Unlike the family’s home or station wagon, the husband’s earning power has not yet reached its full value, but it promises to grow. It seems especially unfair for the wife not to receive a share of it since after helping the husband attain his education she agreed to FORFEIT her earning power to invest time in the family. The several years she spent out of the workforce continue to handicap her earnings. Alimony is the only means available to the court to avoid a potentially unjust division of assets. The judge in this case may award alimony or may award a token amount—such as $1 a year—so that the wife has the option to request an increase later on (modifying an award is easier than winning one after the divorce). Or the judge may award no alimony; judges are not required to award alimony. The HUSBAND AND WIFE in this example are unlikely to find a single solution they both consider equitable. In trying to reach an order that is fair, judges must balance spouses’ con- tributions and sacrifices during the marriage with their needs after the divorce. Although the result may not match both spouses’ ideas of what is fair, one of alimony’s biggest virtues is its flexibility: it can always be changed. Alimony can be modified or eliminated as the former spouses’ needs change, if those needs are the result of decisions they made as a married unit. Awards and increases in alimony are meant to address only needs that are caused by the divorce itself, not unrelated needs. If the wife’s elderly mother becomes ill and dependent on her after the divorce, for example, the wife’s need increases, but the increase is unrelated to the divorce and will not increase her eligibility for alimony. However, a significant change in circumstances—such as a rise in the recipient’s income or a drop in the payer’s income—can cause the court to reduce or end alimony. Occa- sionally, courts increase alimony to keep up with inflation. Many courts have indicated that situations such as maltreatment are not VALID triggers for alimony. Courts have clarified that allegations of physical or other harm done by one spouse must be brought in a civil lawsuit, to be heard and decided by a jury. In successful cases, compensatory and PUNITIVE DAMAGES would be awarded, not alimony. Even in less egreg ious cases, alimony is not awarded as a punishment, especially in states that have adopted no-fault divorce laws—that is, laws providing that neither spouse has to prove wrongdoing on the part of the other. Gaps in earning power that tend in general to favor men over women create another situation that many courts believe they cannot resolve using alimony. Such gaps are often the reason married couples decide that if it is ap- propriate for only one spouse to be the wage earner, it should be the husband. But courts do not base individual alimony awards on this trend alone, in part because an individual spouse cannot be held responsible for social injustices. In fact, state laws specifying the gender of the paying spouse and of the receiving spouse have been ruled unconstitutional. In deciding Orr v. Orr 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102, 59 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Alabama state law, which specified that husbands may be ordered to pay support to wives, but not vice versa, violated the EQUAL PROTECTION Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMEND- MENT . The case arose when William Orr, who had been ordered to pay alimony, was taken to court by his ex-wife for failure to pay. Orr’s defense included a motion requesting that the Alabama alimony statute be declared unconsti- tutional. Although Orr was not seeking alimony from his ex-wife, he argued that the award to her would decrease if his circumstances were considered in addition to hers. The Supreme Court decision supporting Orr meant that gender could not be considered in awarding alimony (although even in 1990s very few alimony awards are made in favor of men). Modern underpinnings for alimony have little to do with gender, but this was not always so. The U.S. model of alimony is based on ecclesiastical law (guidelines of the Christian RELIGION), dating from a time in England’s history when divorce did not exist. Unhappily married couples could live separately, but the husband was still obliged to support the wife financially. This arrangement was known as a divorce A MENSA ET THORO (“from bed and board,” in Latin), and was not really a TERMINATION of the marriage. This limited divorce did not allow the parties to remarry, for example, and did not affect INHERITANCE rules. The wife remained her husband’s dependent, and alimony was seen as his ongoing marital obligation to her. When full divorce became available, the idea of alimony continued, but with some important GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 238 ALIMONY differences. In the early 2000s, alimony awards were being made based not on men’s and women’s roles, but on relative needs arising from decisions made during the marriage. Alimony is not an aspect of marriage, as it was in divorce a MENSA ET THORO, but only becomes necessary— and available—from the time of divorce. Because the considerations that enter into a divorce award are sometimes compl ex, courts usually clarify the award’s purpose and may place a time limit on it. No mathematical guidelines exist to tell courts how to calculate alimony. In addition, each state legislature sets its own policy regarding whether and when alimony may be awarded. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), which many states use as a model, recommends that courts consider the following factors: the financial condition of the person requesting alimony; the time the recipient would need for education or job training; the standard of living the couple had during the marriage; the length of the marriage; the age, physical condition, and emotional state of the person requesting ali- mony; and the ability of the other person to support the recipient and still support himself or herself. Courts have at times awarded alimony when an unmarried couple separates, if the relation- ship closely resembled marriage or in other circumstances, s uch as in k eeping wi t h the c ouple’s intentions and verbal agreements. Awards of this type are informally called palimony. Private separation agreements negotiated between di- vorcing individuals also can contain alimony provisions. For these reasons, it is difficult to estimate accurately the size and frequency of awards through the most common method, U.S. census data. If awards are hard to estimate, COMPLIANCE with awards is nearly impossible to gauge. Alimony enforcement is unlike child support enforcement, which has the “teeth” of wage GARNISHMENT, liens, and other mechanisms. Re- turning to court with contempt-of-court charges is usually the only option a would-be recipient has to enforce an existing alimony order. If the divorce DECREE does not specify an ending date, an order to pay alimony usually remains effective until the court that awarded it changes or ends it. Alimony usually ends when the recipient remarries; this is known as terminable alimony. In the case of the recipient’s remarriage, the payer sometimes must return to court to have the court change the alimony order, but often the termination is automatic. The payer’s death is not necessarily enough to end payments: some orders allow the reci- pient to inherit funds from the payer’s estate or require the payer to maintain a life insurance policy that will continue to support the reci- pient after the payer’s death. These provisions, when made, often involve a recipient whose age or health makes it too difficult for the recipient to enter or reenter the workforce. On September 1, 1995, Texas became the last state in the country to authorize the award of alimony payments in divorce proceedings. TX FAMILY § 8.001. Until then, Texas courts had ruled that the state constitution prohibited alimony awards because alimony was not marital property existing at the time of the divorce. Ins- tead, Texas courts said that alimony awards necessarily involved calculations based solely on the future, post-divorce earnings of the ex-spouse who would be making the alimony payments. Texas courts also observed that spouses who sacrificed educational or career opportunities during the marriage to raise children so their spouses could pursue ed ucational or career opportunities of their own could be adequately compensated for their sacrifice by receiving a larger share of the marital property than spouses who had not made such a sacrifice. In other words, Texas courts believed that since they had the power to give one spouse a larger share of the marital property to compensate for any career or educational sacrifices that spouse made during the marriage, there was no need to award alimony too. Courts also questioned why ex- spouses should be under any obligation to support each other after divorce, when the whole purpose of divorce is to end the costs and benefits of marriage. But judges, lawyers, and scholars increas- ingly criticized the Texas statutory scheme as being unrealistic. For example, before 1995 Texas courts routinely ordered ex-spouses to pay child support from their so-called post- divorce “future earnings,” and these orders survived scrutiny under the state constitution. Critics of Texas law saw no reason why state courts could not order ex-spouses to also pay alimony out of wages and salary they earned after the marriage terminated. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ALIMONY 239 Additionally, critics assailed the absence of alimony provisions in Texas FAMILY LAW as being unduly harsh. In a large number of divorces where neither spouse had acquired substantial assets during the marriage, Texas courts were powerless to compensate spouses who had sacrificed educational and career opportunities, since in such situations there were essentially no assets to divide in the first place. As a result, spouses who successfully pursued educational or career opportunities at the expense of their partner were allowed to walk away from the marriage “scot-free.” Despite the late twentieth-century univer- sality of alimony laws in the all 50 states, lawmakers in some jurisdictions continued to propose legislation that would abolish it. In 1999 several Iowa legislators proposed a bill to abolish alimony, arguing that alimony laws provide incentive to get divorced. The bill never passed. Because alimony is an award for support and maintenance that one spouse may be compelled to pay to another after DISSOLUTION of the marriage, it would seem to follow that no alimony could be awarded to a spouse follow- ing an ANNULMENT, which treats the marriage relationship as if it had never existed. In fact, alimony is not awarded to spouses under any conditions following the annulment of a mar- riage in most jurisdictions. However, in some jurisdictions the enforcement of a flat PROHIBITION of alimony awards to spouses whose marriages have been annulled has sometimes been found to impose unnecessary hardship on a spouse, usually the wife, especially where the parties have lived together for a considerable period of time. Consequently, judicial and legislative exceptions have been created to the basic rule of treating an annulled marriage as if it had never existed, for the purposes of determining whether an alimony award is appropriate. Under these exceptions, temporary as well as permanent alimony have been awarded. FURTHER READINGS “Alimony Strategies” 2003. Family Advocate 25, vol. 4 (spring). American Law Institute. 