all domestic passengers traveled through a hub city before arriving at their final destination. Of those passengers, eight out of ten remained on the same airline throughout their journey. By 1992, there were at least 12 “fortress hubs,” or airports where one airline controlled more than 60 percent of the traffic. Passengers who flew out of these hubs paid over 20 percent more than they would have for a comparable trip out of an airport that was not a hub. After deregulation, the a irlines also c a me to realize that they needed a more efficient way to book reservations and issue tickets. It is difficult to imagine, in these days of highly sophisticated computers and split-second communications, that until the late 1970s and early 1980s, airline schedules were contained inlarge printed volumes, reservations wer e taken o ver the telephon e and tallied manually at the end of each day, and tickets were written b y hand. To streamline this process, the large companies initially proposed a joint computer syst em, l i sting schedul e s and fares. The DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE objected on the grounds that such a system would be anticompetitive and would violate the SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT (15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. [1890]). Instead, each airline developed its own computer system and entered data in a manner that unfairly biased t ravel agents’ choices in favo r of t he carrier that owned the system. Through s killful m a nipulation of t he data, the airlines were able to put competitors at a disadvantage. For example, the airline that owned the system might enter the data so that all its flights to a particular destination appear on the screen before any flights of a competitor. In a further attempt to win loyalty from passengers, the large airlines instituted frequent- flyer programs, which awarded free tickets to ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. U.S. Airline Industry, 1999 to 2007 SOURCE: Air Trans p ort Association of America, annual re p orts. Revenue passengers enplaned (millions) 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 636.0 622.1 646.3 738.6 769.2 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 800700 Revenue passenger miles (billions) 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 652.0 651.7 656.9 779.0 829.0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 900 700 800 a Excludes bankruptcy-related charges. Annual profit/loss (billions of dollars) 2007 a 2005 a 2003 2001 1999 Ϫ8.0 Ϫ7.0 Ϫ6.0 Ϫ5.0 Ϫ4.0 Ϫ3.0 Ϫ2.0 Ϫ1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 6.05.0 4.998 Ϫ5.673 Ϫ3.625 Ϫ7.710 5.576 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 198 AIRLINES travelers after they logged a certain number of miles flown with the company. The combination of hubs, central computer reservation systems, and frequent-flier programs made the major airlines almost invulnerable in large markets. Deregulation also brought a period of finan- cial upheaval and an epidemic of “merger fever.” A number of companies ceased doing business between 1989 and 1992, and still others merged with stronger, more aggressive companies. Among the companies that disappeared from the skies were Eastern, Pan Am, Piedmont, and Midway Airlines. Continental and TWA sought the shelter of Chapter Eleven BANKRUPTCY reorga- nization. USAir and Northwest required cash infusions through cooperative arrangements with foreign airlines. Even financially strong carriers such as United and American laid off employees and abandoned plans to purchase new aircraft, which added to the burdens on the depressed aerospace industry. The mergers and buyouts of the 1980s were often accomplished in an atmosphere of hostility and distrust. Charges of predatory pricing and other unfair business practices were leveled by one carrier against another. During the 1980s the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division made a number of GRAND JURY investigations into alleged anticompetitive activity by the major airlines, but no indictments were handed down. However, the companies that survived did not emerge unscathed. Many of the acquisitions were highly leveraged buyouts that left the reconstituted companies heavily in debt. With profits insufficient to cover their enormous debt loads, the companies frantically competed for business, engaging in fare wars that produced a dizzying array of pricing plans with equally numerous and confusing restrictions. Some of the tactics were questionable, but, again, not clearly illegal. In 1993 American Airlines was sued by Continental and Northwest for alleged predatory pricing during a 1992 fare war. The jury took just over two hours to return a VERDICT in favor of American. By 1993 the industry began to rebound. Continental Airlines and TWA emerged from bankruptcy, and a few small carriers, such as Kiwi International, formed by former Eastern pilots, responded to the public’s demand for low fares and began to make incursions into the established markets, although they generally shied away from directly challenging the giants. Older carriers, for the most part, chose to stay with their hub-and-spoke systems, whereas several, including Northwe st and United, came up with a creative new solution to their financial situation. Northwest avoided bankruptcy when its unions agreed to wage concessions in return for part ownership of the airline. Then in 1994, after seven years of negotiating, employees of United gained majority control of their company in return for deep pay and benefits cuts. Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich commented that other financially troubled companies would undoubt- edly follow suit: “From here on in, it will be impossible for a BOARD OF DIRECTORS to not consider employee ownership as one potential business strategy.” However, some industry analysts doubted that employee ownership would be effective in the long run because of inherent conflicts between labor and manage- ment, or between different labor groups. “It can’t work,” declared former Chrysler chairman Lee A. Iacocca. “What do you think will happen when it’s a choice be tween employee benefits and capital investment?” Safety One troubling criticism of deregulation is that aggressive competition has forced airlines to cut corners, resulting in safety lapses. In 1990 Eastern Airlines was handed a 60-count federal INDICTMENT charging it with shoddy and dishonest maintenance practices. The indictments came after years of complaints by the financially troubled airline’s mechanics, who claimed that pressures to cut costs led to maintenance short- cuts and falsification of maintenance records. In January 1991 Eastern ceased operation. Critics contend that Eastern was hardly alone in its cavalier approach to safety. They charge that the FAA is understaffed and poorly managed and that money shortages have caused all the airlines to relax safety standards. They point not only to increased pressures on the labor force but also to companies’ reluctance to replace their aging fleets, the congestion of airspace caused by increased air travel, crowded hub airports that create security risks, and overworked and sometimes poorly trained air traffic controllers. Yet, statistically, passengers are no more likely to die in a plane crash since deregulation than they were before it. Still, critics maintain that, despite the airlines’ and the government’s efforts to assure the traveling GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION AIRLINES 199 public to the contrary, air safety is in need of substantial improvements. Many critics feel that at least part of the problem lies in the dual role of the FAA. Charged simultaneously with promoting the economic health of the aviation industry and fostering safety, the agency is often at odds with itself. In addition, the FAA’s budget was cut, and the number of inspectors reduced in the 1980s, the same period during which the number of passengers multiplied and the number of air traffic controllers was reduced. Furthermore, unions, which stand to benefit from the increased scrutiny and higher stan- dards imposed by the FAA, continue to be major instigators for change. However, even neutral commentators have suggested that it is time to impose some degree of regulation on the industry in the form of stronger FAA oversight. In fact, the FAA has been accused of suffering from a “tombstone mentality” that causes the agency to delay acting on safety concerns until negative publicity generated by a crash forces the issue. Even after safety measures are recommended by the NATIONAL TRANSPORTA- TION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB), the agency charged with investigating accidents, the FAA has been criticized for not always following through. Aging aircraft became a major concern during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988 an Aloha Airgroup Boeing 737-200, purchased in 1969, lost the top of its fuselage while flying at 24,000 feet. A fli ght attendant was immedi- ately sucked out of the plane. The plane made a harrowing emergency landing, but not before 65 passengers suffered injuries, some serious. Congress responded in 1991 by pas sing the Aging Aircraft Safety Act (49 App. U.S.C.A. 1421 note), which requires airlines to demon- strate that their older planes are airworthy. Critics claim that enforcement of the law has been lax and that it ignores other compelling reasons to replace aging aircraft, such as the availability of newer fire-retardant seat materials and of updated seats designed to be more resistant to the impact of a crash. Concerns over airline safety became even more acute in the early 1990s with a series of fatal crashes. The Boeing Company, a major producer of aircraft, predicted that the number of jet crashes worldwide could double by 2010 if accident rates of the early 1990s continue. However, according to David R. Hinson, former FAA administrator, flight safety “is not a simplistic science that lends itself to easy solu- tions.” Flight safety experts point out that all the most obvious causes of crashes have been addressed with technological advances that include such safeguards as early warning systems for wind shear. Many experts feel that not enough research has been devoted to the study of the human elements that contribute to crashes. Boeing reports that flight crews have been the primary cause in more than 73 percent of jet crashes since 1959. In 1990 a federal jury in Minneapolis convicted three Northwest Airlines crewmen—a flight captain, a copilot, and a flight engineer—of flying a jet aircraft while under the influence of alcohol. Although this was the first flying-while- intoxicated CONVICTION involving professional pilots, many claim that the problem of alcohol and drug abuse among flight crews is widespread and well hidden. Yet it is difficult to convince companies to focus on the issue of human elements that contribute to accidents. In 1994 five fatal crashes, three involving commuter airlines, brought safety concerns to light once again. After the fifth crash, Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña ordered a safety AUDIT of the entire airline industry. As a result, commuter airlines, which had previously been held to a lowe r standard of safety than major carriers, were placed under new operat- ing rules that required them to bring their safe ty standards up to those of the other companies by the end of 1996. Industry experts said the elimination of the two-tier safety standards was “the most imp ortant decision affecting the industry since it was deregulated in 1978.” Several other safety and health issues have been publicized. Some have questioned the quality of air aboard an airplane. As a result of intense LOBBYING by passenger groups and flight attendants, federal law prohibits smoking on all domestic fli ghts and on many international flights as well. Air quality was again questioned in 1993 when it was revealed that, as a cost- saving measure, many airlines were circulating fresh air into their aircraft less frequently than they had in the past. This led to complaints by passengers and crew of headaches, nausea, and the transmission of respiratory illnesses. Although the FAA conceded that circulating more fresh air would be beneficial, it backed off from requiring airlines to do so, because of the cost involved. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 200 AIRLINES The safety of babies and toddlers on airplanes was investigated after it was shown that a number of them suffered injuries, some serious or fatal, during incidents that did not injure their parents. Unlike adults and their luggage, children under age two are not required to be secured on an airplane but rather may be held on an adult’s lap. These “lap babies” are often ripped from the adult’s grasp during turbulence or crashes. In 1994 Representatives Jolene Unsoeld (D-Wash.) and Jim Ross Lightfoot (R-Iowa) introduced a bill that would have required the use of child safety restraints on commercial flights. However, the measure, which was supported by the Association of Flight Attendants, NTSB, Air Transport Association, Aviation Consumer Ac- tion Project, and Air Line Pilots Association, was opposed by the FAA and eventually defeated. An FAA spokesperson, testifying in opposition to the bill, said the FAA’s research indicated that if all children who needed them were placed in child safety seats, the airlines would save approximately one life over a ten-year period, and families would save $2.5 billion in added fares and costs over the same timespan. In contrast to the FAA’sfindings, a study conducted at Harvard Medical School estimated that one infant per year could be saved through the use of safety seats. The sponsors of the bill vowed to continue to press for more stringent safety standards for babies. Another major concern is delayed and/or cancelled flights. On Valentine’s Day in February 2007, an ice storm hit the Northeast and resulted in many delayed and/or grounded flights. At New York area airports, passengers were grounded on the runway in planes for three to ten hours without water, food, and other basic needs. The air inside the planes became stale, and the restrooms on board were inadequate and/or malfunctioning. Following that disaster, in June 2007 the state of New York became the first in the nation to enact a Passenger BILL OF RIGHTS [N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §251(g)(1)]. The law, which took effect in January 2008, was short-lived. The Air Transport Association of America (ATA) filed suit, arguing that the new legislation regulated a “service” provided by air carriers. Accordingly, the ATA argued, this meant that it was preempted by the federal Airline Deregula- tion Act, the scope of which extended to anything “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” (49 U.S.C. §41713). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Secon d Circuit agreed. Air Transportation Assn v. Cuo mo, 520 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2008). In the INTERIM between legislation and court decision, nine other states had proposed similar legislation relating to lengthy ground delays and likely faced similar challenges. As of August 2009, uniform federal legislation was pending in both House and Senate congres- sional bills, folded into the FAA re-authorization package. Safety concerns will continue to plague the airline industry, even though the FAA assures the flying public that, statistically, at least, flying a major airline in the United States is far safer than driving on an interstate highway. Ques- tions persist about the FAA’s effectiveness in overseeing air safety. And financially strapped airlines, which posted $12.8 billion in losses from 1990 to 1994, must make difficult risk- benefit analyses when contemplating new safety measures. Some critics, such as RALPH NADER, who initially supported deregulation, are now calling for limited government intervention to ensure safety. However, experts warn that the U.S. airline system, which is already extremely safe, probably can never be completely without risk. According to Stuart Matthews, president of the Flight Safety Foundation, “If the public absolutely demands that flying be totally safe, you are going to have to ban flying.” Given the choice between taking a calculated risk and not flying at all, Americans, who take their lives into their hands each time they drive, will probably continue to trust the statistics and take their chances. The ADFAA and September 11, 2001 In 1996, to address concerns that the families of airline crash victims were not receiving timely information, Congress passed the Aviation Disas- ter Family Assistance