Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 1 P38 pptx

implementing the new rules, and many critics felt that the policy further polarized attitudes among service members. Furthermore, the policy shifted the BURDEN OF PROOF to the individual to show that she or he had not engaged in homosexual acts. The first legal challenge to the “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy was filed in March 1994 by the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION and the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. Six service members who had declared their h omosexuality file d suit i n the U.S. District Court for the E astern District of Ne w Y ork, asking for injunctive relief and a declaration that the policy was unconstitutional. The case was heard by Judge Eugene H. Nickerson who issued orders on April 4, 1994, and June 3, 1994, enjoining the Army from pursuing discharge proceedings against the plaintiffs. Nickerson based his de ci- sion on the plaintiffs’ showing that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted and that the case involved “sufficiently serious questions” that would wa rrant its go ing forward for a decision on its merits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that Nickerson had used an incorrect standard in determining whether the injunction should be granted. It held that in a case such as this, where an injunction is sought against a “government action taken in the PUBLIC INTEREST pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme,” a more rigorous showing that the case has a “likelihood of success” must be made (Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128 [1995][per curiam]). The court allowed the injunctions to stand but remanded the case to the district court for a decision on the plaintiffs’ constitu- tional claims within three months. On March 30, 1995, Judge Nickerson delivered the decision the plaintiffs had hoped for. He held that the “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy violated the First and Fifth Amendments, and enjoined the government from enforcing the policy against the plaintiffs (Able, 880 F. Supp. 968 [E.D.N.Y.] ). The court found that the FIRST AMENDMENT prohibits a restraint on the right of a serviceperson to declare his or her homosexuality. According to the court, “Plaintiffs have done no more than acknowledge who they are, that is, their status. The speech at issue in this case implicates the First Amendment value of promoting individual dignity and integrity and thus is protected by the First Amendment from efforts to prohibit it because of its co ntent.” The court further found that to regulate speech content, even in the military context, the government must show a “compelling interest” and prove that it has chosen the “least restrictive means” to further that interest. Nickerson criticized the legal hairsplitting in the policy directives, which purported to differentiate between a homosex- ual “orientation” and a homosexual “propensi- ty.” Once a member of the armed services has admitted or acknowledged being a homosexual, he or she has only a hypothetical chance of escaping discharge. “Thus, the policy treats a statement of homosexual orientation as proof of the case,” said Nickerson. “Once such a statement is made, the speaker is judged guilty until proven innocent of committing miscon- duct the government considers so threatening to the military mission that a member may be discharged for it. This seems to the court a rather draconian consequence of merely admit- ting to an orientation that Congress has determined to be innocuous.” Turning to the government’s argument that the presence of openly gay or lesbian members would be detrimental to morale and troop cohesion, the court found that sufficient sanc- tions were available for dealing with “inappro- priate behavior by a homosexual, whether in the closet or not.” Nickerson further stated his belief that the policy may actually be detrimen- tal to the military becaus e “secrecy and dec ep- tion invite suspicion, which in turn erodes trust, the rock on which cohesion is built.” He noted that a 1993 study conducted by the RAND Corporation found that in countries that have nondiscrimination policies, “no serious pro- blems were reported concerning the presence of homosexuals in the force.” Finally, o n t he Fifth Amendment equal protec- tion question, the court found that the government had failed to show that the policy, which denied to gay and lesbian personnel the same free speech rights guaranteed to heterosexuals, was “tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest.” The policy therefore violated the Fifth Amendment as well as the First, and the court enjoined the government from enforcing it. The military policy of “don’task,don’ttell” has remained intact since 1993. Despite calls for repeal of the policy and return to the former policy of excluding gay and lesbian personnel from GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 358 ARMED SERVICES service, President George W. Bush did not change the policy, and EXECUTIVE BRANCH officials stated that the administration does not plan to change the policy. The controversy has neverthe- less remained heated. Commentators have noted that the ban on gays and lesbians does not apply to such governmental agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, which often engages in quasi- military activities. Moreover, evidence suggests that during times of war in the past, the