presided as chief justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court from 1889 to 1890. From 1896 to 1900, he was an assistant U.S. attorney general to the INTERIOR DEPARTMENT, concurrently serving as a delegate to the Republican National Committee. He also taught law at Columbian College, now GEORGE WASHINGTON University. In 1903 President THEODORE ROOSEVELT appointed him to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, and in 1910 President WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT nomi- nated him to the Supreme Cour t. On the Court, Van Devanter wrote few noteworthy opinions. His contributions came mainly in obscure legal areas that he had mastered while on the circuit court: land claims, WATER RIGHTS, and jurisdictional issues. Rather than writing opinions, Van Devanter preferred to assert his influence in discussions among the justices. He often voiced his belief that government power should be limited. He took an especially narrow view of the powers that could be asserted under the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce, Tax, and Due Process Clauses. From 1918 to 1923, he joined majority opinions that found federal CHILD LABOR LAWS and state MINIMUM WAGE legislation unconstitutional. Ironically, Van Devanter’s most significant opinion marked a rare departure from his ideology. In MCGRAIN V. DAUGHERTY, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580 (1927), he asserted that Congress had broad powers to SUBPOENA and conduct investigations. The opi- nion’s impact was felt dramatically two decades later during congressional investigations of labor corruption and COMMUNISM. In the 1930s, Van Devanter’s desire to restrain government kept him on the Court. He had apparently decided to retire in 1932 but changed his mind because of what he regarded as the excesses of President FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT. The president had embarked on the ambitious New Deal, a broad legislative response to the economic hardships of the Great Depression. Sharing Van Devanter’s opposition to thes e programs were three other conservative justices: JAMES C. MCREYNOLDS, GEORGE SUTHERLAND, and PIERCE BUTLER. Critics dubbed them the “Four Horsemen,” after the four horsemen of the Apocalypse. In a string of decisions, they voted as a bloc to strike down key New Deal laws. Among these decisions was SCHECHTER POULTRY CORP . V. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935), which voided a key part of Roosevelt’s plan for economic recovery and provoked the president into seeking a means to ensure that his legislation survived. Two years later, Roosevelt responded with an extraordinary attempt to expand the numb er of Willis Van Devanter. CORBIS. ▼▼ ▼▼ Willis Van Devanter 1859–1941 18501850 19001900 19251925 19501950 18751875 ❖ 1859 Born, Marion, Ind. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1881 Graduated from Cincinnati Law School; admitted to Indiana bar 1886 Served on Wyoming codification commission 1886–88 Served as Cheyenne city attorney 1889–90 Served as chief justice of Wyoming Supreme Court 1884 Moved to Wyoming 1897–1903 Served as assistant U.S. attorney, Department of the Interior 1898 Spanish American War 1903 Appointed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 1914–18 World War I 1910–37 Served as associate justice of the Supreme Court 1941 Died, Washington, D.C. 1939–45 World War II ◆◆◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 208 VAN DEVANTER, WILLIS justices on the Court—his so-called court- packing plan. In the face of this challenge, the Court backed down and began upholding New Deal legislation. Other decisions during van Devanter’s tenure included his vote against the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (United States v. Butler), federal regulation of labor relations ( NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.), the Railway Pension Act (Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad), unemployment insurance (Steward Machine Co. v. Davis), and the minimum wage (West Coast Hotel v. Parrish). Van Devanter resigned at the end of 1936. Although branded a reactionary during his tenure, in retirement he received accolades from his fellow justices, conservative and liberal alike. He died on February 8, 1941, in Washington, D.C. FURTHER READINGS Johnson, Wallace H. 2001. “Willis Van Devanter: An Examination. Wyoming Law Review 1 (winter). Van Pelt, Lori. 2004. Capital Characters of Old Cheyenne. Glendo, Wyo.: High Plains Press. CROSS REFERENCES New Deal; Roosevelt, Franklin Del ano, “FDR’s Court Packing Plan” (Sidebar). VANDALISM The intentional and malicious destruction of or damage to the property of another. The intentional destruction of property is popularly referred to as vandalism. It includes behavior such as breaking windows, slashing tires, spray painting a wall with graffiti, and destroying a computer system through the use of a computer virus. Vandalism is a malicious act and may reflect personal ill will, although the perpetrators need not know their victim to commit vandalism. The recklessness of the act imputes both intent and malice. Because the destruction of public and private property poses a threat to society, modern statutes make vandalism a