Act (ADFAA) (49 USCA § 1136; 49 USCA § 41113). The act requires air lines to submit a plan to the National Transportat ion Safety Board that would address the needs of the families of passengers who are involved in any aircraft accident that results in a major loss of life. Once approved, the carrier must make a GOOD FAITH effort to carry out t he plan. Plans approved under the ADFAA have some minimum requirements for notification and care of families affected by an airline crash. Among them are that the airline carrier must set up, publicize, and staff a toll-free telephone line that passengers’ families can call for informa- tion. The carrier must al so cooperate with the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION AIRLINES 201 independent, NTSB-appointed NONPROFIT (i.e., the Red Cross) to provide an appro priate level of aid and support. In addition, the carrier must assist a passenger’s family in traveling to the crash site, as well as provide for their physical needs while at the accident location. Finally, the carrier must respect a family’s wishes for burial, a memorial, or a religious ceremony, and obtain the input of all families before any memorial is erected in memory of the passengers. The ADFAA provides limitations on the LIABILITY of airline carriers for passenger lists. The act states that a carrier may not be liable for DAMAGES in preparing or providing a passenger list, unless the conduct of the air carrier was grossly negligent or constituted intentional misconduct. Further limiting airline liability, the ADFAA provides that no unsolicited communication concerning a potential action for PERSONAL INJURY or WRONGFUL DEATH may be made by an attorney or any potential party to the LITIGATION to an individual injured in an airplane accident, or to a relative of an individual involved in the accident, before the 45th day following the date of the accident. The provisions of the ADFAA became crucial on Septemb er 11, 2001—the day that four domestic airplanes were hijacked by terrorists and crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., and a field in Pennsylvania. In the aftermath of that tragedy, the government built on the ADFAA by passing the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA) (Pub.L. 107-42, Sept. 22, 2001, 115 Stat. 230). This act took into consideration the devastation wrought on U.S. airlines on September 11 and enacted measures to try to ensure their survival. In addition to compensating airlines for direct losses incurred as a result of September 11, the ATSSSA established a framework for computing the maximum grant that an airline could claim as COMPENSATION. To streamline efforts, it set up the Air Transpo rtation Stabiliza- tion Board to review the prospective loan applications. The act attempted to protect the insurance industry, as well as the aviation industry, by limiting the claims that could be made upon them. It also established the Septem- ber 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 to deal directly with the needs of families who were victims of the SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS. The fund provided direct financial assistance to families so they would not have to endure lengthy court battles. Liability for all third-party losses was transferred from the airlines to the U.S. govern- ment, and a WAIVER system was established so that families could not sue the airlines for damages as a result of the terrorist attack at any future date. Security measures for airlines have also been upgraded since September 11. The government took over security at airports from private companies through the creation of the Trans- portation Security Administration (TSA) under the DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY . In addi- tion, cockpit doors were reinforced, passengers were limited in what they could bring on to flights, luggage screening was upgraded, and pilots were allowed to carry guns to protect themselves on flights. In 2007 President George W. Bush signed into law the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendation Act (the 9/11 Act), P.L. 110-53, requiring the Sec retary of Homeland Security to establish a system that would ultimately result in the screening of 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. The new law was to be sequentially implemented within three years, with full COMPLIANCE by 2010. Further, the Narrow Body Screening Amendment became effective in October 2008, requiring 100 percent screening of all cargo on narrow body aircraft. Despite the ATSSSA and the increased security measures, the September 11 attacks had a disastrous effect on U.S. airlines. A little over a year later, two major airlines, U.S. Airways and United Airlines, were in bankruptcy, with a good chance that others would follow. And the threat of low-cost airlines, such as Southwest, combined with a widespread decline in flying, made the business plans of most major airlines inviable. Following a few mergers and reorganizations, the airlines appeared to be more stable by 2009. FURTHER READINGS Dempsey, Paul Stephen. 2003. “Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War against Terrorism.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (spring): 649-733. Schroeder, Kristin Buja. 2002. “Failing to Prevent the Tragedy, but Facing the Trauma: The Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996 and the Air Transporta- tion Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001.” Journal of Air Law and Commerce 67 (winter). Schwieterman, Joseph. 