military has allowed gays to remain in the service. Legal challenges to the “don ’t ask, don’ttell” policy continued in the 2000s. In Witt v. Department of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008), an Air Force nurse named Margaret Witt challenged her suspension from the military due to discovery that she was engaged in a lesbian relationship. Witt argued that the military’s action violated her equal protection and due process rights. Although the court concluded that the government’s policy ad- vanced an important governmental interest of managing the military, the court was not convinced that the policy significantly furthered the government’s interest. The court remanded the case to a federal district court in Washing- ton for further proceedings. As a presidential candidate, BARACK OBAMA asserted that he would reverse the military’s policy regarding gays and lesbians. Early in his administration, however, Obama decided not to address the policy until the Witt LITIGATION had been resolved. Sexual Harassment in th e Armed Servi- ces The inclusion of women in virtually all aspects of military life has changed the service from a male-dominated enterprise, strictly seg- regated by gender, into a microcosm of modern society. Although most men and women serve side by side without incident, charges of SEXUAL HARASSMENT in the military became increasingly numerous in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Perhaps the most explosive and far-reaching incidence of this problem took place at the Tailhook Association convention in Las Vegas in September 1991. The Tailhook Association— named for the hook on a Navy jet that catches on the cables that stop it as it lands on an aircraft carrier—is a private group of active and retired Navy and Marine Corps pilots. After its 1991 meeting, Navy lieutenant Paula A. Coughlin charged that she and other women who unwit- tingly stumbled upon the Tailhook hospitality suites at the Las Vegas Hilton were forced to go through a “gauntlet” of drunken Navy and Marine officers who assaulted them, tore at their clothing, and grabbed at their bodies as they were pro- pelled down the hallway. Coughlin’sallegations launched an investigation that revealed drunken, lewd, and out-of-control behavior by the officers. In the ensuing months the Navy severed its ties to the Tailhook Association and submitted the names of more than 60 officers for possible disciplinary action. Nevertheless, a conspiracy of silence among the aviators hampered the investi- gation. In September 1992 the Pentagon’sinspec- tor general issued a report criticizing the Navy’s inquiry into the incident and suggesting that top Navy officials deliberately undermined t he investigation to avoid negative publicity. The commander of the Naval Investigative Service and the Navy’s judge advocate general were relieved of their commands. The following April, the inspector general accused 140 aviators of indecent exposure, assault, and lying under oath in the incident. However, no one was ever court- martialed as a result of the charges, and those who were disciplined received only small fines or reprimands. The Tailhook scandal set off a tidal wave within the upper echelons of the Navy. Navy Secretary H. Lawrence Garrett III resigned in June 1992, accepting full responsibility for the failure of leadership that allowed the incident to occur. In October 1993 his replacement, John H. Dalton, asked for the removal of Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, chief of naval operations, who was present at the convention but denied any knowledge of the debauchery. Dalton’srequest was overruled by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. In February 1994 a military judge cited Kelso for using “unlawful command influence” to “ma- nipulate the initial investigative process” and the Navy’s d isciplinary procedures “to shield his personal involvement” in Tailhook. Kelso, who was to retire on June 30, 1994, angrily denied any wrongdoing and declared that he would not resign early. In the end, however, he was persuaded to step down two months ahead of schedule in exchange for a tribute from Defense Secretary William J. Perry that would clear his name. After a bitter debate, the U.S. Senate voted 54 to 43 to allow Kelso, the Navy’stopadmiral and a 38-year veteran, to retire at his full four- star rank and with a full pension. The women in the Senate, along with many of their male GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ARMED SERVICES 359 colleagues, vehemently opposed the arrange- ment, but they were ultimately overruled. Coughlin resigned from the Navy in Febru- ary 1994, stating that the assault and “the covert attacks on me that followed have stripped me of my ability to serve.” Coughlin was successful in a civil suit against the Tailhook Association, with whom she settled for an undisclosed amount. She also won a civil suit against the Hilton Hotels Corporation, parent company of the Las Vegas Hilton, which she accused of lax security; in October 1994 a jury awarded her $1.7 million in COMPENSATORY DAMAGES and an additional $5 million in PUNITIVE DAMAGES. Still suffering depression and post-traumatic stress from the incident, Coughlin expressed satisfac- tion with the award but uncertainty about her future, saying, “I’m hoping to slip into obscuri- ty. I want to paint my house. I just want to go home.” Anxious to restore the Navy’s tarnished image after the sordid series of events, top officials