2002. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations. Newark, NJ: Bender. Sheldon, John C., and Nancy Diesel Mills. 1993. In Search of a Theory of Alimony. Orono, ME.: Univ. of Maine School of Law 45. Storey, Brenda L. 2003. “Surveying the Alimony Landscape: Origin, Evolution and Extinction.” Family Advocate 25 (spring). CROSS REFERENCES A Mensa Et Thoro; Child Support; Damages; Divorce; Family Law; Husband and Wife; Marriage; No Fault Divorce; Sex Discrimination. v ALITO, SAMUEL ANTHONY, JR. SAMUEL ALITO is a conservative justice appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006. Upon his confirmation, he became the 110th associate justice in the Court’s history and only the second Italian- American. He replaced Sandra Day O’Connor on the Court. Alito was born on April 1, 1950, in Trenton, New Jersey. His father emigrated from Italy as a boy and became a high school teacher. His father later changed careers in the 1950s to work as the research director of a nonpartisan agency that analyzed legislation for state legis- lators. Alito’s mother was an elementary school principal. Alito excelled as a student, deciding on a legal career after discovering a special affinity for in-depth research and finely honed argument on the high school debate team. He graduated as valedictorian of his class and headed off to Princeton University in 1968. After receiving his undergraduate degree in 1972, Alito pursued a law degree at Yale Law School, where he graduated in 1975. At Yale he served as an editor of the Yale Law Journal and quickly became known as a traditionalist with a quick intellect. It was a reputation that he was to carry with him throughou t his working life. In 1976 Alito was hired as a law clerk by Third CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals Judge Leonard I. Garth (who eventually became a colleague when Alito was named to the same bench). Af ter clerking for Garth, Alito spent 1977 to 1981 as an assistant U.S. attorney in New Jersey. He then went to Washington, D.C., to work for the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, first as an assistant to the SOLICITOR GENERAL from 1981 to 1985 and then as a deputy assistant attorney general from 1985 to 1987. In the former position, he argued several cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. By 1987 Alito returned to New Jersey as U.S. attorney, in which role he handled cases from ORGANIZED CRIME to CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. Alito took a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1990. While his time there undisputedly marked him as a solidly conservative JURIST, it also showed a man unwilling to express his politic al views openly. He was widely respected by Democrats and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 240 ALITO, SAMUEL ANTHONY, JR. Republicans alike, and few saw him as either rigid or an ideologue. Still, one of Alito’s controversial opinions was his lone DISSENT in a 1991 case that struck down a Pennsylvania law requiring married women seeking abortions to inform their husbands Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F. 2d 682). He also concluded in a 1998 opinion that a holiday display that included secular symbols along with religious ones did not violate the FIRST AMENDMENT. By contrast, Alito voted with the majority to find a ban on late-term abortions unconstitutional where there is no exception co nsidering the health of the mother. These, and the broad array of other published opinions stemming from 15 years on the bench, were to come under intense scrutiny when Alito was nominated to replace retiring U.S. Supreme Court Justice O’Connor in October 2005. Alito’s nomination came in the wake of the withdrawal of previous nominee Harriet E. Miers, whom many believed was unqualified for the position. It also came at a time when President GEORGE W. BUSH was lagging in the polls and there was increasing acrimony between parties in the Senate. The situation was further sharpened by O’Connor’s pivotal role as a centrist justice on a fairly divided Court, thus making the stakes particularly high for both parties in finding a suitable replacement. In short, there was little doubt that Alito’s confirmation hearings were destined to be difficult and time-consuming, with conservative and liberal agendas likely to take precedence. Several groups, including the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION , strongly opposed Alito’s nomi- nation. According to the ACLU, Alito had displayed a “willingness to support government actions that abridge individual freedoms.” In reviewing Alito’s professional qualifications, though, a committee of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION concluded that Alito was “well- qualified” to serve on the Court. As expected, the ideological battle between the parties caused great friction and talk of filibustering the Alito nomination. Despite Democratic attempts