crime. The penalties upon conviction may be a fine, a jail sentence, an order to pay for repairs or replacement, or all three. In addition, a person who commits vandalism may be sued in a civil tort action for damages so that the damaged property can be repaired or replaced. Vandalism is a general term that may not actually appear in criminal statutes. Frequently, these statutes employ the terms criminal mis- chief, malicious mischief, or malicious trespass as opposed to vandalism. A group of individuals can be convicted of conspiring or acting concertedly to commit vandalism. Generally, the attempt to commit vandalism is an offense as well, but the penalties for attempted vandalism are not as severe as the penalties for a completed act. Penalties also depend on the value of the property destroyed or the cost of repairing it. To obtain a conviction the prosecution must ordinarily prove that the accused damaged or destroyed some property, that the property did not belong to the accused, and that the accused acted willfully and with malice. In the absence of proof of damage, the defendant may be guilty of TRESPASS, but not vandalism. If there is no proof that the defendant intentionally damaged the property, the defendant cannot be convicted of the crime but can be held liable for monetary damages in a civil action. Some state statutes impose more stringent penalties for the destruction of certain types of property. Such statutes might cover the dese- cration of a church or synagogue, the destruc- tion of jail or prison property by inmates, and Workers in Pittsburgh examine spray- painted vandalism on a statue of Christopher Columbus. Though political demonstrators may exercise their freedom of speech, doing so through the defacement of public property can lead to conviction. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION VANDALISM 209 the intentional destruction of property belong- ing to a public utility. Destructive acts will not be excused merely because the defendants acted out of what they thought was a noble purpose. Political demon- strators may exercise their FIRST AMENDMENT rights of FREEDOM OF SPEECH and FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY , but if they deface, for example, government property with spray- painted slogans, they can be convicted of vandalism. The peak period for committing relatively minor property crimes is between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one. In the United States adolescent vandalism, including the wanton destruction of schools, causes millions of dollars of damage each year. Apprehending vandals is often difficult, and the costs of repairing the damage are passed on to taxpayers, private property owners, and insurance companies. Some states hold parents financially responsible for vandalism committed by their minor children, up to specified limits. These statutes are designed to encourage parental supervision and to shift part of the cost of vandalism from the public to the individuals who are best able to supervise the children who destroyed the property. CROSS REFERENCES Juvenile Law. v VANDERBILT, ARTHUR T. Arthur T. Vanderbilt was chief justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court and a nationally renowned champion of judicial reform in the 1950s. Though he never became a U.S. Supreme Court justice, Vanderbilt’s philosophy and personal energy paved the way for the modern- ization of state judicial systems. He used the New Jersey courts as his la boratory for judicial change. Vanderbilt was born in Newark, New Jersey, on July 7, 1888. He attended Newark (now Barringer) High School where he served as class president, edited the newspaper and was a member of two fraternal groups, The Ramblers (later Omega Gamma Delta) and Lambda Tau. Following high school, he took a year break from school to work on the railroad to earn money for college. He graduated from Wesleyan University in 1910, then attended Columbia University School of Law in New York City. Upon graduation in 1913, he began private practice in Newark. Vanderbilt was notable for the longevity of his service in education and public office. In 1914, he began teaching as an adjunct professor at New York University School of Law, a position he held for 29 years. In 1921 he was appointed county counsel for New Jersey’s Essex County where he served for 26 years. In 1934 Vanderbilt became a trustee for Wesleyan University; he remained on the board until his death. Shortly after his graduation from law school, Vanderbilt became active in the REPUBLI- CAN PARTY as part of a group of “Clean- Government” reformers who sought change in the political apparatus that ran Essex County and New Jersey. The Clean Government movement strongly supported Frank Driscoll as the Republican candidate for governor. When Driscoll won the gubernatorial election in 1946, he kept his promise to Clean Govern- ment advocates to hold a constitutional con- vention and to seek judicial reform. A stroke prevented Vanderbilt from attending the 1947 constitutional convention, but he served as an adviser to the governor who followed through on many of the convention’s recommendations. Chief among these was the replacement of New ▼▼ ▼▼ Arthur T. Vanderbilt 1888–1957 1875 1925 1950 1975 1900 ❖ 