Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 10 P36 ppsx

While at Columbia on a full scholarship, Wattleton trained as a midwife in New York City’s Harlem Hospital. In the 1960s, abortion was prohibited by law in most states. At Harlem Hospital, Wattleton saw firsthand the appalling medical consequences of illegal abortions. She witnessed the blood poisoning, torn uteruses, and painful deaths of desperate women who tried to induce abortions with chemicals or sharp instruments. These grim cases influenced Wat- tleton’s decision to join Planned Parenthood and to support reproductive freedom. To Wattleton, the issue was one of self-determination and basic HUMAN RIGHTS for women. After earning her master’s degree in 1967, Wattleton became assistant director of the Montgomery County Combined Public Health District, in Dayton. As a public health nurse, she helped increase the prenatal health care services in the area. In 1970 Wattleton became executive director of a Planned Parenthood affiliate in Dayton. She married social worker and musi- cian Franklin Gordon in 1971, and had a daughter, Felicia Gordon, in 1976. Wattleton and Gordon divorced in 1981. Wattleton’s work ethic and her successful outreach and fund-raising efforts in Dayton led to her appointment in 1978 as president of the national Planned Parenthood organ ization. At age 34, Wattleton became the youngest person ever to head the huge family planning enterprise. (By the time Watt leton resig ned in the early 1990s, Planned Parenthood had 900 U.S. affiliates and an annual budget of $380 million.) Wattleton assumed leadership at a time when donating funds to P lanned Parenthood was neither controversial nor a political act. Once Wattleton began to lobby for abortion rights, Pla nned Parenthood’s reputation and perceived mission changed dramatica lly. Although Planned Parenthood became syn- onymous with abortion, Wattleton pointed out that only a relatively small part of its operation was involved in terminating pregnancies. Only one-third of its U.S. clinics even performed abortions. BIRTH CONTROL, gynecologic exams, and prenatal care were the services most commonly provided. Whereas 130,000 abor- tions were performed at Planned Parenthood clinics in 1990 (when 1.5 million abortions were performed nationwide), 3 million women received pregnancy tests, contraceptives, and prenatal exams from Planned Parenthood during the same year. Wattleton placed Planned Parenthood squarely in the pro-choice camp because she was concerned about the erosion of ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case guaranteeing a woman’s right to choose an abortion. When President RONALD REAGAN took office in 1982, he aligned his administration with the anti-abortion faction. During his two terms in office, federal funds for family planning clinics under title X of the PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 300–300a-41 [1970]) were cut significantly. Also, the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT attempted to prevent federally funded clinics from even mentioning abortion as a medical option (42 C.F.R. 59.8). Its so- called GAG RULE was denounced by Wattleton as a violation of free speech and an unfair restriction on poor women. The controversial regulation was enjoined by federal courts and ultimately struck down by a U.S. district court in 1992 (National Family Planning & Reproduc- tive Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227 [1992]). Perhaps the most discouraging blow to Wattleton and the pro-choice movement was the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1989). In Webster the High Court ruled that individual state legislatures had the power to regulate abortion. As a result, an increase in state laws limiting access to abortion was likely. Wattleton supported the introduction into the United States of RU486, an abortion- inducing drug not yet approved by the federal government. She also backed a reproductive rights amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although Wattleton was a staunch abortion rights advocate, she was equally emphatic about the need to prevent unwanted pregnan- cies in the first place. She campaigned for the establishmen t of comprehensive health education programs in the schools and the community. Because of her high profile and pro-choice position, Wattleton received several death threats while head of Planned Parenthood. During her tenure, several U.S. affiliates were bombed, picketed, and besieged by anti-choice groups. WE’RE NOT SAYING ABORTION IS RIGHT OR WRONG OR PREACHING A MORAL CAUSE , BECAUSE THAT IS A VERY PERSONAL DECISION . W HAT WE ARE SAYING IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO RIGHT TELLING WOMEN WHAT TO DO WITH THEIR LIVES . —FAYE WATTLETON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 338 WATTLETON, ALYCE FAYE In 1992 Wattleton resigned from Planned Parenthood to become host of a syndicated talk show in Chicago. She left behind a strengthened organization with a defined course of action, and a powerful example of living one’s life according to principles. In 1995 Wattleton helped cofound the Center for the Advance- ment of Women, formerly known as the Center for Gender Equality, a research and education organization that advocates for the equality of women. Wattleton currently serves as the organization’s president, and in addition to sitting on the board of directors of a number of national corporations and nonprofit organiza- tions, she became a trustee of Columbia University in April 2002. FURTHER READINGS Solinger, Rickie. 