ANNULMENT, or separation. Such laws have come under attack by parents, who argue that giving grandparents visitation rights infringes on their right to raise their children as they see fit. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), held that the state of Washington’s grandparent visitation statute violated the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, as it interfered with the rights of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. The statute permitted “any person” at “any time” to petition a state family court for visitation rights whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child.” Most states hold that the ongoing family is not subject to enforced intrusion by grandparents, if both parents are fit and object. A majority of states also hold that any ADOPTION preempts visitation by the natural grandparents and that grandparents generally have no rightto intervene in an adoption proceeding involving their grandchild. FURTHER READINGS Jackson, Anne Marie. 1994. “Coming of Age of Grandparent Visitation Rights.” American Univ. Law Review 43. Krause, Harry D., and David D. Meyer. 2007. Family Law in a Nutshell. 5th ed. Eagan, MN: West. Sember, Brette McWhorter. 2002. The Visitation Handbook. Naperville, IL: Sphinx. CROSS REFERENCES Child Custody; Children’s Rights. VITIATE To impair or make void; to destroy or annul, either completely or partially, the force and effect of an act or instrument. Mutual mistake or FRAUD, for example, might vitiate a contract. v VITORIA, FRANCISCO DE Francisco de Vitoria was a Sp anish theologian, egal philosopher, teacher, and defender of the rights of the Native Americans who inhabited the newly discovered continents of Nor th and South America. Francisco de Vitoria, was born in Vitoria, capital of the Basque province of Álava, Spain. While still a boy, he joined the Dominican order in Burgos, and in 1509 or 1510 he was sent to the Collège Saint-Jacques in Paris, where he finished his courses in the humanities and went on to study philosophy and theology. While a student of theology, he directed an edition of the Secunda Secundae ("Second Part of the Second Part" of the Summ a) of St. Thomas Aquinas. The date of his ordination is un- known. From 1516 to 1522 or 1523 he taught theology in the ècoles majeures of the Collège Saint-Jacques and edited the Sermones Domin- icales of Peter of Covarrubias, the Summa Aurea of St. Antoninus of Florence, and the Diccio- nario moral of Peter Bercherio. He obtained the licentiate and doctorate in theology in 1522. After teaching theology at St. Gregory’ s monas- tery in Valladolid from 1523 to 1526, he w on by competition the "chair of prime," the most important chair of theology, at the University of Salamanca and held it until his death. Melc hior Cano, Mancio, Ledesma, Tudela, Orellana, and Barron, among others, were his disciples. Vitoria helped to formulate the imperial legislation regarding the newly discovered American territories. Vitoria’s campaign for the rights of native peoples started in 1532, when he began a series of lectures on that subject. He in corporated the substance of these lectures into a treatise entitled Relecciones De Indis et De iure belli (Readings on the Indians and on the law of war). ▼▼ ▼▼ Francisco de Vitoria c.1483–1546 14501450 15001500 15251525 15501550 14751475 ❖ c.1483 Born, Vitoria, Alava, Spain ◆ 1492 Christopher Columbus reached the Caribbean ◆ 1520 Cortes conquered central Mexico ◆ 1523 Worked as professor, University of Valladolid, Spain ◆ 1526 Worked as theology teacher, Salamanca, Spain ◆ 1530 Spanish conquests of South America began ◆ 1532 Presented lectures published as Readings on the Indians and on the Law of War ❖ 1546 Died, Salamanca, Spain [JUS GENTIUM] IS WHAT NATURAL REASON HAS ESTABLISHED AMONG NATIONS . —FRANCISCO DE VITORIA GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 258 VITIATE The work not only advocated the case for the Native Americans but also presented basic precepts on the LAW OF NATIONS. In his fight for freedom for Native Amer- icans, Vitoria asserted that they owned the territories they inhabited and opposed their compulsory conversion to Christianity. He believed that the Spanish government should establish a ruling system that would benefit, not injure, the native people. Vitoria believed that an ideal government would receive its authority from the people and would rely on the tenets of NATURAL LAW and reason to enact laws beneficial to all. The thesis that Vitoria was the founder of modern INTERNATIONAL LAW has been definitively established by numerous scholars. It was officially acknowledged in 1926, when the Dutch Association of Grotius gave the Univer- sity of Salamanca a gold medal coined to honor Vitoria as the founder of international law. Also in 1926, the Asociaciòn Francisco de Vitoria was founded in Spain for the purpose of studying and spreading Vitoria’s ideas through publica- tions, conferences, and special courses at the University of Salamanca. FURTHER READINGS Anghie, Antony. 1996. “Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law.” Social & Legal Studies 5 (September). Hernandez, Ramon. 1992. “The Internationalization of Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto.” Fordham International Law Journal 15 (summer). Kennedy, David. 1986. “Primitive Legal Scholarship.” Harvard International Law Journal 27 (winter). Scott, James Brown. 1934. The Spanish Origin of Interna- tional Law: Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations. Reprint, 2000. Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange. CROSS REFERENCES Native American Rights. VIVA VOCE [Latin, With the living voice; by word of mouth.] Verbally; orally. When applied to the examination of wit- nesses, the term viva voce means oral testimony as opposed to testimony contained in deposi- tions or affidavits. Viva voce voting is voting by speech, as distinguished from voting by a written or printed ballot. VIZ. [Latin, A contraction of the term videlicet, to wit, namely, or that is to say.] A term used to highlight or make more specific something previously indicated only in general terms (ie, The charges in this case, viz: murder and armed robbery, deserve to be fully punished.). VOID That which is null and completely without legal force or binding effect. The term void has a precise meaning that has sometimes been confused with the more liberal term voidable. Something that is voidable may be avoided or declared void by one or more of the parties, but such an agreement is not void per se. A void contract is not a contract at all because the parties are not, and cannot be, bound by its terms. Therefore, no action can be maintained for breach of a void contract, and it cannot be made valid by ratification. Because it is nugatory, a void contract need not be rescinded or ot herwise declared invalid in a court of law. A void marriage is one that is invalid from its inception. In contrast to a voidable marriage, the parties to a void marriage may not ratify the union by living together as HUSBAND AND WIFE.NoDIVORCE or ANNULMENT is required. Nevertheless, parties frequently do seek, and are permitted to seek, such a decree in order to remove any doubt about the validity of the marriage. Unlike a voidable marriage, a void marriage can be challenged even after the death of one or both parties. In most jurisdictions a bigamous marriage, one involving a person who has a living spouse from an undissolved prior marriage, is void from the outset. In addition, statutes typically prohibit marriage between an ancestor and descendant; between a brother and a sister (whether related by whole blood, half blood, or ADOPTION); and between an uncle and niece or aunt and nephew. A judgment entered by a court is void if a court lacks jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter of a lawsuit. A void judgment may be entirely disregarded without a judicial declaration that the judgment is void and differs from an erroneous, irregular, or voidable judgment. In practice, however, an attack on a void judgment is commonly used to make the judgment’s flaw a matter of public record. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VOID 259 A law is considered void on its face if its meaning is so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning and may differ as to the statute’s application (Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 2d 322 [1926]). DUE PROCESS requires that citizens receive fair notice of what sort of conduct to avoid. For example, a Cincinnati, Ohio, city ordina nce made it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assembl e on a sidewalk and conduct themselves in a manner that was annoying to passersby. A conviction carried the possibility of a $50 fine and between one and thirty days imprisonment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions of several persons found guilty of violating the ordinance after a demonstration and picketing (Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 [1971]). The Court ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it subjected citizens to an unascertainable stan- dard. Stating that “conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others,” the Court said that the ordinance left citizens to guess at the proper conduct required. The Court noted that the city could lawfully prohibit persons from blocking the sidewalks, littering, obstructing traffic, committing assaults, or engaging in other types of undesirable behavior through “ordi- nances directed with reasonable specificity to- ward the conduct to be prohibited.” CROSS REFERENCES Bigamy; Consanguinity; Void for Vagueness Doctrine. VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE A doctrine derived from the DUE PROCESS CLAUSES of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution that requires criminal laws to be drafted in language that is clear enough for the average person to comprehend. If a person of ordinary intelligence cannot determine what persons are regulated, what conduct is prohibited, or what punishment may be imposed under a particular law, then the law will be deemed unconstitutionally vague. The U. S. SUPREME COURT has said that no one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of a penal law. Everyone is entitled to know what the govern- ment commands or forbids. The void for vagueness doctrine advances four underlying policies. First, the doctrine encourages the government to clearly distin- guish conduct that is lawful from that which is unlawful. Under the Due Process Clauses, individuals must be given adequate notice of their legal obligations so they can govern their behavior accordingly. When individuals are left uncertain by the wording of an imprecise statute, the law becomes a standard less trap for the unwary. For example, VAGRANCY is a crime that is frequently regulated by lawmakers despite difficulties that have been encountered in defining it. Vagrancy laws are often