The ethnic triangle state, majority, and minority in indonesia, malaysia, and singapore

THE ETHNIC TRIANGLE: STATE, MAJORITY AND MINORITY IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE SUN TSAI-WEI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2010 THE ETHNIC TRIANGLE: STATE, MAJORITY AND MINORITY IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE SUN TSAI-WEI MA (National Taiwan Univ.; UCLA) A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2010 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe thanks to many people for helping me during my doctoral work. My deepest gratitude goes first and foremost to Associate Professor Hussin Mutalib, my main supervisor, for his constant encouragement and guidance. Words cannot express my gratitude for Professor Hussin’s firm support and illuminating comments. Most importantly, without his patience with my slow writing process, this thesis could not have reached its present form. I would also like to record my heartfelt gratitude to my three co-supervisors: Dr. Kenneth Paul Tan, Dr. Jamie Davidson, and Dr. Wang Cheng-Lung, for their valuable comments and suggestions on the draft of my thesis. I particularly appreciate their tolerance of my insistence on writing this thesis my way. I am also greatly indebted to the professors at the Department of Political Science—Professor Shamsul Haque, A/P Lee Lai To, Dr. Kilkon Ko, Dr. Ethan Putterman, and Dr. Bradley Williams—for their kind words of encouragement and support during my time at NUS. I also owe my sincere gratitude to my friends and my fellow classmates Yew Chiew Ping, Ang Ming Chee, and Andy Mickey Choong, who assisted me in adapting to life in Singapore, preparing for my qualifying exams and fieldworks, as well as lending a listening ear and helping me work out my problems during the difficult course of my study. Because of them and many other friends at NUS and Taiwan, I had a joyful and memorable time in the past five years. i I would also like to thank the National University of Singapore for awarding me a Research Scholarship for four years and the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, RCHSS, Academia Sinica (Taiwan) for providing me a Ph.D Candidate Research Grant during my final stage of thesis writing. Both funds enabled me to carry on with my research. Lastly, my thanks go to my life-time mentor Professor Wu Yu-shan, my dearest father Professor Sun Chen-ching and mother Huang Hsien-rong, and my sweetest husband Dr. Liao Chien-neng, for their loving support and confidence in me all through these years. At this time when I am writing this acknowledgement, I thank God not only for the completion of this thesis, but more so for having them. Tsai-wei February 2010 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements Table of Contents Summary List of Tables and Figures CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION The Argument Research Method and Data Source Thesis Organization CHAPTER II: THEORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE Literature Review and Alternative Framework The Ethnic Triangle Conclusion CHAPTER III: ETHNIC DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: A CROSS-NATIONAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS Ethnic Difference, Discrimination, and Ethnic Conflict The Chinese in Southeast Asia CHAPTER IV: INDONESIA 1950-2009 Phase I (1950-1965): Formation of the State-Minority Alliance and its Breakup Phase II (1966-1998): From State-Pribumi Marriage to a Stable Unit-Veto Triangle Phase III (1998-2009): A Romantic Triangle in the Democratization Era Summary and Conclusion CHAPTER V: MALAYSIA 1957-2008 Phase I (1957-1969): the Breakdown of the State-Chinese Marriage Phase II (1970-1987): the Consolidation of the State-Malay Marriage Phase III (1988-2008): the Ups and Downs of the State-Malay Relations Summary and Conclusion CHAPTER VI: SINGAPORE 1965-2008 Phase I (1965-1979): From Unit-Veto to Romantic Triangle Phase II (1979-1988): the Outcast State? Phase III (1988-2008): the “Ménage Trois” Triangle and its Challenges Summary and Conclusion CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION The Ethnic Triangle: Purposes and Concepts The Ethnic Triangle: The Empirical Applications Conclusion: Implications of the “Ethnic Triangle Paradigm” to Future Research BIBLIOGRAPHY i iii v vi 11 13 13 25 49 51 51 72 79 80 89 111 127 131 132 142 157 169 173 174 188 203 218 221 221 225 233 237 iii APPENDICES A: Employed MAR Variables in Chapter III B-1: State-Pribumi-Chinese Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Indonesia B-2: State-Malay-Chinese Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Malaysia B-3: State-Chinese-Malay Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Singapore C: GDP Growth Rate (%) of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, 1961-2007 263 265 268 269 270 iv SUMMARY Conventional studies of ethnic conflict and violence have offered general explanations as to the factors that variously influence the escalation of conflicts into violence. The validity of such explanations, by and large, has been confirmed via numerous empirical and quantitative research studies. This particular study, however, does not intend to figure out which factors are more important in bringing about ethnic conflict and violence but rather, is more concerned with interpreting how the various “master cleavages” in selected countries affect ethnic groups and inter-ethnic relations in general. More specifically, this thesis aims to investigate “the processes” by which Governments adopt in managing ethnic relations, specifically, the series of institutional arrangements or policy designs, which in turn lead to changes in the balance of ethnic groups’ relative status and strength. Given the dynamic characteristic of inter-ethnic relations, especially majority-minority relations, invariably, there are bound to be different responses from ethnic groups of such state-initiated policy moves. In turn, these could force the government to further mediate, if not amend, its policies—with the similar corresponding chain reactions from affected ethnic groups, being repeated again and again. It is argued in this thesis that such processes, although admittedly dynamic and somewhat complicated, can actually be better understood through the “ethnic triangle model”, which is adapted from the “strategic triangle” theory in international relations. Applying this theoretical paradigm, this dissertation reviews and analyzes the dynamic, on-going change consequent to State actions, in the relationships among the principal actors in the “triangle”, namely, the State, the Chinese, and the indigenous population, in three post-colonial countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. v LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES A. Tables Table 2-1: Ethnic Triangle and Ethnic Violence 43 Table 3-1: Selected Countries and Ethnic Groups 54 Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics 59 Table 3-3: Correlation Coefficients Between Independent Variables 63 Table 3-4: Regression Results for Three Types of Ethnic Conflict 65 Table 3-5: The Chinese in Southeast Asian Countries 73 Table 4-1: Indonesian Parliamentary Election Results, 1971-2009 95 Table 5-1: Institutional Sources of Malay Electoral Advantage, 1955-2004 136 Table 5-2: Malaysian Parliamentary Election Results, 1959-2008 142 Table 5-3: Mean Monthly Household Income and Poverty Rates, 1970-2007 152 Table 5-4: Ownership of Share Capital of Limited Companies (%), 1970-2004 152 Table 5-5: Demographic Transition in Malaysia, 1970-2000 163 Table 6-1: Singaporean Parliamentary Election Results, 1968-2006 186 Table 6-2: Key Educational and Economic Indicators of the Resident Population 193 Table 6-3: Revealed Ethnic Preferences in the Resale Market for HDB Flats 201 Table 6-4: Distribution of SMD/GRC MPs and Opposition Performance 204 Table 6-5: Elected MPs and Ethnicity, 1968-2006 212 B. Figures Figure 2-1: The strategic Triangle 27 Figure 2-2: Analytical Framework of the Research 50 Figure 4-1: Shifts of the Ethnic Triangle in Indonesia, 1950-2009 80 Figure 5-1: Shifts of the Ethnic Triangle in Malaysia, 1957-2008 131 Figure 5-2: Number of Parliament Seats won by Major Political Forces, 1959-2008 166 Figure 6-1: Shifts of the Ethnic Triangle in Singapore, 1965-2008 172 Figure 6-2: Educational Performance by Malays and Chinese, 1980-2008 217 Figure 7-1: Multiple Ethnic Triangles 225 vi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This dissertation adapts an international relations theory, the “strategic triangle” model, to interpret the dynamic changes in relations between the state and ethnic groups over time. Using this model, it assesses the likelihood of ethnic violence in general and the nature of relations between ethnic Chinese and native populations in three Southeast Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—in particular. Specifically, this study focuses on the effects of policy and institutional factors on state-majority-minority relations, which lead to either ethnic peace or ethnic violence. Over the last decade, ethnic and nationalist strife across the world has drawn both public and academic attention to ethno-cultural violence as a “striking symptom of the ‘new world disorder’” (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998: 424). Recognizing that ethnic war or peace has