vowed to handle sexual harassment charges swiftly and sensitively. The Navy’s new “zero-tolerance” policy on sexual harassment required automatic dismissal for aggravated sexual harassment or repeat offenses. Under the policy, about 90 officers and sailors had been dismissed by the end of 1994. In spite of the publicity generated by Tailhook and other scandals, and the efforts of the military to clamp down on sexual harassment, charges continued to come to light. In one 1994 case that tested the resolve of Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, Admiral Kelso’s successor as chief of naval operations, two officers were reprimanded for failing to act properly on complaints by Lieutenant Darlene Simmons. Simmons charged that her commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Arthur Catullo, had offered to advance her career in exchange for sexual favors. Catullo was censured. Simmons, who had an impeccable record before she brought the charges but received an “adverse” evaluation afterward, received an apology from Navy Secretary Dalton. Dalton also cleared her record and offered to extend her active-duty Navy service by two years. Another egregious incident, again involving the Navy, occurred in 1994 when four male instructors were court-martialed and six others punished for sexually harassing 16 women students at the Naval Training Center in San Diego. The women, who were learning to operate the Navy’s computer and telephone networks, claimed that the male instructors made unwanted verbal and physical advances. After a seven-month investigation, the Navy found all but one of the instructors guilty of the charges and imposed various sanctions, from a criminal conviction and $1,000 fine, to a loss in pay, required counseling, and inclusion of punitive letters in their files. Sexual harassment was also found among the ranks at the U.S. Military Academy, at West Point, New York. In October 1994 female cadets complained that they had been groped at a pep rally by members of the West Point football team as the players ran past them in a regimental “spirit run.” Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, superintendent of West Point, launched an immediate investigation that resulted in three players being suspended from the team for the rest of the season, restricted to academy grounds for 90 days, and given 80 hours of marching discipline. Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.), a member of the House ArmedServicesCommittee, criticized the punishment as too lenient, saying, “[I]tlookslike[the incident] was treated as a prank and not as a serious violation of the code of conduct.” Despite the attention placed on the problem of sexual harassment in the military, incidents of sexual harassment have remained relatively common. According to a report released by the Pentagon in 2008, about one-third of military women polled said that they experienced sexual harassment in 2006. Sexual misconduct by servicemen is not limited to sexual hara ssment. The Army ac- knowledged in 1992 that soldiers committed at least 34 sex crimes during the Gulf War in 1991, including RAPE and assault against fellow U.S. soldiers. One sergeant was charged with rape, indecent assault, and adultery after he allegedly raped several female soldiers in the port of Al Jubayl in Saudi Arabia in 1991. Some of the crimes reported by the Army at that time included consensual sexual activities, including adultery and gay and lesbian conduct. Army records disclosed few records regarding actions taken against the soldiers for their miscondu ct. Four years later, three U.S. soldiers, two marines, and a sailor stationed near Japan, abducted and raped an 12-year-old Okinawa schoolgirl, in part prompting Okinawa citizens to call for the closing of U.S. military bases on the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 360 ARMED SERVICES island. The incident likewise enraged citizens of Japan. According to a study of records in 1988, Navy and Marine bases in Japan held 169 courts martial for sexual assaults, far exceeding the number at any U.S. base elsewhere in the world. Statistics regarding Air Force courts martial likewise showed a significant number of assault charges on bases in Japan. Prior to 2000, many criminal activities by military employees went unpunished because the host country in which the crime occurred failed to PROSECUTE the action or the military courts of the United States did not have jurisdiction to try the case. In 2000 Congress enacted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3261-3267), which extends federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes com- mitted by military personnel and their depen- dents stationed abroad. The statute allows the U.S. Defense Department to order the arrest, detention, and removal of military employees for crimes that would constitute an offense punishable for more than one year if the conduct had been engaged in within the jurisdiction of the United States. Several U.S. soldiers were convicted of some heinous criminal acts during the Iraq War. One of the worst incidents occurred in the Iraqi town of Al-Mahmudiyah in 2006. Five soldiers attacked the family of a 14-year-old girl, killing her father, mother, and younger sister before gang raping the girl. Four of the five soldiers stood trial by co urt martial, while a fifth was tried in a federal district court. FURTHER READINGS Bravin, Jess, and Laura Meckler. 2009. “Obama Avoids Test on Gays in Military.” Wall Street Journal. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49, no. 4 (May 1993). Shanor, Charles A., and L. Lynn Hogue. 1996. Military Law in a Nutshell. St. Paul, MN: West. Winthrop, William. 2000. Military Law and Precedents. Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein. CROSS REFERENCES American Civil Liberties Union; Bias; Court-Martial; Defense Department; Equal Protection; Gay and Lesbian Rights; Judge Advocate; Military Law; National Guard; Sexual Harassment; Uniform Code of Military Justice; U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims; Veterans Affairs Department; War. ARMISTICE A suspending or cessation of hostilities between belligerent nations or forces for a considerable time. An armistice differs from a mere “suspension of arms” in that the latter is concluded for very brief periods and for local military purposes only, whereas an armistice not only covers a longer period, but is agreed upon for po litical purposes. It is said to be general if it relates to the whole area of the war, and partial if it relates to only a portion of that area. Partial armistices are sometimes called truces but there is no hard and fast distinction. Armistice Day originated as a day set aside by the United States, Great Britain, and France to commemorate the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, that brought an end to WORLD WAR I. After WORLD WAR II, it became a day for tribute to those who lost their lives in that General Douglas MacArthur (top) signs the Japanese armistice documents on the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945. Mamoru Shigemitsu and General Yoshijiro Umezu, with delegation, witness. (TOP) NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (BOTTOM) LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ARMISTICE 361 conflict as well. In Canada it became known as Remembrance Day, and in Britain the Sunday closest to November 11 was declared Remem- brance Sunday to honor the dead of both world wars. In 1938 the day was made a federal holiday in the United States. In 1954 after the KOREAN WAR, President DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER signed an act of Congress (5 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (a) [1995]) to change the name of the holiday to Veterans Day “to honor veterans on the eleventh day of November of each year a day dedicated to world peace.” Thus, Veterans Day now honors all U.S. veterans of all wars. From 1971 to 1977 the holiday was celebrated on the fourth Monday in October, but in 1978 the traditional date of November 11 was restored. Veterans Day celebrations in towns and cities in the United States usually include parades, speeches, and floral tributes placed on soldiers’ graves or memorials, with special services held at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, in Arlington, Virginia, outside Washington, D.C. Group NATURALIZATION ceremonies, in which individuals are made citizens of the United States, have also become part of Veterans Day celebrations. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT One of the major efforts to preserve interna- tional peace and security in the twenty-first century has been to control or limit the number of WEAPONS and the ways in which weapons can be used. Two different means to achieve this goal have been disarmament and arms control. Disarmament is the reduction of the number of weapons and troops maintained by a state. Arms control refers to treaties made between potential adversaries that reduce the likelihood and scope of war, usually imposing limitations on military capability. Although disarmament always involves the reduction of military forces or weapons, arms control does not. In fact, arms control agree- ments sometimes allow for the increase of weapons by one or more parties to a treaty. History Arms control developed both in theory and i n practice during the COLD WAR, a period between the late 1940s and 1991 when the t wo military superpowers, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), dealt with one another from a position of mutual mistrust. Arms control was devised consciously during the postwar period as an alternative to disarmament, which for many had fallen into discredit as a means of reducing the likelihood of war. Germany had been forced to disarm following WORLD WAR I but became belligerent again during the 1930s, resulting in WORLD WAR II. Although Germany’s weapons had been largely eliminated, the under- lying causes of conflict had not. Germany’s experience thus illustrated that no simple cause- and-effect rela tionship existed between the pos- session of weapons and a tendency to create war. Following World War II, advocates of arms control as a new approach to limiting hostility between nations emphasized that military weapons and power would continue to remain a part of modern life. It w as unrealistic and even dangerous, they felt, for a country to seek complete elimination of weapons, and it would not necessarily reduce the likelihood of war. Whereas disarmament had formerly been seen as an alternative to military strength, arms control was now viewed as an integral part of it. Arms control proponents sought to create a stable balance of power in which the forces that cause states to go to war could be controlled and regulated. The emphasis in arms control is thus upon overall stability rather than elimination of arms, and proponents recognize that an in- crease in weaponry is sometimes