language in pleadings that is redundant, imma- terial, impertinent, or scandalous. A party can file a motion for a more definite statement when the language in a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the party cann ot reasonably be expected to draft a responsive pleading. A motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT, also known as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asks the court to make a judgment solely on the facts set forth in the pleadings, without the necessity of trial. A court will grant a summary judgment motion when the material facts of the case are not in dispute and all that remains to be determined are QUESTIONS OF LAW. For example, in Stieber v. Journal Publishing Co., 120 N. M. 270, 901 P.2d 201 (App. 1995), the court found that the issue of whether a newspaper company’s treatment of a reporter was extreme and outrageous was a legal question, not a factual question. In that case the reporter, Tamar Stieber, sued her employer for, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Stieber charged that the newspaper asked her to write so many daily stories that she could not perform her duties as a special projects reporter. To recover for the TORT of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court noted, Stieber had to prove that the newspaper’s conduct was so extreme and outra- geous as to go “beyond all possible boundaries of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized community.” The court ruled that as a MATTER OF LAW, Stieber failed to prove this allegation, and the lower court’s summary judgment was affirmed. A motion in limine, also made before trial, asks the court to prohibit an opposing party A sample motion to dismiss form. ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. Name(s) of plaintiff(s), Plaintiff(s) Civil Action No. v. Name(s) of defendant(s), Defendant(s) MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b) FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, IMPROPER VENUE, INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS, OR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM The defendant moves to dismiss the action because: 1. the amount in controversy is less than the sum or value specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1332; 2. the defendant is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of this court; 3. venue is improper (this defendant does not reside in this district and no part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the district); 4. the defendant has not been properly served, as shown by the attached affidavits of ________________________; or 5. the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Date: Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party __________________________________________________ _ Printed name Address E-mail address Telephone number Motion to Dismiss Form UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the ________________ DISTRICT OF ________________ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 138 MOTION from offering evidence or referring to matters that would be highly prejudicial to the movant during a trial. A motion to suppress is similar to a motion in limine but asks the court to keep out of a criminal trial evidence that was obtained illegally, usually in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For example, a defendant in a murder trial may move the court to suppress her confession because she was questioned without being told of her right to have an attorney present. Following a trial but before a jury verdict, a party may move for a directed verdict, asking the judge to make a judgment without letting the jury reach a verdict. Following a jury verdict, a party may move for JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND- ING THE VERDICT , or JNOV. This motion requests that the court enter a judgment contrary to the jury verdict, and is granted when no reasonable jury could have reached that verdict. A motion for a new trial asks the judge to order a new trial, setting aside the judgment or verdict, because the trial was improper or unfair. This motion is sometimes brought as the result of newly discovered evidence. FURTHER READINGS Chemerinsky, Erwin. 2006. Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. Frederick, MD: Aspen. Dessem, R. Lawrence. 2008. Pretrial Litigation in a Nutshell. Eagan, MN: West. Robert, Henry M. 2004. Robert’s Rules of Order, Newly Revised in Brief. Cambridge, MA: Perseus. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Procedure; Criminal Procedure. MOTIVE An idea, belief, or emotio n that impels a person to act in accordance with that state of mind. Motive is usually used in connection with CRIMINAL LAW to explain why a person acted or refused to act in a certain way—for example, to support the prosecution’s assertion that the accused committed the crime. If a person accused of murder was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy on the deceased, the prosecu- tion might argue that greed was the motive for the killing. Proof of motive is not required in a criminal prosecution. In determin ing the guilt of a criminal defendant, courts are generally not concerned with why the defendant committed the alleged crime, but whether the defendant committed the crime. However, a defendant’s