IGNORANCE away (from the minds of the common people) the screen of the clouds of perversion enabling them to get (back to) the (original) purity But in truth, the ultimate nature of things itself neither (becomes) impure nor clean.' (698b) Error is not devoid of object: It is to be noted that whether it is at the "munaane" level or at the "transmundane" level error is not devoid of object While at the mundane level the object of error is the condition ed, changing, entity, the error in regard to the ultimate truth has for its object the unconditioned reality itsel£ While in the one case the error consists in the imagination of unconditionedness and substantiality in regard to the conditioned and non-substantial, in the other case it con sists in the imagination of division and determination in regard to that which is undivided and indeterminate The cancellation of error in the one case means the revelation of the conditioned and changing nature of things, and the cancellation of error in the other case means the revela tion of the ultimate reality as the undivided being And under all cir cumstances the root form of error still stands as the error of misplaced absoluteness, which always fWlctions by way of seizing, clinging The Siistra points out that it is not true that at any time cognition hap pens without an object Thus it says: Ifit is said that things are seen to be existent (purely) out ofperversion (without any objective basis), then, where one sees a single person why does one not see two or three persons instead? For (is it not the conten tion here that) cognition happens without any object and that every thing is seen purely out of perversion? (I7IC) Even in a dream cognition is not devoid of an object, although it cannot be taken as true beyond the state of the dream Those who argue that dream objects are as real as the objects of waking experience commit the same error as those who deny the object altogether, holding it to be totally non-existent Both commit alike the error of clinging to dead-ends Posing the question whether it is not true that even in a dream there 93 NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY is cognition only when the mind confronts the proper o�ject and how, in that case, it could be that the dream objects are unreal, the Siistra proceeds to say that although in a dream we see many things, still, they are not unconditionally true For, the unconditionally true is unde niable, while the dream objects are denied beyond the state of dream, as they are private and inconsistent with the objects of normal, waking experience which is open to all Thus the Siistra says: (In dreams) things that (are inconsistent with the things of waking experience and which therefore) should not be seen (as true) (�I1.IJ!ilff J! ) In a dream (for example) one sees a man with horns on his head Sometimes one sees in a dream that the human body flies in the sky Actually, no man has horns on his head nor can the human body fly in the sky Therefore (the objects seen in the dream) are not true But surely says the inquirer, there is the human head and surely there are the horns although in different places On account of the confusion in the mind (J2I C,,1i'JMc) one j ust sees that the human head has horns Again, surely, there is the sky and there are the things that fly, and simply out of confusion, one sees that one's body itself flies in the sky It cannot be that the objects seen in the dream are false (*� .@,) (For, is it not the very objects which we see in waking experience that constitute the objects in dream?)8 (I03c) we see There is no doubt, says the Siistra, that there is the human he3d and there are also horns ; still, that the human head bears horns is false But the inquirer would urge: The world is wide and the fruits of the deeds done by men in their former lives are various It may be that in some other country the human head bears horns ; It may be that there men have only one hand and one leg and are only one foot high, or they may even be nine feet high What is there to wonder if a man has horns on his head? Now, if people in other countries have horns on their head, let them have; but in a dream we see that in this very country, the very person 94 IGNORANCE whom we know has horns on his head, and this cannot be true Again, if one would see in a dream the end of space, the end of the regions, the end of time, how can this be true? Where is the place where there is no space, no region, no time? Therefore it is said that in a dream we see things as existent which are actually non-existent (I03c-I04a) In a dream we experience objects, but they hold only there; they have no truth beyond that state And when wejudge that in a dream we experience as existent the things that are truly non-existent we are judging the dream-state from the standpoint of the waking state But even in a dream, cognition is not without an object As to your question as to how there can be cognition even when there are no objects, now, although, (in trUth), there are not in dream the five kinds of sense objects (as substantial entities), still, out of one's own thought (aided by) memory ( § ,E,!j t1t�:h"$:) there arise (the- diverse kinds of) things (that serve) as objects (r!