Ảnh hưởng của quy mô hội đồng quản trị và sự kiêm nhiệm giám đốc điếu hành đến giá trị thị trường của các doanh nghiệp bằng chứng tại việt nam luận văn thạc sĩ

TR BO GPO DUC VA DAO TAO G DAI BOC KINII TE TP.BO CBI MINB HUYNH THj /OM TUYET ANH HIfONG CUA QUY MO“ HOI DONG QUAN TRJ, VA Sj/ KIEM NHIjIM GIAM DOC DIEU HANH DEN GI/i TRj THj TRIfâNG CUA CAC BANG CHYNG T@I VIĐT NAM Chuyộn nganh: Kinh Té Tai Chinh — Ngfin Bang Ma so: 60340201 LU@N VAN TH@C SI KINH TE Ngwol hwirng dan khoa hpc: TS TRAN THJ TP He Chl Minh - Niim 2013 LY L1$I CAM DOAN To xin cam doan lu@ vén “ANB BAIG CUA QUY MO BOI DONG QUAN TRI, VA SQ KIEM NBIEM GSM DOC DIEU VNB DEN GA TRI TBJ TR G CUA CAC DOANB NGBIEP BANG CB G TAI VIET NAM” la cfing trinh nghién c u ciia chinh tac gia, nfii dung duoc duc két tit qua trinh hoc tap va cac két qua nghién c u thuc tién their gran qua, so lieu su dung la tmng thuc va co ngufin goc trich dan ro r:ing Luan vén duoc thuc hien ducii su huéng dan khoa hoc ciia TS Tran Th) Bai Ly Buynh Th) Anh Tuyét L1$I CAM DN Tfii chan th:inh cain on Ban Gram Hieu v:i Khoa D:to tao Sau Dat hoc Truéng Dat hoc Kinh té Th Ho Chi Minh da Jo diéu kien thuan lot cho tfii hoc ¼p va nghién c u suot thc›i gran qua Tfii chin th cain on cac Thay Co Truéng Dat hoc Kinh té Th Ho Chi Minh da nhiet tinh giéng day cho tfii suot qua trinh tham gia hoc tap @i Truéng Xin tr n cain on ! Buynh Th) Anh Tuyét MIjC LIjC 1.2 Muc tiéu nghién c u 1.3 Cau hfii nghién c u: 1.4 Bo cuc cua lu@ vén: Ly thuyét dat dren va nhfmg lap lu@ ring hfi su tach biet vat trfi chit tich HDQT va GDDH: .5 2.1.1 Ly thuyét dat dren (Agency Theory) .5 2.1.2 Nhfmg lap luan déng sau ly thuyét dat dren ring hfi cho viec tach biet vat trfi chit tich HDQT va GDDH 2.3 Ly thuyét quan ly va quan diem ring hfi viec kiém nhiem vat trfi chit tich HDQT va GDDH: .11 2.3.2 Quan diem ring hfi viec kiém nhiem vat trfi chit tich HDQT va GDDH .11 2.4 Ly thuyét ve cac bén lien quan (Stakeholder Theory) 13 3.1 Béng chfmg ve su anh huéng cua viec kiém nhiem GDDH den gia tri doanh nghiep 15 3.1.1 Béng chfmg ve su énh huéng tich cuc cua viec kiém nhiem GDDH den gia tri doanh nghiep 15 3.1.2 Béng ch rig ve su énh huéng nguoc chiéu ciia viec kiém nhiem GDDH den gia tri doanh nghiep: 17 3.1.3 Béng chfmg hon hpp ve su anh huéng cua viec kiém nhiem GDDH den gia tri doanh nghiep 18 3.2 Béng ch rig ve su anh huéng ciia quy mo HDQT den gia tri doanh nghiep 21 3.2.1 huéng ciing chiéu ciia quy mo HDQT va tinh doc lap ciia vién HDDQT doc lap gia tri doanh nghiep 21 3.2.2 huéng nguoc chiéu ciia quy mo HDQT gia tri doanh nghiep 22 3.2.3 Cac anh huéng hon hpp ciia quy mo HDQT gia tri doanh nghiep 24 DC LIEU VA PB ONG PYP NGBIEN CN 28 Mau