most states, a material witness may be required to post a bond guaranteeing his appear ance. In cases where a bond cannot be issued, a material witness may be confined by the police until he testifies. Right to Compensation Compensation for witnesses is governed by statute and is not designed to reward them for testifying. Its purpose is merely to pay their expenses while they are away from home or work. A witness must be in attendance in the court to be entitled to compensation, ev en in cases where he is not called upon to testify or proves to be incompetent to serve as a witness. Witnesses who are subpoenaed are usual ly entitled to travel expenses. Compensation for voluntary attendance depends upon state law. Some statutes provide that a witness who attends voluntarily without being subpoenaed is entitled to a daily allowance and mileage, while other state laws provide only a daily allowance, or no compensation at all. Competency The general rule is that a person is competent to testify if he is able to perceive, remember, and communicate, and believes that he is morally obligated to tell the truth. Legislatures have the authority to set a standard of competency for witnesses in all cases. In the case of young children, the court must assess whether the child is competent to testify. Expert Witnesses An expert witness is a person who, by reason of education or specialized experience, is allowed to testify at a trial, not just about the facts of the case but also about the professional conclusions he draws from the facts. Medical, scientific, and technical experts are commonly used, but other types of experts can be used. For example, in an employment DISCRIMINATION case, an economist might serve as an expert witness, providing professional testimony about discriminatory wage patterns in the affected industry. Expert witnesses generally charge a fee for their services. Relationship to a Party Generally a witness is not disqualified merely because he is related to one of the parties by blood or marriage. Such a relationship only affects the credibility, not the competency, of the witness. At COMMON LAW, husbands and wives were considered to be incompetent as witnesses for or against each other in civil or criminal proceed- ings. This consideration was based on the legal presumption that the testifying spouse was too strongly interested in the outcome of the proceedings to testify truthfully. Most states have modified the common law rule so that either spouse can testify for or against the other in civil cases. In criminal cases, one spouse can ordinar- ily offer testimony in favor of the other. A spouse can voluntarily testify against the other in federal prosecutions. In addition, a spouse who is a victim of the other spouse’s criminal act may testify. Privileged Communications As a matter of PUBLIC POLICY, certain relation- ships are held to be confidential, and certain communications are privileged against disclo- sure by a witness. A witness cannot refuse to testify about a matter disclosed in a private conversation in confidence and in reliance upon the witness’s promise of secrecy unless the law recognizes it as a CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION. Certain communications arising between an attorney and client, a HUSBAND AND WIFE, a priest and penintent, and a physician and patient are privileged against disclosure by a witness. An individual who refuses to either provide testimony or to answer proper questions when examined before a court is liable for contempt. A mere evasive or noncommittal answer does not, however, constitute a refusal to answer that is punishable by contempt, at least when the court does not direct the witness to be more specific in his answers. A witness cannot be penalized for refusing to answer questions when the answers would violate his PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF -INCRIMINATION under the FIFTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution. Credibility A credible witness is an individual whose state- ments are reasonable and believable. Courts are reluctant to impute PERJURY (lying under oath) to an apparently credible witness because a witness is, in general, presumed to speak the truth. Anything that may shed light on the accuracy, truthfulne ss, and sincerity of a witness can be brought out by the parties in a case. In particular, a party has the right in either a civil or criminal case to introduce evidence attacking the credibility of a witness for his adversary. The GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 438 WITNESSES term to IMPEACH a witness means to question the individual’s truthfulness by offering evidence that tends to show that the witness should not be believed. In addition, a party has the right to confront witnesses and to cross-examine wit- nesses who testify in a criminal case. Ultimately, however, the fact finder must decide how much credit should be given to a witness’s testimo ny. CROSS REFERENCES Attorney-Client Privilege; Confrontation; Cross-Examination; Demeanor; Direct Examination; Eyewitness; Hearsay; Husband and Wife; Impeach; Marital Communications Privilege; Privileged Communication; Scientific Evidence; Sequestration; Sexual Abuse “Child Testimony in Day Care Center Sexual Abuse Cases” (In Focus); Shield Laws. v WOLCOTT, ALEXANDER President James Madison’s appointment of ALEXANDER WOLCOTT to the U.S. Supreme Court was a tribute to Wolcott’s political loyalty, not his legal acumen. Nominated by Madiso n on February 4, 1811, Wolcott was a well-connected Republican whom Federalists and most histor- ians regarded as unqualified for the High Court. Unable