drafted in such a way as to encompass ordinarily innocent activity. In one case the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited “loafing,” “strolling,” or “wandering around from place to place” because such activity comprises an innocuous part of nearly everyone’s life (Papa- christou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 [1972]). The court concluded that the ordinance did not provide society with adequate warning as to what type of conduct might be subject to prosecution. Second, the void for vagueness doctrine curbs the ARBITRARY and discriminatory enforce- ment of criminal statutes. Penal laws must be understood not only by those persons who are required to obey them but by those persons who are charged with the duty of enforcing them. Statutes that do not carefully outline detailed procedures by which police officers may perform an investigation, conduct a search, or make an arrest confer wide discretion upon each officer to act as he or she sees fit. Precisely worded statutes are intended to confine an officer’s activities to the LETTER OF THE LAW. Third, the void for vagueness doctrine discourages judges from attempting to apply sloppily worded laws. Like the rest of society, judges often labor without success when inter- preting poorly worded legislation. In particular cases, courts may attempt to narrowly construe a vague statute so that it applies only to a finite set of circumstances. For example, some courts will permit prosecution under a vague law if the government can demonstrate that the DEFENDANT acted with a SPECIFIC INTENT to commit an offense, which means that the defendant must have acted willfully, knowingly, or deliberately. By reading a specific intent requirement into a vaguely worded law, courts attempt to insulate innocent behavior from criminal sanction. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 260 VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE Such judicial constructions are not always possible. Ultimately, a confusing law that cannot be cured by a narrow judicial interpre- tation will not be submitted to a jury for consideration but will be struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clauses. A fourth reason for the void for vagueness doctrine is to avoid encroachment on FIRST AMENDMENT freedoms, such as FREEDOM OF SPEECH and religion. Because vague laws cause uncer- tainty in the minds of average citizens, some citizens inevitably decline to take risky behavior that might land them in jail. When the vague provisions of a state or federal statute deter citizens from engaging in certain political or religious discourse, courts will apply HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY to ensure that protected expression is not suppressed. For example , a law that prohibits “sacrilegious” speech would simultaneously chill the freedoms of expression and religion in violation of the void for vagueness doctrine (Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777, 96 L. Ed. 1098 [1952]). A finding by a state or federal court that a law is vague is generally rare. The most common instances where the void for vagueness doctrine is applied include criminal statutes and those statutes and ordinances that may infringe on First Amendment rights. In several instances courts have determined that broad language used in a statute was appropriate. For instance, in Ohio v. Williams, 728 N.E.2d 342 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to a statute that required registration of sex ual predators. While the statute involved CRIMINAL LAW, the court determined that the statute was remedial in nature and did not prohibit any certain conduct. The court rejected an argument that the statute was constitution- ally vague, finding that the broad language was better suited to achieve the statute’s goals. Although courts scrutinize a vague law that touches on a fundamental freedom, in all other cases the void for vagueness doctrine does not typically require mathematical preci- sion on the part of legislators. Laws that regulate the economy are scrutinized less closely than laws that regulate individual behavior, and laws that impose civil or administrative penaltie s may be drafted with less clarity than laws imposing criminal sanctions. FURTHER READINGS Goldsmith, Andrew E. 2003. “The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited.” American Journal of Criminal Law 30. Sparks, Sarah. 2007. “Deteriorated vs. Deteriorating: The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine and Blight Takings Nor- wood v.Horney.” Universityof Cincinnati Law Review 75. CROSS REFERENCES Chilling Effect Doctrine; Due Process of Law; Fi fth Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment. VOIDABLE That which is not absolutely vo id, but may be voided. Voidable Contracts In contracts, voidable is a term typically used with respect to a contract that is valid and binding unless avoided or declared void by a party to the contract who is legitimately exercising a power to avoid the contractual obligations. A contract may be voidable on the grounds of FRAUD, mistake, MISREPRESENTATION, lack of capac- ity, duress, UNDUE INFLUENCE, or abuse of a FIDUCIARY relationship. A contract that is based on one of these grounds is not automatically void but is voidable at the option of the party entitled to void it. For example, a person who was induced by fraud to enter into a contract may disclaim the contract by taking some positive action to disaffirm