��) For example, some one might say men have two heads ; by hearing these words, there arises (in some mind) the thought (that men really may have two heads) That in a dream one sees as existent things that are really nonexistent is also like this The same is the case with all things Although all things are devoid of reality, all the same, (they are objects of experience), they are heard and seen and known (IO�) The things that are illustrated as illusory are indeed objects of experi ence, but they are not real and self-existent; there arises the sense of reality in regard to them only in the mihd of the uncritical, who, in accepting these things as real and sdf-existent, allow themsdves to be bound by them; but the wise, who have realized the illusoriness of these things stand beyond them, for they know the true nature of these (When for example) the ignorant (hear an echo) they would say that (inside the cave the� is actually) a person making the sound But the wise understand within themsdves that this sound which is an echo is not produced by any person (inside the cave) The sound that emerges 95 NAGAR-JUNA'S PHILOSOPHY from the cave arises only on account of the contact (of the first sound with the cave) and only thus derives its name, echo The echo is siinya, devoid of substance, and yet- it can deceive the ears ( of the hearers) (103a) Again, when a child sees an image in the mirror, it feels delighted at heart, and passionately seeks to seize it When the image disappears, it breaks the mirror to pieces (out of rage), but atfempts to seize (the image once again) The elders laugh at this Now, this is just the case with (the ignorant, who) having lost the pleasaure (of the five senses), seek it once again And these are laughed at by the wise who have r�alized the Way (104c) The wise and the ignorant: While the thing is one and the same, our attitude in regard to it differs according to the way we understand it No one can alter the true nature of things, but everyone can improve his own conception of them This is the idea that is sought to be set forth in the several illustrations of illusion The sharp in understanding grasp (without difficulty) this (central) idea ofthe Buddha's teachings, but those whose power of grasping is blunt give rise to clinging at every step They cling to words and names If they hear of sunyata, to this they cling If they hear that sunyata is also sunya even to this they cling If they - hear that all things in their ultimate nature are themselves the peace, (the NirvaJ?a) , where the entire course of words stops, even there they cling As their own minc1 is impure so, even the noble truths that they hear they mistake, seizing them in an impure way When a person with his eyes covered with a coloured screen perceives the pure crystal, the spha!ika, even there he perceives only the screen of his own eyes ; ( in his ignorance he imputes the colour of the screen to the crystal itself and) he just says that the crys tal is itself impure (722c-723a) In reference to the elements (like the sense, the object and the contact of sense with object that arise by way of conditioned origination) one gives rise to all kinds of kle1as and sinful deeds as a result of one's per verse tho qghts But in regard to these very elements one who has the 96 IGNORANCE right thought (and right attitude) gives rise to elements of merit (that are of help to him in his way-faring) (3 64c) Difference, distinction, is essential to the mundane nature of things, everything is a specific, determinate entity The course of the world is an or ganic unity of the distinct and the unique And· yet if one where clings to the determinate as itself the ultimate, then, neither the mundane nature nor the ultimate nature of things can be rightly conceived ; one then fails to realize the good that the world is ca p able of y ielding If one clin gs to the divided, the determin ate, as itself ultimate then one cannot enhance one's potency for merit� But the bodhisattva, faring in the ultimate reality, viz., the ulldivi ded dharma ever increases his potency for good from the very beginning up to the end of his way faring There is no mixture of error (in his potency for merit, and so it stands invincible) (656c) To repeat the central idea in the philosophy of whi ch his works are replete : Nagarjuna, with When one fares by seizing, by clinging, then (in one's case) the world would be a (mass of) perversion ; but when one fares free from seizing, free from clinging, then (the world itself) is Nirvat:la.9a (644C) When the Buddha specifies things and their relations, when He speaks of the conditioned entities and their ways of working, He is not violating the ultimate nature of things, for He is aware of them as condi tioned and specific and He does not mistake their determinate nature itself to be their ultimate nature Those who lack the sense of the beyond cling to the dete rm inate while the wise have no confusion about tl�ngs.10 97 ... nor can the human body fly in the sky Therefore (the objects seen in the dream) are not true But surely says the inquirer, there is the human head and surely there are the horns although in different... reality in regard to them only in the mihd of the uncritical, who, in accepting these things as real and sdf-existent, allow themsdves to be bound by them; but the wise, who have realized the illusoriness... this they cling If they hear that sunyata is also sunya even to this they cling If they - hear that all things in their ultimate nature are themselves the peace, (the NirvaJ?a) , where the entire