to win support even among fellow Republicans, Wolcott saw his confirmation rejected by the U.S. Senate, 24–9. Wolcott was born in Windsor, Connecticut, on September 15, 1758, to Dr. Alexander Wolcott and Mary Richards Wolcott. After attending Yale College, he studied law and eventually practiced in Massachusetts and Con- necticut. Wolcott married Frances Burbank in 1785 and settled in Middletown, Connecticut, where he became a port customs collector and an influential Republican. Wolcott was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1811 to fill a vacancy left by the death of Associate Justice WILLIAM CUSHING. He was not Madison’s first choice. Before Wolcott, Madison had nominated former U.S. attorney general LEVI LINCOLN. Lincoln refused the honor, even after winning confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Madison then turned to Wolcott, primarily for political reasons. Although Wolcott was a recognized leader among Republicans, few people believed he had the professional ability to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. Lincoln supported Wolcott, but Federalists condemned his appointment, calling Wolcott depraved and his nomination abominable. Opposition to the Connecticut customs official was unusually strong because of his public support of the EMBARGO ACT of 1807. The act, signed by President THOMAS JEFFERSON, prevented goods from England, France, and other countries from entering U.S. ports. The law was extremely unpopular with U.S. merchants and farmers, whose profits were diminished by the reduced trade. Wolcott’s endorsement of the embargo, as well as his undeniable lack of judicial talent, doomed his nomination. After Wolcott’s rejection by the U.S. Senate, Madison appointed JOHN QUINCY ADAMS to serve on the Court. Adams, later the nation’s sixth president, also turned down the seat, despite a unanimous Senate confirmation. The position eventually went to JOSEPH STORY, of Massachu- setts, who at age 32 became the youngest person in U.S. history to sit on the high court. After the confirmation defeat, Wolcott con- tinued his political career, participating in the Connecticut state constitutional convention of 1818. At the convention, Wolcott sparked debate by supporting the expulsion of any judge who declared a legislative act unconstitutional. He also favored limitations on JUDICIAL REVIEW,the U.S. Supreme Court’s power to interpret laws. Alexander Wolcott 1758–1828 ▼▼ 17501750 18001800 18251825 17751775 ❖ 1758 Born, Windsor, Conn. ❖ 1775–83 American Revolution ◆ 1779 Graduated from Yale College 1828 Died, Middletown, Conn. 1800 Supported Jefferson's bid for president ▼▼ ◆ 1807 Supported the Embargo Act of 1807 ◆ 1818 Participated in the Conn. state constitutional convention ◆◆ 1811 Nominated to U.S. Supreme Court by Madison, but confirmation was rejected by U.S. Senate 1812–14 War of 1812 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WOLCOTT, ALEXANDER 439 Wolcott died in Middletown, Connecticut, on June 26, 1828. FURTHER READINGS Brant, Irving. 2004. The Fourth President: A Life of James Madison. Jefferson City, MO: Easton. Congressional Quarterly. 2004. Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. Hogue, Henry B. 2006. “Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789–2004.” Foundation of American Scientists. Available online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/misc/RL31171.pdf; website home page: http://www .fas.org (accessed September 7, 2009). WOMEN’S RIGHTS The effort to secure equal rights for women and to remove gender discrimination from laws, institu- tions, and behavioral patterns. The women’s rights movement began in the nineteenth century with the demand by some women reformers for the right to vote, known as “suf frage,” and for the same legal rights as men. Though the vote was secured for women by the NINETEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution in 1920, most of the gains women have made in achieving legal equality and ending gender DISCRIMINATION have come since the 1960s. CIVIL RIGHTS legislation of that era was primarily focused on ensuring that African Americans and other racial minorities secured EQUAL PROTECTION of the laws. However, the inclusion of sex as a protected category under the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) gave women a powerful legal tool to end SEX DISCRIMINA TION and to erase cultural stereotypes about females. The modern women’s rights movement began in the 1960s and gained momentum with the development of the scholarly field of FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE in the 1970s. The quest for women’s rights has led to legal challenges in the areas of employment, domestic relations, reproductive rights, education, and CRIMINAL LAW . Although the women’s rights movement failed to secure RATIFICATION of the EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (ERA), the courts have generally been receptive to claims that demand recogni- tion of rights under the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. Nineteenth Century Women’s Rights Movement The effort to secure women’s rights began at a convention in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. A group of women and men drafted and approved the Declaration of Sentiments, an impassioned demand for equal rights for women, including the right to vote. The declaration was modeled after the language and structure of the DECLARATION OF INDEPEN- DENCE of 1776. Many of those gat hered at Seneca Falls, including early women’s rights leaders SUSAN B. ANTHONY and ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, had been active in