profound effects on prospects for democracy and economic growth in many countries1, a multitude of explanations has been offered to account for the causes of ethnic violence. These include primordial-cultural, socio-economic, and political factors that contribute to ethnic mobilization and conflict. Scholars and policy-makers have also sought ways of managing ethnic tension and preventing potential violent conflict. These include various designs of constitutional and electoral systems, elite level negotiation and co-operation, and, as a last resort, interventions by international peacekeeping institutions. A review of some of the major research in ethnic-conflict studies will be presented in Chapter II. It appears that some are more theory-oriented, For empirical reports on the effect of ethnic conflict on economic growth, see Alesina, et al. (1999), Easterly & Levine (1997), and Rodrik (1999) for some of the examples. For discussions on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity on the one hand, and political participation, social capital, and the fate of democracy on the other hand, see Alesina & La Ferrara (2000) and Horowitz (1993). seeking to understand and explain ethnic conflict in general, while others provide either statistical data for comparison or detailed information on specific cases or events. Arguably, there are two major weaknesses in much of the past research on ethnic conflict studies. First, most of the research fails to make a distinction between ethnic “conflict” and ethnic “violence,” and between different forms of ethnic violence.2 This lack of a conceptual distinction raises some pertinent questions: Why some ethnic conflicts escalate while others are controlled? Why are some factors salient in some conflicts but not in others? Which kinds of socio-economic and political circumstances are more likely to produce some form of ethnic violence? Second, much of the research is rather mono-dimensional—or at best dual-dimensional. To be sure, many scholars either focus on how state institutions (e.g. the electoral system) and public policies (e.g. language education) unilaterally influence particular ethnic groups, or concentrate on the mobilization processes and tactics of two parties in conflict—either “state versus the opposition” or “group A versus group B.” However, in most multiethnic societies, there are almost always more than two parties in competition in different arenas, and they all affect and are affected by other parties. How these multiple actors or groups (including the state) interact with others and reach a status of equilibrium? What is the role of the state—which represents either the majority group, or the minority group(s), or none—within such multi-actor, multi-dimensional competition? This dissertation proposes to answer the above puzzles by focusing on the dynamics of ethnic conflict and violence. The central questions of this study are: Under what conditions would ethnic groups behave violently? Which types of violence would these Some exceptions include Horowitz (2001) and Varshney (2002), which will be discussed in Chapter II. Suharto's Coup d'état in Indonesia. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press. Rose, William. 2000. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses.” Security Studies 9(4): 1-51. Rossetti, Florence. 1997. “The Chinese in Laos: Rebirth of the Laotian Chinese Community as peace returns to Indochina.” China Perspectives 13: 26 (available at: www.cefc.com.hk/uk/pc/articles/art_ligne.php?num_art_ligne=1305) Rothchild, Donald. 1991. “An Interactive Model for State-Ethnic Relations.” In Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Rozman, Gilbert. 2000. “A New Sino-Russian-American Triangle?” Orbis 44 (4): 541-556. Rush, James. 1991. “Placing the Chinese in Java on the Eve of the Twentieth Century.” In Leonard Blusse (ed.), The Role of the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern Indonesian Life: A Conference in Retrospect. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Samson, Allan A. 1973. “Indonesia 1972: The Solidification of Military Control.” Asian Survey 13(2): 127-139. Samson, Allan A. 1974. “Indonesia 1973: A Climate of Concern.” Asian Survey 14(2): 157-165. Sardini, Nur Hidayat. 2003. “Social Tolerance and Religion Pluralism: The Experience of Three Institutions.” In Stanley Adi Prasetyo, A.E. Priyono, and Olle Tornquist (eds.), Indonesia’s Post-Soeharto Democracy Movement. Jakarta: DEMOS. Sartori, Giovanni. c1997. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes.2nd edition. New York: New York University Press. Schmitt, Hans O. 1962. “Foreign Capital and Social Conflict in Indonesia, 1950-1958.