necessary to preserve a balance of power. The development of arms control owes a great deal to the existence of NUCLEAR WEAPONS as well. By the 1950s, when both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weap- ons, the superpowers became convinced that they could not safely disarm themselves of those weapons. In the absence of guaranteed verifica- tion—the process whereby par ticipants in a treaty monitor each other’s adherence to the agreement—neither side could disarm without making itself vulnerable to cheating by the other side. The goal of the superpowers and other nations possessing nuclear weapons therefore became not total elimination of those weapons, but control of them so that a stable nuclear deterrent might be maintained. According to the idea of nuclear deterrence, a state possessing nuclear weapons is deterred, or effectively prevented, from using them against another NUCLEAR POWER because of the threat of retalia- tion. No state is willing to attempt a first strike GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 362 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT because it cannot prevent the other side from striking back. Nuclear deterrence is therefore predicated upon a mutual abhorrence of the destructive power of nuclear weapons. This idea has come to be called mutual assured destruction (MAD). Many experts see deterrence as the ultimate goal of nuclear arms control. Because many civilians generally assume that arms control and disarmament are the same thing, there has often been public disappointment when treaties have resulted in an increase in the number or power of weapons. An advantage of arms control over disarma- ment, however, is that even states with a high degree of suspicion or hostility toward each other can still NEGOTIATE agreements. Disarma- ment agreements, on the other hand, require a high degree of trust, and their formation is unlikely between hostile nations. Arms control is often used as a means to avoid an arms race—a competitive build-up of weapons between two or more powers. Such a race can be costly for both sides, and arms control treaties serve the useful purpose of limiting weapons stockpiles to a level that preserves deterrence while conserving the economic and social resources of a state for other uses. Modern Arms Control Although disarmament and arms control agree- ments were forged prior to World War II (1939–45), the modern arms control effort began in earnest after the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS of 1962. That situation erupted when the United States discovered that the Soviet Union was constructing launch sites for nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba, thereby threatening to put nuclear weapons very close to U.S. soil. President JOHN F. KENNEDY declared a naval blockade of the island, and for two weeks the United States and the USSR existed in a state of heightened tension. Finally, the USSR and the United States faced off in what became a white- hot international drama of brinksmanship, each side waiting to see who would blink first. With the United States’ promise not to overthrow Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba, the Soviets U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Soviet President Leonid Brazhnev shake hands after signing SALT II in June 1979. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 363 canceled plans to install the mis siles. After the crisis, Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev, “I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament. Perhaps we can together make real progress in this vital field.” Among the earliest arms control treaties were the LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY (LT BT), an agreement that prohibited nuclear test explo- sions in the atmosphere, under water, or in space, which was signed in 1963 by the United States, Britain, and the USSR, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Conv ention, a superpower treaty that banned biological weapons and provided for the destruction of existing stock- piles. The 1972 convention was the first and only example, since 1945, of true disa rmament of an entire weapons category. Although negotiation on a comprehensive test ban—an agreement that would prohibit all nuclear testing—continued, this solution remained elusive. Nevertheless, in 1974 the superpowers signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which limits nuclear tests to explosive yields of less than 150 kilotons. (A kiloton represents the explosive force of one thousand tons of TNT.) But the TTBT did not prevent the superpowers from developing nuclear warheads (the bomb- carrying segments of a nuclear missile) with power exceeding 150 kilotons; warheads on the Soviet SS-17 missile possess as much as a 3.6- megaton capacity. (A megaton equals 1 million tons of TNT.) In 1976 the superpowers signed the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), which banned so-called peaceful nuclear testing. Numerous ar ms cont rol a gre ements h ave been designed to improve communications between the superpow e rs. The first of these, coming just a fter t he Cuban Missile Crisis, was the 1963 Hot Line Agreement, setting up a special telegraph line between Moscow and Washington. In 1978 the hot line was updated by a satellite link between the two superpowers. The United States and the USSR also sought to create protocols designed to prevent an accidental nuclear war. This effort led