it. Or the victim of the fraud may ratify the contract by his or her conduct or by an express affirmation after acquiring full knowledge of the facts. Likewise, a contract between a minor and another party is generally viewed as voidable by the minor. The minor may legally decide to ratify the co ntract or disaffirm the contract. Voidable Marriages A voidable marriage is a marriage that is valid when ente red into and remains completely valid until a party obtains a court order nullifying the relationship. The parties may ratify a voidable marriage upon removal of the impediment preventing a lawful marriage, thus making the union valid. Living together as HUSBAND AND WIFE following the removal of the impediment typically constitutes a RATIFICATION. A voidable marriage can only be attacked by a direct action brought by one of the parties against the other and therefore cannot be attacked after the death of a spouse. It differs from a void marriage, where no valid marital relationship ever existed. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VOIDABLE 261 Most jurisdictions hold that the marriage of a person under the statutory AGE OF CONSENT, but over the age of seven, is voidable rather than void. Such a marriage may be subject to attack through an ANNULMENT or may be ratified when the underage party reaches the age of consent. Some jurisdictions have determined that a marriage involving an incompetent party is void, but others hold that such a marriage is only voidable. A voidable marriage involving an incompetent party may be ratified during periods when the party is lucid or after he or she regains competency. Generally, a marriage procured or induced by certain types of fraud is viewed as voidable; voluntary COHABITATION following a disclosure of all pertinent facts ratifies the marriage. A marriage made without the voluntary consent of one of the parties is generally considered voidable. Moreover, a person who is so intoxicated at the time of marriage as to be incapable of understanding the nature of the marital contract lacks the capacity to consent, and such a marriage is thus voidable. CROSS REFERENCES Contracts; Divorce; Husband and Wife. VOIR DIRE [Old French, To speak the truth.] The prelimi- nary examination of prospective jurors to deter- mine their qualifications and suitability to serve on a jury, in order to ensure the selection of fair and impartial jury. Voir dire consists of oral questions asked of prospective jurors by the judge, the parties, or the attorneys, or some combi nation thereof. This oral questioning, often supplemented by a prior written questionnaire, is used to deter- mine whether a potential juror is biased, knows any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses, or should otherwise be excluded from jury duty. Voir dire is a tool used to achieve the constitutional right to an impartial jury, but it is not a constitutional right in itself. Typically, a number of prospective jurors are called to the jury box, given an oath, and then questioned as a group by counsel or the court. Local federal rules generally provide for questioning by the judge. Individual or seques- tered voir dire is used in rare cases where extensive publicity may potentially damage a defendant’s case; some jurisdictions mandate it in death penalty cases. A prospective juror must answer questions fully and truthfully but cannot be faulted for failing to disclose information that was not sought. The purpose of voir dire is not to educate jurors but to enable the parties to select an impartial panel. Therefore, voir dire questions should test the capacity and competency of the jurors without intentionally or unintentionally planting prejudicial matter in their minds. Trial judges have wide latitude in setting the para- meters of questioning, including the abilities to determine the materiality and propriety of the questions and to set the time allowed for voir dire. A party may move for dismissal for cause to remove any potential juror shown to be connected to or biased in the case. A court may sustain counsel’s request to strike a juror for cause, in which case the juror steps aside and another is called. Or a judge may overrule a challenge for cause if a suitable reason has not been sufficiently established. Challenges for cause are not limited in number. Each side also exercises peremptory chal- lenges to further shape the composition of the jury. Peremptory challenges are used to dismiss a prospective juror without the need to provide a reason for dismissal. Statutes or court rules typically set the number of peremptory chal- lenges afforded to a party. Voir dire also describes a court’s prelimi- nary examination of a prospective witness whose competency or qualifications have been challenged. VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA [Latin, To the co nsenting, no injury is done.]In the law of NEGLIGENCE, the precept that denotes that a person who knows and comprehends the peril and voluntarily exposes himself or herse lf to it, although not negligent in doing so, is regarded as engaging in an ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK and is precluded from a recovery for an injury ensuing therefrom. CROSS REFERENCES Assumption of Risk. VOLSTEAD ACT Volstead Act is the popular name for the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305), a comprehensive statute that was enacted in 1919 to enforce the EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT to GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 262 VOIR DIRE the U.S. Constitution and to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. The act was rendered inoperative by passage of the TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, which repealed PROHIBITION. The act was named after ANDREW VOLSTEAD, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, which oversaw the act’s passage. Wayne Wheeler of the Anti-Saloon League conceived and drafted the bill. v VOLSTEAD, ANDREW JOHN Andrew John Volstead was a midwestern lawyer and ten-term U.S. representative (Republican) from Minnesota who gained national promi- nence as the originator of the VOLSTEAD ACT, officially the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305). The Volstead Act was a comprehensive statute enacted to enforce the EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution. It prohib- ited the manufacture, sale, or trans portation of intoxicating liquor. The Volstead Act was later rendered inoperative by the passage of the TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT , which repealed Prohi- bition. Volstead, a reluctant national symbol of Prohibition, was the product of modest, rural beginnings. His parents had been Norwegian farmers who earned their living by selling surplus produce in Oslo street markets until they immigrated to the United States in 1854, where they eventually settled on a farm near the town of Kenyon, in Goodhue County, Minnesota. Volstead was born October 31, 1860, near Kenyon, Minnesota. After attending local public schools, he went on to Saint Olaf College, in Northfield, Minnesota, and the Decorah Insti- tute, in Decorah, Iowa. He graduated from Decorah in 1881. After graduation, he taught school in Iowa, and studied law with two Decorah attorneys. Volstead was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1883 and to the Minnesota bar one year later. He practiced law in Granite Falls, Minnesota. In 1887, one year after his arrival, Volstead was named Yellow Medicine County attorney— a post he held for 14 years. He was a member and president of the Granite Falls Board of Education, a Granite Falls city attorney, and a Andrew J. Volstead. CORBIS. ▼▼ ▼▼ Andrew John Volstead 1860–1947 1850 1900 1925 1950 1875 ❖ 1860 Born, Kenyon, Minn. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ◆ 1883 Admitted to Iowa bar 1887–1901 Served as Yellow Medicine County (Minn.) attorney 1902–22 Served in U.S. House ◆ 1913 Joined House Judiciary Committee 1914–18 World War I ◆ ◆ 1918 Named chair of the House Judiciary Committee 1919 Eighteenth Amendment ratified; Volstead Act passed over presidential veto 1939–45 World War II ❖ 1947 Died, Granite Falls, Minn. ◆ 1933 Twenty-first Amendment ratified; repealed Eighteenth Amendment 1924–31 Served as legal adviser to the Northwest Prohibition Enforcement District in St. Paul ◆ 1922 Capper-Volstead Act gave antitrust exemption to agriculture-based cooperative monopolies GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VOLSTEAD, ANDREW JOHN 263 Granite Falls mayor. Volstead married Helen (“Nellie”) Mary Osler Gilruth on August 6, 1894. From his platform as mayor of Granite Falls, Volstead launched his first major political campaign in 1902. Running as a Republican, he sought to represent Minnesota’s seventh congressional district in the U.S. House of Representatives. He was elected, and was returned to office nine times, serving for a total of almost 20 years. Volstead sought to protect the interests of the small farmer in general—and western Minnesota wheat farmers in particular. He opposed legislation that favored big cities, big business, and big labor. He believed in compe- tition, he hated monopolies, and he supported early legislative attempts to regulate the railroad industry. Though he had supported President WOODROW WILSON’s WORLD WAR I policies, Vol- stead opposed many of the administration’s domestic programs. He believed the Under- wood Tariff Act of 1913 (19 U.S.C.A. §§ 128, 130, 131 [1982]) discriminated against the farmer, the FEDERAL RESERVE Act of 1913 (12 U.S.C.A. § 321 [1989]) benefited large city banks, and the CLAYTON ACT of 1914 (15 U.S.C.A. § 12 [1994]) exempted labor from federal laws. In spite of, or perhaps because of, his opposition to Wilson’s domestic agenda, Vol- stead was admired and supported by his conservative rural constituents. He was also respected by his Washington, D.C. colleagues. Over the years, he earned a reputatio n as a hardworking public servant with a fine legal mind. Volstead joined the House Judiciary Committee in 1913. As a committee member, he frequently demonstrated his ability to frame successful bills and to move them through the legislative process. Volstead’s professional skills were put to the test in 1918. Shortly after the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, he was named chair- man of the House Judiciary Committee. In this capacity, he was called upon to draft a new law to enforce Prohibition. Volstead’s bill permitted the sale of alcohol for industrial, medicinal, and sacramental purposes. It outlawed any beverage containing more than one-half of one percent of alcohol; provided concurrent state and federal power to allow for the enforcement of stricter state laws; included a SEARCH AND SEIZURE clause; and provided for injunctions against, and the padlocking of, establishments selling alcoholic beverages. The bill was passed in 1919 over President Wilson’s VETO. Although Volstead’s bill was less drastic