the abolitionist movement, seeking an end to SLAVERY. However, these women realized that they were second-class citizens, unable to vote and possessing few legal rights, especially if they were married. Some leaders, like LUCY STONE, saw parallels between women and slaves: both were expected to be passive, cooperative, and obedient. In addition, the legal status of both slaves and women was unequal to that of white men. After the CIVIL WAR ended in 1865, many of these reformers fully committed their energies to gaining women’s suffrage. Stanton and Anthony established the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) that sought an amendment to the U.S. Constitution similar to the FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT, which gave nonwhite men the right to vote. In 1872, Anthony was prosecuted for attempting to vote in the presidential election. Stone, on the other hand, helped form the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA). AWSA worked for women’s suffrage on a state-by-state basis, seeking amendments to state constitutions. The U.S. Supreme Court was hostile to women’ssuffrage.InMinor v. Happersett,88U.S. 162, 22 L. Ed. 627 (1875), the Court rejected an attempt by a woman to cast a ballot in a Missouri election. The Court stated that the “Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one.” In addition, the Court said, “Women were excluded from suffrage in nearly all the States by the express provision of their constitutions and laws.” In essence, the Court relied on past exclusions to justify current exclusions, concluding that because women had never been allowed to vote, they could continue to be excluded. The attitude of the Court in Minor was foreshadowed three years earlier in the concur- ring opinion of Justice JOSEPH P. BRAD LEY in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 21 L. Ed. 442 (1872). Bradley supported the Illinois Supreme Court’s denial of Myra Bradwell’s application to GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 440 WOMEN’ S RIGHTS practice law in the state. Bradley articulated the widely held view that the “natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. ” He further concluded that the “paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.” By the late nineteenth century, LOBBYING of state legislatures by AWSA and other suffrage supporters began to bear fruit. A few states changed their statutes to permit female suffrage. By 1912 nine states had extended the franchise to include women. In 1918 President WOODROW WILSON endorsed women’s suffrage, and Con- gress soon adopted a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT granting women the right to vote and submit- ting the amendment to the states for ratifica- tion. In 1920 the Nineteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution, immediately dou- bling the potential electorate. Domestic Relations in the Nineteenth Century The legal inequality that Lucy Stone and other women’s rights leaders argued aga inst was evident in the relationship of HUSBAND AND WIFE. Under English COMMON LAW, which was adopted by the states after independence, the identity of the wife was merged into that of the husband; he was a legal person, but she was not. Upon marriage, he received all her PERSONAL PROPERTY and managed all property owned by her. In return, the husband was obliged to support his wife and children. A married woman, therefore, could not sign a contract without the signature of her husband. In a society that had no government WELFARE system, a wife’s property could be squandered by a profligate or drunken husband, leaving her without financial means if the husband died or abandoned her. By the 1850s women’s rights supporters convinced many state leg islatures to pass Married Women’s Separate Property Acts. These acts gave women the LEGAL RIGHT to retain ownership and control of prop erty they brought to the marriage. Women also secured the right to have CUSTODY of their children after a DIVORCE. Traditionally, fathers retained custody of their children. This tradition weakened in the nine- teenth century as judges fashioned two doctrines governing CHILD CUSTODY.The“best-interest-of- the-child” doctrine balanced the new right of the mother to have custody of the child against the assessment of the needs of the child. The “tender years” doctrine arose after the Civil War, giving mothers a presumptive right to their young children. Reproductive Rights in the Nineteenth Century The fertility rate of white women declined steadily during the nineteenth century. In part, this was the result of using BIRTH CONTROL and ABORTION to control family size. By the 1870s, a woman’s right to make decisions about REPRO- DUCTION was restricted by federal and state laws. The most famous was the federal COMSTOCK LAW OF 1873, which criminalized the transmission and receipt of “obscene,”“lewd,” or “lascivious” publications through the U.S. mail. The law specified that mate rials designed, adapted, or intended “for preventing conception or pro- ducing abortion” were included in the list of banned items. Some states passed laws banning the use of contraceptives. A woman’s opp ortunity to have an abortion was outlawed by the states during the latter part of the nineteenth century. ABORTIONS, which increased markedly in the 1850s and 1860s, especially among middle-class white women, had been legal until the fetus “quickened,” or moved inside the uterus. The AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (AMA) and religious groups led the successful move to have state legislatures impose criminal penalties on persons perform- ing abortions. In