NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY The ignorant who attend only to the obvious miss the hinterland ; they seize the specific a s the self-contained The wise are awake t o the complete truth Thus the Siistra commenting on the aLove passage, says : The things that constitute du ality cannot be one without the other (��:f:tIJII) But common p eople speak of them as two, (i.e separate and independent) and so what they say is a perversion Whatever is a case of seizing the lak$alJa is a cas e offaring in duality (I&:f:tItr;l!=).23 (664a) To s eize the determinate (l&:f:tI) is really to allow oneself to be misled by names ; it is to imagine that different names mean separate essences ; this is to tum relative distinctions into absolute divisions When names are not seized as standing for separate substances, then they cannot be made objects of clinging A thing derives its significance only when specified and named things are spoken of only through name, determination All (ffl.:ff �*) that the bodhi is spoken o£ Even the bod hisattva is spoken of only through names All these names (as well It is only in name as the ncqned) are born of the complex of causes and conditions and they are spoken of only thro ugh derived names, thought-constructions (ffl.f).5tZlj1l:t!MN�m).23a (3 I Sa) When a d eterminate thing is an alyzed into its consti tuent elements by virtue of the combination of which the thing derive s its name, it cannot be placed either inside or outside or in between them The composite thing is not one more thing in addition to its components The thing is the components themselves in combination ; the latter are the thing it self analyzed into different asp ects Between the constituents and the constituted there cannot be any such relation of inside or outside or in between which holds only among entities that are mutually apart 78 CONCEPTS AND ENTITIES (The referent of) the name "fire" for example is not itself inside the two elements of heat and light (which constitute the object called flre) But why? These elements are two while fire is one ; one is not two and two is not one There can be no confusion (if) between the name and what it means (i.e., the thing named) In such a case when the word "fire" is being uttered, the mouth should get burnt (Again, the name and the named are not completely apart.) If they were completely apart (�), then, having asked for fire one might get water On account of these reasons, it should be known that the name fire is not itself inside these two elements But suppose fire is outside these two elements (unconnected with them in any way) Then, when one hears the name "fire," there should not be born in him the thought of fire in regard to these two elements And if the name fire is in between these two elements (being vague in its significance), then it has not any fixed sphere of reference (�1.I:.!i!) And in that case there cannot be any definite knowledge of fire ( �IiJ�) Therefore it should be known that fire cannot be found in any of these three zones Fire is only a derivedt name (and the thing designated by it is also only a conditioned entity) Just the same is the case with the bodhisattva Two elements, nama and rupa J combine and it is the complex of these two elements that is called the bodliisattva Rupa is different and nama is different And (apart from these two) if there is any entity called the bodhisattva that should be a third entity (separate from these) But actually there is no such thing Therefore it should be known that bodhisattva is only a derived name And the name bodhisattva cannot be located either in side or outside or in between (nama and rupa) 24 (3 S8a-b) When we imagine the components to be separate and independent, we cannot get back to the unity of the thing It is only the awareness of the determinate as determinate, the relative as relative that restores 79 NAGARjUNA'S US PHILOSOPHY to the original organic unity of the aspects in the thing, as well as to unity of the thing itself with its larger s etting the The name and the named: It i s necessary to bring to mind that this whole discussion on names and de terminate essences or entities bears direcdy on the doctrine of elements of the S arvasti vadin s who base their pluralism on the sep arateness of names and argue from their meaning fulness to the reality of the enti ties they stand for.2 Now the Siistra points out that the presence of a name need not me an the actuality of the thing named and the existence of the name does not mean at all the reality or the self-being of the thing n ame d It is not proper to say that (the thing) is a reality (a substantial entity ) just because there is the name (;ff �$:;ff ) Names are of two kinds, true ( ) and untrue (� ) , (or significant and non-significant) As an example of the non-significant (non-