A GREAT EQUALIZER OF THE CONDITIONS OF MEN ,—THE BALANCE WHEEL OF THE SOCIAL MACHINERY . —HORACE MANN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MANN,. purposes of prostitution James R. Mann. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 454 MANN, JAMES ROBERT POWER. Once passed, the Mann Act became a central part of the work of. secretary of education ◆ ◆ ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 452 MANN, HORACE attended private schools. To clean up this mess, the 1837 law called for the appointment of a state