to block a vote on the nomination by filibustering, a Sen ate closure motion ended debate by a 72-25 vote. The closure motion forced a vote on the nomina- tion, and the Senate confirmed Alito by a 58-42 vote, the smallest margin since CLARENCE THOMAS Samuel Alito. STEVE PETTEWAY, COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ▼▼ ▼▼ 1950 2010 1970 1990 ◆ ◆◆ ◆◆◆ ◆◆◆ Samuel Anthony Alito Jr. 1950– 1950 Born, Trenton, N.J. 1972 Received B.A. from Princeton 1975 Graduated from Yale Law School 1977–81 Served as assistant U.S. attorney in New Jersey 1981–85 Moved to Washington, D.C.; served as assistant to the solicitor general 1985–87 Served as deputy assistant attorney general 1987 Named U.S. attorney in New Jersey 1990 Appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1991 Dissented in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 2006 Appointed to U.S. Supreme Court with a 58–42 Senate vote 2007 Voted with the majority in Gonzales v. Carhart, which upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 2008 Wrote majority opinion for Gomez- Perez v. Potter 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks ❖ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ALITO, SAMUEL ANTHONY, JR. 241 was confirmed in 1991. Alito was sworn in on January 31, 2006. Since his confirmation, Alito has generally voted with t he Court’s conservative block, though he has voted differently in some cases from other conservative justices, including ANTONIN SC ALIA . During his second year on the Court, Alito voted with the majority in Gonzales v. Carhart (550 U.S. 124, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 167 L. Ed. 2d 480 [2007]), where the Court upheld a challenge to the federal Partial-Birth ABORTION Ban Act of 2003. This marked the f irst abortion case the C ourt heard since Alito and Chief Justice JOHN ROBERTS became members of the Court. Alito and Roberts joined the majority opinion of Justice ANTHONY KENNEDY, along with Scalia and Thomas. In 2008 Alito wrote the majority opinion in Gomez-Perez v. Potter (128 S. Ct. 29, 168 L. Ed. 2d 806), where the Court held that a federal e mployee could assert a claim for retaliation resulting from the employee’s filing of a complaint for AGE DISCRIMINATION . Significantly, the more liberal justices on the Court joined Alito’smajority, while Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas d issented. Alito is married to the former Martha-Ann Bomgardner, and they have two children. FURTHER READINGS Babington, Charles. 2006. “Alito Is Sworn in on High Court.” Washington Post. February 1. Davis, Elliott M. 2007. “The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. 30 (Summer). ALL FOURS Identical; similar. All fours specifically refers to two cases or decisions that have similar fact patterns and raise identical legal issues. Because the circum- stances leading to their individual determina- tions are virtually the same, the decision ren- dered by the court in each case will be similar. Such cases or decisions are said to be on all fours with each other. ALLEGATION The assertion, claim, declaration, or statement of a party to an action, setting out what he or she expects to prove. If the allegations in a pl aintif f’s complaint are insufficient to establish that the person’slegal rights have been vio lated, the DEFENDANT can make amotiontothecourttodismissthecomplaintfor failure to state a CAUSE OF ACTION. If the allegations in the defendant’s answer do not contradict the allegations in the complaint, the PLAINTIFF can make a motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ALLEGE To state, recite, assert, or charge the existence of particular facts in a pleading or an indictment; to make an allegation. ALLEGIANCE In English law, the duty of loyalty and obedience owed by all persons born within the king's realm that attaches immediately upon their birth and that they cannot be relieved of by their own actions. In U.S. law, allegiance is the obligation of fidelity and obedience that is owed by native born and naturalized U.S. citizens to the United States that cannot be relinquished without the consent of the government expressed by a statutory enactment. The act of swearing allegiance to the country, its laws, and its government is a bedrock requirement of U.S. citizenship reflected in both state and federal law. Before foreign citizens may lawfully immigrate to the United States, they must take an OATH renouncing their allegiance to all foreign sovereigns and swearing their alle- giance to the laws and constitution of the U.S. government (8 USCA § 1448). The U.S. Constitution itself requires state and federal legislators, judicial officers, and EXECUTIVE BRANCH officials to take an oath or affirmation to support itsprovisions(Article6,clause3). Swearing allegiance to the government is not always the most i mportant value recognized by U. S. law. Having won its independence and liberty from England t hrough a blo ody revolution, the United States has a long history of respecting FREEDOM OF SPEECH,freedomofRELIGION, and the right to DISSENT in its participatory democracy. In fact, one reason many Americans remain stead- fastly loyal to the United States is that U.S. laws protect their right to dissent, PROTEST,demon- strate, and criticize the government. Public school children in many states learn to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Slightly fewer than half of the states plus the TERRITORY of Guam require public school teachers to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in