NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY person, for example, passes fro m one room to another and in this move ment he is not said to be himself lost (254c) But what is wrong if the thing is not lost in this passage from future to present and from present to past? That in this passage the thing is not lost means that it ever remains self-identical which means that it is not impermanent A denial of im permanence would amount to a denial of birth and death, of sin and merit and of bondage and liberation (254c) But these objections not arise in the case of those who accept time as a derived notion So the Siistra obs erves that all the three periods of time have their respective characters The past ha� the character of pastness, the future has the character of futurity, the present has the character of presentness The difficulties urged occur only if one holds that past and future have the character of being present But now, past and future have each its own character (fo B fl"f6) but not the character of being present.69 That the past and the future are equally present would be to end in eternalism, while that they are absolutely non-existent ('U*) , would be to end in ne gativis m To hold that past and future are absolutely non-existent would be to deny causal continuity, which would render impossible the cultivation of moral life If one is at the present moment dwelling in evil thought, and if all the moral worth that one has achieved from past deeds is now totally extinct, then one cannot now be considered as a wayfarer in dharma.7o Agahi, on this supposition of total non-existence of past and future if the mind of a sage were at any time directed to worldly activities, then at that time he would be simply and wholly a common man, for all his former cultivation of the way would be completely non-existent now Similarly, there would be no committing of the five deadly sins, nor would there be any culti vation of moral worth This indeed is a perverse notion.7 The Siistra continues, CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES We not say that past and future are there in the same way in which the present is said to be (tlDmtE;J:IHf) ; we say that although the past object is not any more existent, still it can be ("ilJ �tl;ttt ) (consequently) giving rise to the mental memory states For example, (is certainly not here now), it is extinct ; (s till) its revived in memory '(i>J �lltt!' � ) Just because the the fire of yesterday impressions can be revived in thought (of the fire of yesterday) is (now) in mind, revived through memory, it cannot be held that the fire itself is here Similarly, seeing the bundle of firewood one anticipates the fire of the future which case also gives (�1t�k), rise to the thought of the fire of tomorrow As in the of (the thought of) yesterday's fire so in the case of the fire of tomorrow, the presence of the thought of fire does not mean the actual presence of the fire itself (2s sa) Although the present mind does not endure even for a moment still, as the stream (of the moments of thought) arises in continuity the mind can know things With the present (mo ment of) dtta, the mind, the internal element, as the hetll (the cause) and with the external object as the pratyaya (the condition) there arises the internal unifying cogni tion (lit mind-cognition) ; by means of this internal unifying cognition one can freely know all things, past, present and future (2s sa) It is in thi$ way that the Buddha is said to know all things past, pres ent and future without any impediment This is a mundane truth and should not be mistaken to stand for the ultimate truth The knowledge of the past, present and future is pertinent, but pertinent only to the world of the determinate In the ultimate truth there is neither past nor present nor future In reference to the ultimate truth of things it has been said that all specific nature.72 the three times are of one nature, viz , devoid of any Sastra observes that it is precisely in order to remove the wrong of eternalism in regard to time that the Buddha has used the word "sal/laya" and not "kala" for "time."72a The notion 99 NAGARJUN�'S PHILO�OPHY Samaya is a derived notion So it does not give room for misunder standing (generally) In th� teaching o f the Buddha mosdy used and it is only rarely that kala is used.?3 (66a) _ samara is Space and time are not substances There is no thing like an abs�lute time which remains as a reality apart from the successive events Time ;md space are derived notions" modes of reference , They refer to the ansing and perishing of events which C011s Utute the organic, dynamic c o urse of the world of the ' determinate 'lie per ceive the course of ('vents, give the name "time" t o this Universal order of successio� and d w the di:stinc tion of past �d futu re, the remembered and the antici p;l ted" the no t any more and the not yet, in contrast with that which is h'fl now, the presen t We perceive again the many different contem I'('.r;'!lCOtts events constituting a totality, a togetherness, and give it the na ll l c " space," the "container of all' and draw the distinction of direc tiorls wi thin it As the Sastra observes, not only space and time, but in bet all the categories of understanding are derived notions, notions derived- from the distinctions perceivable within the co mposi te whole of interrelated events.780 The course o f events, the conditioned becom ing, is fundamental and it is on its basis and as