Bài giảng Kinh tế môi trường: Chương 6 - ĐH Kinh tế

Bài giảng Kinh tế môi trường: Chương 6 sau khi học xong chương này người học có thể hiểu về: Đặc điểm của quyền sở hữu, ai sở hữu, sở hữu tài sản hoặc tài nguyên gì, quyền sở hữu được sử dụng có mang đến hiệu quả không,...

Bộ môn Kinh tế Môi trường, Nông nghiệp Tài nguyên (Department of Environmental, Agricultural, and Resource Economics) 1A Hoàng Diệu, Phú Nhuận, Tp.HCM Môn học: Kinh tế môi trường Ngun nhân suy thối mơi trường: Thất bại thị trường (quyền sở hữu) Quyền sở hữu ▪ Tài liệu tham khảo: Grafton et al 2004 The economics of the environment and natural resources Blackwell Publishing Chapter (Tiếng Anh) Các câu hỏi quyền sở hữu: ▪ Đặc điểm quyền sở hữu? ▪ Ai sở hữu? ▪ Sở hữu tài sản tài nguyên gì? Trả lời câu hỏi giúp xác định hai thứ: ▪ Quyền sở hữu sử dụng có mang đến hiệu không? ▪ Việc phân bổ quyền sở hữu có cơng hay khơng? Phân loại hàng hóa theo khả loại trừ mức độ cạnh tranh Đặc điểm quyền sở hữu Common-pool resources: ➢ Access/enjoyment right ➢ Withdrawal/harvesting right ➢ Management right ▪ Hiệu ngoại tác - Hiệu nghĩa hiệu Pareto An outcome is Pareto efficient if it is not possible to make someone better off without making someone else worse off An outcome is efficient if goods and services, assets and resources have been allocated to their highest value in use based on the marginal willingness and ability to pay - Tiêu chí Pareto thường dùng để so sánh phương án cải thiện Pareto tiềm (PPI) ▪ Hiệu ngoại tác - Một kết không hiệu Pareto? An inefficient outcome arises whenever an individual, agent, or firm undertakes an action that has an external effect, other than through the price system, on the utility function of consumers or production function of producers This inefficiency is a type of market failure and is called a technological externality and may be positive or negative ▪ Hiệu ngoại tác - Một kết không hiệu Pareto? Externalities may also be pecuniary in the sense that individual actions affect others, but these effects occur only through the price system Technological externalities lead to inefficiency because they prevent resources from being allocated to their highest value in use ▪ Hiệu ngoại tác The existence of transactions costs – the costs associated with the negotiation, exchange and enforcement of property rights – are a principal reason why externalities remain unresolved The existence of a technological externality implies that transactions costs are either too high, property rights are improperly specified which prevents mutually beneficial trading to an efficient outcome ▪ Ngoại tác quyền sở hữu The classic case of where a lack of property rights leads to technological externalities is open access where there is free entry and exit and no restrictions on the withdrawal from a commonpool resource The absence of all property rights leads to the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968) where individual users consider only their private costs, but not the costs their actions impose on other resource users ▪ Định lý Coase (the Coase theorem) If property rights exist then, under certain conditions, irrespective of the assignment of property rights, the parties affected by a technological externality who negotiate or bargain among themselves will achieve an efficient outcome ▪ Định lý Coase (the Coase theorem) The conditions to ensure this result are that (1) parties negotiate or bargain at zero cost, (2) there is no strategic behavior in the bargaining, (3) all parties have complete and full information, and (4) the initial distribution of rights does not affect the marginal valuation of resources or assets ▪ Định lý Coase (the Coase theorem) Policy insights: decentralize to resolve technological externalities => MBRs The Coasian approach is radically different to the traditional methods of legal action, and to the use of command and control approaches to mitigate externalities ▪ Market-based rights Assumptins: - An industry with n firms Each firm i produces an output qi Each unit of output causes unit of emission All firms can regulate their emissions only by controlling their output MEC = $e (fixed) Profit maximization Competitive market for output, price = $P Same total cost function: TCi = cqi2 c is constant (MC) Case 1: No property rights Max Ai = P.qi – cqi2 Ai/qi = P – 2cqi => qi‘ = P/2c (inefficient outcome) (1) Case 2: Efficient outcome Max Wi = P.qi – cqi2 – eqi Wi/qi = P – 2cqi – e => qi* = (P-e)/2c (2) Case 3: Decentralized outcome Max Ai = P.qi – cqi2 – €(mi + ti) mi : initial allocation of emission permits ti > if buy, ti < if sell € : price/marketable rights Subject to: qi ≤ mi + ti Max Ai = P.qi – cqi2 - €qi Ai/qi = P – 2cqi – € => qi~ = (P- €)/2c (3) Compare cases and 3: qi* = qi~ if e = € Suppose the allocated number of MBRs = the efficient total level of emissions: E = (q1~+ q2~ + … + qn~) (4) because emissions are homogenous, so E = nqi~ (5) substitute (3) into (5), then E = n(P - €)/2c € = P – 2cE/n (6) ▪ Các loại quyền sở hữu - Private rights - Always exists over private goods Increasingly used for common-pool resources Being introduced for pollution - Community rights - Exist over both private and common-pool resources - State rights - Unique environmental assets Many examples of failures ▪ Tham khảo thêm: Field and Olewiler (2005): Ch.4, 10 Hàm ý sách ▪ Xác lập phân quyền sở hữu ▪ Tư nhân hóa thơng qua việc hình thành thị trường quyền sở hữu tài nguyên ▪ Hạch toán quốc gia dịch vụ sinh thái ... E = n(P - €)/2c € = P – 2cE/n (6) ▪ Các loại quyền sở hữu - Private rights - Always exists over private goods Increasingly used for common-pool resources Being introduced for pollution - Community... common-pool resources Being introduced for pollution - Community rights - Exist over both private and common-pool resources - State rights - Unique environmental assets Many examples of failures ▪ Tham... and to the use of command and control approaches to mitigate externalities ▪ Market-based rights Assumptins: - An industry with n firms Each firm i produces an output qi Each unit of output causes