Nagarjunas philosophy as presented in the maha prajnaparamita sastra (41)

CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES Dik is admitted in the mundane truth (as a derived name) and there­ fore there is no falling into neg ativism, and it is denied in the ultimate truth and therefore there is no falling into eternalism (288b) Clinging to the specific as absolute would create in regard to the spatial and temporal divisions the wrong no tions of absolute end and absolut e devoidness of end, leading to the errors of negativism and eternalism The Sastra observes that this would lead the wayfarer to a total abandoning of the attitude of unbounded love and service for all Suppose the wayfarer traverses helping people of one nation, in one direction, say, in the east, and takes up another in the same direction and thus continues to traverse country after country, in one and th e same direction, helping all with his merciful heart Now if he should give rise to the notio n that the direction as well as his faring in it are absolute­ ly endless, then he might give rise to the false notion of absolute endless­ ness, i.e., eternalism; and if he would think that the direction and his faring in it are exhausted, then he would be a victim to the false notion of absolute end, i.e., negativism With the rise of these two kinds of wrong notions his loving heart would not be there any more But through the sunyata of dik, ifhe would rej ect his clinging to directions then there would not be these wrong notions of absolute end and absolute endlessness.81 For example, in the great ocean, at the time of tide the water reaches the ne ver-ending banks and then returns And if the fish (that is thrown out in the tide) would not return to the ocean (along with the water flowing back) then it would have to be tossing about on the moist earth (lJ:f:EJlft!!.) and would be subject to all pain and confusion But if the fish is wise it will return to the ocean a long with the water, and will for ever be in peace and security The same is the case with the wayfarer If he will not return along with his mind (to sunyata) then he will be tossed about in perversion But if he will return along with his mind (to sunyata), then he will not lose his heart oflove This way the great pervers ion s about dik are removed in this sunyata of dik Hence the name great (288b) 203 NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY· Space (aka1a) as a substance: If the spatial directions are not substantial, could the space (iikiisa) in which ·the directions are distinguished itself be anything substantial? Even space is only a derived name and not any substance.82 It stands for the universal possibility of movement Being nothing in itself it contains all It is not itself any specific entity If it were itself a determinate entity with its own nature it would be ex­ clusive of all else and it could not then have been the container of all.83 It is not an object of sightS4 for it is devoid of form It is not the blue vault In fact, when sight is cast at a great distance (where the light emitted from the eyes meets no object) the light returns and thus there is the sight of blue There is nothing over there which is actually blue If some one would By up very high in the sky and examine, he would not see anything there It is on account of the enormous distance at which the sight is cast that there appears the color blue.85 Some would maint� that space (akasa) is a reality ("1fJl.t;), a thing­ in-itsel£ They would say that if there wer.e not the element of akasa as a reality, then the activities like lifting things and laying them down, coming and going, curving and straightening, entering and emerging, etc would not have been there For, in the absence of akaia, there would not be any accommodation for movement (1I.l.l!l).86 But, the Siistra observes that if aka1a were a specific, existent entity, then it should have itself a location For, there cannot be the existence of any specific "spatial" entity without a location To conceive that space is located in something empty would amount to saying that space is located in space, therefore that is not right Again, it cannot be taken to be located in some plenum ( ), for the plenwn is devoid Of empty space and hence devoid of accommodation The stonewall, e.g., being a plenum as accepted by common sense and so having no empty space in it, is devoid of accommodation Further, if akasa were a plenum it would not meet the de£nition of accommodation which is accepted even by those who· hold it to be a substance So even in the plenwn which is devoid of accommodation there cannot be the supposed sub­ stance, akasa So, neither in anything empty nor in the plenum can akasa which is conceived as a substantial entity be accominodated.87 Therefore there cannot be any akasa as a specific entity 204 CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES Again , if iikiiSa were any specific entity, it should have a character of its own But it cannot be conceived to have any character (�t§) (milMH'Hft§) When have any such specific character Therefore iikiiia itself cannot be (I02C) Every specific thing has its sp ecific character the character is present one understands that the thing is present For example , earth is hard, water is moist But iikiisa cannot be taken to Now, can it not be that devoidness of form (�fS!I) is the character of iikiiJa?8'8 It cannot be Because, "devoidness of form" (�fS) simply means the negation of form (�fS); there is nothing else th at is p osi tive (J!.A�) here which can be the unique character of iikiisa The nega­ tion of form is comparable to the extinction of flame Both alike are simply negations ; �ey are not themselves anything positive So, there is no positive character specific to iikiiSa.89 Again, for another reason, «kala is denied It is only in contrast with something tang ible and full thAt negation of ,.upa (fS), form and resistance, is conceivab le which is now advanced as the character of iikiiJa But then, when rupa has not come into existence (�*1:.IIif) there can be no character of iikiisa.90 Again, you say that form is impermanent while iikiiJa is permanent In that case, even prior to form, there should be iikiiJa , for it is perma­ nent But how can there be "the negation of form" prior to forni? In the a bsence of "the negation of form" there is not the character of iikasa (And how can there be iikiisa without it s character ?) In the ab­ sence of the character, the thing is also absent Therefore, iikiiSa is only a name and not any substance.91 (103a) Space as a derived· name.' In the mundane truth iikiisa is admitted as the necessary 'condition for movement, as the" container of all." It is capable of containing everything precisely because it is akificana (�m1f Me), no t itself anything specific ; everything dwells in it The formed objects have their dwelling place; from them it is known that there is iikiisa as their accommodation; the formed objects, bei ng 205 NAGARjUNA'S PHILOSOPHY formed, calUlot be the container of anything, and so akasa is known as the principle of accommodation Formed objects and (formless) akaJa are mutually o pposed in character (;fHJlri); as fo rmed o�ject is non-ac­ commodative, so it is known that akaJa is the principle of accommoda­ tion (�); even as knowledge is known through (or in contrast with) ignorance , pleasu re is known through (o r in contrast with) pain, JUSt so (in contrast with and ) by the absence of formed (and hence resisting) objects, there is said to be akaJa, the principle of accommodation (426b) Siistra distinguishes akaJa from the mind and the menul states and says that although in being shapeless (1!!U�), and colourless (�f5) there is a cer tain similarity b etween them, they are not similar in every respect While the mind and the mental states are of the nature of feeling and understanding (iUIl;fH), akaJa has for its nature, accommodation; while the former are devoid of ac commodation , they are not also toully de­ void of specific nature; the mind is known to be of a deftnite " form" (�) by virtue of mentation (vikalpa 5tjjIJtn) Further, mind and menul states are known to be definitely non-accommodative For instance the false view es not contain the right view and the right view does not tain the false view But this is n o t the case with akiiJa, it is the con­ tainer of all A gain, the mind and the mental states are of the nature of arising and perishing, they can be put an end to This is not, however, the case with iikasa Therefo re it is said that among all things it i s akasa that is the "container of all." This calUlot be sa; d in regard to the mind and the mental states 92 But the above consideration should not however lead one to think that iikiisa is a reality, subsuntial and self-being, or even a specific entity with a positive nature of its own For in truth, accommodation (�tn) is but the absence of res istance (�f5*11) It is the inacces sibility of form (f5;;Y:;�Jl!!) or the formlessness that is called akaJa; it is not itself any peciflc entity.93 In the case of one who entertains the wrong notion that kiisa is a specific, substantial, entity, there occur all the inconsistencies mentioned above In the ultimate truth iikiisa is of the same nature as Nirv:il;ta, which is the universal reality.94 In being the universal principle of accommodation while no t b ein g itself any specific thing, akiisa is the ' 206 CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES prototype of the ultimate reality.94 The Great Way is compared to it G Substance and Attribute Substance as self-being: Substance (svabhava) in its general sense of self­ being is of the greatest importance to our present treatise, because the one principal idea that runs through its pages is that a determinate entity is not a substance; it is devoid of self-being In this general sense, substantiality or self-being means ul timacy, unconditionedness, reality In this general sense character (la�a�a) is a synonym of determinate entity as well as its determination or specification.96 The determinate entities are divisions within the undivided being, determinations within the indeterminate dharma These are held as "entities" only by con­ vention and there is no absoluteness about them with regard to their "own" natures and there is no sharpness of their division from the rest In this general sense, all that is deterninate can be called a "character" which is a representation, a determination by the self-conscious intellect of the reality that it confronts And of the relation between the determi­ nate characters and the indeterminate dharma, their ground, thHe is no question of any absolute descri ption in terms o fidentity or difference Substance as substratum of quality: It is ·this consideration of the mutual implicatedness and the relativity of determination between the specific "entities" or characters and their ground, that is found even in regard to the limited issue, viz., of the relation between quality and substance Substance is the substratum (lak�a) in which the quality (lak�a1}a) rests or "inheres." It is the subject o f which the character is predicated The questions are: Does the quality rest in the qualified or in the not qualified? Between the quality and the substratum, which is earlier and which is later? Or, are they simultaneous? Are substance and quality identical or separate? Quality does not inhere (/FA) in the qualified (.fI'I) for in the qualified the quality is already there Nor does it inhere in the thing devoid of quality for (that which is absolutely devoid of quality is not any thing) 207 ... in- itsel£ They would say that if there wer.e not the element of akasa as a reality, then the activities like lifting things and laying them down, coming and going, curving and straightening, entering... contain the right view and the right view does not tain the false view But this is n o t the case with akiiJa, it is the con­ tainer of all A gain, the mind and the mental states are of the nature... substance So even in the plenwn which is devoid of accommodation there cannot be the supposed sub­ stance, akasa So, neither in anything empty nor in the plenum can akasa which is conceived as a substantial