than an earlier measure drafted by Wayne B. Wheeler, of the Anti-Saloon League, and less strict than existing laws in Ohio and New York, it was not well received by those against Prohibition. Passage of the National Prohibition Act forced the quiet Minnesota congressman into the national spotlight, and made him a central figure in the country’s ongoing debate between wet and dry factions. It is somewhat ironic that Volstead became so closely associated with the Prohibition debate. He was a nondrinker who supported Prohibition, but he had never made a speech on the issue before his bill was passed. And, though he was proud of the act that came to carry his name, he expressed disappointment in later years that the Volstea d Act got more attention than other legislative contributions that he deemed equally or more important. In spite of his outstanding record of support for Minnesota farmers, Volstead’s notoriety following the passage of the Volstead Act made him vulnerable in reelection bids. A coalition of Prohibition opponents was unable to defeat him in 1920, but two years later, Ole J. Kvale, a Lutheran minister, was elected to replace the ten-term congressman. Volstead refused to profit from the Prohibi- tion debate, and he turned down lucrative speaking engagements with some regularity. He did, however, continue to support the cause that had cost him reelection. From 1924 to 1931 he lived in St. Paul and served as the legal adviser to the Northwest Prohibition Enforcement District. The Volstead Act was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933. Volstead died in Granite Falls at age 87, on January 20, 1947. FURTHER READINGS Men of Minnesota: A Collection of the Portraits of Men Prominent in Business and Professional Life in Minnesota. 1915. 2d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: R. L. Polk. Narvestad, Carl. 1972. A History of Yellow Medicine County, Minnesota, 1872–1972. Granite Falls, Minn.: Yellow Medicine County Historical Society, and Carl and Amy Narvestad. Rose, Arthur P., ed. 1914. An Illustrated History of Yellow Medicine County. Marshall, Minn.: Northern History. EVERY LAWYER IS FAMILIAR WITH THE LARGE CORPORATE INTERESTS THAT APPEAL TO OUR COURTS TO SET ASIDE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AS EXPRESSED BY OUR STATE LEGISLATURES . [T] HOSE WHO SEEK TO THWART THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE [THAT] ADVANTAGE. —ANDREW J. V OLSTEAD GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 264 VOLSTEAD, ANDREW JOHN VOLUNTARY ACT A crime that is the product of conscious choice and independent will. No crime can be committed by bad thoughts alone. One basic premise of U.S. law is that every crime requires the commission of some act before a person may be held account- able to the justice system. A criminal act may take the form of affirmative conduct, such as the crime of murder, or it may take the form of an omission to act, such as the crime of withholding information from the police. However, in order for an act to be considered criminal, it must be voluntary. To constitute a voluntary act for which a person may be held criminally liable, the act must result from the person’s conscious choice. The choice need not be the product of thorough deliberation but may stem from an impulse, as long as the person is physically and mentally capable of exercising restraint and discretion consistent with the requirements of the law. A person who suddenly slips on a mountain trail and reaches out to grab the arm of a bystander to avoid falling has acted voluntarily because his mind has quickly grasped the situation and dictated a response. Acts over which a person has no physical or mental control are not voluntary. A muscle reflex driven by the autonomic nervous system, such as a knee jerk, is not considered voluntary under the law. Acts committed during seizures, convulsions, hypnosis, or unconscious mental states also lack suffi cient volition and judgment needed to impose criminal liability. For the same reasons, acts committed during episodes of sleepwalking are not considered voluntary. All of these actions can also be labeled as examples of automatism. Since 2005 a number of persons accused of crimes have asserted the “Ambien defense” for their acts. Ambien, a prescription drug adminis- tered for sleep disorders, should not be consumed with alcohol. Defendants have successfully argued that the combination of the drug and alcohol produced mental states that were akin to sleepwalking. In 2008 a Massachusetts man was acquitted of driving under the influence and criminal vehicular homicide because he had toxic levels of Ambien in his system. The judge ruled that he could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated when he operated the motor vehicle. On the other hand, acts that are not fully the result of independent will but are committed with extreme indifference to human life are usually treated as voluntary. A conscious person who points a loaded gun at another, for example, will typically be held liable for any harm that results from its accidental discharge because the act of brandishing a loaded gun is treated as a voluntary choice manifesting a recklessness toward the safety of others. Simi- larly, an intoxicated person who passes out behind the wheel of a car cannot escape liability for any criminal acts that ensue, because they followed from the voluntary acts of drinking and driving. Persons who have a history of seizures, fainting spells, or blackouts may be held responsible for criminal acts that result during such episodes if a court finds that reasonable precautions could have been taken to avoid the dangers created by thes e physical and mental conditions. In the majority of criminal cases, the voluntary nature of a defendant’s act is not at issue. Until something in eviden ce indicates to the contrary, a court may presume that a defendant has acted with the intent to carry out the bodily movem ents for which she is being prosecuted. The law expects every person to take responsibility for her own actions and anticipate the natural consequences that might reasonably follow from particular behavior. Medical testimony is commonly required to place a defendant’s mental state into question and raise the defense of voluntariness before a judge or jury. Involuntary criminal acts should be distin- guished from acts that are the product of duress. Duress includes the use of force, or threat of force, to coerce another to commit a criminal act. Crimes committed under duress are considered voluntary because an individual’s decision to succumb is normally based on a cost-benefit analysis in which he weighs the consequences of acting and refusing to act. Nonetheless, the law protects individuals who succumb to coercion by allowing them to assert the defen se of duress. The defense of duress is based on the idea that the deterren t and retributive value of CRIMINAL LAW is not served by punishing individuals for behavior that is not the product of free and independent will. CROSS REFERENCES Automatism; Insanity Defense. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VOLUNTARY ACT 265 VOTING The right to vote is a fundamental element of the U.S. system of representative democracy. In this form of government, policy decisions are made by representatives chosen in periodic elections based on the principle of universal suffrage, which requires that all citizens (or at least all competent adults not guilty of serious crimes) be eligible to vote in elections. Demo- cratic governments are premised on political equality. Although individuals are inherently unequal with respect to their talents and virtues, they are deemed equal in their essential worth and dignity as human beings. Each individual has an equal right to participate in poli tics under the law. Though these principles of representative democracy and universal suffrage have been idealized throughout U.S. history, citizens often have needed to struggle to make these principles a reality. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not explicitly define qualifications for voting but delegated to the states the right to set voting requirements. When the Constitution was ratified, property qualifications for voting still existed, and the franchise was granted originally only to white men. The Growth of Enfranchisement The movem ent toward universal suffrage can be traced to the advent of Jacksonian democracy in the 1830s. Property qualifications rapidly di- minished for white voters by the beginning of the U.S. CIVIL WAR. The end of SLAVERY led, in 1870, to the adoption of the FIFTEENTH AMEND- MENT , which theoretically granted the right to vote to African Americans. It was not until the 1960s, however, that this right became a reality. The NINETEENTH AMENDMENT, ratified in 1920, removed gender as a qualification for voting. The TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT,ratifiedin 1964, abolished POLL TAXES as prerequisites for voting in federal elections. Finally, the TWENTY- SIXTH AMENDMENT, ratified in 1971, lowered the voting age to 18. These constitutional amend- ments reveal the slow movement toward univer- sal suffrage, but it would take court decisions as well as federal legislation to ensure that citizens were not denied their constitutional right to vote. Attempts at Disenfranchisement For more than a century, the legislatures of southern and border states used a succession of different types of legislation to disenfranchise African Americans and the members of other minority groups. These laws were challenged in court, leading to a steady stream of decisions that restricted the ability of legislatures to limit VOTING RIGHTS. Beginning in the 1960s, the federal government became actively involved in ending discriminatory voting practices. In addition, the federal government set new procedures for voter registration, which made it easier to register and vote. Despite the passage of the Fifteenth Amend- ment in 1870, African Americans had difficulty exercising their right to vote. In some states, public officials ignored the Fifteenth Amend- ment, and in other areas, groups such as the KU KLUX KLAN used TERRORISM to prevent African Americans from voting. The U.S. SUPREME COURT struck down congressional attempts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 214, 23 L. Ed. 563 (1875). The Court reversed itself in Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884), yet in the 1880s Congress showed little interest in securing African Americans’ voting rights. Southern and border states realized, how- ever, that the federal government had the power National Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections, 1960 to 2008 Percentage of voting-age population Year SOURCE: Federal Election Commission. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 63.1 61.9 60.8 55.2 53.6 52.6 53.1 50.1 55.1 49.1 51.3 55.3 56.8 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PER- MISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 266 VOTING to ensure the ENFRANCHISEMENT of African Americans. Therefore, these states sought ways to exclude African Americans from the political process; such methods appeared neutral but were employed solely against persons of color. Grandfather Clause The most blatant official means of preventing African Americans from voting was the GRANDFATHER CLAUSE. First enacted by Mississippi in 1890, this method soon spread throughout the southern and border states. Typically, these clauses required literacy tests for all voters whose ancestors had not been entitled to vote prior to 1866. This meant that African Americans were subject to literacy tests arbitrarily administered by white officials, whereas illiterate whites were exempted from this requirement because their ancestors could vote in 1866. In 1915, the Supreme Court struck down Oklaho- ma’s grandfather clause in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340. White Primary After the grandfather clause was ruled unconstitutional, southern states adopted the WHITE PRIMARY as a way of excluding African Americans from voting in a meaningful way. The DEMOCRATIC PARTY, in many states, adopted a rule excluding African Americans from party membership. The state legislatures worked in concert with the party, closing the party primaries to everyone except party members. Because nomination by the Demo- cratic Party was tantamount to election in these essentially one-party states, African Americans were effectively disenfranchised. The Supreme Court, in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944), stru ck down the white primary as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition against voting DIS- CRIMINATION based on race. Literacy Tests The end of grandfather clauses and white primaries led to the use of other exclusionary tactics. Many states relied on literacy tests that, despite superficial neutrality, were administered in a racially discriminatory manner. White people rarely had to take the test, even if their literacy was questionable. However, because the Constitution had left the determination of voting qualifications to the states, and the literacy tests were on their face racially neutral, the Supreme Court refused to strike them down. Ultimately, Congress abol- ished literacy tests through the VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq.). Poll Tax Another less common means of lpreventing African Americans from voting was the POLL TAX. When Constitution was adopted, poll taxes were used as a legitimate means of raising revenue. By the 1850s poll taxes had disappeared, but they were revived in the early twentieth century by states seeking to exclude African Americans from the political process. The tax generally amounted to $2 per election, an amount large enough to deter most persons of color, as well as poor whites, from voting. On its face, the poll tax was racially neutral. The Supreme Court initially upheld the tax in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S. Ct. 205, 82 L. Ed. 252 (1937), but over time it became clear that it was being used in a racially discriminatory manner. The Twenty-fourth Amendment, ratified in 1963, abolished the use of the poll tax in federal elections. In 1966, the Supreme Court, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, struck down the use of poll taxes in state and local elections, ruling that such taxes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. Voting Reforms Voting Rights Act of 1965 The passage of the VOTING RIGHTS ACT of 1965 was a watershed event in U.S. history. For the first time, the federal government undertoo k voting reforms that had traditionally been left to the states. The act prohibits the states and their political subdivi- sions from imposing voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or standards, practices, or procedures that deny or curtail the right of a U.S. citizen to vote because of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The act was exte nded in 1970 and again in 1982, when its provisions were renewed for an additional 25 years. Southern states challenged the legislation as a dangerous attack on STATES’ RIGHTS, but the Supreme Court, in South Carolina v. Katzen- bach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S. Ct. 803, 15 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1966), upheld the constitutionality of the act, despite the fact that the law was, in the words of Chief Justice EARL WARREN, “inventive.” The initial act covered the seven states in the South that had used poll taxes, literacy tests, and other devices to obstruct registration by African Americans. Under the law, a federal court can appoint federal examiners, who are authorized GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VOTING 267 . the judgment’s flaw a matter of public record. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION VOID 259 A law is considered void on its face if its meaning is so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence. RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PER- MISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 266 VOTING to ensure the ENFRANCHISEMENT of African Americans. Therefore, these. WILL OF THE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE [THAT] ADVANTAGE. —ANDREW J. V OLSTEAD GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 264 VOLSTEAD, ANDREW JOHN VOLUNTARY ACT A crime that is the product of