motive is important in other stages of a criminal case, such as police investigation and sentenc- ing. Law enforcement personnel often consider potential motives in detecting perpetrators. Judges may consider the motives of a convicted defendant at sentencing and either increase a sentence based on avaricious motives or de- crease the sentence if the defendant’s motives were honorable—for example, if the accused acted in defense of a family member. In criminal law, motive is distinct from intent. Criminal intent refers to the mental state of mind possessed by a defendant in commit- ting a crime. With few exceptions the prosecu- tion in a criminal case must prove that the defendant intended to commit the illegal act. The prosecution need not prove the defendant’s motive. Nevertheless, prosecutors and defense attorneys alike may make an issue of motive in connection with the case. For example, if a defendant denies commis- sion of the crime, he may produce evidence showing that he had no motive to commit the crime and argue that the lack of motive supports the proposition that he did not commit the crime. By the same token, the prosecution may produce evidence that the defendant did have the motive to commit the crime and argue that the motive supports the proposition that the defendant committed the crime. Proof of motive, without more evidence tying a defen- dant to the alleged crime, is insufficient to support a conviction. A HATE CRIME is one crime that requires proof of a certain motive. Generally, a hate crime is motivated by the defendant’s belief regarding a protected status of the victim, such as the victim’s religion, sex, disability, customs, or national origin. In states that prosecute hate crimes, the prose cution must prove that the defendant was motivated by animosity toward a protected status of the victim. Hate-crime laws are exceptions to the general rule that proof of motive is not required in a criminal prosecution. In CIVIL LAW a plaintiff generally need not prove the respondent’s motive in acting or failing to act. One notable exception to this general rule is the TORT of MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. In a suit for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove, in part, that the respondent was motivated by malice in subjecting the plaintiff GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MOTIVE 139 to a civil suit. The same applies for a malicious criminal prosecution. FURTHER READINGS Binder, Guyora. 2002. “The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent.” Buffalo Criminal Law Review 6 (fall). Available online at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/6/1/bind- er.pdf; website home page: http://wings.buffalo.edu (accessed August 17, 2009). Candeub, Adam. 1994. “Motive Crimes and Other Minds.” Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Review 142 (June). Pillsbury, Samuel H. 1990. “Evil and the Law of Murder.” Univ. of California at Davis Law Review 24. v MOTLEY, CONSTANCE BAKER CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY played an integral role in defending legislation that was created to protect the rights of all Americans. Her work on landmark CIVIL RIGHTS CASES in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s helped to abolish SEGREGATION in schools and changed the way in which the U.S. Constitution is interpreted. Motley was the first African-American woman to be elected to the New York State Senate; the first African- American and the first woman to be elected as Manhattan borough president; and the first female African American federal judge. Motley was born in New Haven, Connecti- cut, on September 14, 1921, one of nine children. The America in which Motley grew up was segre gated. As a child going to a beach in Milford, Connecticut, Motley was turned away because of the color of her skin. When she returned home, she asked her parents, both West Indian immigrants, why the color of her skin meant that she could not go swimming. Her parents were unfamiliar with U.S. segrega- tion and had no answer. As a teenager, Motley became fascinated with U.S. history, particularly the Civil War, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, and the EMANCIPATION PROCLA- MATION . She sought out role models in her community to help her focus her interests and began attending meetings at a local adult community center. At that center, she came in contact with George W. Crawford, a prominent black lawyer in New Haven, who told her about the case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed. 208 (1938). At the time of Gaines, Missouri was like many southern states that maintained all-white professional schools, sending qualified minority law school applicants to schools in other states. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Gaines that Missouri’s admissions practice did not offer an equal educational opportunity to minority students and that it therefore violated the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. That verdict meant that many states had to re- evaluate their school systems and either create new schools specifically for black students or desegregate existing white graduate schools. Crawford told Motley that he believed that the Gaines case would prompt states to create separate schools to avoid desegregation. The Gaines case inspired Motley to attend law school. She wanted to be a lawyer in order to fight for CIVIL RIGHTS, as Abraham Lincoln had done. Howe ver, when she approached her father about following her dream, he told her that college was a financial impossibility on his wages as a chef at a Yale fraternity house. After graduating from high school as an honor student in 1939, Baker spent 18 months Constance Baker Motley 1921–2005 ▼▼ ▼▼ ◆ ❖ 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ ◆ ◆ 1921 Born Constance Baker, New Haven, Conn. ◆ ◆◆◆ ◆ 1938 U.S. Supreme Court ruled states must provide state-funded professional school opportunities for minorities in Gaines v. Canada 1945 Joined legal staff of NAACP’s Legal Defense and Educational Fund ◆ ◆ 1946 Earned LL.B. from Columbia 1949 Argued Sweatt v. Painter before Supreme Court ◆ 1966 Appointed to U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 1964 Elected to New York State Senate 1982 Became chief justice of the District Court 1986 Retired to senior status on the court 2001 Received Presidential Citizens Medal 1993 Appointed Jurist in Residence at Indiana University School of Law; inducted into National Women’s Hall of Fame 1998 Approved settlement in sexual harassment and discrimination class action suit involving 22,000 women against Wall Street firm Smith Barney; Equal Justice Under Law: An Autobiography published 1954 U.S. Supreme Court outlawed “separate but equal” education in Brown v. Board of Education 1925 2000 1975 1950 2005 Died, New York City ❖ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 140 MOTLEY, CONSTANCE BAKER working for the National Youth Administration in New Haven. Disturbed by blacks’ lack of interest in the community center, she decided to address her peers at a meeting at the center. As president of the New Haven Youth Council, Motley spoke about the apparent apathy of blacks toward the center, which she suggested stemmed from the lack of black involvement in setting policy and designing projects for the center. Clarence Blakeslee, the successful, white businessman who had been the primary donor for the community center, heard Motley speak and was very impressed. He offered to pay for Motley’s education. Accepting the offer, Motley attended New York University, where she received a bachelor of arts degree in economics. She then went to Columbia University School of Law, where she received her law degree in 1946. While still at Columbia, Motley got a job with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP) Legal Defense and Educational Fund, clerking for chief counsel THURGOOD MARSHALL , who would later sit on the U.S. Supreme Court. Motley joined the NAACP during WORLD WAR II and worked on many cases involving black servicemen. These soldiers told of segre- gation in the armed forces and protested that punishments given to black soldiers were outrageous compared with those given to white soldiers for similar infractions. Motley worked on hundreds of COURT-MARTIAL cases that earned the NAAC P much notoriety. Her work with the NAACP enabled her to try cases in federal courts and even to try ten cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. Motley often was the first African American attorney, and usually the first female African American attorney, to be seen in many of those courtrooms. In the late 1940s the NAACP decided to focus on eliminating segregation in education. Motley’s first case after she had completed law school took the Gaines case a step further. It involved Herman Marion Sweatt (Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed. 1114 [1949]) who was denied admission to the law school at the University of Texas solely because he was black. Under pressure from the NAACP, the school set up a makeshift class- room for Sweatt in the basement of a building, obtained books for him, and assigned him four professors from the faculty. However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state had violated the Equal Protection Clause because Sweatt’s inability to interact with fellow classmates made his education inferior. Motley tried other cases involving segregation in professional schools and was a driving force in reforming their admission practices, thus paving the way for minority professionals in this country. In 1954 Motley helped to write legal briefs for the landmark case BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA , KANSAS, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). In Brown, the Court ruled that segregated schools were unconstitu- tional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The case was a major victory for civil rights advocates and fueled Motley’s hope for real change in U.S. attitudes toward minority groups. In the 1960s Motley turned her attention toward minority children. She was concerned about the inadequate schooling for black chil- dren, the slum conditions in which man y were forced to live, and the high rates of unemploy- ment in black communities. She wanted new legislation to address these problems. In 1964 Motley became the first African-American woman to be elected to the New York State Senate. In 1965 she relinquished her Sena te seat when she was elected president of the borough of Manhattan. From that post, she worked to revitalize Harlem and to advance urban renewal. In 1966, when President LYNDON