2000. Wake Up Little Susie: Single Pregnancy and Race before Roe v. Wade. New York: Routledge. Wattleton, Faye. 1996. Life on the Line. New York: Ballantine. CROSS REFERENCE Reproduction. WATTS, THOMAS HILL See CONFED ERATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL. v WAYNE, JAMES MOORE As an associate justice, James Moore Wayne served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1835 to 1867. Wayne rose to prominence in his native Georgia in the early 1800s, establishing himself as a local politician with cosmopolitan views. Nominated to the Court by President ANDREW JACKSON , he shared the president’s strong federalist views, and Wayne often took an expansive view of federal power in his opinions. His FEDERALISM was put to the test, however, because of his support of SLAVERY. Loyal in his support for the Union during the U.S. CIVIL WAR, he paid a dear price in the south for choosing to remain on the Court even as other southern judges quit the federal bench. Born in Savannah, Georgia, in 1790, Wayne was the son of aristocratic parents. In his teens, he chose to leave Georgia in order to attend Princeton University. He graduated in 1808, and two years later returned home to establish a law practice. After brief service as a captain in the WAR OF 1812, he set out on an intermittent political career. From 1815 to 1816, he served in the Georgia House of Representatives and was James Moore Wayne 1790–1867 ❖ ◆ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 ▼▼ 1790 Born, Savannah, Ga. 1808 Graduated from Princeton University 1812–14 War of 1812 1775–83 American Revolution 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ❖ ◆ 1822–28 Sat on Georgia Superior Court 1819 Elected judge of the Savannah Court of Common Pleas 1815–16 Served in Georgia House of Representatives 1816 Elected mayor of Savannah 1849 Passenger Cases invalidated N.Y. and Mass. laws that imposed taxes on incoming ship passengers 1857 Concurred with Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford 1835–67 Served as associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court 1828–35 Served in U.S. House 1867 Died, Washington, D.C. ◆◆ ◆ James M. Wayne. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WAYNE, JAMES MOORE 339 then elected mayor of Savannah. His local political career soon gave way to a judicial one. In 1819 he was elected judge of the Savannah Court of COMMON PLEAS, and in 1822 he became a judge of the superior court. In 1828 Wayn e’s interest in national affairs took him to Washington. Winning election to the U.S. House of Representatives, he became a strong supporter of Andrew Jackson over the course of three terms in office. In 1834, when President Jackson needed a southerner to fill the vacancy left by the death of Associate Justice WILLIAM JOHNSON, Jackson nominated Wayne. Wayne struggled to strike the appropriate balance between state and federal powers. His specialty was ADMIRALTY law—the law of the seas—which was of great significance during the era. Admiralty issues were often volatile because they involved one of the sharpest constitutional conflicts of the day, the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce relativ e to state POLICE POWERS. The cases heard by the Court during Wayne’s tenure involved taxation, li- censing, and slavery, and the Court was often divided due to its inability to agree upon the extent of power vested in the Constitution’s COMMERCE CLAUSE. Wayne generally voted in favor of the federal government’s interests. In the so-called Passenger Cases of 1849, when the Court invalidated New York and Massachusetts laws that imposed taxes on incoming ship passengers, Wayn e wrote in his concurring opinion that Congress had exclusive control over interstate commerce. Politically, the dividing point in Wayne’s federalism was the very issue that split the nation into Civil War—slavery. As a slave owner, he struggled to find justification for preserving the institution even as the federal government opposed it. He believed that Congress had no power to interfere with slavery under the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the FIFTH AMENDMENT , and thus concurred in Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s opinion in DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD, 60 U.S. 393, 19 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857), which upheld the legality of slavery. The decision fueled animosities which led to the Civil War. Southerners detested Wayne’s decision to remain on the Court during the war. Yet even as he was denounced as a traitor and his property in Georgia was seized, he supported the cause of union. He remained on the bench until his death on July 7, 1867. FURTHER READINGS Lawrence, Alexander A. 1970. James Moore Wayne, Southern Unionist. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. O’Connor, Sandra Day. 1991. “Supreme Court Justices from Georgia.” Georgia Journal of Southern Legal History 1 (fall-winter). WEAPONS A comprehensive term for all instruments of offensive or defensive combat, including items used in injuring a person. The term weapons includes numerous items that can cause death or injury, including firearms, explosives, chemicals, and nuclea r material. Because weapons pose a danger to the safety and well-being of individuals and communities, federal, state, and local statutes regulate the possession and use of weapons. A dangerous or deadly weapon is one that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm. A handgun, a hand grenade, or a long knife are examples of deadly weapons. A weapon capable of causing death is, however, not necessarily a weapon likely to produce death. For example, an ordinary penknife is capable of causing death, but it is not considered a deadly weapon. The regulation of firearms in the United States has proved controversial. Opponents of GUN CONTROL argue that the SECOND AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution makes the right to bear arms an inherent and inalienable right. Never- theless, federal and state laws regulate who may own firearms and impos e other conditions on their use. The passage in 1993 of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 921 et seq.) was the first major federal gun control law. The Brady Act bars felons and selected others from buying handguns, estab- lishes a five-day waiting period for purchase, requires the local police to run background checks on handgun buyers, and man dates the development of a federal computer database for instant ba ckground checks. The 1994 federal crime bill addressed deadly weapons used by criminals. The law (108 Stat. 1796) banned 19 assault-type firearms and other firearms with similar characteristics. It limited the magazine capacity of guns and rifles to ten rounds, but exempted firearms, guns, and A CORPORATION SEEMS TO US TO BE A PERSON , THOUGH AN ARTIFICIAL ONE , INHABITING AND BELONGING TO THAT STATE [OF INCORPORATION ], AND THEREFORE ENTITLED , FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUING AND BEING SUED , TO BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THAT STATE . —JAMES MOORE WAYNE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 340 WEAPONS magazines that were legally owned when the law went into effect. The deadliness of chemical explosives w as demonstrated by the April 1995 bombing of the federal courthouse in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. In response, Congress passed the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Pen- alty Act. (P.L. 104-132). The act increases the penalties for conspiracies involving explosives and for the possession of nuclear materials, criminalizes the use of chemical weapons, and requires plastic explosives to contain “tagging” elements in the explosive materials for detection and identification purposes. Unless proscribed by statute, possessing or carrying a weapon is not a crime, nor does it constitute a breach of the peace. However, most states make it a crime to carry a prohibited or concealed weapon. The term concealed means hidden, screened, or covered. The usual test for determining whether a weapon is concealed is whether the weapon is hidden from the general view of individuals who are in full view of the accused and close enough to see the weapon if it were not hidden. If the surface of a weapon is covered, the fact that its outline is distinguish- able and recognizable as a weapon does not prevent it from being illegally concealed. In addition, most states have enacted laws man- dating longer prison terms if a firearm was used in the commission of the crime. Law enforcement officers who must carry weapons in order to perform their official duties ordinarily are exempted from statutes governing weapons. Private citizens may apply to the local police department for a permit to carry a firearm. Permits are generally granted if the person carries large sums of money or valuables in his or her business, or can demonstrate a particular need for personal protection. CROSS REFERENCES Deadly Force; Self-Defense. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Weapons of mass de struction are any nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, or other types of weap- ons capable of destroying property and killing large numbers of people. The term weapons of destruction was coined after the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945. However, the use of poison gas in WORLD WAR I was the first example of modern warfare employing technology to achieve mass killings. Until that time, only pandemic diseases had been capable of killing large numbers of people in a short time. The term entered the popular lexicon during the months leading up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States. President GEORGE W. BUSH and members of his administration argued that Iraqi dictator Sad- dam Hussein possessed chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and was seeking enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon. Hussein