1888 Born, Newark, N.J. ◆ 1913 Received LL.B. from Columbia University 1914–43 Taught at NYU School of Law 1939 Helped draft statute that created U.S. Administrative Office of the Courts ◆ 1941 One of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ◆ ❖ 1943–48 Served as dean of NYU Law School 1948–57 Served as chief justice of newly created N.J. Supreme Court 1957 Died 1939–45 World War II 1914–18 World War I GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 210 VANDERBILT, ARTHUR T. Jersey’s outdated Court of Errors and Appeals with the New Jersey Supreme Court. In 1948, Governor Driscoll appointed Vanderbilt as chief justice of the new court. Prior to the adoption of the 1947 Constitu- tion, New Jersey ’s courts had functioned as separate units, each with its own rules, proce- dures, and case management system. As part of his duties as chief justice, Vanderbilt also functioned as the administrative head of all of the New Jersey courts. He immediately began the difficult process of creating a unified court system with standardized procedures and pro- cesses. One of the most egregious problems facing the new chief justice was the large number of cases that were backlogged on the dockets of the trial courts. Vand erbilt required the state’s judges to increase their productivity by demanding that they submit weekly reports showing the number of cases and motions that had been resolved and listing those cases that were still not decided. Vanderbilt not only personally reviewed the reports, but had them published. While many judges resisted these changes, the case backlogs were eliminated by 1950 and New Jersey’s courts were judged to be among the most efficien t in the United States. Besides facing battles inside the court system, Vanderbilt wrestled with the New Jersey Legislature over which body had control over judicial rule making. In a significant case, Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1950), Vanderbilt wrote a majority opinion in which the court interpreted the phrase “subject to law” to mean that the court, not the legislature, had the final word on rules it promulgated regarding procedural matters. Despite opposition from one dissenting justice and from members of New Jersey’s General Assembly, significant support from the press and members of the New Jersey bar helped Vanderbilt to prevail in the Winberry case and in other matters relating to judicial independence and court administration. Vanderbilt gained a national reputation as a leading judicial reformer. In 1939 he helped to draft the statute that created the U.S. Adminis- trative Office of the Courts, which oversees the federal court system. In 1941 he was one of the drafters of the Federal Rules of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE . In 1952 he helped to found the Institute for JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION at the New York University School of Law, where he served for many years as Dean. Vanderbilt was a sought after speaker and lecturer who received numerous awards and honorary degrees. He was also President of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA- TION in 1937-1938, and authored two books: The Challenge of Legal Reform and The Doctrine of the SEPARATION OF POWERS and Its Present Day Significance He remained in the office of chief justice and continued to advocate for the improvement of judicial administration until his death on June 16, 1957. FURTHER READINGS Gerhart, Eugene C. 1980. Arthur T. Vanderbilt: The Compleat Counsellor. Albany, N.Y.: Q Corporation. Vanderbilt, Arthur T. 1976. The Challenge of Law Reform. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. Vanderbilt, Arthur T., II. 1976. Changing Law: A Biography of Arthur T. Vanderbilt. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. VANZETTI, BARTOLOMEO See SACCO AND VANZETTI TRIAL. VARIANCE The discrepancy between what a party to a lawsuit alleges will be proved in pleadings and what the party actually proves at trial. In ZONING law, an official permit to use property in a manner that departs from the way in which other property in the same locality can be used. The term variance is used both in LITIGATION and in zoning law. In both instances it has the general meaning of a difference or divergence. Variances in Litigation A party to a civil lawsuit or a PROSECUTOR in a criminal trial must prove the allegations set forth in a complaint, INDICTMENT, or informa- tion. If there is a substantial difference or discrepancy between the allegations and the proof offered in support, a variance exists. For example, if the crime of ROBBERY is alleged and the crime of BURGLARY is proved instead, the failure of proof on the robbery charge consti- tutes a variance that will lead to the dismissal of the case. Similarly, a variance between the counts alleged in a civil lawsuit and the proof offered at trial can raise due process concerns, if one of the parties is unfairly surprised by the evidence submitted at trial and is prejudiced as a result of this surprise. If the variance is not material and would not work a prejudice on either party, courts normally allow the civil pleadings to be amended to reflect the new evidence. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VARIANCE 211 Variances in Zoning Law Most U.S . communities have zoning laws that control and direct the development of prop erty within their borders according to its present and potential uses. Typically, a community is divided into zoning distric ts based on the type of use permitted: residential, commercial, and industrial. Additional restrictions may limit population density and building height within these districts. A variance is an exception to one or more of the zoning restrictions on a piece of property. A variance is different from a nonconforming use, which permits existing structures and uses to continue when zoning is first instituted. Once a zoning plan has been established, a property owner who wishes to diverge from it must seek a variance from the municipal government. The variance will be granted when unnecessary hardship would result to the landowner if it were denied. Although other forms of adminis- trative relief from zoning restrictions are available, such as rezoning the area, variances are most frequently used. There are two types of variances: area variances and use variances. An area variance is usually not controversial because it is generally granted due to some odd configura- tion of the lot or some peculiar natural condition that prevents normal construction in compliance with zoning restrictions. For example, if the odd shape of a lot prevents a house from being set back the minimum number of feet from the street, the municipality will usually relax the requirement. Use variances are more controversial be- cause they attempt a change in the permitt ed use. For example, if a lot is zoned single-family residential, a person who wishes to build a multifamily dwelling must obtain a variance. Residents of an area will generally object to applications for variances that seek to change the character of their neighborhood. Although the municipality may heed these objections, it will likely grant the variance if it believes unnecessary hardship would result without the variance. If, however, the owner seeking a variance for a multifamily dwelling bought the property with notice of the current zoning restrictions, the variance will probably be denied. Applicants for a variance cannot argue hardship based on actions they commit that result in self-induced hardship. If many use variances are sought in a particular area on the basis of unique or peculiar circumstances, it may be a sign that the entire neighborhood needs to be rezoned rather than forcing property owners to seek variances in a piecemeal fashion. Properly used, variances provide a remedy for hardships affecting a single lot or a relatively small area. FURTHER READINGS Burke, Barlow. 2009. Understanding the Law of Zoning and Land Use Controls. 2d ed. Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis. Salkin, Patricia E. 2008. American Law of Zoning. 5th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West. CROSS R EFERENCES Land-Use Control; Setback v VAUGHN, GEORGE L. George L. Vaughn was an African American lawyer and civic leader who became a promi- nent member of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY. Vaughn, who practiced in St. Louis, Missouri, is best remembered for representing J. D. Shelley in the George L. Vaughn 1885–1950 ▼▼ ▼▼ 1875 1950 1925 1900 ❖ 1885 Born, Ky. ◆ 1907 Graduated from Lane College (Tennessee) ◆ 1910 Graduated from Walden University Law School ◆ 1919 Helped found the Citizen Liberty League in St. Louis 1914–18 World War I ◆ 1941 Ran unsuccessfully for city alderman as a Democrat ◆ 1936 Appointed justice of the peace in St. Louis ◆ 1939–45 World War II ❖ 1950 Died, St. Louis, Mo. ◆ 1945 J.D. Shelly and his family purchased and moved into St. Louis house governed by a restrictive covenant barring blacks 1948 Supreme Court ruled restrictive land covenants unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer; Vaughn played a prominent role in the Democratic National Convention GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 212 VAUGHN, GEORGE L. landmark CIVIL RIGHTS case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948), which struck down racially discriminatory real estate covenants. Vaughn was born in Kentucky in 1885, the son of former slaves. He attended Lane College in Jackson, Tennessee, and went to law school at Walden University in Nashville, Tennessee. He served in the artillery as a first lieutenant in WORLD WAR I. After the war he moved to St. Louis, where he practiced law and, in 1919, helped to found the Citizen Liberty League, an organization that sought the election of more African Americans to public office. In 1936 Vaughn was appo inted a St. Louis JUSTICE OF THE PEACE , and in 1941 he ran unsuccessfully for city alderman as a Democrat. Vaughn became nationally known for his representation of J. D. Shelley. Shelley, an African American, was employed at a govern- ment-owned munitions factory and had saved enough money to make a down payment on a house. Using an African American real estate BROKER, he purchased a house in St. Louis and moved his family to the property in October 1945. An association of white homeowners was outraged at the sale of the house to an African American and served an eviction order on Shelley. An association of African American real estate