class. The majority of states make recitation discretionary. IF SOMEONE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ILLEGAL LAW EN- FORCEMENT ACTIVI- TIES , THEY SHOULD HAVE A DAY IN COURT .AND THAT’S WHAT THE COURTS ARE THERE FOR , TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS AGAINST THE GOV- ERNMENT OR ANYONE ELSE WHO VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTS . —SAMUEL ALITO GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 242 ALL FOURS The U.S. Supreme Court, in striking down a state law that compelled public school students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, drew upon this history when it wrote that if “there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein” (West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 [U.S. 1943]). After the Supreme Court announced its decision in Barnette, neither the state nor federal government could lawfully compel public school children to recite the pledge, though they could require school teachers and admin- istrators to lead the pledge, so long as they allowed students the right to abstain from reciting it themselves. But the Barnette decision did not end the controversy over the Pledge of Allegiance. In 1954 Congress changed the official version of the pledge to include a statement that the United States is “one nation under God” (4 USCA § 4). The reference to a deity in the pledge promp- ted several constitutional challenges. Many of these challenges were raised under the establish- ment clause of the FIRST AMENDMENT,whichgene- rally forbids the state and federal governments from “establishing” an official religion within their jurisdiction. In 2002, one day after a three-judge PANEL for the Ninth CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals released a decision holding that recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools was unconstitu- tional, the full court voted to stay the decision pending further consideration. However, on February 28, 2003, the full court reinstated its holding that a school district’s policy of requiring teacher-led recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance violated the establi shment clause of the First Amendment by impermissibly coercing a religious act (Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 [9th Cir. 2003]). At the same time, in its amended opinion, the Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the constitutionality of the words “under God” in the federal statute. U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olson filed a PETITION for WRIT of certiorari on April 30, 2003, asking the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the Ninth Circuit decision. Indeed, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (9542 U.S. 1 [2004]). However, the Court did not address the constitutional merits of the case. Instead, it reversed on a procedural technicality, ruling that Sacramento, California, atheist and di- vorced parent Michael Newdow lacked the legal standing to sue on behalf of his daughter because he did not have legal custody of her, such custody having been granted to the mother. (Standing is a legal requirement that the PLAINTIFF must have been injured or threat- ened with injury by the action complained of and focuses on the question of whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the lawsuit.) In 2005 Newdow, to avoid the standing issue, joined with three other anonymous parents/families and again filed legal challenges. In these cases, defendants included the Rio Linda Union School District and the United States as a defendant- intervenor, along with John Carey (the captioned DEFENDANT), who sought to preserve the current wording of the Pledge. This time around, the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three defendants’ cases on appeal for oral arguments in December 2007. As of late 2009, it had not issued its Children in a California elementary school recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In June 2002, a Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals panel ruled that the phrase “under God,” as contained in the pledge, violated the Establishment Clause. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ALLEGIANCE 243 opinion (Newdow v. Carey, Nos. 05-17257, 05-17344, and 06-15093). Also in 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing of its 2008 decision to let stand a Florida law that required public school students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance unless excused by a note from their parents (Frazier v. Alexandre, 535 F.3d 1279 [2008]). However, the appellate court struck a provision within the same law that required students and other civilians to stand during recitation. In Croft v. Perry (N.D. Tex., March 26, 2009), a federal district court threw out an establishment challenge to the Texas Pledge of Allegiance, which reads, in relevant part, “Honor the Texas flag; I pledge allegiance to thee, Texas, one state under God, one and indivisible.” FURTHER READINGS Bergman, Jerry. 1997. “The Modern Religious Objection to Mandatory Flag Salute in America: A History and Evaluation.” Journal of Church and State 39 (spring): 215–36. Canipe,Lee.2003.