some states, women who had abortions could also be held criminally liable. The Modern Women’s Rights Movement For many decades of the twentieth century, supporters of women’s rights had little success in legislatures or in the courts. Gender inequal- ity meant that women could legally be discr im- inated against in employment, education, and other important areas of everyday life. The CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT of the 1960s drew the support of many college-educated women, much like the women who supported the abolitionist cause a little more than a hundred years before. Like their predecessors, these civil rights work- ers realized that discrimination based on race existed side by side with discrimination based on gender. The result was the birth of the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WOMEN’ S RIGHTS 441 modern feminist movement and the quest for women’s rights. Legislation Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a major step forward for women’s rights. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, giving women the ability to challenge the actions of employers or potential employers. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k), prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of pregnancy and childbirth with respect to employment and benefits. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 , prohibits discrimination in the extension of credit on the basis of sex or marital status. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681–1686, prohibits sex discrimination in educational institutions receiving federal financial assistance and covers exclusion on the basis of sex from noncontact team sports. Title IX revolu- tionized women’s collegiate athletics, forcing COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES to fund women’s athletics at a level comparable to men’sathletics. The Equal Rights Amendment The Equal Rights Amendment was the central goal of the women’s rights movement in the 1970s. Congress passed the ERA and sent it to the states for ratification on March 22, 1972. The operative language of the ERA stated, “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” The effect of the amendment would have been limited to the actions of any government or government official, acting in his official capacity. In addition to its symbolic effect, the ERA would have shifted the BURDEN OF PROOF in LITIGATION alleging discrimination from the person making the complaint, to the public officials who were denying that the discrimination had occurred. Such an effect would have been significant, because the party with the responsibility for carrying the burden of proof must do so successfully or else lose the litigation. Congress initially required the ERA to be ratified by three-fourths of the states (38 states) seven years from the time Congress sent the amendment to the states. By 1978, 35 of the 38 states had ratified the amendment. Proponents of the ERA secured an extension of the ratifica- tion deadline to June 30, 1982. A determined effort by conservative groups opposed to the ERA prevented any additional states from ratifying the amendment by the 1982 deadline. However, some states have amended their constitutions to include an equal rights amendment. Intermediate Judicial Scrutiny Without the Equal Rights Amendment, women’s rights supporters faced a more difficult task in convincing the courts to set aside state laws and policies that perpetuated inequality and sex discrimination. The main constitutional tool for litigating women’s rights cases has been the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One key issue in equal protection analysis by the courts is what standard of judicial scrutiny to apply to the challenged legislation. Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has applied “height- ened” or “intermediate” judicial scrutiny to cases involving matters of discrimination based on sex. In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225, extended the application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to gender- based discrimination. Women’srightssupporters sought to have the Court include sex as a “suspect classification.” The SUSPECT CLASSIFICA- TION doctrine holds that laws classifying people according to race, ethnicity, and religion are inherently suspect and are subject to the STRICT SCRUTINY test of JUDICIAL REVIEW. Strict scrutiny forces the state to provide a compelling STATE INTEREST for the challenged law and demonstrate that the law has been narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose. If a suspect classification is not involved, the Court will apply the RATIONAL BASIS TEST , which requires the state to provide any reasonable ground for the legislation. Under strict scrutiny, the government has a difficult burden to meet, while under the rational basis test, most laws will be upheld. The Supreme Court has refused to make sex a suspect classification, but it did not impose the rational basis test on matters involving sex discrimination. Instead, the Court developed the intermediate or HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY test. As articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451, 50 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1976), “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Thus, interme- diate scrutiny lies between strict scrutiny and rational basis. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 442 WOMEN’ S RIGHTS The Supreme Court has sustained numer- ous challen ges to gender-based discrimination, thereby mandating equal rights under the law. It has established the right of equality in laws concerning survivors’ benefits (Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S. Ct. 1225, 43 L. Ed. 2d 514 [1975]), ALIMONY (Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102, 59 L. Ed. 2d 306 [1979]), sex-based MORTALITY TABLES (City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 S. Ct. 1370, 55 L. Ed. 2d 267 [1978]), and pensions (Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1236 [1983]). Nevertheless, the Court has upheld laws that apply sex-based distinc tions. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 101 S. Ct. 1200, 67 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1981), the Court upheld a STATUTORY RAPE law that set different ages of consent for females and males. The Court also upheld, in ROSTKER V. GOLDBERG, 453 U.S. 57, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 69 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1981), the Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C.A. App. § 451 et seq.), passed by Congress in 1980, though only men are required to register. The Court has granted women equal rights to attend publicly funded colleges and universi- ties that have traditionally enrolled only men. In UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA, 518 U.S. 515, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996), the Court ruled that the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a publicly funded military college, must end its The Campaign to Defeat the ERA A B fter a 50-year struggle, in March 1972 Congress approved the Equal Rights Amend- ment(ERA),amovethatappearedtopavetheway for the qu ick and easy ad option of the amendme nt by the states. Under the Constitution, thirty-eight states are required for ratification, and within a year of congressional approval, thirty states had ratified the amendment. At this point, howe ver, a concerted opposition campaign stopped the momentum for the ERA dead in its tracks. The most intense opposition to the ERA came from c onservative religious and political organiza- tions, including the right-wing John Birch Society and STOP ERA, a group led by conservative firebrand Phyllis S. Schlafly. Supporters of the ERA had cast it as mainly a tool to improve the economic position of women. Opponents, however, saw the amendment as a means of undermining traditional cultural values, especially those concerned with the family and the role of women in U.S. society. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision legalizing abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), also affected the ratification strug gle, as theemergingright-to-lifemovementsawtheERAas an additional legal basis for a woman’s right to an abortion. During the 1970s and ea rly 1980s, fierce lobbying took place i n state legislatures that were considering the ERA. Opponents pointed out that during the U .S. Senate debate on the ERA, a host of amendments that would have restricted the reach of the amendment were defeated. These included prohibitions against drafting women into the military and allowing women to serve in combat. The defeat of other amendments to the ERA led opponents to claim that women would l ose the right to child support and certain special privileges and exemp- tions based in state and federal law. Opponents also warned that the passage of the ERA would lead to unisex public toilet facilities and the abolition of traditionally gender-based segregated facilities. Finally, many opponents saw the ERA as a means to remove criminal laws deal ing with homosexual acts. Although the deadline for ratification was extended for 30 months, ERA supporters were never able to gain the additional states needed for ratification. FURTHER READINGS Berry, Mary Frances. 1986. Why ERA Failed: Politics, Women’s Rights, and the Amending Process of the Constitution. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. Hoff-Wilson, Joan. 1986. Rights of Passage: The Past and Future of the ERA. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. Mansbridge, Jane J. 1986. Why We Lost the ERA. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WOMEN’ S RIGHTS 443 all-male enrollment policy and admit women. According to the Court, the all-male policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reproductive Rights The reproductive rights of women were recog- nized by the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s, overturning one hundred years of legislation that restricted birth control and banned legal abortions. Since the 1980s, how- ever, the Court has retreated, allowing states to place restr ictions on abortion. In GRISWOLD V. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965), the Court struck down a Connecticut law that made the sale and possession of birth contro l devices to married couples a misdemeanor. The law also prohibited anyone from assisting, abetting, or counseling another in the use of birth control devices. In Griswold, the Court announced that the Constitution contained a general, indepen- dent right to privacy. Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1972), the Court struck down a Massachusetts law that banned the distr ibution of birth control devices. In this case, the Court established that the right to privacy is an individual right, not a right enjoyed only by married couples. These two cases paved the way for ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), which struck down a Texas law that banned abortions. Writing for the majority, Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN co ncluded that the right to privacy “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” More importantly, he stated that the right of privacy is a FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT. This meant that the state of Texas had to meet the strict scrutiny test of constitutional review. The Court held that Texas’ interest in prevent- ing abortion did not become compelling until that point in pregnancy when the fetus becomes “viable” (capable of “meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”). Beyond the point of viability, the Court held that the state may prohibit abortion, except in cases where it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. The Roe decision provided women with the right to continue or terminate a pregnancy, at least up to the point of viability. However, by the 1980s, a more conservative Supreme Court began upholding state laws that placed restric- tions on this right. In WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES , 492 U.S. 490, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1989), the Court upheld a Missouri law that forbids state employees from performing or assisting in abortions, or counseling women to have abortions. It also prohibited the use of state facilities for these purposes and required all doctors who would perform abortions to conduct viability tests on fetuses at or beyond 20 weeks’ gestation. Though it appeared that the Court might overturn Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992), it reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe that the constitutional right of privacy is broad enough to include a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. Domestic Violence The right of women to be free from DOMESTIC VIOLENCE has drawn increasing concern and support since the 1970s. As a result, the issue of spousal abuse, in which most of the victims are women, has led to changes in state and federal law. For example, many states have repealed laws that prevented a wife from filing a marital rape char ge against her husband. In addition, most court systems have attempted to be more consistent in enforcing and prosecuting these toughened domestic violence laws. For example, a spouse who has been attacked or harassed by a marital partner may obtain an order for protection, which prohibits the aggressor from contacting the victim. The federal VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VWA), passed in 1994 (108 Stat. 1796, 1902), sought to ensure that orders for protection are given FULL FAITH AND CREDIT in every state, not just in the state where the order was made. Anyone facing a RESTRAINING ORDER for domestic abuse is prohibited from possessing a firearm. In addi tion, the law established a federal CAUSE OF ACTION for gender-motivated violence, which means that victims were allowed to bring a civil suit for damages or equitable relief in federal or state court. However, the Supreme Court, in Brzonkala v Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L. Ed.2d 658 (2000), struck down this section of the act (42 USC section 13981). The Court held that Congress did not have the authority to enact the section under either the COMMERCE CLAUSE or the Fou rteenth Amendment, which GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 444 WOMEN’ S RIGHTS had been identified by Congress as the sources for its authority. The VWA provision had nothing to do with interstate commerce or any type of economic enterprise. In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment could not sustain this section of the VWA because the amend- ment only applies to the actions of state governments, not private persons. The Court concluded that the suppression of violent crime and the “vindication of its victims” had, in its view, always been the responsibility of state governments. FURTHER READINGS Bierbauer, Charles. May 15, 2000. “Supreme Court Strikes Down Violence against Women Act.” CNN.com: Law Center. Available online at www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/ 05/15/scotus.violence (accessed January 28, 2010). Ching, Jacqueline. 2001.Women’s Rights. New York: Rosen. National Organization for Women site. Available online at www.now.org (accessed August 30, 2009). Strom, Sharon Hartman. 2003. Women’s Rights. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. VanBurkleo, Sandra F. 2001. “Belonging to the World”: Women’s Rights and American Constitutional Culture. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Anthony, Susan B.; Clinton, Hilary; Dworkin, Andrea; Family Law; Feminist Jurisprudence; Fetal Rights; Friedan, Betty Naomi Goldstein; Ireland, Patricia; MacKinnon, Catharine Alice; Millett, Katherine Murray; National Organization for Women; Pornography; Seneca Falls Convention; Sexual Harassment; Stanton, Elizabeth Cady; Steinem, Gloria. See also primary documents in “Women’s Rights” section of Append ix. v WOODBURY, LEVI Levi Woodbury served on the U.S. Supreme Court as an associate justice from 1845 to 1851. Woodbury’s career encompassed a range of positions in state and federal government. By the time of his nomination by President JAMES K. POLK, he had served as a state judge, governor, U.S. senator, and secretary of both the U.S. Navy and Treasury. A lifelong advocate of STATES’ RIGHTS, this position guided him through- out his brief tenure on the Court. He rarely stood out except in the occasional instance when he dissented. A proponent of SLAVERY,heworried about the Court’s potential for exacerbating national tensions over the volatile issue. Woodbury was born on December 22, 1789, in Francestown, New Hampshire. He graduated from Dartmouth College in 1809 and then studied at the LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL. After his admission to the New Hampshire bar in 1812, he began practicing law while gradually prepar- ing himself for politics. In 1816 he served as Levi Woodbury. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Levi Woodbury 1789–1851 ❖ 1789 Born, Francestown, N.H. 1812 Admitted to N.H. bar 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 1775–83 American Revolution 1812–14 War of 1812 ◆◆ 1825 Became speaker of N.H. House ◆ 1823 Elected governor of N.H. 1834–41 Served as secretary of the Treasury 1817–23 Served on N.H. Superior Court 1849 Dissented in the Passenger Cases 1851 Died, Portsmouth, N.H. 1846–51 Served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court ◆ ❖ 1841–45 Served in U.S. Senate 1831–34 Served as secretary of the Navy 1825–31 Served in U.S. Senate GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WOODBURY, LEVI 445 clerk of the state senate, and in 1817 he entered the judiciary as associate justice of the New Hampshire Superior Court. Woodbury was passionate about states’ rights, the cause of the Jeffersonian Republicans. His marriage in 1819 to Elizabeth Clapp, the daughter of a wealthy merchant, helped to advance his aspirations, and in 1823 he won election as governor of New Hampshire. In 1825 he became speaker of the state House of Representatives and then served two terms as a U.S. senator, from 1825 to 1831 and from 1841 to 1845. During the interim, he served twice in the cabinet of President ANDREW JACKSON: first as U.S. secretary of the Navy (1831–1834) and then as U.S. secretary of the Treasury (1834– 1841), a position he also held for the first four years of Martin Van Buren’s administration. In 1845 Polk chose Woodbury to fill the vacancy left by the death of Justice JOSEPH STORY. The Court was led by Chief Justice ROGER BROOKE TANEY , whom Woodbury often joined in deci- sions. Notably, he generally agreed with the majority on the Taney Court in its reading of the U.S. Constitution’s Contract Clause (Article I, Section 10, Clause 1). The Contract Clause, which bars the states from passing laws that impair the obligations of contracts, was an important subject of constitutional interpreta- tion during the era, and the Court invoked it in order to limit the power of states to regulate business and economic matters. Woodbury left no landmark opinions. However, he occasionally dissented when he thought the Court was trampling the rights of states: He dissented from the Court’s decisions to extend the boundaries of federal jurisd iction over national waters and, in the so-called Passenger Cases of 1849, to strike down state laws that provided for taxing immigrants upon their arrival. Woodbury died on September 4, 1851, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. FURTHER READINGS Bader, William D., Henry J. Abraham, and James B. Staab. 1994. “The Jurisprudence of Levi Woodbury.” Vermont Law Review 18 (winter). Capowski, Vincent. 2006. The Making of a Jacksonian Democrat: Levi Woodbury, 1789–1851. Ph.D. diss. Fordham Univ., Cole, Donald B. 1999. Jacksonian Democracy in New Hampshire, 1800–1851. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse Inc. WOODS AND FORESTS A comprehensive term for a large collection of trees in their natural setting and the property on which they stand. State and federal laws govern the harvesting, reforestation, and other uses of woods and forests. The federal government maintains a system of national forests under the direction of the Forest Service, and most states also have forested land set aside as reserves. State Regulation A state may properly compel and encourage private owners to participate in programs for the reforestation of land. It can mandate that private property owners who are engaged in commercial lumbering operations provide for reforesting by leaving a certain number of trees for reseeding purposes, or by restocking the area with seedlings. The property owner’s logging permit can be granted with the condition that he participate in the reforestation program. A state can also give its forestry department the authority to arrange for the planting of roadside trees and to regulate the cutting and trimming of trees along the highways. In addition, various state statutes have been enacted to provide for the nurture and protec- tion of shade and ornamental trees on public streets and highways. These statutes are based on a state’s POLICE POWER, which is to be used to promote the GENERAL WELFARE of its citizens. State laws require precautions to be taken against forest fires. The state can prevent property owners from having fires during the summer without permission, or it can authorize a state forester to determine whether an owner of forest land has provided sufficient protection against fire. During drought periods, when the fire danger is increased, the public may be prohibited from entering forests and woodlands. National and State Forests Since the early twentieth century, it has been federal policy to reserve federally owned wooded areas as national forests. The goal is to improve and protect these areas so they can provide timber to be used by the public. Congress has the authority to provide for the development and maintenance of national forests and to acquire land for such purposes. Federal laws and regulations concerning national forests and their protection are paramount and PREEMPT conflicting I CARRY WITH ME, AS A CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE , THE PROPOSITION THAT STATE POWERS, S TATE RIGHTS, AND STATE DECISIONS ARE TO BE UPHELD WHEN THE OBJECTION TO THEM IS NOT CLEAR . —LEVI WOODBURY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 