B. JOHNSON appointed Motley to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, protest from Constance Baker Motley. AP IMAGES THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY IS LIKE A PRAIRIE FIRE . Y OU MAY SUCCEED IN STAMPING OUT THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY IN ONE CORNER AND , LO AND BEHOLD , IT APPEARS SOON THEREAFTER SOMEWHERE ELSE . —CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MOTLEY, CONSTANCE BAKER 141 southerners held up her appointment from January to August. Later, when President Johnson nominated Motley to the U.S. Court of Appeals, male opposition pressured him into withdrawing her name. As a federal judge, Motley ruled on more than 2,500 cases. In 1982 Motley became chief judge of the court. She assumed senior status in 1986. In 1993 Motley was inducted into the National Women’s Hall of Fame, and in 1998 she published Equal Justice Under Law: An Autobiography. In the new millennium, Motley continued to hear cases as a senior U.S. district court judge. She has been the recipient of numerous honorary degrees and awards, in- cluding the NAACP Legal Defense Fund ’s Equal Justice Award. In 200 1 President BILL CLINTON awarded her the Pres idential Citizens Medal. The following year, the jury assembly room of the Southern District federal courthouse was dedicated in her honor, and in 2003 her portrait was hung in that room. Motley continued working as a senior judge until her death in 2005 at age 84, of congestive heart failure. FURTHER READINGS Berry, Dawn Bradley. 1996. The 50 Most Influential Women in American Law. Los Angeles: Contemporary Books. Gilbert, Lynn, and Gaylen Moore. 1981. Particular Passions: Talks with Women Who Have Shaped Our Times. New York: Potter. Motley, Constance Baker. 1998. Equal Justice under Law: An Autobiography. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux. Orfield, Gary, Eaton, Susan E. and Jones, Elaine R. 1997. Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education. New York: New Press. Plowden, Martha Ward. 1993. Famous Firsts of Black Women. Gretna, La.: Pelican. Stoddard, Hope. 1970. Famous American Women. New York: Cromwell. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights Movement; Integration; School Desegregation. MOTOR VEHICLES, DEPARTMENTS OF See STATE DEPARTMENTS OF MOTOR VEHICLES . MOVANT One who makes a motion before a court. The applicant for a judicial rule or order. Generally, it is the job of the movant to convince a judge to rule, or grant an order, in favor of the motion. Rules and legal precedent within particular jurisdictions, as well as the type of motion sought, dictate the burdens of proof and persuasion each party must meet when a court considers a motion. For example, one common type of motion is a motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. This motion is made shortly before a trial commences and is granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits indicate that no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a favorable judgment as a MATTER OF LAW. In other words, if the facts of the case are not disputed, it is easier, faster, and less expensive for a judge to simply rule on the legal issues that apply to those facts, avoiding a trial altogether. A summary judgment movant in most jurisdictions has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that, by law, the undisputed facts support a judgment in the movant’s favor. But once the movant meets this burden, the opposing party is given a chance to refute the movant’s argument. The opposing party will try to establish that there is a genuine dispute about a material fact in the case and that the law does not support a judgment in the movant’s favor. For example, assume a case in which a fashion model is suing a newspaper for publish- ing her picture without her knowledge or permission in an advertisement for a nightclub. Shortly before trial the newspaper makes a motion for summary judgment. The movant newspaper admits that the photograph of the model ran in the newspaper and that the newspaper did not have the model’s permission to publish it. The newspaper argues, however, that the model has no right under curre nt law to sue the newspaper, which merely sells space for advertisements, and that her only legal recourse is in suing the advertiser that placed the advertisement in the newspaper. Thus, the newspaper has argued that no material facts are in dispute. The movant has also shown that, given the incontestable material facts, the law would support a judgment in favor of the newspaper. Now the burden shifts to the model, who must demonstrate the existence of a disputed fact that, if proven, would make the newspaper legally liable. She may do this by producing an affidavit—a sworn written statement—by a former newspaper employee alleging that the newspaper did not merely print the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 142 MOTOR VEHICLES, DEPARTMENTS OF advertisement but actually created the adver- tisement wit h the model’s picture for the nightclub. Because this material fact, if proven, could make the newspaper legally liable, the court would deny the movant’s summary judgment motion. In most jurisdictions the burden of produc- ing evidence supporting the granting or denial of a summary judgment motion shifts between the movant and the opposing party, but the ultimate burden of persuading the court remains with the movant. A movant’s burdens of proof and persuasion differ depending on the jurisdiction and the type of motio n. In Hawaii, a movant in a criminal case seeking to have the trial continued or postponed because a witness is unavailable must show that the movant has exercised due diligence in finding the witness; the witness would provide substantial favorable evidence; the witness is otherwise available and willing to testify; and the movant would be materially prejudiced by a denial of the CONTINUANCE (State v. Lee, 9 Hawai’i App. 600, 856 P.2d 1279 [1993]). In Utah a movant requesting that the court set aside its CHILD SUPPORT award because of a judicial mistake in failing to use a required joint custody worksheet in computing the amount of child support need only demonstrate the existence of a judicial mistake. A denial of the motion by the trial court, without an explana- tion as to why it deviated from the joint custody worksheet requirement, was an ABUSE OF DISCRE- TION and was reversed and remanded by an appellate court (Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 [Utah App. 1995]). FURTHER READINGS Foremaster, Gary T. 1987. “The Movant’s Burden in a Motion for Summary Judgment.” Utah Law Review 1987. Friedenthal, Jack H., Mary Kay Kane, and Arthur R. Miller. 2005. Civil Procedure. Eagan, MN: West. Yeazell, Steven. 2009. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2009 Statutory Supplement. Frederick, MD: Aspen. MOVE To make an application to a court for a rule or order, or to take action in any matter. The term comprehends all things necessary to be done by a litigant to obtain an order of the court directing the relief sought. To propose a resolution, or recom- mend action in a deliberative body. To pass over; to be transferred, as when the consideration of a contract is said to move from one party to the other. To occasion; to contribute to; to tend or lead to. MOVIE RATING A classification given to a commercially released motion picture that indicates to consumers whether the film contains sex, profanity, violence, or other subject matter that may be inappropriate for persons in certain age groups. The idea for a nationwide movie rating system took root in the late 1960s. In 1966 Jack Valenti, a former aide to President LYNDON B. JOHNSON, became president of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). That same year the film Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf was completed. The film used terms such as screw and hump to refer to sexual intercourse. Because these terms were considered controver- sial language, Valenti met with officials at Warner Brothers before the film’s release, and the group decided which terms could be deleted and which ones were necessary to the film’s content. The experience led Valenti in 1968 to implement a voluntary film ratings system, which has remained in effect, in varying forms, since that time. The MPAA that year created the Classification and Ratings Administration (CARA) to designate films with one of four ratings: G (general audiences), M (mature audiences), R (children under 16 years of age not admitted witho ut parent or guardian), and X (children under 17 years of age not admitted). Three years later M became PG (parental guidance suggested). In 1984, in response to violence in the movie Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom, the film review board instituted the PG-13 rating, which cautions parents that the film’s contents may be inappropriate for children under age 13. In 1990 the board responded to criticism that the X rating unfairly categorized artistic adult films, such as Midnight Cowboy, with hard-core PORNOGRAPHY. In that year the board replaced X with NC-17. In the movie business, a better rating is generally a lower rating. Movies typically make more money when they appeal to the widest possible audience. This rule holds true particu- larly with motion picture video sales. Many video outlets limit their inventory to movies with ratings no higher than PG-13 or R. Some theaters refuse to show movies with the NC-17 rating, and some newspapers refuse to carry GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MOVIE RATING 143 advertisements for movies with the NC-17 rating. A movie studio therefore wants its film to earn the least restrictive rating possible. One exception to this general rule is the marketing of pornographic films. Because studies have suggested that sexually explicit films become more desirable when they are restricted, the pornographic film industry voluntarily labels its films X or XXX in an effort to increase sales. XXX is a marketing tool, not an actual MPAA rating. Although the MPAA publicizes the meaning of each rating, mos t moviegoers do not know how the ratings are assigned. A ratings board, consisting of 11 members, views approximately 600 films per year, discusses each film’s content, and chooses a rating for each film. Valenti and the board’s chair choose all the board members and keep their identities secret to prevent film producers and studios from attempting to influence them. The member s work full-time, serving terms of varying length. Members must be parents and cannot be involved with the motion picture industry, but they must meet no other requirements. Members base their ratings on a set of MPAA guidelines, some of which are precise whereas others call for individual taste and judgment. According to one MPAA guide- line, a certain word used merely as an expletive in a film may garner a PG rating whereas the same word used to convey a sexual meaning may result in an R rating. Directors who are unhappy with the board’s rating may cut or edit objectionable film footage and resubmit the movie, or they may appeal the rating. Movie producers have the right to know the reason behind the rating their film receives. However, directors and producers have com- plained that the board’s reasons are often unclear or too general, requiring them to edit a film several times before i t receives the target rating. Some directors have added especially gory scenes to the first version of a film with the idea that they will cut the gore during the ratings process, leaving the film in its intended state with the desired rating. Because the movie ratings system is a voluntary process not under government con- trol, FIRST AMENDMENT protections do not apply to ratings. If filmmakers believe that the rating for their film is too restrictive, they may appeal to a special board, which is composed of movie industry professionals rather than laypersons. The board screens the film, consults with the original ratings board, and listens to the com- plaints of the producer or director before voting. A two-thirds majority will overturn the original rating, and the decision of the appeals board is final. No law requires filmmakers to undergo the ratings process; it is strictly voluntary. Yet, with very few exceptions, filmmakers comply. The system has the support of major film studios, theater owners, and video rental chains that rely on customer satisfaction for a healthy business. It is the movie industry that pays for the privilege of having a film rated; the producer of a film pays a fee for this service that is based on the cost of film production. The ratings system has critics. Filmmakers complain that the system is ARBITRARY and point to instances in which films with similar content have different ratings. Producers and directors have also alleged racism, arguing that films depicting sexual encounters between African Americans receive more restrictive ratings than films involving sex between white characters. Critics also allege sex bias in that movies with frontal nude shots of women commonly receive R ratings, whereas movies with similar nude shots of men commonly receive X or NC-17 ratings. And major studios, say some critics, receive better treatment from the ratings board than do smalle r, independent studios, which also have less money to spend on reediting and resubmitting movies in an effort to achieve a better rating. FURTHER READINGS Brown, Jay. 1993. Rating the Movies. Lincolnwood, IL: Publications International. Cole, David. 1994. “Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression” Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Review 143 (November). Katz, Michael. 1996. “The Precursor: Movie Ratings.” Broadcasting and Cable 8 (February 19). Margulies, Edward, and Stephen Rebello. 1993. Bad Movies We Love. New York: Plume. Mosk, Richard M. 1997. “Motion Picture Ratings in the United States.” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 15 (spring). Available online at http://www. cardozoaelj.net/issues/97/Mosk.pdf; website home page: http://www.cardozoaelj.net (accessed August 17, 2009). “The Ratings Game: Movies’ Ratings Can Have Strong Effect on Box Office’s Rental Performances.” 1994. Video Store 16 (May 1). CROSS REFERENCES First Amendment; Pornography; X Rating. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 144 MOVIE RATING v MUELLER, ROBERT SWANN, III Robert Swann Mueller III became the sixth director of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) on September 4, 2001. In that position, Mueller has faced conflict and controversy stemming from a host of problems concerning spy scandals, terrorist activities, and accusations that the Bureau had developed a “cultu re of arrogance” that impeded its ability to function. Mueller was born in New York City on August 7, 1944. He graduated from Princeton University in 1966. He also received a master’s degree in International Studies from New York University. In 1973, he received his JURIS DOCTOR from the University of Virginia School of Law, where he also served on the LAW REVIEW. Mueller served for three years as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. He spent one year in the Third Marine Division in Vietnam. He was awarded the Bronze Star, the Purple Heart, two Navy commendation medals, and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry. After his military service, Mueller embarked on a multifaceted career that saw him moving between private practice and governme nt posi- tions while building a record of support from Republicans as well as Democrats. From 1973 to 1976, Mueller worked as a LITIGATION associate at the law firm of Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro in San Francisco. Between 1976 and 1981, he served in a number of positions in the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Office of the U.S. Attorney, Northern District of California in San Francisco. From 1986 to 1987, Mueller served as U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, where he had been Chief of the Criminal Division from 1982 to 1985. While he served in these offices, Mueller gained experience prosecuting a wide variety of cases, including RACKETEERING cases, complex tax and financial FRAUD cases, drug conspiracies, government corruption, and cases involving terrorists. Mueller was a partner in the Boston firm of Hill & Barlow from 1988 to 1989. From 1989 to 1990 he worked in the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT as the assistant to Attorney General RICHARD L. THORNBURGH. In June 1990 he was nominated by President GEORGE H.W. BUSH to be Assistant Attorney General in charge of the department’s Criminal Division. While in that position, Robert S. Mueller. AP IMAGES Robert Swann Mueller 1944– ▼▼ ▼▼ ◆ ❖ 1939–45 World War II 1944 Born, New York City ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1954 Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott to protest segregation 1965 Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed 1964 Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed 1993 FBI and ATF attack on Waco, Texas Branch Davidian compound 2001 Terrorists attack Pentagon and World Trade Towers 2002 Department of Homeland Security established 1966 Graduated from Princeton University 1967–70 Served in U.S. Marines 1976–81 Worked in U.S. attorney’s office in San Francisco 1990 Appointed U.S. assistant attorney general, criminal division 2001– Appointed FBI director; confirmed unanimously by Senate 1995–98 Worked in homicide division of the U.S. attorney’s office, District of Columbia 1998 Appointed interim U.S. attorney, San Francisco; confirmed in 1999 1973 Earned J.D. from University of Virginia School of Law 2000 1975 1950 MUELLER, ROBERT SWANN, III 145 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION Mueller oversaw a number of high-profile cases including the prosecutions of former Panama- nian president Manuel Noriega and New York organized-crime boss John Gotti and the investigation into the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103. From 1993 to 1995, Mueller prac ticed law as a partner in Hale & Dorr, a Boston firm where he centered his work on sophisticated transac- tions, including complex litigation, WHITE- COLLAR CRIME, and internal corporate reviews. From 1995 to 1998, Mueller worked in the HOMICIDE Section of the office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, becoming Section Chief in 1997. Some former colleagues viewed this as a step down for a man who had supervised an entire division of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , but Mueller explained that he felt obligated to do what he could to stop the horrendously high MURDER rate of young people in the nation’s capital. In August 1998, Mueller became interim U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California. He was nominated by President BILL CLINTON on the recommendation of Democratic Senator Barbara Boxer and confirmed by the Senate to the permanent position in October, 1999. Mueller held that position until August 2001. Between January and May of 2001, he also served as Acting Deputy General of the U.S. Department of Justice. In May 2001, FBI Director Louis Freeh announced his resignation. His eight-year tenure had been marked by criticism of several high-profile cases, including that of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh and turncoat FBI agent Robert Hanssen. Two months later, Mueller was nominated by President GEORGE W. BUSH to fill a ten-year term as director of the FBI. Mueller was confirmed to the position in August 1, 2001, by a Senate vote of 98– 0. Despite enjoying broad bipartisan support, Mueller has faced a numb er of difficult challenges involving interdepartmental commu- nications, the continuing investigations into alleged terrorist activities, and the restructuring of the department’s BUREAUCRACY. Controversies continued to arise, including criticism regarding the FBI’s failure to act on information that preceded the SEPTEMBER 11TH TERRORIST ATTACKS and the FBI’s announcement in April 2003 that a former FBI agent might have caused serious losses of classified information during his affair with a prominent Chinese businesswoman who was accused of being a double agent working for Chin a. In 2009 a report delivered to Congress found that the warrantless WIRETAPPING program begun under President Bush yielded limited results. The program, a part of the larger President’s Surveillance Program, was devel- oped in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and sparked intense debate within the Bush administration over its lega lity. In 2004 Mueller and other members of Bush’s staff, including then-Attorney General JOHN ASHCROFT , supposedly prepared their resigna- tions pending the unconstitutionality of the surveillance program. Bush agreed to adjust aspects of the program, which Mueller defended, stressing that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to prevent future terrorist attacks. FURTHER READINGS Mueller, Robert S. 2003. “Congressional Statement, 2003: War on Terrorism” (statement). Available online at www. fbi.gov/congress/congress03/mueller021103.htm (accessed August 19, 2009). “Profile: FBI Chief Robert Mueller.” 2003. Available online at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1424760.stm (accessed August 19, 200 9). “Robert S. Mueller, III.” 2009. Available online at www.fbi. gov/libref/directors/directmain.htm (accessed August 19, 2009). v MUKASEY, MICHAEL B. Michael Mukasey was appointed by President GEORGE W. BUSH in 2007 to serve as the 81st attorney general of the United States. Mukasey is a lawyer and former judge who served for 18 years on the bench with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Mukasey was born on July 28, 1941, in the Borough of the Bronx in New York City. He graduated from the Ramaz School, an Orthodox yeshiva on Manhattan’s Upper East Side, in 1959 and then received an undergraduate degree from Columbia University in 1963. In 1967, he was awarded a law degree from Yale University before heading back to New York to enter the private PRACTICE OF LAW. Mukasey’s first job as an attorney was with the firm of Webster Sheffield. He moved on to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan in 1972. During his four- year tenure there, he developed a friendship with another young prosecutor, Rudolph W. Giuliani. Giuliani would go on to become I KNOW WE WILL BE JUDGED BY HISTORY NOT JUST ON HOW WE DISRUPT AND DETER TERRORISM , BUT ALSO ON HOW WE PROTECT THE CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALL AMERICANS, INCLUDING THOSE AMERICANS WHO WISH US ILL . —ROBERT S. MUELLER GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 146 MUKASEY, MICHAEL B. mayor of New York City, and in 2007 a Republican presidential hopeful. The two reportedly retained a close relationship through- out the years. In 1976 Mukasey joined the New York firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb, & Tyler. His notable clients there included socialite Claus von Bulow, the Daily News, and the Wall Street Journal. Successful as his legal career had been thus far, however, it would reach greater heights. In 1987 Mukasey was appointed to the bench of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by then- president RONALD REAGAN. The Manhattan fede- ral court was so famously independent that it had acquired the moniker “Sovereign District of New York,” and Mukasey promptly fit right in, quickly gaining a reputation as a tough and objective jurist. Indeed, while there was little doubt about his conservative character—he later endorsed provisions of the controversial PATRIOT Act, for instance, and supported Giuliani’s presidential bid—his sense of fairness and adherence to the law garnered him many fans from the defense bar as well as from prosecutors. He received the prestigious Learned Hand Medal from the Federal Bar Council for “excellence in federal jurisprudence.” He was also once considered as a possible candidate for the U.S. SUPREME COURT. Good examples of this duality lay in Mukasey’s rulings in the 2002 and 2003 trial of alleged terrorist Jose Padilla. On the one hand, he agreed with the government’s view that Americans could be held indefinitely as enemy combatants. On the other hand, he ruled against the government’s contention that such prisoners should be denied access to legal counsel and was considerably less than pleased when prosecutors persisted in refusing to act in the matter. The Economist quoted the judge ’s response as “Lest any confusion remain, this is not a suggestion or a request that Padilla be permitted to consult with counsel, and it is certainly not an invitation to conduct a further ‘dialogue’ about whether he will be permitted to do so. It is a ruling—a determination—that he will be permitted to do so.” Mukasey retired from the federal bench in 2006 and returned to his partnership position at Patterson Belknap. His name arose several times, however, as a possible successor to Michael Mukasey. AP IMAGES Michael B. Mukasey 1941– 2000 1975 1950 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks; PATRIOT Act signed into law 2003 U.S. troops invaded Iraq ▼▼ ▼▼ ❖ ◆◆ ◆ 1963 Earned B.A. from Columbia University ◆◆ ◆ ◆◆◆ 1967 Earned LL.B. from Yale; entered private practice 1972 Accepted position at the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan; worked with Rudolph Giuliani 1976 Joined the firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler 1987–2006 Served on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 2000 Named chief judge of the court 2006 Retired from the bench; returned to private practice 2007–09 Served as U.S. attorney general 2009 Made partner at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 1941 Born, New York City NOT EVERY WRONG, OR EVEN EVERY VIOLATION OF THE LAW , IS A CRIME. —MICHAEL MUKASEY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MUKASEY, MICHAEL B. 147 . AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALL AMERICANS, INCLUDING THOSE AMERICANS WHO WISH US ILL . —ROBERT S. MUELLER GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 146 MUKASEY, MICHAEL B. mayor of New York City, and in 20 07. Law 2000 1 975 1950 MUELLER, ROBERT SWANN, III 145 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION Mueller oversaw a number of high-profile cases including the prosecutions of former Panama- nian president Manuel. City NOT EVERY WRONG, OR EVEN EVERY VIOLATION OF THE LAW , IS A CRIME. —MICHAEL MUKASEY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MUKASEY, MICHAEL B. 1 47