“Under God and Anti-communist: How the Pledge of Allegiance Got Religion in Cold-War America.” Journal ofChurch and State 45(spring): 305–23. Ellis, Richard J. 2007. To the Flag: The Unlikely History of the Pledge of Allegiance. Lawrence, Kansas: Univ. Press of Kansas. Sanford, Bill W., Jr. 2003. “Separation v. Patriotism: Expelling the Pledge from School.” St. Mary’s Law Journal 34 (winter): 461–502. CROSS REFERENCES Citizens; Dissent; Establishment Clause; First Amendment; Freedom of Speec h; Immigration and Naturalization. ALLOCATION The apportionment or designation of an item for a specific purpose or to a particular place. In the law of trusts, the allocation of cash dividends earned by a stock that makes up the principal of a trust for a BENEFICIARY usually means that the dividends will be treated as income to be paid to the beneficiary. The allocation of stock dividends generally means that such dividends will be added to the shares of stock held as principal, thereby increasing its size. ALLOCUTION The formal inquiry by a judge of an accused person, convicted of a crime, as to whether the person has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him or her or as to whether the person has anything to say to the court before being sentenced. ALLODIAL Free; not subject to the rights of any lord or superior; owned without obligation of vassalage or fealty; the opposite of feudal. A description given to the outright ownership of land that did not impose upon its owner the performance of feudal duties. CROSS REFERENCE Feudalism. ALLOGRAPH A writing or signature made by one person for another. When a principal gives his or her agent the power to pay creditors, the checks written by the agent are allographs for the principal. An autograph is the opposite of an allograph. ALLONGE Additional paper firmly attached to commercial paper, such as a promissory note, to provide room to write endorsements. An allonge is necessary when there is insufficient spa ce on the document itself for the endorsements. It is considered part of the commercial paper as long as the allonge remains affixed thereto. ALLOTMENT A portion, share, or division. The proportionate distribution of shares of stock in a corporation. The partition and distribution of land. v ALLRED, GLORIA Gloria Allred, born July 3, 1941, in Philadelphia, is a flamboyan t, widely recognized lawyer, feminist, activist, and radio talk show host. Though her critics dismiss her as a publicity monger and a dilettante, Allred has received praise from others who believe that she is a master at using the power of the news media to draw attention to the day-to-day struggles of ordinary people. Born Gloria Rachel Bloom, Allred grew up in Philadelphia with her parents, Morris Bloom, a door-to-door salesman, and Stella Davidson Bloom, a homemaker. Her conventional middle- class childhood gave no hint of the outspoken activist to come. Allred graduated with honors GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 244 ALLOCATION from the University of Pennsylvania in 1963 with a bachelor’s degree in English. She moved to New York to pursue a master’sdegreein teaching at New York University. While there, she became interested in the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, which was beginning to gain momentum. After earning her master’s degree in 1966, she returned to Philadelphia to teach at a high school with a predominantly black enrollment. Allred says that her interest in the struggle for equal rights arose from personal experi- ences. While she was in college, she married, gave birth to a daughter, and divorced. Unable to collect CHILD SUPPORT from her forme r husband, she was forced to return to her parents’ home. She also recalls being paid less than a man for what she considered equal work. The reason given was that the man had a family to support, but at the time, Allred as the single mother also had a dependent to support. Perhaps the experience that most galvanized her commitment to equal rights was being raped and then having to undergo an ABORTION at a time when the operation could not legally be performed by a doctor. She nearly died after the operation. According to Allred, the experi- ence made her realize the need for safe and legal abortions and precipitated her lifelong commit- ment to the fight for reproductive freedom. Allred moved to Los Angeles and married again in 1968, this time to Raymond Allred; they were divorced in 1987. Allred taught in the turbulent Watts section of Los Angeles and became the first full-time female staff member in United Teachers of Los Angeles, the union representing Los Angeles’s teachers. The experience stirred her interest in CIVIL RIGHTS and COLLECTIVE BARGAINING and prompted her to go to law school. She received her law degree, with honors, from Loyola Marymount Univ er- sity, Los Angeles, Law School in 1974. Soon after, she entered a law firm partnership with her classmates Nathan Goldberg and Michael Maroko. Allred, Maroko, Goldberg, and Ribak- off grew during the 1970s and 1980s into a firm with annual revenues exceeding $2.5 million. The firm’s caseload has ranged from family and CONSTITUTIONAL LAW to business LITIGATION and PERSONAL INJURY suits. The firm has won national Gloria Allred. AP PHOTOS. Gloria Allred 1941– ▼▼ ▼▼ ❖ ◆◆◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 2003 Served as president of Women’s Equal Rights Legal Defense and Education Fund 1994 Wrote “Prosecution or Persecution” for L.A. Times, advocating legalization of prostitution 1988 Sued Friars Club NY for sex discrimination 1980 Sued L.A. County to stop shackling of pregnant inmates during labor and delivery ◆ 1974 Received J.D. from Loyola Law School; formed law partnership with Nathan Goldberg and Michael Maroko 1973 U.S. Supreme Court upheld Roe