to the 1971 agreement, Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak o f Nuclear Wa r, which required advance warning for any missile tests and immediate notification of any accidents or missile-warning alerts. One highly celebrated arms control agree- ment is the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or Non-Proliferation Treaty, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. The agreement involves well over one hundred states. Under it, countries not possessing nuclear weapons give up their right to acquire such weapons, and countries with nuclear weapons waive their rights to export nuclear weapons technology to countries lacking that technology. Another class of arms control treaties seeks to ban weapons from as-yet-unmilitarized areas. These include the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which prohibits military bases, maneuvers, and tests on the Antarctic Continent; the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a ban on the testing or deploy- ment of “weapons of mass destruction” in Earth’s orbit or on other bodies in the solar system; the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty, prohibiting On December 13, 2001, former President George W. Bush, shown with General Richard Myers, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice, announced that the United States would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic- Missile Treaty of 1972. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 364 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT nuclear weapons in Latin America; and the 1971 Seabed Treaty, banning the placement of WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION on or below the seabed. SALT I and After The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II) were first undertaken in the era of détente in the early 1970s, when relations between the United States and the USSR became more amicable. SALT I led to two agreements: the ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE TREATY OF 1972 (ABM Treaty), which eventually limited each superpower to one site for antiballistic missiles (ABMs), the missiles designed to intercept and destroy incoming missiles; and an “interim” a rms agreement limiting t he number of intercont inental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched bal- listic missiles (SLBMs) to those already deployed by specific dates in 1972. It also required that any modernization and replacement of ICBMs and SLBMsbeonaone-for-onebasisandprohibited any development of new, more powerful ICBMs. The agreement was meant to set limits before a more definitive SALT II treaty could be negotiat- ed. When the SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979, it set a limit of 2,400 st rategic missiles and bombers for each side. Alt hough the U.S. Sena te did not ratify this treaty, the United States abided by it for several years. The ABM Treaty of SALT I was much more successful than the interim ICBM-SLBM agree- ment. Because the SALT agreements limited only the number of ICBM launchers, or missiles, both superpowers went on in the 1970s to develop missiles with multiple war- heads, called “multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles” (MIRVs). Launcher totals thus remained constant, but the number of warheads increased dramatically. Adding warheads to missiles also made nuclear deterrence more unpredictable; a superpower with MIRVs could have enough warheads to destroy the opponent’s retaliatory capability, thereby making MAD ineffective. Both superpowers felt that their land-based missile forces had become vulnerable to a first strike from the other side. Compliance with the SALT treaties became a contentious issue in the 1980s when the United States accused the USSR of violating treaty provisions on the development of new missiles. The administration of President RONALD REAGAN decided that alleged Soviet violations made it necessary to end U.S. compliance with the agreements. In 1986 the United States exceeded limits set by SALT II when a B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles (nuclear missiles that fly at a low altitude) entered active service. Another U.S. military proposal, the Strategic Defense Initia- tive (SDI), also complicated the ABM Treaty. In 1983 Reagan made a televised speech in which he announced plans to develop a space-based missile defense system. He presented SDI as an alternative to MAD. SDI would, he claimed, effectively shield the United States from a Soviet missile launc h, including an accidental or third- party attack. SDI would also protect the land- based leg of the United States’ nuclear triad, the other two legs of which are aircraft bombers and submarine-launched miss iles. Many doubted whether such a missile defense system could actu ally be created, and others criticized SDI as a dangerou s upset in the nuclear balance. A debate also arose as to whether SDI was in violation of the ABM Treaty. Relations be tween the superpowers eventu- ally warmed when Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as leader of the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. Relatively young and dynamic compared with his predecessors, Gorbach ev initiated reforms for increased openness in the Soviet Union that facilitated arms control agreements. In 1987 President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nu- clear Forces (INF) Treaty, another major step in arms control. The INF Treaty called for the