nghién c u: .28 4.2 Mo hinh va cac gia thuyét nghién c u 28 4.3.2 Bién doc lap: 30 5.2 Phan tich moi tuong quan giua cac bién: 36 Da cong myén: 41 5.4.3 Tu tuorig quan: 42 i‹ét luan: 46 6.2 Ham y cua de tai: 46 TH LI U TBAM KIIAO 61 DANH MIjC CAC TIf VIET TAT BDH: Ban diéu h HDQT Hfii dong qu:in tri HOSE: st giao dich chfmg khoan Th Pho Ho Chi Minh HNX: st giao dich chfmg khoén H:i Noi PSTD: Phuong sai thay dfii REM: Random Effect Model - Mo hinh tac dong ngau nhién FEM: Fixed Effect Model - Mo hinh tac dong co d)nh TP.HCM : Th:inh Pho Ho Chi Minh DANH MIjC CAC BANG BIEU B:ing Tong két tu ly thuyét lien quan den HDQT 13 Béng 3: Ma tr¾ tuorig quan 36 DANH MIjC SD DO VA PHtj LIjC Phu luc 1: Két qu:i chay hfii quy dang Pooled tit ph n mém STATA 11 50 Phu luc 2: Két qua chay hfii quy dang FEM tu ph n mém STATA 11 .51 Phu luc 3: Két qua chay hfii quy dang REM tit phan mém STATA 11 52 Phu luc Danh sach cac cfing ty niém yet trén st HOSE mau nghién c u 54 TOM LY@C Mijc tiéu ciia biii nghién ciru n:iy 1:i xem xét iinh huéng ciia quy méi HDQT vii su kiém nhiem GDDH den gi:i tri thi tru6ng ciia ciic doanh nghiep t i Viet Nam Vfii in u gfim 130 cfing ty niém yet trén SP giao dich chimg khoiin Th:inh Ph Héi Chi Minh thfii gian tu niim 2008-2012 Bring phuong ph:ip hfii quy trén dii lieu bring nhu Pooled, Random Effect Model, Fixed Effect Model v:i phuong ph:ip ufic lupng GLS, T:ic gi:i dfi ph:it hien quy méi HDQT co iinh huéng nguoc chiéu gi:i tri thi tru6ng ciia doanh nghiep, duoc lu6ng bring Tobin’s Q t i miic y nghia 1:i 1% Diéu n:iy cho thfiy quy méi HDQT ciing l6n ciing 1:tin gi:tin gi:i tri ciia cfing ty Su kiém nhiem GDDH co mii quan he ciing chiéu véii gi:i tri thi tru6ng ciia doanh nghiep, duoc lu6ng bring Tobin’s Q t i miic y nghia 1% Tir khéa.- Quy mo HDQT, Sq kiem nhie:in, gié tr[ doanh nghie:p GIOI THI U 1.1 Ly chp n dé Hi: H i déing quiin tri vii su kiém nhiem ciia gi:tin d c diéu h:inh duoc nhiéu nghién ciiu trén the gifii tim thiiy 1:i co vai trfi quan trpng vi c gia tiing gi:i tri doanh nghiep M t st nghién ciiu dién hinh ve tinh huéng ciia quy méi HDQT gi:i tri ciia doanh nghiep nhu: Yermach (1996), Mak — Kusnadi (2005) Gin diiy hon, Paul M Guest (2009) xem xét tinh huéng ciia quy méi HDQT den gi:i tri doanh nghiep vfii in u dii lieu l6n gfim 2.746 cfing ty niém yet trén siin chiing khoiin t i Vuong Qu c Anh giai doin In 1981-2002 Peng Wang (2013) xem xét tinh huéng ciia quy méi HDQT gi:i tri doanh nghiep t i Trung Qu c ciia in t in u gfim 1.325 cfing ty phi tiii chinh duoc niém yet trén hai siin chimg khoiin Shanghai vii Shenzhen khoiing thfii gian In niim 2000-2009 Nhiing nghién ciru dién hinh ve tinh huéng ciia su kiém nhiem GDDH gi:i tri ciia doanh nghiep nhu Mary A Callaghan (2005) su dqng in u 485 cfing ty bring xép hpng ciia chi st S&P 500 niim tiii chinh 2004, Khaled Elsayed (2007) chpn in u 92 cfing ty 19 ng:inh cfing nghiep khiic t i Ai C p thfii In niim 2000 den 2004, Johnny Jermias (2008), Nirosha Hewa Wellalage & Stuart Locke (2011) v:i Marcio Alves Amaral-Baptista (2011) ciing nghién ciru tinh huéng ciia su kiém nhiem GDDH gi:i tri doanh nghiep Ngoiii ra, M.A Rouf (2011) thi xem xét mii quan he giiia quy méi h i déing quiin tri, su kiém nhiem GDDH den gi:i tri doanh nghiep t i Bangladesh Amarjit Gill and Neil Mathur (2011) kiém tra tinh huéng quy méi HDQT v:i kiém nhiem GDDH den gi:i tri doanh nghiep siin xufit t i Canada Chan Kaixian, Hee Pui Mun, Lee Chaw Chin v:i Yeoh Huey Chyng (2012) nghién ciru mii quan he giiia da)c diem H i déing quiin tri bao gfim tinh trpng kiém nhiem GDDH, th:inh vién HDQT d c p vii quy méi h i déing quiin tri gi:i tri doanh nghiep t i 205 cfing ty niém yet trén siin chiing khoiin Malaysia niim 2010 bring ciich :ip dqng Ly thuyét dli dien 52 Phij lijc 3: Két quit ch;jy hoi quy d;jng REM tir ph n niém STATA 11 Random-effects GLS Number of obs 650 regression Group variable: Number of groups 130 company Obs per group: R-sq: within 0.2639 5.0 between = 0.4888 avg overall max 0.3607 Random effects u i corr(u i, X) tobinsq Gaussian Wald chi2(5) (assumed) Coef Std Err - 304.94 Prob > chi2 z P+|z| [95% Conf Interval] In(boardsize) -.0956299 0656172 -1.46 145 -.2242371 0329774 ceoduality 0191443 0276393 0.69 0.489 -.0350277 0733163 firmsize 0513626 0109336 4.70 0.000 0299332 072792 roa 1.013081 1521057 6.66 0.000 7149595 1.311203 PG 1795292 0141062 12.73 0.000 1518817 2071768 cons -.4829689 3079704 -1.57 117 -1.086580 1206420 sigma u 13509146 sigma e 27573547 rho 1935697 (fraction of variance due to u i) Phij lijc 4: Két quit ch;jy GLS khac phijc phirong sai thay doi Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression Coefficients: generalized least squares Panels: heteroskedastic Correlation: no autocorrelation Estimated covariances 130 Number ofobs 650 130 Estimated autocorrelations Number of groups = Estimatedcoefficients Time periods tobinsq Coef Std Err Wald chi2(5) - 789.56 Prob >chi2 - 0.0000 z P+|z| [95% Conf Interval] In(boardsize) -.0521507 0192495 -2.71 0.007 -.0898791 -.0144223 ceoduality 0274137 0104837 2.61 0.009 006866 0479614 firmsize 0474174 0024665 19.22 0.000 0425831 0522516 roa 7094112 079428 8.93 0.000 5537353 PG 2444112 0132989 18.38 0.000 2183458 2704767 -.4557285 0686341 -6.64 0.000 -.5902489 -.3212081 cons 8650871 54 Ph:J l:Jc 5: DANH SACH CAC CONG TY NIEM YET TIN SAN HOSE TRONG MAU NGHIEN CNU MW STT Chim Ten cfing ty g Khoiin ABT Cfing ty ct phfin Xufit nh p khfiu thiiy siin Ben Tre ACL Cfing ty ct phfin Xufit nh p khfiu Thiiy siin Ciiu Long An Giang AGF Cfing ty ct phfin Xufit nh p khfiu thiiy siin An Giang ALP Cfing ty ct phfin Alphanam Thuong Mpi ANV Cfing ty ct phfin Nam Viet ASP Cfing ty ct phfin T p doiin Diiu An Pha BBC Cfing ty CN phfin Bibica BHS Cfing ty CN phfin Du6ng Bién Hfia BMC Cfing ty ct phfin Khoiing siin Binh Dinh 10 BMI Téing cfing ty CN phfin B:to Minh 11 BMP Cfing ty ct phfin nhua Binh Minh 12 BT6 Cfing ty ct phfin Beton 13 CDC Cfing ty ct phfin Chuong Duong 14 CII Cfing ty ct phfin Diiu In H:J ting Ky thu t TP.HCM 15 CLC Cfing ty CN phfin Ciit Loi 16 CNT Cfing ty ct phfin Xiiy dpng vii Kinh doanh v t In 17 CYC Cfing ty ct phfin G ch Men Chang Yih 18 DCL Cfing ty ct phfin Duoc phfim Cuu Long 20 DDM Cfing ty CN phfin H:ing h:ii Déing Déi 21 DHA Cfing ty CN phfin Hoii An 22 DHG Cfing ty ct phfin Duoc H u Giang 23 DIC Cfing ty ct phfin Diiu In v:i Thuong mii DIC 24 DMC Cfing ty ct phfin Xufit nh p khfiu Y té Domesco 25 DPM Téing Cfing ty Phfin bon v:i Hoa chit Diiu - CTCP 26 DPR DPR Cfing ty ct phfin Cao su Déing Phii 27 DQC Cfing ty ct phfin Bong dén Dien Quang 28 DRC Cfing Ty Céi Phfin Cao Su D:i Nang 30 DXV Cfing ty ct phfin Xi miing V t lieu xiiy dpng Xiiy lap D:i Nang 31 FBT Cfing ty ct phfin Xufit nh p khfiu liim thiiy siin Ben Tre 32 FMC Cfing ty CN phfin Thuc phfim Sao Ta 33 FPT Cfing ty ct phfin FPT 34 GIL Cfing ty CN phfin Siin Xufit Kinh Doanh Xufit Nh p Khfiu Binh Th nh 35 GMC Cfing ty CN phfin Siin xufit Thuong mii May Siii Gon 36 CMD Cfing ty ct phfin Dpi ly Lién hiep v n chuyén 37 ATA Cfing ty CN phfin ché bién g Thu n An 38 HAG Cfing ty ct phfin Hoiing Anh Gia Lai 56 39 HAI Cfing ty ct phfin Néing Duoc Hai 40 HAP Cfing ty ct phfin T p doiin HAPACO 41 HBC Cfing ty ct phfin Xiiy Dung v:i Kinh Doanh Dia c Hfia Binh 42 HDC Cfing ty ct phfin Ph:it trién nh:i B:i Ri.a — Viing 43 HLA T:iu Cfing ty ct phfin Hiiu Lién A Chiiu 44 HMC Cfing ty CN phfin Kim Th:inh ph Héi Chi Minh 45 HRC Cfing Ty Céi Phfin Cao su Hfia Binh 46 HSE Cfing ty ct phfin T p doiin Hoa Sen 47 HT1 Cfing ty ct phfin xi miing H:i Tién 48 HTV Cfing ty ct phfin v n tiii H:i Tién 49 ICF Cfing ty ct phfin Diiu In Thuong mii Thiiy siin 50 IFS Cfing ty CN phfin Thuc phiim Qu c Té 51 IMP Cfing ty ct phfin dupc phfim Imexpharm 52 ITA CTCP Diiu tu Cfing nghi p Tin Tpo 53 KBC Téing Cfing ty Ph:it trién Déi Thi Kinh Bac — Cfing ty CN 54 KDC phfin Cfing ty ct phfin Kinh Déi 55 KHA Cfing ty ct phfin xufit nh p khfiu Khiinh H i 56 KHP Cfing ty ct phfin Dien luc Khiinh Hfia 57 KMR Cfing ty ct phfin Mirae 58 KSH 59 L10 Cfing ty CN phfin T p doiin Khoiing siin Hamico Cfing ty ct phfin LILAMA 10 60 LAF 61 LBM Cfing ty CN phfin Ché bién h:ing xufit khfiu Long An Thuc Phfim Cfing ty ct phfin Khoiing siin v:i V t lieu xiiy dpng Lim Déing 62 LCD Cfing ty ct phfin LICOGI 16 63 LSS Cfing ty ct phfin Mia du6ng Lam Son 64 MCP Cfing Ty Céi Phfin In v:i Bao bi My Chiiu 65 MHC Cfing ty ct phfin h:ing h:ii H:i N i 66 MPC CTCP T p doiin Thiiy siin Minh Phii 67 NAV Cfing ty CN phfin Nam Viet 68 NSC Cfing ty CN phfin Gi ng cfiy trfing Trung long 69 NTL Cfing ty ct phfin Ph:it trién dfi thi Tu Liém Bfit D ng Siin 70 OPC Cfing ty ct phfin Duoc phfim OPC 71 PAC Cfing ty CN phfin Pin Ac quy mién Nam 72 PAN Cfing ty CN phfin Xuyén Th:ii Binh 74 PGD Cfing ty CN Phfin Gas Petrolimex 75 PIT Cfing ty CN phfin Xufit nh p khfiu Petrolimex 76 PIT Cfing Ty Céi Phfin V n tiii Xiing dfiu Duéing Thiiy Petrolimex 77 PNC Cfing ty ct phfin viin hoii Phuong Nam 78 PPC Cfing ty ct phfin Nhiet dien Ph:i Lpi 79 PTC Cfing ty ct phfin Diiu In v:i Xiiy dpng Buu di n 80 PVD Téing cfing ty ct phfin Khoan v:i Dich vp khoan dfiu 81 PVF Téing cfing ty T:ii chinh ct phfin Diiu Vi t Nam 82 PVT Téing Cfing ty ct phfin V n tiii dfiu 83 RAL Cfing ty ct phfin Bong dén Phich nuéc Ring Déing 85 SAM Cfing ty ct phfin Diiu In v:i Ph:it trién SACOM 86 SAV 87 SBT 89 SCD Cfing ty CN phfin Nufic Gi:ii khiit Chuong Duong 90 SFI Cfing ty ct phfin Dpi ly V n tiii SAFI Cfing ty ct phfin Hpp tiic kinh té v:i Xufit nh p khfiu SAVIMEX Cfing ty ct phfin Bourbon Tiiy Ninh Vié'nn théinSiii Gfin 92 SID Cfing Ty Céi Phfin Thiiy Dien Cfin Don 93 SIS 94 SMC Cfing ty ct phfin dfiu In thuong mii SMC 95 SSC Cfing ty ct phfin Gi ng cfiy trfing mién Nam 96 SSI Cfing ty CN phfin chimg khoiin Siii Gon 97 ST8 Cfing ty ct phfin Siéu Thanh 98 STB 99 SVI Cfing ty ct phfin Bao bi Bién Hfia 100 SZL Cfing ty ct phfin Sonadezi Long Th:inh Cfing ty ct phfin Diiu tu Ph:it trién Déi thi vii Khu Sing D:i Ngfin h:ing Thuong mii ct phfin Siii Gon Thuong Tin cfing nghi p 59 102 TBC Cfing ty CN phfin Thiiy dien Th:ic B:i 103 TCM Cfing ty ct phfin Det may - Diiu In - Thuong mii Th:inh Cfing 104 TCR Cfing ty ct phfin Cfing Nghiep G in sit Taicera 105 TDH Cfing ty CN phfin Ph:it trién nh:i Thii Diic 106 TMS Cfing ty ct phfin Kho v n Giao nh n Ngo i thuong TP.HCM 107 TNA Cfing ty CN Phfin Thuong Mpi Xufit Nh p Khfiu Thien Nam 108 TNC TNC Cfing ty ct phfin Cao su Thing Nhfit 109 TPC Cfing ty ct phfin Nhua Tin Dpi Hung 110 TRC Cfing ty CN phfin Cao su Tiiy Ninh 111 TS4 Cfing ty ct phfin Thiiy siin st 112 TTF Cfing ty ct phfin T p doiin Ky nghe g Truéng Th:inh 113 TTP Cfing ty ct phfin bao bi Nhua Tin Tién 114 UIC Cfing ty ct phfin Diiu 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