brokers assisted Shelley by hiring Vaughn to fight the order. The homeowners justified the eviction on the basis of a RESTRICTIVE COVENANT contained in the deed, which stated that the property could not be “occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race.” Vaughn opposed the eviction and won at the trial court. However, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the validity of the restrictive COVENANT and the eviction (Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679, 681 [1946]). With the support of the African American real estate brokers, Vaughn successfully peti- tioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear an appeal. At oral argument he called racially restrictive covenants “the Achilles heel” of U.S. democracy. The Supreme Court agreed in its 1948 decision, ruling that suc h covenants could not be enforced in state courts because they violated the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT by infring- ing upon the right of a citizen to purchase and dispose of property. That same year Vaughn played a prominent role in the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia. As a Missouri delegate, Vaughn proposed a resolution that would bar the seatin g of the Mississippi delegation because of the white supremacy provisions contained in the Mississippi state constitution. His resolution fell just 115 votes short of prevailing. Vaughn died in St. Louis in 1950. FURTHER READINGS Kluger, Richard. 2004. Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality. New York: Vintage. Low, W. Augustus, and Virgil A. Clift, eds. 1984. Encyclopedia of Black America. New York: Da Capo. Sullivan, Patricia. 2009. Lift Every Voice. New York: New Press. VEL NON [Latin, Or not.] A term used by the courts in reference to the existence or nonexistence of an issue for determination; for example: “We come to the merits vel non of this appeal, ” means “we come to the merits, or not, of this appeal,” and refers to the possibility that the appeal backs merit. VENDEE Buyer or purchaser; an individual to whom anything is transferred by a sale. The term vendee is ordinarily used in reference to a buyer of real property. VENDOR Seller; an individual who transfers property for sale; merchant; retail dealer; supplier. The term vendor is frequently used in reference to an individual who sells real property. VENDOR AND PURCHASER Vendor and purchaser refers to the legal relationship between the buyer and the seller of land during the interim period between the execution of the contract and the date of its consummation. The sale of real property is treated differ- ently by the law than the sale of PERSONAL PROPERTY . The relationship between the seller and the buyer has traditionally been labeled that of vendor and purchaser. A contract to sell real property (for example, a house, a building, farmland, or a vacant lot) does not automati- cally mean the sale will be consummated. The GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VENDOR AND PURCHASER 213 vendor will be required to prove that she can convey a MARKETABLE TITLE to the land. A contract for the sale of real property is executed when the vendor and the purchaser sign an agreement in which the vendor promises to convey ownership of the property to the purchaser, who promises to pay an agreed sum. The contract is consummated when the vendor delivers a deed to the purchaser and the purchaser pays the vendor’s price. Consumma- tion of the contract is variously referred to as the closing of escrow, the date of closing,or simply the closing. The vendor-purchaser relationship is based on the unique nature of land. Title to any particular parcel has always involved more complications than arise with the ownership of personal property. The status of the vendor’s title is a matter of great concern to any prospective purchaser, but that title is often subject to deficiencies. Most purchasers offer to buy land before they have made an investigation of the seller’s title to it. To protect the purchaser in this situation, the law permits him to demand a marketable title from the vendor and to withdraw from a sales contract if the title turns out to be unmarketable. Therefore, every contract for the sale of land includes the implied requirement that the vendor’s title be marketable, unless the contract specifically provides otherwise. A marketable title is a title that the vend or does in fact have and that is not subject to encumbrances, which are interests in the property held by someone other than the vendor or purchaser. Unless an agreement indicates otherwise, the purchaser is entitled to receive an absolutely undivid ed interest in all the property he has contracted to buy. For example, if the vendor promises to convey 40 acres in the sales agreement and the next day the purchaser discovers that the vendor has title to only 25 acres, the purchaser is not obligated to honor the contract because the vendor lacks marketable title to the land the vendor agreed to convey. If the vendor’s title is subject to an outstanding mortgage, the title may be unmar- ketable. The mere existence of an encumbrance does not necessarily cause the title to be unmarketable, however, if the parties have provided for it in their contract. For example, in