2002. “From Consolidation to Crisis: The Airline Industry in Transition. (Terrorism, Security, and Competition: The Future of the Airline Industry).” DePaul Business Law Journal 14 (spring): 269-277. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 202 AIRLINES Sheth, Jagdish N., and Fred C Allvine. 2007. Deregulation and Competition: Lessons from the Airline Industry. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. Stempel, Jeffrey W. 2002. “The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad Claims, Multiple Lines, Argu- ments over Occurrence Counting, War Risk Exclu- sions, the Future of Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Government Role.” Tort and Insurance Law Journal 37 (spring). Transportation Security Administration. 2009. “TSA: Programs and Initiatives.” Available online at http:// www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/air_cargo/programs.shtm; website home page: ht tp://www.tsa.gov/ (accessed September 10, 2009) CROSS REFERENCES Aeronautics; Carriers; Federal Preemption; Homeland Security; Labor Union; National Transportation Saf ety Board; Sherman Anti-Trust Act; Unfair Competition. v AKERMAN, AMOS TAPPAN Amos Tappan Akerman, born in 1821 in New Hampshire, served as attorney general of the United States from 1870 to 1872 under President ULYSSES S. GRANT. A graduate of Dartmouth College, Akerman was admitted to the bar in 1841. He opened his first practice at Elberton, Georgia, in 1850. He was a well-established attorney by the outbreak of the Civil War. Akerman supported Ge orgia’s decision to secede from the Union in 1861, and he served the Confederate government in the quartermaster’s department during the war. (A quartermaster is charged with procuring and dispensing uniforms, WEAPONS, and other sup- plies for the troops.) After the war, Akerman developed ties with the REPUBLICAN PARTY and the Reconstructionists. He was appointed DISTRICT ATTORNEY for Georgia in 1866. Four years later, he was named attorney general of the United States. Akerman’s TENURE as attorney general coin- cided with the Grant administration’s early attempts to enforce CIVIL RIGHTS laws in the South during RECONSTRUCTION. Initially, Aker- man believed prosecutions for violations of criminal CIVIL RIGH TS ACTS should be left to state and local authorities. However, he soon chan- ged his mind and advocated a more aggressive federal role in the prosecution of crimes related to civil rights. His change of mind can be attributed to the growth of the KU KLUX KLAN in the South, and the results of a congressional investigation. Investi- gators found that state and local legal systems in Amos Tappan Akerman 1821–1880 1821 Born, Portsmouth, New Hampshire 1841 Graduated from Dartmouth College 1850 Opened law practice in Georgia 1866 Appointed district attorney for Georgia 1865 Ku Klux Klan founded 1861–65 Served in Confederate army 1868 Fourteenth Amendment ratified 1870 Fifteenth Amendment ratified 1870–72 U.S. attorney general under Ulysses S. Grant 1880 Died, Cartersville, Georgia ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ▼▼ ▼▼ 1825 1800 1850 1875 1900 ◆ Amos Tappan Akerman. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION AKERMAN, AMOS TAPPAN 203 the South were inadequate to protect the rights of free blacks or to PROSECUTE the increasingly violent actions of the Klan. Akerman agreed that the federal govern- ment should step in, and he wrote extensively on the subject. In his opinion, some South- erners would never acknowledge the rights of free blacks and government attempts to “con- ciliate by kindness” were a waste of time. He noted that Southern klansmen and other malcontents “take all kindness as evidence of timidity, and hence are emboldened to lawlessness by it.” He concluded that the federal government should “command their respect by the exercise of its powers.” With Akerman’s leadership—and his suc- cessful effort to obtain a financial commitment from Congress—attorneys from the newly created DEPARTMENT OF JUST ICE worked with l ocal U.S. attorneys to bring hundreds of indict ments under the Enforcement A ct of 1870 (16 S tat. 140 [codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 et seq.]) and the KU KLUX KLAN ACT of 1871 (§ 2, 17 Stat. 13 [current v ersion at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3 ) (Supp. V 1976)]). Together, these government officials prose- cuted, convicted, and i mprisoned hundreds o f Klan members from 1870 to 1872, and, for a short time, criminal civil rights acts were successfully enforced in the South. Though he “rejoiced” at the suppression of the Klan, Akerman wrote, “Ifeel greatly saddened by this business. It has revealed a perversion of moral sentiment among the South- ern whites, which bodes ill to that part of the country for this generation.” Akerman was also saddened—and frustrated—by fiscal circumstances that com- bined to slow his efforts. Concerned by the growing financial burden of the actions, and pressured to allocate funds for other priorities, Congress and the Grant administration eventual- ly brought Akerman’s prosecutions to a standstill. The violence resumed, and Akerman resigned. Akerman’s resignation as attorney general can also be attrib uted to his discouragement with the pace of federal civil rights enforcement, and to political issues as well. Akerman had angered President Grant by refusing to execute a deed conveying western lands to the railroads, and he had antagonized many congressional Republicans with his lack of support for other business and railroad projects. After his resignation, Akerman returned to private life and the PRACTICE OF LAW. He died in 1880. FURTHER READINGS Baker, Nancy V. 1992. Conflicting Loyalties: Law and Politics in the Attorney General’s Office, 1789–1990. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. Kousser, J. Morgan, and James M. McPherson. 1982. Region, Race, and Reconstruction. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Sobel, Robert. 1990. Biographical Directory of the United States Executive Branch. 1774–1989. Westport, CT: Greenwood. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights Acts; Grant, Ulysses Simpson; Ku Klux Klan Act; Railroad. ALASKA BOUNDARY DISPUTE During the late 1800s and early 1900s, a dispute erupted between the United States and Canada regarding the legal boun daries of Alaska, which the United States had purchased from Russia in 1867. The primary point of contention in the dispute related to a several thousand mile long strip to the west of British Columbia and to the southeast of the Alaska TERRITORY. Although the dispute was resolved by way of a treaty signed in 1903, it caused a severe threat to U.S Canadian relations. Russia was the first nation to claim the Alaska territory after it was discovered by Vitus Bering, a Danish explorer who received a commission from Peter the Great to lead Russian sailors on a expedition of Siberia on August 20, 1741. Russia named the land Russian-America, and Russian whalers and fur traders established settlements in the region. Russia and Canada, then a colony of Great Britain, disagreed as to the proper bound- aries, and in 1825 Russia and Great Britain signed the Anglo-Russian treaty. Under this treaty, the Russian and Canadian territory was divided by the 141st Meridian, though at the time, much of this land had not been surveyed. Russia lost much of the land it had claimed under the treaty, though the specific boundaries were still unclear. As fur-trading from Russian-America began to decline, Russia lost interest in the territory. The United States in 1867 ag reed to purchase the territory for $7,200,000 and renamed the territory Alaska. The continental nation of Canada formed during the same year, encom- passing the Province of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. IT CONCERNS US MORE TO ASCERTAIN WHAT IS THE CONSTI- TUTIONAL RULE THAN TO LEARN WHETHER THAT RULE HAS ALWAYS BEEN OBSERVED .NINETEEN VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION DO NOT JUSTIFY A TWENTIETH . —AMOS TAPPAN AKERMAN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 204 ALASKA BOUNDARY DISPUTE The United States maintained that it had taken over the territory that appeared on Russian maps at the time of the purchase. However, the Russian maps indicated that Russia had owned more of the land than had been stipulated in the 1825 treaty. As early as 1872, British Columbia petitioned the United States for an official survey of the boundaries between Alaska and western Canada, but the United States refused due to the costs that would have been involved. Both the United States and Canada conducted surveys of particular areas in the region in the 1870s and 1880s, but no widespread survey was conducted during that time. The dispute regarding the proper boundaries between Alaska and western Canada heated up during the 1880s after gold was discovered in the area. Between the 1880s and 1890s, an estimated 100,000 fortune seekers moved to the Klondike region in search of gold. Though only a fraction of the se miners and prospectors actually discov- ered gold, more than $100 million was eventu- ally extracted from the region. Although the Klondike gold rush was not a direct factor in the ALASKA BOUNDARY DISPUTE, it almost certainly focused more attention on that region. In 1898 the United States and Great Britain formed a Joint High Commission to resolve the boundary dispute. The goal of the commission was to order the survey and marking of the 141st Meridian and to reach a compromise between the United States and Canada. The commission agreed to a convention that would have resulted in the survey and marking of the territory, but the western states of the United States objected to the commission’s wor k, and the United States Senate refused to ratify the convention. Five years later, in January 1903, the United States and Great Britain agreed to appoint an Alaskan Boundary TRIBUNAL, which consisted of six IMPARTIAL judges, three from each side, to resolve the dispute. U.S. President THEODORE ROOSEVELT appointed Senator HENRY CABOT LODGE, Secretary of War Elihu Root, and former senator George Turner. Great Britain appointed Lord Chief Justice of England Baron Alverstone and two officials from Canada, Sir Louis A. Jette and Allen B. Aylesworth. Although Canada believed that Great Britain would support Canadian interests, Great Britain largely sided with the United States because it needed the latter’s assistance in an arms race between Great Britain and Germany. After three weeks of discussion, the PANEL of judges voted in favor the United States’ position. The tribunal established an International Boundary Commission to mark the official boundaries between Alaska and Canada. The commission was made permanent by a treaty between the United States and Great Britain in 1908. Another treaty in 1925 required the com- mission to maintain a 20-foot wide demarcated line along the border. The boundary is several thousand miles long and spread over mountains and through rivers, marshes, and forests. Although the Alaska Boundary Dispute has fallen beyond the American consciousness, it remains a point of contention among some Canadians. The United States and Canada have had several disagreements regarding the proper land and water division in parts of the area. Moreover, environmentalists decry the clearing of timber along the border because of the potential for destroying biological diversity of plant and animal life. The Alaskan boundary remains, however, exactly how it appeared in the 1903 agreement, and the 1925 treaty remains intact. FURTHER READINGS Carroll, F. M. 1987. “Robert Lansing and the Alaska Boundary Settlement.” International History Review 9. Munro, John A., ed. 1970. The Alaska Boundary Dispute. Toronto: Copp Clark. Penlington, Norman. 1972. The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal. New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. CROSS REFERENCES Boundaries; International Law. v ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE KORBEL Madeleine Korbel Albright served from 1997 to 2001 as U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, the government’s highest-ranking foreign relations officer. She has the distinction of being the first woman to serve in this position. Albright, who has also taught international affairs, has had a long association with DEMOCRATIC PARTY presidential candidates, advising them on foreign policy. Albright was born on May 15, 1937, in Prague, Czechoslovakia, the daughter of a Czech diplomat. In 1939 her family left Czechoslova- kia for London, arriving shortly before the outbreak of WORLD WAR II. After the war ended in 1945, the family returned to their homeland but left again in 1948 following the Communist takeover of the Czech government. The family settled in the United States in 1949. WE UNDERSTAND THAT TRUE DEMOC- RACY IS NEVER ACHIEVED ; IT IS AL- WAYS A PURSUIT . A ND WE KNOW THAT IF WE WHO LOVE LIBERTY GROW WEA- RY , THOSE WHO LOVE ONLY POWER WILL ONE DAY SWEEP US AWAY . —MADELEINE ALBRIGHT GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE KORBEL 205 Albright earned a bachelor’s degree in politi- cal science from Wellesley College in 1959 and then studied at the School of Advanced Interna- tional Studies at Johns Hopkins University. She then entered the graduate program at Columbia University, receiving her master’s degree and doctorate from the university’s Department of PUBLIC LAW and Government. While working on her advanced degrees, Albright served in the diplomatic corps, acting as counselor for eco- nomic affairs at the U.S. embas sy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, from 1969 to 1972. She also worked for the Export-Import Bank. After receiving her doctorate in 1976, Alb- right joined the staff of Democratic Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, serving as his chief legislative assistant until 1978. She became a staff member of the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL in 1978, serving President JIMMY CARTER until he left office in 1981. Albright shifted her focus in 1981 to acade- mia. She was awarded a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian (1981– 82), following an international competition in which she wrote about the role the press played in the political changes that occurred in Poland during the early 1980s. Her findings were published in Poland, the Role of the Press in Political Change (1983). Albright also served as a senior fellow in Soviet and Eastern European Affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, conducting research in developments and trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. From 1982 to 1993 Albright taught at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, lecturing on interna- tional affairs, U.S. foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and Central and Eastern European politics. She was also responsible for developing and implementing programs designed to en- hance women’s professional opportunities in international affairs. From 1989 to 1993 Albright was president of the Center for National Policy, a NONPROFIT research organization formed in 1981 by representatives from government, industry, labor, and education to promote the study and discussion of domestic and international issues. Albright began working with Democratic presidential candidates in 1984 when she advised Walter F. Mondale on foreign policy. She served in a similar role for 1988 nominee Michael Dukakis and did the same for BILL CLINTON in 1992. After he was elected president, Clinton named Albright chief U.S. representative to the UNITED NATIONS, a cabinet-level position. After President Clinton was reelected in 1996, he made changes in his cabinet. In Madeleine Albright. AP IMAGES Madeleine Korbel Albright 1937– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1935 2000 1975 1950 ❖ ◆ ◆◆◆ ◆ 1937 Born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 1949 Father gained political asylum for family in U.S. ◆ 1976 Received Ph.D. from Columbia Univ. 1939–45 World War II 1948 Communists took over Czech government 1981 Sandra Day O’Connor became first female U.S. Supreme Court justice 2003 Madam Secretary: A Memoir published 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks 1978–81 Member of National Security Council 1997–2001 Served as first woman U.S. Secretary of State 2008 Memo to the President Elect published 1992–96 Chief U.S. representative to the UN 1982–93 Taught at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service 1989–93 President of the Center for National Policy 1983 Poland, the Role of the Press in Political Change published ◆◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 206 ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE KORBEL December 