claimed he did not possess weapons of mass destruction, and UNITED NATIONS inspectors did not find any prior to the invasion. Follo wing the invasion, U.S. military and intelligence agencies made an exhaustive search of Iraq but finally concluded that Hussein had destroyed any weapons of mass destruction he might have possessed. The proliferation of NUCLEAR WEAPONS has remained a world concern. Pakistan and North Korea gained nuclear weaponry, while Iran seemed intent on achieving the same goal. Fears that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon have been a constant in the debates over the so-called WAR ON TERRORISM.As of 2010, however, the United States and Russia possessed the most nuclear weapons of mass destruction and were in conversation about reducing them. FURTHER READINGS Cordesman, Anthony. 2008. Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending the U.S. Homeland. New York: Praeger. Harris, Robert. 2002. A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare. New York: Random House. CROSS REFERENCE War. v WEBER, MAX Max Weber was a German sociologist and political economist who is best known for his theory of the development of Western capital- ism that is based on the “Protestant Ethic.” In addition, Weber wrote widely on law and religion, including groundbreaking work on the importance of BUREAUCRACY in modern society. He also worked to establish the discipline of sociology based on an objective scholarship. [THE] MODERN JUDGE IS A VENDING MACHINE INTO WHICH THE PLEADINGS ARE INSERTED TOGETHER WITH THE FEE AND WHICH THEN DISGORGES THE JUDGMENT TOGETHER WITH THE REASONS MECHANICALLY DERIVED FROM THE CODE. —MAX WEBER GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WEBER, MAX 341 Weber was born on April 21, 1864 , in Erfurt, Germany, into a wealthy manufacturing family. He studied at the Universities of Heidelberg and Berlin and joined the faculty at Heidelberg in 1896. A prolific writer and scholar, Weber resigned his professorship in 1907 after coming into an inheritance that made him financially independent, allowing him to devote all his energies to scholarship. In 1886 Weber passed the examination for “Referendar”, comparable to the bar association examination in the British and American legal systems. Throughout the late 1880s, Weber continued his study of history. He earned his law doctorate in 1889 by writing a doctoral dissertation on LEGAL HISTORY entitled The History of Medieval Business Organisations. Weber’s most fam ous work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–1905), introduced the concept of the “Protestant Ethic.” Weber theorized that certain Protestant religious beliefs promoted the growth of capitalism. He claimed a relationship existed between success in capitalist ventures and Protestant (in particular, Calvinist and Puritan sects) theology. The Calvinist doctrine of predestination posited that individuals could never know if they were to receive God’s salvation. This doctrine bred psychological insecurity in John Calvin’s followers, who eventually looked for signs that might indicate they were in God’s grace. From this search for signs developed the Protestant Ethic, which called for unce asing commitment to work and ascetic abstinence from any enjoy - ment of the profit realized from such labors. The result, Weber argued, was the rapid accumulation of capital that fueled the rise of Western capitalism. During WORLD WAR I, Weber served as director of the army hospitals in Heidelberg. In 1915 and 1916 he sat on commissions that tried to retain German supremacy in Belgium and Poland after the war. Weber’s views on war, as well as on expansion of the German empire, changed throughout the war. He became a member of the worker and soldier council of Heidelberg in 1918. In the same year, Weber became a consultant to the German ARMISTICE Commission at the TREATY OF VERSAILLES and to the co mmission charged with drafting the Weimar Constitution. Weber also analyzed how politics, govern- ment, and law have developed in Western and Max Weber. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. Max Weber 1864–1920 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18501850 19251925 19001900 18751875 ❖ ❖ ◆◆ ◆◆ 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1914–18 World War I 1864 Born, Erfurt, Germany 1886 Passed bar exam 1894 Became full professor of economics at University of Freiburg 1896–1907 Held professorship at Heidelberg University (Germany) 1904–05 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism published 1918 Helped create constitution of the Weimar Republic 1920 Died, Munich, Germany 1922 Economy and Society published 1870–71 German Empire formed GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 342 WEBER, MAX non-Western cultures. He proposed the idea of the charismatic leader, who exhibited both religious and political authority. Weber was more interested, however, in the development of modern government and the growth of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is a method of organization based on specialization of duties, action according to rules, and a stable order of authority. For Weber, bureaucracy was an expression of “rationality,” which in his termi- nology meant the use of rules and procedures to determine outcomes rather than sentiment, tradition, or rules of thumb. Weber’s sociological theories had a great impact on twentieth century sociology. He developed the notion of “ideal types,” which were examples of situations in history that could be used as reference points to compare and contrast different societies. This approach analyzes the basic elements of social institutions and examines how these elements relate to oneƠanother. Weber died on June 14, 1920, in Munich, Germany. FURTHER READINGS Kim, Sung Ho. 2004. Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Milovanovic, Dragan. 1989. Weberian and Marxian Analysis of Law: Development and Functions of Law in a Capitalist Mode of Production. Brookfield, Vt.: Avebury. Schroeder, Ralph, ed. 1998. Max Weber, Democracy and Modernization. New York: St. Martin’s Press. v WEBSTER, DANIEL Daniel Webster was a nineteenth-century law- yer, representative, senator, SECRETARY OF STATE, and one of the great orators in U.S. history. A man of prodigious talent and great political ambition, Webster reversed himself on issues involving the economy and SLAVERY in hopes of becoming president. As the greatest constitu- tional lawyer of his day, he helped shape the nationalist JURISPRUDENCE favored by Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL. Webster was born on January 18, 1782, in Salisbury, New Hampshire. He entered Dart- mouth College when he was 15 and graduated in 1801. He then studied law with an attorney in Boston before becoming a member of the New Hampshire bar in 1805. Webster moved to Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1807 and quickly developed a legal association with the shipowners and merchants of the city. Webster became the spokesperson for the Portsmouth Daniel Webster. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Daniel Webster 1782–1852 ❖ ◆◆ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 ▼▼ 1782 Born, Salisbury, N.H. 1801 Graduated from Dartmouth College 1805 Became member of New Hampshire bar 1812–14 War of 1812 1775–83 American Revolution 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1846–48 Mexican War ❖ ◆◆ 1822–27 Served in the U.S. House 1824 Argued Gibbons v. Ogden before the Supreme Court 1813–17 Served in U.S. House 1819 Argued Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward and McCulloch v. Maryland before the Supreme Court 1850 Appointed secretary of state by President Fillmore 1845–50 Served in U.S. Senate 1841–45 Served as secretary of state under Harrison and Tyler 1836 Helped form the Whig Party 1827–41 Served in U.S. Senate 1852 Died, Marshfield, Mass. ◆◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WEBSTER, DANIEL 343 business community, who opposed the Jefferson administration’s trade restrictions with Great Britain and France. His vehement denunciations of the trade embargo and the WAR OF 1812 against Great Britain led to his election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1812. He aligned himself with the pro-British FEDERALIST PARTY and endorsed a strong national government. Webster left Congress in 1817 and relocated to Boston where he emerged as an eminent attorney, specializing in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. His reputation increased when he became involved in three landmark cases. In the first, TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE V . WOODWARD, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819), Webster successfully defended his former college against the state of New Hampshire’s attempt to disregard the corporate charter of the school and make it a public institution. The Court, with Chief Justice Marshall writing the opinion, ruled that a corporate charter was a contract that could not be impair ed. In that same year, Webster argued for the validity of the BANK OF THE UNITED STATES and against the right of a state to tax a federal institution in MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. Again, Chief Justice Marshall agreed with Webster’s nationalist philosophy, finding that the NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE provided the basis for Congress’s creation of a national bank and that “the government of the Union, though limited in its power, is supreme within its sphere of action.” Five years later, in GIBBONS V. OGDEN, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824), Webster argued against navigation monopolies granted by the state of New York to private individuals. Chief Justice Marshall and the Court sided with Webster, holding that the Constitution’s COM- MERCE CLAUSE empowered Congress to regulate interstate commerce, establishing a precedent that had far-reaching effects in the economic expansion of the nineteenth century. With these accomplishments to his credit, Webster returned to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1822, where he represented Massachusetts for the next five years. In the House he chaired the Judiciary Committee and opposed the 1824 tariff, believing that it would injure the merchant class. Following his election to the U.S. Senate in 1826, however, Webster made one of his famous reversals and embraced the need for a tariff. He endorsed the tariff of 1828. Webster’s skills as an orator were renowned. Oral arguments before the Supreme Court could last several days, requiring attorneys to have both mental and physical stamina. Web- ster excelled in oral argument but he was also famous for his public addresses. In 1826 he delivered addresses on the deaths of JOHN ADAMS and THOMAS JEFFERSON. In 1830 he debated Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina, who favored a coalition between Western and Southern states to benefit both areas in tariffs and land prices. Webster opposed this section- alism and denounced the doctrine of nullifica- tion, which upheld the right of a state to declare a federal law invalid within its boundaries. Webster’s phrase “Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!” came from the Hayne debate and helped cement his popularity in the North. In 1836 Webster abandoned the Federalist Party and helped form the WHIG PARTY, made up of groups opposed to President ANDREW JACKSON and the Democrats. He was considered for the Whig presidential nomination in 1836 but was defeated. In 1841 President WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON appointed Webster secretary of state. When Harrison died shortly after taking office, President JOHN TYLER asked Webster to remain at his post. The Tyler administration was a troubled one, largely because Tyler was a Democrat with a cabinet of Whigs. His decision to reject a Whig measure establishing a new national bank caused a revolt in his cabinet, with most members resigning in protest. Webster alone remained to aid Tyler, motivated by the possibility of becoming his vice-presidential running mate in 1844. Howeve r, Tyler was not renomin ated. As secretary of state, Web- ster did negotiate the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, which established the boundary line for Maine. Webster returned to the Senate in 1845, with his salary supplemented by a fund raised by Boston and New York businessmen. Critics charged that he had surrendered his political independence to manufacturing interests. As a senator he opposed the Mexican War and the acquisition of Texas. He opposed slavery but feared civil war. Because of this fear Webster supported the COMPROMISE OF 1850 . This act GOD GRANT LIBERTY ONLY TO THOSE WHO LOVE IT , AND ARE ALWAYS READY TO GUARD AND DEFEND IT . —DANIEL WEBSTER GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 344 WEBSTER, DANIEL admitted California into the Union as a free state, gave the Utah and New Mexico territories the right to determine the slavery issue for themselves at the time of their admission to the Union, outlawed the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and gave the federal government the right to return fugitive slaves under the FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT (9 Stat. 462). In 1850 President MILLARD FILLMORE appointed Webster secretary of state. He used his influence to enforce the Compromise of 1850, especially the Fugitive Slave Act. Though the act was unpopular in the North, Webster sought to demonstrate to Southern politicians his determination to uphold the law. Aside from promoting national unity, Webster dreamed of a “Union” party that would help make him president in 1852. However, Webster died on October 24, 1852, at his farm in Marshfield, Massachusetts. FURTHER READINGS Remini., Robert V. 2009. Daniel Webster: The Man and His Time. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Waxman, Seth P. 2000. “In the Shadow of Daniel Webster.” The Federal Lawyer 47 (November-December). Webster, Daniel. 2008. The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster. Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar. WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1989), the United States SUPREME COURT reviewed the constitutionality of several Mis- souri statutes restricting access to ABORTION services and counseling. Webster is significant because it narrowed the Supreme Court’s holding in the landmark case ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), by modifying the trimester analysis under which the constitutionality of abortion regulations had been evaluated during the intervening 16 years. The case arose in 1986 when seven Missouri statutes regulating abortion were challenged in a CLASS ACTION filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The class action was brought on behalf of all HEALTHCARE professionals who were providing abortion services in the state of Miss ouri and on behalf of all pregnant women who were seeking access to those services. The federal district court declared all seven statutes unconstitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Missouri attorney general appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Webster splintered the nine Supreme Court justices. Chief Justice WILLIAM REHNQUIST wrote the Court’s plurality opinion, joined by Justices BYRON WHITE and ANTHONY KENNEDY. Justices SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR and ANTONIN SCALIA wrote separate concurring opinions. Justices HARRY BLACKMUN and JOHN PAUL STEVENS wrote separate dissenting opinions, with Justices WILLIAM BREN- NAN and THURGOOD MARSHALL joining Blackmun’s DISSENT. The plura lity opinion was separated into three parts. First, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Missouri REVISED STATUTES section 1.205.1, which provided that the “life of each human being begins at conception” and that all “unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.” The plaintiffs had argued that this provision was inconsistent with previous cases in which the Court had prohibited states from adopting a single theory regarding when life begins. The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument, concluding that this statutory language had no operative legal effect because it was contained in a legislative preamble. Thus, this particular Missouri statute raised no constitutional issue for the Court to decide. Second, the Court upheld the constitution- ality of Missouri Revised Statutes section 188.20, which prohibited abortions at public hospitals or on other property owned by the state. The plaintiffs had asserted that the Constitution guarantees every woman access to public facilities for the purpose of obtaining an abortion. The Court took exception to this argument, observing that “[n]othing in the Constitution requires states to enter or remain in the business of performing abortions.” Instead, the Court said, states may take affirmative steps to encourage childbirth over abortion, which is exactly what the state of Missouri did in this case. Although the statute in question prevented women from seeking abortion services at public facilities, the Court noted that pregnant women in Missouri could still obtain abortion services from private healthcare providers. Third, the Court upheld the constitutional- ity of Missouri Revised Statutes section 188.029, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 345 which required physicians to perform certain medical tests when there was reason to believe a fetus had reached at least 20 weeks of gestational age. These tests, which included assessments of fetal weight and lung maturity, were designed to determine the viability of an unborn child. Because this statute created a presumption of viability at 20 weeks, the plaintiffs contended that it violated the trimester framework estab- lished by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). In Roe the Supreme Court ruled that states have no legitimate interest in regulating abor- tion during the first trimester of pregnancy, and that the decision to terminate a pregnancy during this period rests solely with the pregnant woman and her attending physician. During the second trimester, the Court said in Roe, states may pass abortion regulations that are reason- ably related to preserving the mother’s health. During the third trimester, Roe held that states may ban abortion altogether, unless requiring childbirth would endanger the life of the mother. The Roe decision was based on the premise that states have a compelling interest in protecting fetal life that is triggered by the on set of the third trimester, at which point fetuses typically become viable outside the womb. In Webster the Supreme Court acknowl- edged that the Missouri statute clashed with the Roe trimester analysis by compelling doctors to perform viability examinations during the second trimester of pregnancy, even though such tests were intended to protect the life of a fetus and were unrelated to preserving maternal health. However, the rigid trimester formula created by Roe, the Court pointed out, failed to take into account that some fetuses reach viability before the twenty-fifth week of preg- nancy. The Court also queried why a state’s interest in protecting fetal life should be cognizable only after the second trimester. States have an important interest in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy, the Court posited. The Court then held that the Missouri statute requiring viability examinations during the second trimester was reasonably related to this important governmental interest. The Court emphasized that its holding in Webster would leave undisturbed the fundamental holding of Roe. The Court reiterated that pregnant women still enjoy a LEGAL RIGHT to abortion that is protected by the DUE PROCESS CLAUSES of the FIFTH AMENDMENT and FOURTEE NTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution. At the same time, the Court said that its decision in Webster had modified the Roe trimester analysis by permitting states to regulate abortions prior to the 25th week of pregnancy. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia expressed regret that the Court had not taken this opportunity to completely OVERRULE Roe. The legality of abortion, Scalia argued, is a political issue that should be decided by state legislatures, whose members are democratically elected to office, and not by federal courts, whose members are appointed to the bench for life. In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor urged a more moderate approach. Prior to the point in which a fetus reaches viability,O’Connor wrote, states should be allowed to pass any abortion regulations that do not “unduly burden” a women’s right to terminate her pregnancy. According to O’Connor, the severity of a particular regulatory burden would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The “undue burden” analysis was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992). Most courts now interpret the Webst er decision as it was clarified by Casey, meaning that government attempts to restrict a woman’s liberty at any point during a preg- nancy will be assessed to determine whether the restrictions impose an “undue burden” on the right to have an abortion. Of the two dissenting opinions, Blackmun’s was the more vigorous. As the author of the Roe opinion, Blackmu n chastised the Court for permitting Missouri to regulate abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy in con- travention of established precedent, and char- acterized the Court’s opinion as an invitation to enact draconian abortion regulations. The plurality opinion conceded that the Court’s holding in Webster would enable states to regulate abortion earlier in a pregnancy but reminded the dissenting justices that the decision on how early would partially rest with the American people and their elected representatives. FURTHER READINGS Devins, Neal. 2009. “How Planned Parenthood v. Casy (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars.” Yale Law Journal 118 (May). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 346 WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES Parrish, Jenni, ed. 1995. Abortion Law in the United States. New York: Garland. Rossotti, Jack E., Laura Natelson, and Raymond Tatalovich. 1997. “Nonlegal Advice: The Amicus Briefs in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.” Judicature 81 (November-December). Spahn, Elizabeth, and Barbara Andrade. 1998. “Mis- conceptions: The Moment of Conception in Religion, Science, and Law.” Univ. of San Francisco Law Review 32 (winter). Weddington, Sarah. 1992. A Question of Choice. New York: Putnam. Ziegler, Mary. 2009. “The Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and the Changing Debate on Abortion Law.” Law and History Review. 27 (Summer). CROSS REFERENCES Abortion; Fetal Rights; Precedent; Privacy; Substantive Due Process. v WEDDINGTON, SARAH RAGLE Sarah Ragle Weddington is a Texas lawyer, teacher, author, and public speaker who is best known as the lawyer who took the case on ABORTION rights, ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), to the U. S. Supreme Court and prevailed. Since Roe, Weddington has been a vigorous defender of the decision. During the administration of President JIMMY CARTER, Weddington served in a series of key posts that involved WOMEN’S RIGHTS . Weddington also helped to found the Foundation for Women’s Resources and its subsequent Women’s Museum, which opened in 2000 and features an exhibit on Weddin gton. Weddington was born on February 5, 1945, in Abilene, Texas. She earned a bachelor’s degree from McMurry University in 1965 and a law degree from the University of Texas at Austin in 1967. She was admitted to the Texas bar in 1967. Following her ADMISSION TO THE BAR,Wed- dington opened a law practice in Austin. Soon after, she was approached by a group of women who needed free legal research concerning their inability to secure legal abortions in Texas. Weddington began a CLASS ACTION lawsuit and named as her PLAINTIFF “Jane Roe,” a fictitious name for a woman who was pregnant and wished to terminate her pregnancy. Sarah Ragle Weddington 1945– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1925 2000 1975 1950 ❖ 1945 Born, Abilene, Tex. ◆ 1967 Graduated from University of Texas Law School; admitted to Texas bar 1973 Argued Roe v. Wade before U.S. Supreme Court 1979 Appointed special assistant to President Carter ◆ ◆ 1972–77 Served in the Texas House ◆ 1980 Served as a U.S. delegate to the second World Conference of Women ◆ 1992 A Question of Choice published 1981–90 Distinguished Lecturer at Texas Woman’s University (TWU); adjunct professor in 1993 1983–85 First woman director of Texas Office of State-Federal Relations 2000 Helped launch the Women’s Museum in Dallas, Tex. ◆ ◆ ◆◆ 2001 Sarah Weddington Centennial Leadership Conference held at TWU 1939–45 World War I 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 2008 Received Margaret Brent Women Lawyers of Achievement Award from ABA 2004 Featured speaker at the March for Women’s Lives in D.C. Sarah Weddington. COURTESY OF SARAH WEDDINGTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WEDDINGTON, SARAH RAGLE 347 . THE PURPOSE OF SUING AND BEING SUED , TO BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THAT STATE . —JAMES MOORE WAYNE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 340 WEAPONS magazines that were legally owned when the law went. Women Lawyers of Achievement Award from ABA 2004 Featured speaker at the March for Women’s Lives in D.C. Sarah Weddington. COURTESY OF SARAH WEDDINGTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E. Died, Washington, D.C. ◆◆ ◆ James M. Wayne. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION WAYNE, JAMES MOORE 339 then elected mayor of Savannah. His local political career soon