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 10(3): 284-293. Schwarz, Adam. 2000. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Schwarz, Adam. 2004. Indonesia: the 2004 Election and Beyond. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Seah, Chee-Meow. 1980. “Singapore 1979: The Dialectics of Survival.” Asian Survey 20(2): 144-154. Shamsul, A. B. 1997. “Identity Construction, Nation Formation, and Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia.” In Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds.), Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Shamsul, A. B. 1998. “Bureaucratic Management of Identity in a Modern State: ‘Malayness’ in Postwar Malaysia.” In Dru C. Gladney (ed.), Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Shari, Ishak. 2000. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality in Malaysia, 1971-95.” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 5(1/2): 112-124. 255 Shee, Poon-Kim. 1978. “Singapore in 1977: Stability and Growth.” Asian Survey 18(2): 194-201. Shee, Poon-Kim. 1979. “Singapore 1978: Preparation for the 1980s.” Asian Survey 19(2): 124-130. Shiraishi, Takashi. 1997. “Anti-Sinicism in Java’s New Order.” In Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (eds.), Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Siegel, James. 1998. “Early Thoughts on the Violence of May 13 and 14, 1998 in Jakarta.” Indonesia 66: 75-108. Singh, Bilveer. 2008. “Singapore: Success at Home, Challenges from Abroad.” Southeast Asian Affairs 2009. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singh, Bilveer. 2009. “Malaysia in 2008: The Elections That Broke the Tiger’s Back.” Asian Survey 49(1): 156-165. Singh, Pritam. 2007. “Framing Islamic Education in Malaysia: Transnationalism, Education Politics, and Affirmative Action.” Working Papers on Social and Cultural Issues No.3. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Siregar, Arifin M. 1969. “Indonesian Entrepreneurs.” Asian Survey 9(5): 343-358. Smith, Anthony D 1971. Theories of Nationalism. London: Duckworth. Smith, Anthony D 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin. Smith, Anthony D 1998. Nationalism and Modernism. London: Routledge. Smith, Anthony D c1988. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. New York: Blackwell. Smith, Martin. 1991. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed Books. Smith, T. E. 1960. “The Malayan Elections of 1959.” Pacific Affairs 33(1): 38-47. Snider, Nancy L. 1968. “What Happened in Penang?” Asian Survey 8(12): 960-975. Snow, David A., Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford. 1986. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” American Sociological Review 51(4): 464-481. Snyder, Jack and Edward Mansfield. 1995. “Democratization and the Danger of War.” International Security 20(1): 5-38. Snyder, Jack. c2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: Norton. Soh, Kay Cheng. 1993. “Ethnic Relations in Neighborhood Schools.” In Ooi Giok Ling, Sharon Siddique and Soh Kay Cheng (eds.), The Management of Ethnic Relations in Public Housing Estates. Singapore: Times Academic Press for Institute of Policy Studies. Somers, Heidhues Mary F. 1965. Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia. Ph.D Thesis. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University. Somers, Heidhues Mary F. 1974. Southeast Asia's Chinese Minorities. Hawthorn, Vic.: Longman. 256 Starner, Frances L. 1965. “Malaysia’s First Year.” Asian Survey 5(2): 113-119. Suhandinata, Justian. 2009. Indonesian Chinese Descent in Indonesia’s Economy and Political Stability. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama Publisher. Sukardi Rinakit. 2005. “Decentralization and the military.” In Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Carole Faucher (eds.), Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia. New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Sukma, Rizal. 2005. “Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution.” In Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson (eds.), Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Sundhaussen, Ulf. 1989. “Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with Democracy.” In Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner. Sundrum, R.M. 1986. “Indonesia’s Rapid Economic Growth: 1968-81.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 22(3): 40-69. Sundrum, R.M. 1988. “Indonesia’s Slow Economic Growth: 1981-86.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 24(1): 37-72. Suryadinata, Leo. 1990. “National Ideology and Nation-Building in Multi-Ethnic States: Lessons from Other Countries.” In Jon S. T. Quah (ed.), In Search of Singapore’s National Values. Singapore: Times Academic Press. Suryadinata, Leo. 1993. “Patterns of Chinese Political Participation in Four ASEAN States.