v. Wade, legalizing abortion 1961–73 Vietnam War 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles 1955–68 Martin Luther King active in civil rights movement 1950–53 Korean War 1966 Received master’s in teaching from NYU 1941 Born, Philadelphia, Pa. 1939–45 World War II ◆ 2000 1975 19501930 1968 Moved to Los Angeles to teach in Watts 2008 Elected as delegate to Democratic National Convention 2006 Fight Back and Win published GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ALLRED, GLORIA 245 prominence through many pre cedent-setting cases over the course of more than 30 years, working on such high profile cases including those involving O.J. Simpson, Michael Jackson, Scott Peterson, and Robert Blake, as well as one of the earliest SEXUAL ABUSE suits against the Catholic Church. Allred has been perhaps the most flamboy- ant and well known member of her firm. She has achieved notoriety and name recognition through staged press conferences and demon- strations publicizing and dramatizing the causes she has championed at various times. She has also accepted controversial cases that naturally attract media attention. During her years in practice, she has successfully sued Los Angeles County to stop the practice of shackling and chaining pregnant inmates during labor and delivery; put a halt on the practice by the city of El Segundo of quizzing job applicants about their sexual histories (Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131 [9th Cir. 1986]); represented a client who was turned down for a job as a police officer after a six-hour lie detector exam that included questions about her sex life; and sued a dry cleaning establi shment for discrimination because it charged more to launder women’s shirts than men’s. Allred also successfully sued on behalf of two lesbians who had been denied entrance to the “romance booth” at a Los Angeles restaurant (Rolon v. Kulwitsky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 [Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984]). The OWNER of the restaurant vowed to close the booth if Allred’s clients won. They did, and he made good on his promise. Allred relishes confrontation, and her showy tactics have earned her both praise and criti- cism. Defending what man y have called self- promoting publicity stunts, Allred says she is aware of the impression she makes and contends that it is exactly the effect she wants. She tries to use the few moments she is in the spotlight to make her point as forcefully as possible. Her detractors say that she wastes her time and energy on trivial issues that do not advance any worthwhile cause and deflect attention away from serious issues. Yet, she points out, she is often stopped on the street by people who recognize her and want to thank her for taking on the small fights that no one else wants. Allred contends that what she is really doing is tackling issues that are symbolic of the day-to-day struggles people face. It is her way of educating the public and the legal establishment to move beyond stereotypes. Asked whether she is an activist or a lawyer, Allred replied that she is an “activist lawyer.” She added that she believes in seeking change and winning rights through the legal process but that she does not shrink from utilizing the political process when legal remedies prove inadequate. She once held a press conference in the office of California governor Jerry Brown to cast media attention on his threat to VETO a bill authorizing payroll deductions for child support payments. When the news media arrived, Allred and a group of w omen and children had hung diapers across the governor’s office. Brown reversed his position and signed the bill. In another case that drew media attention, Allred held a press conference at the door of the all- male Friars Club of New York to dramatize her lawsuit challenging the club’s policy of not allowing women members and not allowing women to enter, even as guests, before 4:00 p.m. She won her suit on the grounds that the club did not me et the “substantially private” require- ment under New York law that would have allowed it to legally exclude women. Possibly her most famous politically motivated demon- stration was presenting California state senator John Schmitz (R-Corona del Mar) with a chastity belt at a hearing on a bill to limit abortion and BIRTH CONTROL. Schmitz retaliated in a press release in which he called Allred “a slick butch lawyeress.” Allred sued for libel and won a damage award and an apology. Allred has earned a rep utation as a champion of those who have been sexually victimized. She represented a woman who won a $5 million civil suit ag ainst an accused rapist the DISTRICT ATTORNEY declined to PROSECUTE; represented a boy who claimed to have been sexually abused by a famous rock singer (although she abruptly and without explanation withdrew from the case before it was settled); and tackled the thorny issue of clergy sexual abuse. She says she wants people to know that, even if the criminal justice system fails them, they are entitled to file a civil suit. Allred is an ardent feminist who believes that all attorneys and all judges should be feminists, because she feels anyone who is not a feminist is a bigot. Some critics say she is all show and no substance. She has been compared to legal showmen such as Melvin M. Belli (“the King of Torts”) and Marvin Mitchelson, who gained THERE ARE ENOUGH HIGH HURDLES TO CLIMB , AS ONE TRA- VELS THROUGH LIFE , WITHOUT HAVING TO SCALE ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS CREATED BY LAW OR SILLY REGULATIONS . —GLORIA ALLRED GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 246 ALLRED, GLORIA notoriety through a series of celebrity palimony suits. However, even Mitchelson, not one to shrink from publicity himself, describes her style as rough. But Allred has many supporters as well. Among them is Justice Joan Dempsey Klein of the California COURT OF APPEAL who credits Allred with moving women’s issues forward. Klein also points out that Allred saves her dramatics for outside the courtroom and always observes proper decorum while before the bench. Accord- ing to Klein, Allred is always well-prepare d and, for that reason, is quite successful. In 1994 Allred wrote an editorial for the December 6 issue of the Los Angeles Times, titled “Prosecution or Persecution,” in which she asserted that laws prohibiting PROSTITUTION are sexist and victimize women. She advocated legalization and regulation of the sex trade in order to reduce sexually transmitted diseases and drug abuse. According to Allred, “Unprotected, uninsured sex workers are the real victims who deserve legal status and an end to government- funded harassment. ” In the 1990s Allred, whose law firm partners were both t he chil dren of Holo caust s urvivors, sued an organization that had promised a monetary award to an Auschwitz survivor for proving the existence of the Holocaust and then reneged on the award. Allred won a six-figure judgment that ultimately bankrupted the organi- zation. In 1995 Allred sued the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) over the organization’srefusalto let a girl join the troop to which her twin brother belonged. The tria l judge’s decision t hat the BSA wasnotabusinessorganizationandwasnot subject to the state Civil Right s Act was u pheld by the Court of Appeals. The case was appealed to California’s Supreme Court, but, when that court upheld two similar cases, the PLAINTIFF withdrew her appeal. In early 2003 Allred served as president of the Women’s Equal Rights Legal Defense and Education Fund, an organization she founded. She hosted her own radio talk show on a Los Angeles radio station and was selected as one of the 25 most imp ortant talk show hosts by USA Today. She has also been a columnist for the National Law Journal and has been nominated three times for television’s Emmy award for her commentaries on KABC-TV. During the early twenty-first century, Allred’s career achievements include being elected as a delegate to the 2008 Democratic National Convention and receiving the Distinguished Alumna Achievement Award from New York University’s Steinhardt School of Culture, Educa- tion, and Human Development in May 2009. Allred’s most recent case garnering media atten- tion involved Nadya Suleman, the so-called “Octo-mom,” who gave birth to eight babies in 2009. Allred asked for an investigation into what she alleged were violations of labor laws and regulations in the filming of the babies. California State Labor officials issued numerous citations for violations of the law as a result of the investigation. Dressed in her trademark reds and electric blues, Allred is a combination of scholarship and theatrics. Her intelligence and shrewd understanding of the power of the media have made her a contemporary success story in the world of law and politics. Gloria Allred has her own Web site: www.gloriaallred.com. FURTHER READINGS Allred, Gloria (with Deborah Caulfield Rybak). 2006. Fight Back and Win: My Thirty-Year Fight against Injustice and How You Can Win Your Own Battles. New York: Harper Collins. Berry, Dawn Bradley. 1996. The 50 Most Influential Women in American Law. Los Angeles: Contemporary Books. Drachman, Virginia G. 1998. Sisters in Law: Women Lawyers in Modern American History. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Gloria Allred. Available online at <www.gloriaallred.com> (accessed August 12, 2009). ALLUVION See TERRITORY. ALTER EGO A doctrine used by the courts to ignore the corporate status of a group of stockholders, officers, and directors of a corporatio n i n reference to their limited liability so that they may be held personally liab le for their actions when they have acted fraudulently or unjustly or when to refuse to do so would deprive an innocent victim of redress for an injury caused by them. A corporation is considered the alter ego of its stockholders, directors, or officers when it is used merely for the transaction of their personal business for which they want IMMUNITY from individual LIABILITY. A parent corporation is the alter ego of a SUBSIDIARY corporation if it controls and directs its activities so that it will have limited liability for its wrongful acts. The alter ego doct rine is also known as the INSTRUMENTALITY RULE because the corporation GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ALTER EGO 247 . Abortion Ban Act of 2003 2008 Wrote majority opinion for Gomez- Perez v. Potter 19 50–53 Korean War 19 61 73 Vietnam War 20 01 September 11 terrorist attacks ❖ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ALITO,. PETTEWAY, COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ▼▼ ▼▼ 19 50 2 010 19 70 19 90 ◆ ◆◆ ◆◆◆ ◆◆◆ Samuel Anthony Alito Jr. 19 50– 19 50 Born, Trenton, N.J. 19 72 Received B.A. from Princeton 19 75 Graduated from. gave no hint of the outspoken activist to come. Allred graduated with honors GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 244 ALLOCATION from the University of Pennsylvania in 19 63 with a bachelor’s