1996 Clinton nominated Albright as secretary of state. After being unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate, she was sworn in as secretary of state on January 23, 1997. The outspoken and dynamic Albright rein- forced U.S. alliances, promoted American trade and business, and sought to establish international standards on trade and HUMAN RIGHTS.Albright advocated forthe expansion and modernization of NATO and helped coordinate NATO’s successful campaign to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. She helped to promote peace in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Albright sought the expansion of democracy in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America; she traveled to China to promote trade with the United States and also to address human rights issues. In June 2000, Albright and representa- tives from all over the world convened the first ever Conference of the Community of Democ- racies. Albright also led the fight to reverse a decade-long drop in funding fo r U.S. embassies and overseas operations by helping to persuade Congress to increase funding by 17 percent. In May 2001 Albright returned to George- town University where she accepted an endowed chair in the School of Foreign Service. She lectures at colleges and universities and has appeared on numerous television news com- mentary programs since leaving the STATE DEPARTMENT . In 2006 her book The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs, was published. In 2008 Memo to the President Elect: How to Restore America’s Reputation and Leadership, HarperCollins (New York, NY) was published. She continues her work with The Albright Group (global strategy firm), of which she is founder and principal, and Albright Capital Management LLC ( INVESTMENT advisory firm), which she chairs and is principal. FURTHER READINGS Albright, Madeleine. 2003. Madam Secretary: A Memoir. New York: Miramax. Blackman, Ann. 1998. Seasons of Her Life: A Biography of Madeleine Korbel Albright. New York: Scribner. Blood, Thomas. 1997. Madam Secretary: A Biography of Madeleine Albright. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Dobbs, Michael. 1999. Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth- Century Odyssey. New York: Henry Holt. Georgetown University. Available online at www.georgetown. edu (accessed August 24, 2009). Hirsh, Michael. 2000. “The Lioness in Winter.” Newsweek (July 10). Lippman, Thomas W. 2000. Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy. New York: Westview. Special Libraries Association. Available online at www.sla. org (accessed August 24, 2009). ALCOHOL Alcohol is the active principle of intoxicating drinks, produced by the fermentation of sugars. A Congressman was once asked by a constitu- ent to explain his attitude toward whiskey. “If you mean the demon drink that poisons the mind, pollutes the body, desecrates family life, and inflames sinners, then I’m against it,” the Congressman said. “But if you mean the elixir of Christmas cheer, the shield against winter chill, the taxable potion that puts needed funds into public coffers to comfort little crippled children, then I’m for it. This is my position, and I will not compromise.” The LEGAL HISTORY of alcohol in the United States closely parallels the economic and social trends that shaped the country. The libertarian philosophy tha t ignited the WHISKEY REBELLION wasborninthe American Revolution. Shifting concerns about morality and family harmony t hat were character- istic of the Industrial Revolution inspired the TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT and brought about PROHIBI- TION , w hich began with t he 1919 pas sage o f the EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT to the Constit ution and ended with its repeal in 1933. The return of legalized drinking in the United States led to renewed discussion of the many health and safety issues associated with alcohol consumption. Over the following decades, the stat es addressed these issues through a va riety of l a ws, such as those dealing with a minimum age for the purchase or consumption of alcohol, the la beling of alcoholic beverages, and drunk driving. Private litigants have expanded protections against harm from alcohol through tort actions, and various groups, both national and local, continue to lobby for increased legislation and higher penalties for alcohol-related acts that lead to injury. Historical Background of Alcohol in the United States Drink is in itself a good creature of God, and to be received with thankfulness, but the abuse of drink is from Satan, the wine is from God, but the Drunkard is from the Devil. (Increase Mather, Puritan clergyman, Wo to Drunkards [1673]) Alcoholic beverages have been consumed in the United States since the days of Plymouth Rock. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ALCOHOL 207 . Georgia ❖ ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ▼▼ ▼▼ 18 25 18 00 18 50 18 75 19 00 ◆ Amos Tappan Akerman. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION AKERMAN, AMOS TAPPAN 203 the South were inadequate to protect the rights of free blacks. bring hundreds of indict ments under the Enforcement A ct of 18 70 (16 S tat. 14 0 [codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 19 81 et seq.]) and the KU KLUX KLAN ACT of 18 71 (§ 2, 17 Stat. 13 [current. charges. Annual profit/loss (billions of dollars) 2007 a 2005 a 2003 20 01 1999 Ϫ8.0 Ϫ7.0 Ϫ6.0 Ϫ5.0 Ϫ4.0 Ϫ3.0 Ϫ2.0 1. 0 0.0 1. 0 2.0 3.0 4.0 6.05.0 4.998 Ϫ5.673 Ϫ3.625 Ϫ7. 710 5.576 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN