Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 1 P46 docx

exception as it applied not only to automobiles but also to containers found in automobiles, to mobile homes, and to sobriety checkpoints. For several decades the Court rarely cited Carroll in vehicle-search cases. Instead, it relied on the “search-incident-to-arrest” doctrine, which allowed the police to search, without a warrant, the areas surrounding an arrest site. Originally the police could search areas that w ere outside the control of the arreste d person. (See, e.g., Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 [8th Cir. 1966], cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 [ 1967], in which the Court let stand a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that the search of a car parked in a driveway, while the suspect was arrested at the front door of his house, was valid.) However, the Court restricted the search-incident-to-arrest standard in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), which held that a warrantless search must be limited to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee. After the Chimel decision, the Court abandoned this line of reasoning and re turned to the “probable- cause-accompanied-by-exigent-circumstances” rationale in Carroll. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S . Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970), the justices found that Carroll supported a warrantless search of an impounded car. They based this finding on the theory that had the search been conducted at the time of the arrest, it would have been valid because of the exigent circumstances that existed at that time. The fact that the car was impounded, and therefore immobile, by the time the search was conducted did not affect the Court’s decision. A year later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) ( PLURALITY opinion), the Court held that a search conducted with a warrant that was later found to be invalid fell outside of the automo- bile exception. The Court stated that the police in Coolidge could not have legally conducted a warrantless search at the arrest scene, because no exigent circumstances existed: At the time of arrest, the arrestee had not had access to the car and therefore could not have moved it. The Coolidge decision firmly established that the police must show both PROBABLE CAUSE and exigent circumstances in order for a warrantless search to be valid. The Court continued with this line of reasoning as recently as April 21, 2009, when it issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant 556 U.S. ___. In Gant, the r espondent was arrested for driving on a suspended license. He was handcuffed and locked in a police car before the officers searched his car and found cocaine in one of his jacket pockets. The Supreme Court held that police officers may search the passenger compartment o f a vehicle incident to an a rrest only if it was reasonable to conclude that t he individual may access the vehicle at the time of the search, or if the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. In its decision, the Court rejected the broader holding of its previous decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), which permitted a vehicle s earch incident to an arrest even if no possibility existed that the arrestee could gain a ccess t o t he ve hicle a t the time of the search. In Gant, the responden t was arrested for a n o ffense in connection to which police officers co uld not have reasonably expected to find evidence in his car. Thus, the Court concluded that the search was unreasonable. The Supreme Court added an alternative rationale to support automobile searches, with its decision in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion). In Cardwell, the police had made an impression of the tires of the suspect’s car and had taken paint samples from the car, without a warrant. The Court held that the search had been permissible because the police had had probable cause, and the search had been conducted in a reasonable manner. No exigency had existed in this case, but the Court found justification in the principle that individuals have a “lower expectation of privacy” in their automobiles. Writing for the plurality, Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN stated, “One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects.” The same rationale supported the Court’s determination that police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they search a passenger’s personal belongings inside an auto- mobile that they have probable cause to believe contains CONTRABAND. Officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings that are capable of concealing the object of the search. If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, including every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search, then this rule extends to passengers’ property as well, the Supreme Court wrote in Wyoming v. Houghton, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 438 AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (U.S. 1999). The balancing of the relative interests weighs in favor of allowing searches of a passenger’s belongings, because passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars. This “lesser-expectation-of-privacy” ratio- nale was not sufficient to support a warrantless search in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977). In Chadwick, the defendants were arrested imme- diately after they had placed a footlocker in their trunk. Federal agents, who had probable cause to believe that the footlocker contained mari- juana, impounded the car and opened the footlocker without a warrant. The Court found that although the agents did have probable cause to search the footlocker, they had not proved that they had had probable cause to search the car in order to find the footlocker. Because the car was impounded, no exigent circumstances existed. Furthermore, the Court held that the defendants had a greater expecta- tion of privacy in the closed footlocker than in an automobile, which is open to public view. “The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to the (defen- dants’) footlocker,” the Court concluded. Therefore, the lesser-expectation-of-privacy ra- tionale did not support an extension of the automobile exception to the closed footlocker. Armed with the Carroll-Chambers line of cases (the probable-cause-accompanied-by-exigent- circumstances rationale) and the Chadwick decision (the lower-expectation-of-privacy ra- tionale), the Court tackled the question of whether a warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi fell under either justification. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979), the police had probable cause to believe that a suitcase picked up by the DEFENDANT at an airport contained contraband. After the defen- dant placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and left the airport, the police stopped the taxi, opened the trunk, and searched the suitcase, which contained the contraband that they expected to find. The Court evaluated the facts under each rationale and found that (a) once the taxi had been stopped, no exigency existed; and, (b) an individual’s privacy expectations in a suitcase, which “serve[s] as a repository for personal items,” are greater than his or her privacy expectations in an automobile. For these reasons, the Court held that the search had violated the Fourth Amendment. Later cases, however, extended the automo- bile exception to containers located in an automobile, where authorities have probable cause to search the automobile. For example, in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), the police stopped a car that they had probable cause to believe contained contraband. Without a warrant, they opened a closed paper bag that they found inside the car’s trunk, and discovered heroin. The Court held that the search was valid, reasoning that if the police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, they also had justification to search the bag. However, the Court retreated from this holding in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (U.S. 1998), where it held that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred when a police officer had conducted a full search of a car, including the trunk, after the driver had been stopped for speeding. The officer had issued the driver a citation, rather than arresting him, although Iowa law would have permitted an arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the search could not be sustained under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, as the underlying rationales for the exception, includ- ing the need to disarm the suspect and to preserve evidence, did not justify the search of the car’s trunk. While the concern for officer safety in the context of a routine traffic stop might justify the minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, the Court said, it does not, by itself, justify the often considerably greater intrusion attend- ing a full field-type search. However the Supreme Court moved back toward its reasoning of Ross in the case of Illinois v. Caballes 543 U.S. 405 (2005). In that case, Caballes was stopped for speeding by an Illinois State Trooper. A second trooper arrived to the scene with his narcotics-detection dog and walked the dog around the car while the first trooper wrote Caballes a traffic ticket. The dog alerted the officers at Caballes’ trunk. As a result, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana and then arrested Caballes. The Supreme Court determined that a narcotics-detection dog sniff, which was conducted during a lawful traffic stop, and reveals no information other than the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES 439 location of an unlawful substance, does not violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. The automobile exception was also extend- ed to searches of some mobile homes, in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985). In Carney, the police had searched a motor home that was parked in a public lot. The Court found the search to have been valid, stating that the mobile home was being used for transportation and that it therefore was as readily movable as an automobile. In addition, the Court noted a reduced expectation of privacy in a mobile home, as contrasted with an ordinary residence, as mobile homes, like cars, are regulated by the state. In this case, where the mobile home was parked in a public parking lot, rather than a mobile home park, and was not anchored in any way, it resembled a vehicle more than a residence. Therefore, the automobile exception applied. Carney established not only that the automobile exception applies to some mobile homes but also that it applies to parked vehicles. Another extension of the automobile excep- tion, called the “inventory exception,” was recognized by the Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976). Donald Opperman’s illegally parked vehicle was ticketed and towed to an impound lot, where the police inventoried its contents. In an unlocked glove compart- ment, they found marijuana. The Court held that once a vehicle has been legally impounded, its contents may be inventoried. Three justifica- tions were given: protection of the owner’s property while it is in police custody; protection of the police against claims; and protection of the police against danger. Likewise, in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987), the Court found that marijuana discovered in a closed backpack durin g an inventory of an impounded vehicle had been legally seized because there was no showing that “the police, who had followed standardized procedures, had acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” The Court concluded that “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administer ed in GOOD FAITH satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” This patchwork of decisions led many, including Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., to conclude that “the law of SEARCH AND SEIZURE with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing” (Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 [1981] [Powell, J., concurring]). The Court attempted to put the confusion to rest with its decision in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). In Acevedo, federal drug agents tracked a bag that they knew contained marijuana, as it was in transit to the defendant. They then notified police officers, who watched as the defendant put the bag into the trunk of a car and drove away. The police officers stopped the car, opened the trunk, and searched the bag, finding the marijuana. The Court held that the search had been legal, stating that it is not necessary for an officer to obtain a warrant before searching a container located in an automobile when the officer has probable cause to believe that the container holds contraband or evidence. After analyzing the long and ambiguous line of automobile exception cases, the Court decided that the distinction between the Ross situation (where the police had probable cause to search the car) and the Sanders situation (where the police had probable cause only to search the container) was not supported by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Discarding the reasoning in Sanders as unwork- able and an unjustified impingement on legiti- mate police activity, the justices announced a new and unequivocal rule: “The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” The Acevedo decision was met with harsh criticism by some legal analysts, who saw it as an excessive retreat from Fourth Amendment guarantees. Supporters, however, pointed out that the police still must establish that they have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search before such a search will be found valid. Probable cause can be shown in a variety of ways, but generally it follows from a chain of events that raise police suspicions from the level of mere conjecture to the level of reasonable grounds. For example, in Acevedo, federal drug enforcement agents had previously seized and inspected the package that was eventually delivered to the defendant, and they knew that it contained marijuana. In Sanders, a reliable informant had told the police that the defendant would arrive at the airport carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. And in Ross, an informant had told the police that someone known as Bandit was selling drugs from the trunk of his car; when the police located the car GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 440 AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES described by the informant, they discovered through a computer check that the driver, the defendant, Albert Ross Jr., used the alias Bandit. From these cases, the Court has shown that arbitrary searches, or searches based on mere SUSPICION, will not be supported by a spurious claim of probable cause. Warrantless Seizures of Automobile as Forfeitable Contraband The Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. The U.S. Supreme Court thus reversed a decision in which the Supreme Court of Florida had held that the warrantless SEIZURE of an automobile, pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, violated the Fourth Amendment in the absence of exigent circum- stances. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999). The case involved a defendant who had been convicted of POSSESSION of cocaine, which had been found during a police inventory search of his automobile following its warrantless seizure from a public parking lot pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Fla. Stat. 932.701. Although the police lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant’s car contained contraband, they did have probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under the Florida law. Fourth Amendment JURISPRUDENCE recog- nizes the need to seize readily movable contra- band before it is spirited away, and this need is equally weighty when the automobile, as distinguished from its contents, is the very contraband that the police seek to secure, the Court observed. In addition to the special considerations recognized in the context of movable items, the Court continued, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently afforded law enforcement officials greater lati- tude in exercising their duties in public places. Because the police had seized defendant’s vehicle from a public area, the Court concluded that the warrantless seizure had not involved any invasion of the defendant’s privacy. Sobriety Checkpoints During the 1980s and 1990s, the Court considered a new line of cases in which t he automobile exception was b een used to just ify sobriety-checkpoint programs. Under such programs, police stop motorists, typically along an interstate highway, for the purpose of a pprehendin g drivers who are impaired by alcohol. One such program was challenged and found to be constitutional in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990). The Court applied a somewhat more stringenttestthanthatusedinautomobile search cases, citing as relevant authority a line of cases involving highway checkpoints for discovering illegal ALIENS. (See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). Brown required “aweighingofthe gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the PUBLIC INTEREST, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Applying that balancing test, the majority in Sitz found that the intrusion on individual liberty imposed by Michigan’s sobriety checkpoint program was outweighed by the advancement of the state’s interest in preventing drunk driving. Therefore, it concluded that the program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Similar sobriety-checkpoint programs have been used in other states. Since the Sitz decision, all have passed constitutional muster. Less certain is the constitutionality of narcotics checkpoints. In 1992, Minnesota instituted a random narcotics checkpoint on an interstate highway’s exit ramp. The police stopped every third or fourth car and asked several questions of the occupants. If the answers or demeanor of the occupants aroused suspicion, the car was diverted for further investigation. A number of individuals were cited when police found marijuana, either in plain view or after a consensual search of the vehicle. The Minnesota scheme raised serious con- stitutional questions. Whereas the state has a legitimate interest in curbing the use of illegal drugs, it was not clear whether a narcotics- checkpoint program was a valid me ans of promoting this interest in light of the privacy interest that is violated by random questioning for investigation of drug possession or use. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32 (2000). In that case, the City of Indianapolis conducted vehicle checkpoints in an effort to detect unlawful drugs. It established roadblocks where GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES 441 one officer would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle, while another walked around the vehicle with a narcotics- detection dog. Each stop that was conducted was without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. In a 6–3 decision issued by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court held that, because the purpose of the checkpoint was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment. Automobile Searches: Is the Fourth Amendment in Jeopardy? T he right to move about freely without fear of governmental inter- ference is one of the cornerstones of democracy in America. Likewise, free- dom from governmental intrusions into personal privacy is a cherished U.S. right. Automobiles have come to symbolize these rights in the United States, but freedom and autonomy often conflict with law enforcement’s interest in pre- serving domestic order. The FOURTH AMENDMENT to the Con- stitution guarantees U.S. citizens free- dom from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), interpreted the Fourth Amendment to mean that a WARRANT issued by a “neutral and de- tached magistrate” must be obtained before police officers may lawfully search PERSONAL PROPERTY. The Court in Katz held that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap- proval by a judge or MAGISTRATE are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend- ment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep- tions.” In its struggle to balance the Fourth Amendment’s personal privacy guaran- tees with the government’s interest in effective law enforcement, the Court has allowed numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement, prompting debate over the amendment’s continued viabili- ty. A particularly tricky area involves decisions regarding warrantless automo- bile searches. Beginning with its decision in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), the Court has granted law enforcement personnel substantial latitude when searching automobiles and their contents. Carroll and its progeny established that automobiles constitute a distinct class of personal property that deserves less privacy protection than other types of property. The Court has consis- tently held that because a car and its contents are easily and quickly moved, police officers need not obtain a warrant to search them if they reasonably believe that doing so would result in lost evidence. Since its decision in Carroll, the Supreme Court has articulated several rationales for allowing warrantless vehicle searches. First, the Court followed Carroll and held that a warrantless search of an automobile is valid because of the exigent circumstances involved (see, e.g., Cham- bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 [1970]). Next, the Court found that warrantless automobile searches are justified because individuals have a lower expectation of privacy in their automobiles than in their homes (see, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 [1974] [plurality opinion]). Finally, the Court extended the warrant exception to con- tainers found inside a vehicle, reasoning that if the police could legally search an automobile, they could also legally search containers found in the automobile (see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 [1982]). However, the Court had previously ruled that where a vehicle search was illegal, a subsequent search of a suitcase found inside the trunk of the vehicle was also illegal (Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 [ 1979]). The need to distinguish between a Sanders situation and a Ross situation caused some confusion, both for the police and for the courts. This need was finally addressed by the Court in 1991. Underlying all the exceptions to the warrant requirement is the need to assist law enforcement personnel without un- duly trampling on the Constitution. However, some have argued that the pendulum has swung too far in favor of POLICE POWER. In 1991 the Court extended the permissible scope of the warrant exception with its decision in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, which upheld the warrantless search of a bag found inside the defendant’s vehicle. In an attempt to clarify the law regarding warrantless searches of containers found in auto- mobiles, the justices announced that the Fourth Amendment does not require a distinction between PROBABLE CAUSE to search an entire vehicle, including con- tainers found inside (as in Ross), and probable cause to search only a container found inside an automobile (as in San- ders). The Court announced a new and succinct rule regarding automobile searches: “The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” The Acevedo decision provides what is known as a bright-line rule, that is, a RULE OF LAW that is clear and unequivocal. But bright-line rules can obscure the important nuances that surround an issue. The Acevedo decision left little doubt in the minds of law enforcement personnel that they could, with probable cause, search not only an automobile but also any containers found inside. But that clarity and the unfettered discretion it gives the police trouble some legal analysts. They assert that the ruling GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 442 AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES The Court further noted that it could not SANCTION traffic stops that were justified only by the possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some type of crime. Although the Sitz and Acevedo decisions have been criticized as giving too much discretion to the police, the Edmond decision indicates that the Court is not effectively guts the Fourth Amendment as it applies to automobile searches and, perhaps more disturbing, that its reason- ing could and probably will be applied to searches of other types of personal property. Justice JOHN PAUL STEVENS noted in his dissent to Acevedo that the majority’s ruling creates the paradoxical situation in which a container, such as a briefcase, is not subject to a warrantless search when it is carried in full view on a public street but becomes subject to such a search upon being placed inside an automobile. Critics of Acevedo also argue that it contradicts earlier rationales established to support exceptions to the warrant requirement. In Acevedo, the Court found no exigent circumstances to justify the search, as it had in Carroll, because the police could have legally seized the bag and obtained a warrant for a later search. Neither, assert critics, would the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the bag be diminished by virtue of his placing it into the automobile. Lacking both exigency and the lesser expectation of privacy justifications, the Court turned to policy considerations to support its decision in Acevedo. The majority stated that law enforcement personnel were unnecessarily impeded by the Court’s previous rulings on this issue. The Court dismissed privacy con- cerns by stating that protection of privacy is minimal anyway, because in many automobile search cases the police may legally search a container under the “search-incident-to-arrest” justification. Critics respond that the policy underly- ing that exception is that the police should be able to secure the arrest site in order to protect their safety; it does not follow that the police should be allowed to search containers even when they are not in danger. Critics assert that by giving the police the discretion to determine what is a reasonable search, the Court ignored established PRECEDENT governing Fourth Amendment cases. Justice ROBERT H. JACKSON wrote in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), The point of the Fourth Amend- ment, which is often not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup- port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. According to Justice Stevens, the majority in Acevedo rejected this prece- dent without justification. Justice ANTONIN SCALIA took a differ- ent approach. He suggested in his concurrence to Acevedo that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe warrant- less searches but rather prohibits unrea- sonable searches. Scalia argued that “the supposed ‘general rule’ that a warrant is always required does not appear to have any basis in the common law.” Lower federal courts and state courts of appeals have struggled with the question of whether Acevedo effectively expands law enforcement officers’ ability to search automobiles without a warrant. For exam- ple, in United States v. Br ooks, 838 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), the U.S. district court for the Western District of New York upheld the conviction of an individual for distribution and conspiracy to distribute cocaine after officers conducted a warrant- less search of the defendant’sautomobile. The officer, an undercover police agent, knew that a package contained cocaine, and the agent and other officers observed the DEFENDANT place the package in the front seat of the car. Noting Scalia’s concurrence, the Court distinguished be- tween a warrantless search and an unrea- sonable search. Because the officer knew that the package contained cocaine, the search of the automobile for the package was reasonable. Some state courts have invalidated warrantless searches notwithstanding the Acevedo decision, though even these courts have struggled with the applica- tion of the decision. In Green v. Indiana, 647 N.E.2d 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), officers conducted surveillance of the defendant at his home in Indiana based upon reliable tips. The officers knew that the defendant and another individual planned to deliver cocaine from Texas to Indiana after making a trip to Texas. The officers anticipated that the defendant would return in two days and reestab- lished surveillance at a state highway in Indiana. The officers did not obtain a SEARCH WARRANT for the automobile, though they had discussed the idea. The officers stopped Green’s car upon his return, arrested him, and conducted a warrantless search of his automobile. The officers discovered the cocaine during their search. The court held that though the officers had probable cause to conduct the search, it was not impracti- cable to secure a warrant. Relying in part on the Acevedo decision, the court held that though the officer had probable cause to conduct the search, it would not have been impracticable for them to secure a warrant, thus their failure to do so rendered the search illegal. FURTHER READINGS Dressler, Joshua. 2002. Understanding Crimi- nal Procedure. Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis. Gottlieb, Henry. 2002. “N.J. Joins Minority of States that Ban Freewheeling Consent Searches; Justices Invoke ‘Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion’ Standard.” New Jersey Law Journal 167 (March 18). Saltzburg, Stephen A., et al. 2003. Basic Criminal Procedure. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group. CROSS REFERENCES Privacy; Search and Seizure; Search Warrant. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES 443 allowing as much latitude to law enforcement officials in stopping and searching automobiles as it previously had. FURTHER READINGS Blade, Bryan S. 1991. “Fourth Amendment—The Constitu- tionality of a Sobriety Checkpoint Program.