the sale of a vendor’s house that has an outstanding mortgage, the purchaser’s money will first be applied to paying off the vendor’s mortgage before the vendor receives any proceeds. To avoid confusion and frustration of the parties’ intentions, contracts of sale usually require an insurable title to the property as evidenced by a TITLE INSURANCE policy. The pur- chaser must accept the vendor’s title, provided an insurance company indicates its willingness to insure the title without making exceptions to the coverage. Because land has always been regarded as a unique asset, a prospective purchaser can usually enforce a sales agreement whether the vendor wants to proceed or not. This power has the effect of giving the purchaser an interest in the land itself, as well as personal contract rights against the vendor. By executing the sales contract, the purchaser becomes the equitable owner of the land. The vendor retains LEGAL TITLE but holds the title only as security for payment. This LEGAL FICTION is known as the doctrine of equitable conversion. In some states the doctrine of equitable conversion shifts any loss or damage to the property to the purchaser before the clo sing. As the true owner of the property, the purchaser is required to bear the risk of loss during the contract period and cannot withdraw from the agreement. Thus, if a fire caused by neither party destroys the premis es two weeks before the closing, the purchaser will still be obligated to complete the contract and pay the vendor’s price. Some courts reject this application of equitable conversion, holding that the contract fails if the vendor cannot deliver the premises in the original condition on the day of closing. This view treats the continued existence of undamaged property as an implied condition of the sales agreement. The pu rchaser is entitled to withdraw from the contract if the property is damaged prior to closing. Thirteen states have adopted the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act, which sets out rules for determining who suffers the loss when property subject to a sales contract is damaged or destroyed. Until possession of the property is transferred to the buyer, the risk of loss remains with the seller. The risk of loss is on the perso n in possession because that person is in the best GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 214 VENDOR AND PURCHASER position to take care of the property. However, the parties may apportion the risk differently if they agree to a risk clause in the purchase contract. FURTHER READINGS Skrocki, Anthony. 2006. Contracts in a Nutshell. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale Cengage. CROSS REFERENCES Sales Law; Title Search. VENIRE FACIAS [Latin, Cause to come. ] A judicial order or writ addressed to the sheriff of a county where a legal action is to take place, commanding the sheriff to assemble a jury. A venireman is a member of a jury summoned by a writ of venire facias. VENIREMAN A member of a jury which has been summoned by a writ of venire facias. VENUE Venue is a proper place, such as the correct court to hear a case because it has authority over events that have occurred within a certain geographical area. A basic principle of U.S. law is that a civil or CRIMINAL ACTION will be decided by a court in the locality where the dispute or criminal offense occurred. This principle is expressed in the concept of venue. In accordance with this principle, a CIVIL ACTION must be started where either the PLAINTIFF or the DEFENDANT resides, where the CAUSE OF ACTION arose, or, if real property is at issue, where the real property is situated. In criminal cases, proper venue is in the locality where the crime was committed or where a dead body was discovered. State and federal venue statutes govern where a case will be tried. State venue statutes list a variety of factors that determine in which county and in which court a lawsuit should be brought, including where the defendant resides, where the defendant does business, where the plaintiff does business, or where the seat of government is located. A plaintiff may bring his action in any of the places permitted by state law. Most commonly, states allow a lawsuit to be brought in the county where the defendant resides. Choosing the wrong place is not fatal to the plaintiff’s action, however. Statutes usually provide that a judgment rendered by a state court is valid even if venue is improper. If a defendant believes the suit is being tried in the wrong venue, she usually must object at the outset of the case, or she will be presumed to have waived the right to object. In criminal cases, the defendant must be tried in the venue where the crime was committed or where the body of a victim was discovered. In extraordinary circumstances, however, a court may grant a change of venue. The request for a change of venue is usually made by the defendant, but it can be made by the PROSECUTOR. The court itself may also initiate the transfer of venue. Changes of venue are governed by statute, but the court has great discretion in applying the statutory grounds. In Alaska, for example, the law gives the court the ability to move a case from one place to another place within the judicial district or to a place