referring to it that these notions are derived They not refer to any specific ultimate sub stances F Space: Spatial Directions Spatial directions (dik) as realities: It has been already noted above that spatial distinc tions are of the same nature as temporal ones with regard to heing derived names; relation al concepts, and not s,tanding for sub stantial entities There is not any substance called east or west, even as there is not any substance called long or short, past or present East and west are references to the ways in which the actual entiti es or events �tand related to one ano the r in the complexes they constitute And yet the w ay in which the analysts would conceive things lends itself to the position tha t east and west, as well as long and short, or even past, pres200 CRITICISM OF C4TEGORIES em and future are substantial entities which for ever remain in them selve� and yet by associating with things give to them spatial and tem poral distinctions Thus some woula urge that dik is a reality (dravya) J that it is' eternal and has its own characters (:frfD) a They would urge: As (our) Sutra would have it, the direction in which the sun rises is the east and that in which the sun sets is the west, the direction where the sun travels ( a fTllI) is the south and that where the sun does not move ( a �fTllI) is the north The sun has contact with three parts ( a :fr=7tit) viz., before, now and after; The order in its contact with the parts depends on the direction (III» a 7t) Its first contact is with the east, (the next contact is with the south, and the last contact is with the west) No part (of the sun) is in contact with that dik (viz., the north) in which it does no t move ( 13 �fT.}!1Ii7t) (Again) this divides from that, that divides from this (fliIll.l Jlt lltlWlfli)-this is the character of dik If there is no dik there is neither " this " nor "that." (Division of) " this " and "that" is the (essential) character of dik (�JIt:l:1jfD).76 (I33b) To this the Sastra replies: Now, this is not correct Sumr,ru is in the middle of the four regions (119.) The sun tums around Sumeru and illumines all the worlds every: where There is no absolute "first" (touch to the sun) anywhere ('I:"1!UJJ) Why? Every direction can be east or south, west or nClrth (in referen(:e to the specific sphere of reference) 76 (I33b-c) The Vai§�ikas say that the direction in which the sun rises is the east etc without any reference to any world The $iistra observes that it can not be ' maintained that there is any ' direction unconditionally fixed as east or south or west, for each world will have its own east and its own west Aga�, the Vai se�ikas say that the direction in which the sun has no contact is the north; but on this SCOl'e, the Siistra o bserve s they can not call it a dikJ for- it has not the character o f contact with the sun.77 But here the Vaise�ikas would argue that they have ' mentioned the characters of dik in reference only to on� country, whereas the critic takes it as referring to the countries on all the four sides and brings an , 2.0 , NAGARJUNA' S PHILOSOPHY objection, while according to them it does hold that the east has indeed the first contact.7 On this the Siistra stresses another point, viz , that even if in one COWltry the SWl has its contact with the east, this means that the dik ends (�i!) at the point where the sun begins So having an end, dik would not be all-pervasive and could not be permanent There fore aik is only a name, a mode of reference and not any eternal sub stance.79 Spatial directions as derived names: As modes of reference spatial direc tions are in fact held to be supremely important and are called "the great." (Dik is called great in the mWldane truth) because it is endless, it is everywhere, it pervades all that is material, it is everlasting ('M�) and it benefits the whole world saving people from getting lost in con fusion.80 (288a) But this does not mean that aik is any thing-in-itself Dik is a derived notion In the system of the, composite material entities there hold the distinctions of "this side " and "that side" and it is from these distinctions that the notion of direction is derived It is a derived name (In the world by common consent) the direction in which the SWl rises is (called) the east, and that in which the SWl sets is called the west This is the character of dik Dik naturally lasts for ever ( § �'M�) There fore it is not any specific entity causally produced It is not any specifIC entity that was not before but is present now and will cease to be later ; therefore it is not anything made It is not perceptible by the senses (*'9iJW�) and therefore it is most subtle (288a-b) Still, it is not anything ultimately real It is admitted only in the mWldane truth In the ultimate truth it is denied (288b) And here there is no question of falling into the errors of eternalism and negativism For, 202 ... things With the present (mo ment of) dtta, the mind, the internal element, as the hetll (the cause) and with the external object as the pratyaya (the condition) there arises the internal unifying... of the future which case also gives (�1t�k), rise to the thought of the fire of tomorrow As in the of (the thought of) yesterday's fire so in the case of the fire of tomorrow, the presence of the. .. stand for the ultimate truth The knowledge of the past, present and future is pertinent, but pertinent only to the world of the determinate In the ultimate truth there is neither past nor present