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 81 (winter). Braeske, Chris. 1993. “The Drug War Comes to a Highway Near You: Police Power to Effectuate Highway ‘Narcotics Checkpoints’ under the Federal and State Constitutions.” Law and Inequality 11 (June). City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32 (2000). Clancy, Thomas K. 2008. The Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Fisanick, Christian A. 2002. Vehicle Search Law Deskbook. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West. Grant, Marguerite T., ed. 2003. Motor Vehicle Stops: Update on the Law Governing Police Searches and Roadside Questioning. Boston: Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). King, Lawrence T. 1988. “The Inventory Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement: Why the Last in Should Be the First Out—or, Putting Opperman and Bertine in Their Place.” American Journal of Trial Advocacy 12 (fall). Kole, Edward T. 1987. “Parked Motor Home Held to Be within Scope of Automobile Exception to Warrant Requirement—California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).” Seton Hall Law Review 17 (summer). Lally, Nicole C. 2000. “Constitutional Law—Fourth Amend- ment Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: Valid Automobile Search Includes a Passenger’s Belongings.” Tennessee Law Review 67 (winter): 455–73. Logan, Wayne A. 2002. “Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche.” Indiana Law Journal 77 (summer): 419–67. Soden, Steven D. 1992. “Expansion of the ‘Automobile Exception’ to the Warrant Requirement: Police Discre- tion Replaces the ‘ Neutral and Detached Magistrate.’” Missouri Law Review 57 (spring). CROSS REFERENCES Privacy; Dru gs and Narcotics; Fourth Amendment; Proba- ble Cause; Search and Seizure; Search Warrant. AUTOMOBILES The first automobile powered by an internal combustion engine was invented and designed in Germany during the 1880s. In 1903, Henry Ford founded the Ford Motor Company and started an era of U.S. leadership in auto production that lasted for most of the twentieth century. In 1908, Ford introduced the highly popular Model T, which by 1913 was being manufactured through assembly line techni- ques. Innovations by Ford, General Motors, and other manufacturers near Detroit, Michigan, made that city the manufacturing center for the U.S. car industry. By the 1920s, General Motors had become the world’s largest auto manufac- turer, a distinction it still held by the mid-1990s. Over time, the auto industry in all countries became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few companies, and by 1939, the Big Three— Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler Corpora- tion—had 90 percent of the U.S. market. No invention has so transformed the landscape of the United States as the automo- bile, and no other country has so thoroughly adopted the automobile as its favorite means of transportation. Automobiles are used both for pleasure and for commerce and are typically the most valuable type of PERSONAL PROPERTY own ed by U.S. citizens. Because autos are expensive to acquire and maintain, heavily taxed, favorite targets of thieves, major causes of air and noise pollution, and capable of causing tremendous personal injuries and property damage, the body of law surrounding them is quite large. Automobile law covers the four general phases in the life cycle of an autom obile: its manufac- ture, sale, operation, and disposal. Brief History of the Automobile In 1929 there were roug hly 5 million autos in the United States. All of those cars required an infrastructure of roads, and by the end of WORLD WAR II, the federal government had begun aggressively to fund highway development. With the intention of improving the nation’s ability to defend itself, Congress passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 838). It authorized construction of a system of multiple-lane, limited-access freeways, officially called the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, designed to connect 90 percent of all U.S. cities of 50,000 or more people. In 1956 the Federal-Aid Highway Act (23 U.S.C.A. § 103 [West 1995]) established the Federal Highway Trust Fund, which as of the early 2000s continued to provide 90 percent of the financing for interstate highways. By 1990 the interstate highway syste m was 99.2 percent complete and had cost $125 billion. During the 1970s the U.S. auto industry began to lose ground to Japanese and European automakers, and U.S. citizens relied to an increasing degree on imported autos. Japan, for example, surpassed the United States in auto production in the 1970s. Oil shortages and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 444 AUTOMOBILES embargoes during the 1970s caused the price of gasoline to rise and put a premium on smaller autos, most of which were produced by foreign companies. Foreign cars also earned a reputation for higher quality during this period. The share of foreign cars in the U.S. market rose from 7.6 percent in 1960 to 24.9 percent in 1984. In the early 1980s the U .S. auto companies were suffering greatly, and the U.S. government bailed out the nearly bankrupt Chrysler Corpora- tion. The U.S. government also negotiated a quota system with Japan t hat called f or limits on Japanese autos imported into the United States, thereby raising t he prices of Japanese cars. By t he 1990s, the U.S. auto companies had regained much of the ground lost to foreign c ompanies. In t he mid- 1990s, however, international manufacturing agreements meant that few cars, U.S. or foreign, were made entirely in one country. Manufacture Throughout the twentieth century, automakers were required to conform to e ver stricter standards regarding the manufactur e of their vehicles. These rules were designed to i mprove the safety, f uel consumption, and emissions of the auto. Safety Standards As autos increased in num- ber and became larger and faster, and people traveled more miles per year