elimination of an entire class of short- and intermediate-range (300- to 3,400-mile) nuclear missiles. The se included 1,752 Soviet and 859 U. S. missiles. It was the first treaty to result in a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. The agreement also involved the most complete verification procedures ev er for an arms control treaty. These included data exchanges, on-site inspections, and monitoring by surveillance satellites. After the INF Treaty, the superpowers continued to try to work out a strategic arms reduction treaty that would cut the number of long-range missiles by 50 percent. By that time, the superpowers each had nuclear arsenals that could destroy the other many times over, and a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 365 50 percent reduction would still leave nuclear deterrence well intact. A New World Order Between 1989 and 1991 a number of significant events brought about the end of the Cold War. In 1989 Gorbachev surprised the world when he led the Soviet Union in its decision to give up its control over Eastern Europe. By the summer of 1991, not only had the Warsaw Pact—a unified group consisting of the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe—dissolved, but so had the Soviet Union itself. Soviet COMMU- NISM , one-half of the superpower equation for over 40 years, had imploded. During this time of increasingly warm relations between the superpowers, a number of major arms control treaties were created. On November 19, 1990, the United States, the USSR, and 20 other countries signed the CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY (CFE Treaty), which President George H. W. Bush called “the farthest-reaching arms agreement in history,” an accord that “signals the new world order that is emerging.” The treaty grew out of a 1989 proposal by Bush that the superpowers each be limited to 275,000 troops in Europe. As events unfolded in Eastern Europe, however, and the countries of the former Eastern Bloc became independent from the USSR, that number of troops began to seem high. Under the CFE Treaty, each side was allowed to deploy, in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, no more than 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored troop carriers, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat airplanes, and 2,000 attack helicopters. The treaty required the Soviet Union to disarm or destroy nearly 20,000 tanks, artillery pieces, and other weapons, to give a 27 percent reduction in Soviet armaments west of the Urals. That decrease was small, however, compared with the 59,000 weapons the USSR shipped east of the Urals to central Asia between 1989 and 1990 as it sought to realign its forces in response to world events. On the other side, the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) forces—the postwar alliance of West- ern European and North American states, including the United States—were required to destroy fewer than 3,000 pieces of military equipment. In May 1991 NATO decided to reduce its forces even further. The United States, for its part, reduced the 320,000 troops it had in Europe by at least 50 percent. Arms agreements on nuclear weapons were also reach ed during this period. On July 31, 1991, Bush and Gorbachev signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). Negotiations on the technically complex accord had begun as early as 1982. The agreement required the USSR to reduce its nuclear arsenal by roughly 25 percent and the United States to reduce its arsenal by 15 percent, within seven years after ratification by both nations. Numer- ically speaking, the USSR would reduce its nuclear warheads from 10,841 to 8,040, and the United States would reduce its warheads from 12,081 to 10,395. These amounts would bring the nuclear arsenals of each nation roughly back to levels that existed in 1982, when START negotiations began. The agreement also limited the development of new missiles and required a number of verification procedures, including on-site inspections with spot checks, monitor- ing of missile production plants, and exchange of data tapes from missile tests. Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era In June 1992 President George H. W. Bush met with Russian president Boris Yeltsin. In a “joint understanding,” the two sides agreed to reduc- tions of nuclear weapons beyond the levels provided for in the 1991 START agreement, with the ultimate goal of decreasing the total number of warheads on each side to between 3,000 and 3,500 by the year 2003. The two presidents also agreed to eliminate MIRVs by 2003. This agreement was signed, as START II, in early 1993. The administration of President BILL CLIN- TON , who became PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES in 1993, revived the debate surrounding missile defense systems—and created fears that a new arms race might begin—when it developed proposals for the Theater High-Altitude Area- Defense System (THAAD). THAAD would be an elaborate missile defense system aimed at protecting allied nations from short-range missile attacks launched by countries such as North Korea. Critics maintained that THAAD would violate the ABM provisions of SALT I, widely believed to be the most successful arms control provisions ever; upset the nuclear balance; and possibly lead to an arms race. Proponents of THAAD maintained that the ABM Treaty was a relic of the Cold War and that missile defenses could protect against accidental nuclear launches. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 366 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT As for Europe, the new structure of power there would also create new challenges for arms control. Agreements such as the CFE were made when the Soviet Union still existed, and did not necessarily conform to current realities. As the war in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated during the early 1990s, a new political situation posed new risks. Would certain states become regional powers and upset the balance of power? Would agreements that were stabilizing for the Soviet Union turn out to be destabilizing for Russia and other states of the former USSR? Would nationalism rise as a destructive force, as it had before and during previous wars? Some experts were proposing that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) develop conventional arms control agreements to replace the CFE Treaty. The CSCE was formed in 1973 in an attempt to promote détente betw een the United States and the USSR. It includes 52 countries—50 Euro- pean natio ns plus the United States and Canada. European leaders hoped the CSCE would play a greater role in determining a peaceful, stable future for Europe, with efforts in arms control being one of its major goals. Formally declaring this goal, European leaders signed the Pact of Paris in November 1990. Some leaders were proposing that the CSCE replace NATO as the chief military and political organization in Europe. During the early 2000s, U.S. defense policy changed dramatically. The election of President GEORGE W. BUSH signaled the rise of neo- conservative policy thinking about post-Cold War security, a framework that no longer prioritized defense against nuclear attack from Russia or the states of the former Soviet Union. Instead, TERRORISM and so-called rogue states were said to pose the greatest danger. In a profound departure from the super- power analysis that had formed the basis of Cold War planning, the threat was now said to come from smaller, weaker nations. Defense planners identified potential THREATS from North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, which were said to be developing—or as in the case of Pakistan, had already developed—nuclear weapons. They pointed to the failure of international non- proliferation agreements as reasons for the United States to reconfigure its defenses and rethink its previous agreements. Accordingly, the Bush administration moved swiftly on both fronts. In 1999 Bush had campaigned on the promise of reviving the Reagan-era SDI project to provide an anti- missile defense system. In 2001 the president unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty of 1972 in order to remove any legal hindrance from testing and development of missile defense. The end of the ABM Treaty proved controversial. Advocates of preserving the treaty praised it for preserving strategic stability, allowing for easy verification of each side’s nuclear capacity, and maintaining the concept of deterrence. Sharply critical of U.S. unilateral withdrawal, both the Russians and Chine se announced they would respond by increasing their nuclear arsenals. Downplaying this threat, critics of the ABM Treaty doubted that either nation could afford to do so. Great uncertainties began to cloud the future of arms control. Following the Septem- ber 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the Bush administration announced its intention to change the policy led under previous administrations from a focus on independent arms control treaties and nonpro- liferation agreements to protecting the Unite d States from global terror. Specifically, Bush’s new doctrine was one of preemptive attack. Departing from historical tradition, the Bush administration declared its intention to attack enemy nations first. Accordingly, despite global objection to the doctrine, the Bush administra- tion ordered the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2005 the Bush administration eliminated the nonproliferation and arms control bureaus in the United States DEPARTMENT OF STATE and reorganized them into a new Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation. SECRETARY OF STATE under George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, stated that the purpose for such reorganization was to increase the role of the Department of State in “protecting America from weapons of mass destruction.” The risks of nuclear proliferation were starkly demonstrated in 2002 when Pakistan and India came to the brink of nuclear war, and again that year when North Korea, abrogating its non- proliferation agreement, defied the United States to stop it from developing nuclear weapons. By the end of the Bush administration, Iran was GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 367 . Treaty of 19 72. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 364 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT nuclear weapons in Latin America; and the 19 71 Seabed Treaty, banning the placement of WEAPONS. Japan, abducted and raped an 12 -year-old Okinawa schoolgirl, in part prompting Okinawa citizens to call for the closing of U.S. military bases on the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 360 ARMED. policy of “don’task,don’ttell” has remained intact since 19 93. Despite calls for repeal of the policy and return to the former policy of excluding gay and lesbian personnel from GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF