NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY that is born becomes extinct (�1: ) the impression arises (�f!:t1:.) ; when (the first) impression comes to an end, there arises in the mind the element called smrti (�) This element of smrti is by nature composite ; although (objects themselves) become extinct, still it can know and dis criminate things Even as the sages can know through their power of prajiiii the things that would happen in the future, similarly smrti (�) can know the past things As the earlier element of visual sensation (Mm MI»X) becomes extinct, there arises in continuation the later element of visual sensation (1:: � HfH.) This latter element of visual sensation will have an enhanced power of grasping (_fIJ'ff t.J) Therefore although the element of color is itself transitory and not stable, by virtue of the sharpness and the powerfulness of smrti (j,J.�t.JfIJ$:) one can dis tinguishingly know (fiMj-BIJ �) the element of color ( I49C ) The objector might argue here that even granting that it is the ciUa that uses the body and performs the act of cognizing things, still there should be the subject, the soul, to me (�) the ciUa Even as the king employs the commander-in-chief and the commander-in-chief com mands the army, so the soul employs the citta and the citta uses the body.37 The Siistra observes that this argument would lead to endless regression (�J{IJ ��), for then there should be another soul to employ tIlls soul and thus there should have to be two or even innumerable souls in a body.3s But if j ust this one soul can by itself (milt) use the citta, even the citta can by itself (m'L') use the body.39 You take the citta as belonging to the soul (lIiji1\1), and (you hold that) apart from the dtta the soul has no knowledge If the soul has no knowl edge, how can it use the dtta? But if the soul has the nature of knowl edge, then, ofwhat use again is dtta to it? Therefore it should be known that dtta itself being of the nature of (self-)consciousness can use the body, and has no need to depend on a soul at all even as fire can burn things by its very nature, and does not need to depend on man for buming.40 (200C ) Here the objector argues that although the 228 fire has the capacity to W ORLD A N D I NDIVI DUAL burn, it is not put to use if there is no person to so (* A/Fffl ) ; similar ly although cognizing is the very nature of the citta, it is not put to use if there is no soul (*jjiI/I/F�) Here the Siistra p oints out that so far as knowledge is concerned, soul is of no use at all Citta or vijiiiina which is the principle of self-determi nation is able to put to use and to determine the course of the activity of itself as well as of the elements that belong to it Even if there wer e a soul, as it was mentioned above, it would be of no use here S ome times fire can burn by itself; it is only in name that the person is said to set the flre to burn A gain the opponent stands defeated on his own ground (�IJ!�,� ) ; the soul is the same as the person ; that itself canno t be used as an example to prove its very existence.u C Soul alia Deeds Is soul the necessary cOtldit;on of deeds and moral respon sibility? The third point of the substantialists is that in the absence of a permanent soul, as th� present element of vijiiiina becomes extinct at the time of the termi nation of the present span of life, the deeds done here would all be lost, for there would be none to follow them and receive their results Who follows the deeds and who receives the results? Who is the receiver of pain and pleasure? Who realizes freedom?u, To this the Siistra replies that when the true way has not yet been realized by one (*1�":ii ) , as one's mind is covered up with kle!Q, one does deeds which breed for one the next sp an of life At the time of one's death, in continuity with the five skandhas of the present span of life, there arises the complex of the five skandhas of the next span of life This is like one lamp lighting another This is again comparable to the birth of the sprout from the seed Now the birth of the sprout from the seed requires three conditions : soil , water, and seed Just the same is the case even with the birth of the next span of life from the present one ; there is the body, there are the defiled deeds and there are the factors of bondage (;ffi � ) like greed etc ; and out of the cooperation of these three c onditio ns there arises the next body Of these three, the body that is already there and the deeds that are already done cannot be destroyed or 229 NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY abandon�d But there remain the factors of bondage, and these alone can be terminated (f,!UUtHf: "ilJII'r ) Although when t hese are terminated, the body and the deeds may continue, still one can realize freedom from the cycle of birth and death This is like the sprouts not arisin g i n the a bsence of water although the soil and the s�eds are there.4 And so even without the need to s uppose a soul it can still be shown how the realiza tion offreedom is possible B o ndage is t hrou gh ig norance and freedom is through ko wledg e ; the soul (that you imagine) is useless here (�tJ :fX�mm) (I 50a) Not that there is no person that beco mes bound or becomes free There is no such soul as the substantialists imagine In t ruth, it is the complex of bodily and mental elements that is derivedly called the per son The ignorant is bound by the bonds of greed , hatred and stupidity But when one realizes the claws (J1\) of the undefiled wisdom one tears off (M) all these bonds ; then one is said to have become free It is like the tying (*6) and the untyin g (M) of the rope T he rope itself is the knot ; the knot is not something apart from the rope Still in the world , one sp eaks of the kno tting and the unknotting of the rope The same is the case with n ama and riipa, the bodily and mental elements It is the complex of bodily and mental elements that is derivedly called the person; the bondage and the body-mind complex are not two s epa rate things It is only in name that the body-mind complex is said to become bound or become free (I 50a) In common discourse there is the talk of bondage of person and free m of person But this s hould not lead one to imagine that there is an eternal substantial, separate entity that becomes bound and becomes free and remains all the time unaffected in essence either by bondage or by freedom Just the same is the case even with the receiving of the results of good and evil dee ds Al though there i� no t any single self identical entity called soul, still with regard to the composite entity, is the "receiving " of the results o f deeds, viz., the body-mind, there 230 WORLD AND INDIVIDUAL good and bad Still, in the world we say that the person receive.s them Hence there is the imagination that there is a separate substantial entity called soul This is again like the cart containing the load (•• �) There is no real, substantial entity called cart apart from and independent of its different parts All the same the cart gets the name of contain ing the load This is just the case with the person receiving the fruits of sin and merit.43 What receives merit and sin is the body-mind com plex, and this is referred to by the derived name, person Here it is the unwary that is led to wrong notions Section III THE C O UR S E O F P E R S O N A L L I F E A Persotl 4S an organism (I) Person as an o rganism: There is no denial here of the fact that the person does deeds and receives the results, good or bad U The deeds are in fact what the self, the self-conscious person, brings to birth as his very way ofgiving expression to his potencies and aspirations; the deeds constitute his very being But in regard to this, the soul that the su� stantialists imagine is of no use On the contrary it would make the per son altogether unrelated to his deeds and his relation to them becomes a mystery As the subject, the person is the self-conscious, self-determining prin ciple He works out a career for himself under the stress of the sense of the unconditioned He is conditioned by the forces dormant in him He confronts an objective reality which he perceives, understands and interprets He works out for himself an organic system of events which is to give expression to the basic urge in him, and he identifies himself with it As identical with it, the person is an organism and personality is an organization, a way of being , (II) The organism and the constitutetlt 23 events: Between oneself and the N.AG.A�JUNA·S PHILOSOPHY system of events that one gives rise to, the two aspects of the integral course of pi!rsonal life there cannot be any description in terms of absolute identity or absolute difference ;4.6 one would reduce the self to the terms of its own creations and the other would make it alien to the expressions of its very being The self is not just the skandhas, the bodily and mental elements theIl' selvd put together ; the person is one and integral whereas the skanJhas are distinct and five, many One is not five and five is not one.u (369a) The person continues while the specific elements arise and perish every moment If the person also perished along with the perishing skanJhas, then he would be as good as just grass or wood arising and dying automatically He would just be an automaton without any of the implications of selfhood In th at case personal identity and moral obligation would be devoid of sense Again the view that the person is completely apart from the skanJhas, which is the substantialist view, commits all the errors of etemalism This would be practically to de p rive the course of personal life of all its significance, denying the purf10siveness of life, denying causal continuity and denying one's con nection with one's deeds." The Kiirikii compares the person to the fire and the skandhas to the fuel, in order to illustrate the nature of the relation between them.48 If the fire is absolutely the same as the fuel, the agent and the o bject would be one and the same ; if they are absolutely different, the one would be independent of the other Having starte d with the notion of their sep aratene ss , it is futile to try to establish their relation as mutual de pendence The relation between them is inconceivable in abso lute terms Just the same is the case with self and its constituents-there can be no unconditional description of the relation between them But this is not to deny either the self or its constituents Even with regard to the relation between them, it is always possible to make rela tive statements from specific standpoints, in a non-clinging way Person ality is not only a dmi tted in the mundane truth, but is essential there Being essentially conditioned, the individual owes his being to the 23 ... itself is the knot ; the knot is not something apart from the rope Still in the world , one sp eaks of the kno tting and the unknotting of the rope The same is the case with n ama and riipa, the bodily... deeds." The Kiirikii compares the person to the fire and the skandhas to the fuel, in order to illustrate the nature of the relation between them.48 If the fire is absolutely the same as the fuel, the. .. cart apart from and independent of its different parts All the same the cart gets the name of contain ing the load This is just the case with the person receiving the fruits of sin and merit.43