in them, the number of motor vehicle deaths and injuries rose. By 1965 some 50,000 people were being killed in motor vehicle accidents every year, making automobiles the leading cause of accidental death for all age groups and the overall leading cause of death for the population below age 44. Between 1945 and 1995, 2 million people died, and about 200 million were injured in auto accidents—many more than were wounded and injured in all the wars in the nation’s history combined. Beginning in the 1960s, consumer and automobile safety advocates began to press for federal safety standards for the manufacture of automobiles that would reduce such harrowing statistics. The most famous of these advocates was RALPH NADER, who published a 1965 book on the deficiencies of auto safety, called Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of the American Automobile. From 1965 to 1995, more than 50 safety standards were imposed on vehicle manufac turers, regulating the construc- tion of windshields, safety belts, head restraints, brakes, tires, and lighting, as well as door strength, roof strength, and bum per strength. In 1966 Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act (15 U.S.C.A . § 1381 note, 1391 et seq. [1995]), which estab- lished a new federal regulatory agency, the National Highway Safety Bureau, later renamed the National Highway Traffic Safet y Adminis- tration (NHTSA). NHTSA was given a mandate to establish and enforce rules that would force manufacturers to build vehicles that could better avoid and withstand accidents . It was also given the power to require manufacturers to recall and repair defects in their motor vehicles and the authority to coordinate state programs aimed at improving driver behavior. Also in 1966, Congress passed the Highway Safety Act (23 U.S.C.A. §§ 105, 303 note, et seq. [1995]), which provided for federal guidance and funding to states for the creation of highway safety programs. As a result of these new laws, 19 federal safety regulations came into effect on January 1, 1968. The regulations specified accident-avoid- ance standards governing such vehicle features as brakes, tires, windshields, lights, and trans- mission controls. They also mandated more costly crash-protection standards. Th ese included occupant-protection requirements for SEAT BELTS, Ralph Nader celebrates the 40th anniversary of his 1965 book Unsafe at Any Speed, which documented the resistance of the automobile industry to the implementation of safety features. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION AUTOMOBILES 445 energy-absorbing steering whee ls and bum- pers, head restraints, padded instrument panels, and stronger side doors. These auto safety standards significantly reduced traffic fatalities. Between 1968 and 1979 the annual motor vehicle death rate decreased 35.2 percent, from 5.4 to 3.5 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles. The seat belt requirement is usually consid- ered the most important and effective safety standard. According to one study, seat belts that attach across both the lap and the shoulder reduce the probability of serious injury in an accident by 64 percent and of fatalities by 32 percent for front-seat occupants. However, because people do not always use restraints that require their active participation, autos began to be required to have passive restraint systems such as automatic seat belts and air bags. Air bags pop out instantly in a crash and form a cushion that prevents the occupants from hitting the windshield or dashboard. These devices can substantially reduce the motor vehicle death rate. Cars made after 1990 must have either automatic seat belts or air bags, for front-seat occupants. However, many auto safety experts point out that regulations on the manufacture of automobiles can only go so far in reducing injuries. Studies indicate that only 13 percent of Unsafe at Any Speed “F B or over half a century the automobi le has brought death, injury, and the most inesti- mable sorrow and deprivation to millions of people.” So Ralph Nader began his 1965 book Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-i n Dangers of the American Automobile, a landmark in the history of U.S. consumer protection. Nader’s book recounts how U.S. automobile manufacturers resisted attempts to improve auto safety in the 1950s and 1960s. Even when makers of other vehicles such as planes, boats, and trains were forced to adhere to safety regulations, auto- makers were still largely uncontrolled in the area of safety. “The gap between existing design and attainable safety,” Nader wrote, “has widened enormously in the post-war period.” Nader examined how auto companies lobbied against safety regulation and organized public relations campaigns that asserted over and over again that most injuries were the result of driver error. He argued that the best and most cost- effective way to reduce auto injuries is not to try to alter dri ver behavior—as honorable a goal as that might be—but to require automakers to design cars that better prevent accidents from occurring and better protect p assengers if accidents do occur. In tell ing his story, Nader cited sobering statistics on traffic injuries and fatalities, including the fact that auto accidents caused the dea ths of 47,700 in 1964—“the extinguishment of about one and three-quarter million years of expected life- times,” he noted—and one-third of all hospitaliza- tions for injuries and 25 percent of all cases of partial and complete paralysis due to injury. Borrowing the zeal and spirit of the civil rights reform movement and t he faith in technology of the space program, Nader looked at traffic fatalities as a public health issue that can be resolved through public action and technological innovation. Quoting Walt Whitman’s epigram “If anything is sacred, the human body is sacred,” Nade r asserted that he was attempting to protect the “body rights” of U.S. citizens. To protect those rights, Nader used his book to call for a number of different strategies to reduce traffic fatalities and injuries: federal safety stan- dards; a federal facility for auto safety research, design, and testing; increa sed manufacturer research and development for safety technology; improved consumer information with r egard to auto safety; better disclosure of auto manufacturers’ safety engineering efforts; and the creation of a department of transportation. It is a mark of Nader’s foresight and determination that all of those goals were achieved in the decades foll owing the publishing of Unsafe at Any Speed. CROSS REFERENCE Nader, Ralph. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 446 AUTOMOBILES auto accidents result from mechanical failure, and of those that do, most are caused by poor maintenance, not inadequate design or con- struction. Other analysts assert that safety regulations cause a phenomenon known as “offsetting behavior.” According to this theory, people will drive more dangerously because they know their risk of injury is lower, pu tting themselves, their passengers, and other drivers, passengers, and pedestrians at greater risk and thereby offsetting the gain in safety caused by stricter manufacturing standards. The NHTSA may also authorize recalls of cars on the road that it deems are safety hazards. In a recall, the federal government mandate s that a manufacturer must repair all the vehicles that it has made that have a specific problem. Between 1976 and 1980 the NHTSA authorized the recall of more than 39 million vehicles. Recall is a controversial policy. One problem with it is that, typically, only 50 percent of auto owners respond to recall notices. All of these manufacturing requirements, coupled with high labor costs and union demands, foreign imports, rising oil prices and a host of other excuses finally created the perfect storm, manifesting in the near-collapse of the U.S. auto industry in 2008. Almost all auto- makers lost money in 2008, though the so- called Big Three of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler were hit hardest. When executives with these companies approached Congress for bailout money, the business strategies of these companies came into question. Though the government eventually agreed to provide the loans these companies requested, the loans came with a steep price: unprecedented govern- ment oversight of the automotive industry. For years, the major American automakers had focused on larger vehicles such as trucks and SUVs. There were several reasons for this. First, demand for these types of vehicles remained fairly constant among U.S. consumers. Second, the cost of producing these types of vehicles was less than the cost of producing more fuel- efficient passenger cars. And third, because of the lower manufacturing costs, the profit margins of these larger vehicles were greater than the profit margins of typical passenger cars. Each of the Big Three found themselves on the verge of BANKRUPTCY and began to lobby Congress for bailout loans that would help the companies survive the crisis. In September 2008 Congress and President GEORGE W. BUSH approved $25 billion in loans to the auto- makers. The plan for these loans had been in the works for some time, but the need became more pressing with the dire economic news. The terms included a generously low interest rate (estimated at about 4 percent) and no payments for five years. Even with these loans, executives of the Big Three said that the corporations needed more assistance to survive. A collapse of any of these companies could result in the loss of some two million jobs, which would further drive the economy downward. In December, Congress agreed to $17.4 billion in loan s to the automakers that came out of a $700 billion bailout package authorized two months earlier. Despite the availability of money from these loans, Chrysler and General Motors continued to suffer. By the spring of 2009, however, Ford executives said that the company had enough credit that it may not need to take its part of the loans. As the automakers continued to struggle, President BARACK OBAMA announced a n alternative strategy to his original car czar proposal. In February 2009, he announced the formation of a t ask force that would o versee the bailout of Chrysler and General Motors and oversee any mergers, reorganizations, or manufacturing deals in an effort to save the industry from further collapse. Emissions Standards Emissions standards are intended to reduce the amount of pollution coming from a car’s exhaust system. Autos are major contributors to AIR POLLUTION. Some cities, such as Los Angeles, have notorious problems with smog, a situation that can cause serious health problems for those with respirato- ry problems such as asthma and bronchitis. Air pollution also damages plants, reduces crop yields, lowers visibility, and causes acid rain. In 1970, Congress passed the CLEAN AIR ACT Amend- ments (Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676–1713 [42 U.S.C.A. § 7403 et seq. (1995)]), which set an ambitious goal of eliminating, by 1975, 90 to 95 percent of the emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and oxides of nitrogen as measured in 1968 automobiles. Manufacturers did not meet the target date for achieving this goal, and the deadline was extended. Also, the new emissions standards caused problems because they reduced fuel economy and vehicle performance. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION AUTOMOBILES 447 . ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 438 AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES 526 U.S. 295, 11 9 S. Ct. 12 97, 14 3 L.Ed.2d 408 (U.S. 19 99). The balancing of the relative interests weighs in favor of allowing. favor of POLICE POWER. In 19 91 the Court extended the permissible scope of the warrant exception with its decision in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 11 1 S. Ct. 19 82, 11 4 L. Ed. 2d 619 , which. 11 1 S. Ct. 19 82, 11 4 L. Ed. 2d 619 (19 91) . In Acevedo, federal drug agents tracked a bag that they knew contained marijuana, as it was in transit to the defendant. They then notified police officers, who