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 15(3): 292-308. Suryadinata, Leo. 1997. Chinese and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. Suryadinata, Leo. 2001. “Chinese Politics in Post-Suharto’s Indonesia: Beyond the Ethnic Approach?” Asian Survey 41(3): 502-524. Suryadinata, Leo. 2004. “Indonesian State Policy Towards Ethnic Chinese: From Assimilation to Multiculturalism.” In Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Chinese Indonesians: State Policy, Monoculture and Multiculture. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish. Suryadinata, Leo. 2005. Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish. Suryadinata, Leo. 2006. “Ethnic Relations and State Policies: the Case of Contemporary Indonesian Chinese.” In Lee Guan Kin (ed.), Demarcating Ethnicity in New Nations: Cases of the Chinese in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. Suryadinata, Leo. 2008. “Chinese Indonesians in an Era of Globalization: Some Major Characteristics.” In Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Ethnic Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Suryadinata, Leo. c2004. The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish. Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan. 2002. “Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition: The Case of Indonesia.” Working Paper 02/01. Jakarta: UNSFIR. Tan, Chee-Beng. 2000. “Socio-cultural Diversities and Identities.” In Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee-Beng (eds.), The Chinese in Malaysia. Oxford University Press. 257 Tan, Eugene K.B. 2004. “The Majority’s Sacrifices and Yearnings: Chinese-Singaporeans and the Dilemmas of Nation-Building.” In Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Ethnic Relations and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: the Case of the Ethnic Chinese. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Tan, Eugene K.B. 2005. “Multiracialism Engineered: The Limits of Electoral and Spatial Integration in Singapore.” Ethnopolitics 4(4): 413-428. Tan, Jason. 1995. “Joint Government-Malay Community Efforts to Improve Malay Educational Achievement in Singapore.” Comparative Education 31(3): 339-353. Tan, Kenneth Paul. 2003. “Crisis, Self-Reflection, and Rebirth in Singapore’s National Life Cycle.” In Southeast Asian Affairs 2003. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Tan, Mely G. 2004. “The Social and Cultural Dimension of Gender-Based Violence in Indonesia: From Labelling to Discrimination to Violence.” In Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Chinese Indonesians: State Policy, Monoculture and Multiculture. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish. Tarrow, Sidney G. c1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Carl. 1963. “Indonesian Views of China.” Asian Survey 3(3): 165-72. Thee, Kian Wie. 2001. “Reflections on the New Order ‘Miracle’.” In Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds.), Indonesia Today: Challenges of History. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Thee, Kian Wie. 2002. “The Soeharto Era and After: Stability, Development and Crisis, 1966-2000.” In Howard Dick, et. al. (eds.), The Emergence of a National Economy: an Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2(2): 369-404. Thomson, Curtis N. 1993. “Political Identity Among Chinese in Thailand.” Geographical Review 83(4): 397-410. Thung Ju Lan. 2004. “Ethnicity and the Civil Rights Movement in Indonesia.” In Lee Hock Guan (ed.), Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Tilman, Robert O. and Jo H. Tilman. 1977. “Malaysia and Singapore, 1976: A Year of Challenge, a Year of Change.” Asian Survey 17(2): 143-154. Tjhin, Christine Susanna. 2009. “A New Political Animal?” Inside Indonesia 95 (Jan-Mar 2009) (available at http://insideindonesia.org/content/section/4/113/) Touwen-Bouwsma, Elly. 2002. “Japanese Policy towards the Chinese on Java, 1942-1945: A Preliminary Outline.” In Paul H. Kratoska (ed.), Southeast Asian Minorities in the Wartime Japanese Empire. RoutledgeCurzon. Tully, James. 1996. Strange Multiplicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turner, Sarah and Pamela Allen. 2007. “Chinese Indonesians in a Rapidly Changing Nation: Pressures of Ethnicity and Identity.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 48(1): 112-127. Utrecht, E. 1969. “Land Reform in Indonesia.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 5(3): 71-88. 258 van der Kroef, Justus M. 1968. “The Sarawak-Indonesian Border Insurgency.” Modern Asian Studies 2(3): 245-265. van Dijk, C. 1981. Rebellion under the Banner of Islam : the Darul Islam in Indonesia. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Varshney, Ashutosh, Rizal Panggabean, Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin. 2004. “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003).” Working Paper 04/03. Jakarta: UNSFIR. Varshney, Ashutosh. 2001. “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond.” World Politics 53(3): 362-398. Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven: Yale University Press. Vasil, R. K. 1980. Ethnic Politics in Malaysia. Radiant Publishers. Vasil, Raj. 1995. Asianising Singapore: The PAP’s Management of Ethnicity. Singapore: Heinemann Asia. von der Mehden, Fred R. 1981. “Malaysia in 1980: Signals to Watch.” Asian Survey 21(2): 245-252. von der Mehden, Fred R. 1982. “Malaysia in 1981: Continuity and Change.” Asian Survey 22(2): 212-218. Walter, Barbara F. 1999. “Introduction.” In Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (eds.), Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention. New York: Columbia University Press. Wang, Gungwu. 1992. Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia. Allen & Unwin. Wariya, Chamil. 1989. “Leadership Change and Security in Malaysia: From the Days of the Tunku to Dr Mahathir Mohamad.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 11(2): 160-185. Weatherbee, Donald E. 1985. “Indonesia in 1984: Pancasila, Politics, and Power.” Asian Survey 25(2): 187-197. Weatherbee, Donald E. 1986. “Indonesia in 1985: Chills and Thaws.” Asian Survey 26(2): 141-149. Webber, Douglas. 2006. “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” Democratization 13(3): 396-420. Weiss, Meredith L. 2000. “The 1999 Malaysian General Elections: Issues, Insults, and Irregularities.” Asian Survey 40(3): 413-435. Weiss, Meredith L. 2002. “Contesting Race and Nation: Malay Dominance and Multiracial Coalitions in Malaysia.” In Roy Starrs (ed.), Nations Under Siege: Globalization and Nationalism in Asia. New York: Palgrave Weiss, Meredith L. 2003. “The Malaysian Human Rights Movement.” In Meredith L Weiss and Saliha Hassan. Social Movements in Malaysia: From Moral Communities to NGOs. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Welsh, Bridget. 2004. “Real Change? Elections in the Reformasi Era.” In Edmund Terence Gomez (ed.), The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Welsh, Bridget. 2005. “Malaysia in 2004: Out of Mahathir’s Shadow?” Asian Survey 259 45(1): 153-160. Wen, Beiyan. 2003. “Comparison of the Ethnic Chinese Integration Degree of Mainstream of Society between Indonesia and Malaysia.” Around Southeast Asia (China) 2003(1): 49-53. Winarta, Frans H. 2008. “No More Discrimination Against the Chinese.” In Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Ethnic Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Wu, Yu-Shan. 1996. “Exploring Dual Triangles: The Development Taipei-Washington- Beijing Relations.” Issues & Studies 32(10): 26-52. of Wu, Yu-Shan. 2000. “Theorizing on Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Nine Contending Approaches.” Journal of Contemporary China 9(25): 407-428. Yang, Tsung Rong. 2006. “The Indonesian Chinese and the Ethnic Issue: A Case Study of the Social Riots in the Late New Order (1994-1997).” In Lee Guan Kin (ed.), Demarcating Ethnicity in New Nations: Cases of the Chinese in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. Yen, Ching-hwang. 2000. “Historical Background.” In Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee-Beng (eds.), The Chinese in Malaysia. Oxford University Press. Yeo, Lay Hwee. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Singapore.” In Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns and Marei John (eds.), Electoral Politics in Southeast & East Asia. Singapore: Freidrich Ebert Stiftung. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Suzaina Kadir. 2005. “Ethnic Conflict, Prevention and Management: The Malaysian Case.” In Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson (eds.), Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Zakaria Haji Ahmad. 1985. “Malaysia in 1984: No More Free Lunches?” Asian Survey 25(2): 206-213. Zakaria Haji Ahmad. 1986. “Malaysia in 1985: The Beginnings of Sagas.” Asian Survey 26(2): 150-157. Zakaria Haji Ahmad. 2000. “The 1999 General Elections: A Preliminary Overview.” In Trends in Malaysia: Election Assessment. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76(6): 22-43. Zhang, Ming and Ronald N. Montaperto. 1999. A Triad of Another Kind: The United States, China, and Japan. New York: Palgrave. Zhou, Fuyuan. 