446 WOODS AND FORESTS state laws. The Forest Service, which is a branch of the AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT, manages and regulates national forests and grasslands. The National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S. C.A. §§ 472a, 521b. 1600, 1611-1614, is the primary statute governing the administration of the national forests. It directs the government to manage the renewable resources on national forest lands. When a national forest is created, the reserved land is no longer subject to use for private purposes, except according to applicable statutes and regulations. The Forest Service can, therefore, issue permits for occupancy and the cutting of timber within national forests. The granting of logging rights to private companies has proved controversial since the mid-1960s, when the practice of clearcutting was introduced. Clearc utting is a method of harvesting and regenerating timber in which all trees are cleared from a site and a new, even- aged stand of timber is grown. Many conserva- tion and citizen groups object to clearcutting in the national forests, citing soil and water degradation, unsightly landscapes, over- harvesting, destruction of diversity of plants and animals, and other damages and abuses. Clear- cutting accounted for 63 percent of the national forest area harvested between 1984 and 1994. Beginning in 1992, the Forest Service modified its policies to reduce clearcutting, but the administration of President GEORGE W. BUSH attempted to reverse course. A final example occurred just before it left office in 2009. It issued the Western Oregon Plan Revisions (WOPR), a plan that would have greatly increased old-growth clearcutting in western Oregon Bureau of Land Management (BLM) forestlands. The incoming administration of President BARACK OBAMA withdrew the plan in July 2009. A portion of the proceeds from the use of national forests is given to the state in which the forest is located. The funds are to be spent for the benefit of public schools and roads in the counties that encompass the forest. Generally a state can create forest reserves when they are reasonably necessary to promote the public WELFARE. A state can also levy taxes for the support of such forests. CROSS REFERENCE Environment al Law. v WOODS, WILLIAM BURNHAM William Burnham Woods served on the U.S. Supreme Court as an associate justice from 1881 to 1887. Woods’s legal career led him into politics in his native Ohio, where he was a mayor and a member of the Ohio General Assembly before the U.S. CIVIL WAR. In the war, he fought on the side of the Union as a commander, and afterward he moved to Alabama where he began a judicial career in the late 1860s. President RUTHERFORD B. HAYES appointed Woods to the U.S. Supreme Court, where his conservative philosophy generally favored STATES’ RIGHTS over federal power. Born on August 3, 1824, in Newark, Ohio, Woods was the son of a farmer. He attended Western Reserve College, graduated from Yale University in 1845, and was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1847. Over the next fourteen years, he practiced law while involving himself in the state’s DEMOCRATIC PARTY. He mounted a successful campaign for the mayoralty of Newark in 1856, and twice won election to the Ohio General Assembly where he served from 1857 to 1861. When the Civil War began, Woods volun- teered for an Ohio regiment. He fought for the Union in several battles, including Shiloh and Vicksburg, and gradually rose through the ranks. He was appointed lieutenant colonel of the 76th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, which served in the Western Theater. He fought at the battles of Shiloh and Vicksburg, and was promote d to brigadier general. Woods commanded a brigade during the Atlanta Campaign and a division during Sherman’s March to the Sea. During the Carolinas Campaign, he fought with distinction at the Battle of Bentonville. He was appointed a brevet major general in early 1865. By the time the war was drawing to a close, he was a commander under Genera l William T. Sherman. Woods led Sherman’s troops in the brutal march to the sea in Georgia that destroyed all the cities and towns between Atlanta and Savannah. Woods’ older brother was Charles R. Woods, another Civil War general. Woods left the Army in February 1866. After the war, Woods changed his life. He left Ohio and moved to Alabama, became a Republican, and commenced a judicial career. In 1868 he served as chancellor of the state’s Middle Chancery Division of Alabama, which made him the presiding judge of the state’s EQUITY courts, the now-antiquated system of THE RIGHTS ENUMERATED IN THE FIRST EIGHT AMENDMENT[S] OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ARE [IPSO FACTO ] FUNDAMENTAL PRIVILEGES OF THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATES ARE INHIBITED FROM IMPAIRING OR ABRIDGING THEM . —WILLIAM B. WOODS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WOODS, WILLIAM BURNHAM 447 . birth of the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WOMEN’ S RIGHTS 441 modern feminist movement and the quest for women’s rights. Legislation Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. supported the Illinois Supreme Court’s denial of Myra Bradwell’s application to GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 440 WOMEN’ S RIGHTS practice law in the state. Bradley articulated the widely. associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court ◆ ❖ 1841–45 Served in U.S. Senate 1831–34 Served as secretary of the Navy 1825–31 Served in U.S. Senate GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WOODBURY,