in another judicial district. Reasons fo r a change of venue in Alaska include the belief that an impartial trial cannot be held or that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change (Alaska Stat. § 22.10.040). The most common reason for a cha nge of venue in criminal cases is PRETRIAL PUBLICITY that makes it unlikely that an impartial jury could be selected in the community where the crime occurred. Different rules regulate venue in the federal courts. The federal court system is divided into judicial districts, which can cover an entire state or, in thecase of populous states, only a portion of the state. The federal venue statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1391) refers to these districts in the way state venue statutes refer to counties. Except when a special law applies to a particular type of case, proper venue is determined by the factor that allows the case to be brought in federal court. Under the federal venue statute, in cases in which a criminal defendant committed ele- ments of the crime in different states, the courts must determine where the defendant must stand trial. In U.S. v. Cabrales (524 U.S. 1, 118 S. Ct. 1772, 141 L. Ed. 2d 1 [1998]), the SUPREME COURT held that in a MONEY LAUNDERING case, the essential element of the crime was the launder- ing itself. Therefore, the defendant must be tried in the state where that occurred rather than in GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VENUE 215 another state where he sold drugs that pro- duced the money to be laundered. In U.S. v. Rodriguez-Moreno (526 U.S . 275, 119 S. Ct. 1239, 143 L. Ed. 2d 388 [1999]), the Court held that a crime barring the use of a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence” made that ongoing crime a critical conduct element of the offense. Therefore, the defendant could be tried in any state where he carried the weapon, not just the state in which the weapon was actually used. If the court derives its authority because the plaintiffs and defendants are residents of different states (known as diversity jurisdiction), then the proper venue is the judicial district where all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside or the district where the claim arose. In lawsuits where the federal court has jurisdiction because a question of federal law is involved (known as federal question jurisdiction), venue lies only in the district where all the defendants reside or where the claim arose. Special statutes set different rules for ADMIRALTY, patent, and INTERPLEADER lawsuits and lawsuits in which the United States is a party. An alien can be sued in any district in the United States, but if the alien is a defendant along with citizens, venue lies where all the citizens reside. A case transferred by removal from a state court to a federal court goes to the federal court in the district where the STATE ACTION was started. Venue and the Oklahoma City Bombing Case T B rial judges are generally reluctant to grant a defendant's request for a change of venue in a criminal trial. A change of venue is inconvenient to the trial participants and is often financially costly. Nevertheless, when a judge beli eves that a defen- dant cannot receive a fai r trial in the place w here the crime was committed, he can order that the trial be moved to another location. The attorneys for Timothy J. McVeigh and Terry L. Nichols, who were charged in federal court with the April 19, 1995 bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma Ci ty, Oklahoma, that resulted in the deaths of 168 people, sought a change of venue from Okl ahoma City. The defense attorneys argued that there was substantial prejudice against McVeigh and Nichols in Oklahoma City and the state of Oklahoma, making it impossible for them to receive a fair and impartial trial. In an order issued on February 20, 1996, Judge Richard P. Matsch agre ed. The news coverage of the events surrounding the bombing, its aftermath, and the arrest of McVeigh and Nichols had been extensive in Oklahoma. Matsch noted that the Oklahoma news media had “de moni zed” the defendants and run news stories suggesting that they had been associated with right-wing militia groups. Because the defendants had been charged with capital crimes, Matsch w as concerned that Oklahoma jurors would not be able to set aside their prejudices and emotions to determine first w hether the defendants were guilty or innocent and then , if found guilty, whether they deserved to be executed. Therefore, Matsch ordered a change of venue to Denver, Colorado. Though he acknowledged that the victims of the bombing wished to attend the trials and that a change of venue would cause them hardship, Matsch concluded that the “interests of the victims in being able to attend this trial in Oklahoma are outweighed by the court's obligation to assure that the trial be conducted with fundamental fairness and with due regard for all constitutional requirements.” McVeigh and Nichols were found guilty of bombing the federal building in 1997. Nichols was sentencedtolifeinprisonandMcVeighwas executed by lethal injection in June 2001. FURTHER READINGS Hoffman, David. 1998. The Oklahoma City Bombing and the Politics of Terror. Venice, Calif.: Feral House. CROSS REFERENCES Terrorism “The Oklahoma City Bombing” (Sidebar). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 216 VENUE FURTHER READINGS Chemerinsky, Erwin. 2007. Federal Jurisdiction. 5th ed. Boston: Aspen. Clermont, Kevin M. 1999. Civil Procedure: Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue. New York: Foundation Press. Davies, Martin. 2003. “Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Cases.” Tulane Maritime Law Journal 27 (summer). Ryan, Antony L. 2003. “Principles of Forum Selection.” Defense Law Journal 52 (spring). VERBA [Latin, Words.] A term used in many legal maxims, including verba sunt indices animi, which means “words are the indicators of the mind or thought”; and verba accipienda ut sortiantur effectum, or “words are to be taken so that they may have some effect.” In practice, the term operates in the useful phrase in haec verba, which is Latin for “in these words.” The use of this phrase allows an attorney to state exact language of an agreement (within a pleading, such as a complaint), without also including a full copy of that other document that is the source of cited or quoted text. VERDICT The formal decision or finding made by a jury concerning the questions submitted to it during a trial. The jury reports the verdict to the court, which generally accepts it. The decision of a jury is called a verdict. Ajury is charged with hearing the evidence presented by both sides in a trial, determining the facts of the case, applying the relevant law to the facts, and voting on a final verdict. There are different types of verdicts, and the votes required to render a verdict differ depending on whether the jury hears a criminal or civil case. Though most verdicts are upheld by the judge presiding at the trial, the judge has the discretion to set aside a verdict in certain circumstances. A general verdict is the most common form of verdict. It is a comprehensive decision on an issue. In civil cases the jury makes a decision in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, deter- mining liability and the amount of money damages. In criminal cases the jury decides “guilty” or “not guilty” on the charge or charges against the defendant. In cases involving a major crime the verdict must be unanimous. In minor criminal cases, however, some states allow either a majority vote or a vote of 10 to 2. In civil cases many states have moved away from the unanimi ty requirement and now allow votes of 10 to 2. A special verdict is sometimes used in civil cases where complex and technical QUESTIONS OF FACT are involved and the parties seek to assert greater control over the decision-making pro- cess. The judge gives the jury a series of specific, written, factual questions. Based upon the jury’s answers, or findings of fact, the judge will determine the verdict. Special verdicts are use d only infrequently because parties often have a difficult time agreeing on the precise set of questions. U.S. law does not permit chance verdicts. A chance verdict is one that has be en deter- mined not by deliberation but by a form of chance, such as the flip of a coin or the drawing of lots. Although such verdicts were once acceptable, they are now unlawful. A directed verdict is not made by a jury. It is a verdict ordered by the court after the evidence has been presented and the court finds it insufficient for a jury to return a verdict for the side with the BURDEN OF PROOF. A court may enter a directed verdict before the jury renders its verdict. If the court allows the jury to make a verdict but then disagrees with the jury’s evaluation of the evidence, the court can decide the case by issuing an order. For example, under rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court can grant a judgment of acquittal to a defendant. In civil cases the court can issue a JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT . CROSS REFERENCE Special Verdict. VERIFY To make certain, to substantiate, or to confirm by formal oath, affirma tion, or AFFIDAVIT. The U.S. legal system relies on its partici- pants to tell the truth. Before witnesses can give testimony at a trial or some other proceeding, they must swear or affirm that the testimony about to be given will be truthful. Apart from witnesses, when a particular PLEADING, state- ment, or other document is submitted to the court, the court requires that the person offering it verify its correctness, truth, or authenticity. The verification takes the form of a written certification that is generally attached to the document in question. The most common form of certification is an affidavit. An affidavit is a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VERIFY 217 . NYU Law School 1948–57 Served as chief justice of newly created N.J. Supreme Court 1957 Died 1939–45 World War II 1914–18 World War I GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 210 VANDERBILT,. School of Law 1939 Helped draft statute that created U.S. Administrative Office of the Courts ◆ 1941 One of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ◆ ❖ 1943–48 Served as dean of NYU. D.C. 1939–45 World War II ◆◆◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 208 VAN DEVANTER, WILLIS justices on the Court—his so-called court- packing plan. In the face of this challenge, the Court