2003. “Where Do We Belong?” Asian Ethnicity 4(3): 453-459. Official Publications and Websites (Government; NGOs) (Indonesia) Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Elections Comission, KPU) Official Website: http://www.kpu.go.id/ (Malaysia) Federal Constitution (as at 1st July, 1985). Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Law Publishers, 1985. 260 (Malaysia) General Report of the Population Census (1970; 1980; 1990; 2000). Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, [1972; 1983; 1995; 2001]. (Malaysia) Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1971. (Malaysia) Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya (SPR, Election Commission Malaysia) Official Website: http://www.spr.gov.my/eng/ (Malaysia) Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1976. (Singapore) AMP Official Website: http://www.amp.org.sg (Singapore) Elections http://www.elections.gov.sg Department Singapore Official Website: (Singapore) Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS) Official Website: http://app.mcys.gov.sg/web/home_main.asp (Singapore) NTU Official Website: http://www.ntu.edu.sg (Singapore) Parliamentary Debates Singapore 1988, 1989. Parliament of Singapore Official Website: http://www.parliament.gov.sg (Singapore) Shared Values. Government of Singapore, White Paper, January 1991 (Singapore) Singapore Statutes Online: http://statutes.agc.gov.sg (Singapore) Singapore Yearbook of Manpower Statistics, 2006. Available from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN028652.pdf. (Singapore) Statistics Singapore Official Website: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/ Country Studies. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, U.S. Department of the Army: http://countrystudies.us/ Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2006. Available from: www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls Goh, Keng Swee and the Education Study Team. 1979. Report on the Ministry of Education 1978. Singapore: Singapore National Printers. International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database (1980-2008) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/WEOOct2008all.xls) Minorities at Risk Project (MAR). 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/. Ong, Teng Cheong and the Moral Education Committee. 1979. Report on moral education 1979. Singapore: Singapore National Printers. Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, Taiwan, R.O.C. http://www.ocac.gov.tw/download.asp?tag=P&file=DownFile/File_17979.pdf&no=179 79 Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Available from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009. World Bank. 1999 World http://www.worldbank.org/. Development Indicators. Available from World Bank. 2008 World http://www.worldbank.org/. Development Indicators. Available from 261 Newspapers, Magazines, and Website Resources Asiaweek BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, various issues. Business Times, various issues. Economist, various issues. Far Eastern Economic Review, various issues. Indonesia Matters (http://www.indonesiamatters.com/) NationMaster.com (http://www.nationmaster.com/time.php?stat=eco_gdp_gro_ann-economy-gdp-growth-a nnual&country=my-malaysia) Swivel Preview (http://www.swivel.com) The Economist, various issues. The Jakarta Post, various issues. The Straits Times (Singapore), various issues. The Times, various issues. 262 APPENDIX A: Employed MAR Variables in Chapter III Variable Implication Value and Label 1. Employed Minority at Risks Variables as Case Selection Criteria: For an ethnic group to be selected in chapter III, it must meet ALL three following criteria: (1) Group’s population > 100,000; (2) Group proportion of country population > 2.5%; (3) GOJPA Exceptions (cases with * in Table 3-1): Groups which not meet criteria (1) or (2) BUT whose GROUPCON AND GOJPA will also be selected GROUPCON Groups spatial Widely dispersed distribution Primarily urban or minority in one region Majority in one region, others dispersed Concentrated in one region GOJPA Group No political movements or organizations representing group interests organization Group interests promoted by umbrella organizations Group interests promoted by one or more conventional political parties/movements for joint Group interests promoted mainly by conventional movements/parties but also by political militant organizations with limited support action Group interests promoted mainly by militant organizations but also by some conventional organizations Group interests promoted only by militant organizations 2. Dependent Variables: Types of Group Conflict (taken directly from Minority at Risks Database) COMCO Communal Annual indicators. . Missing values: -99. conflict index, None manifest 1990-2000 Acts of harassment: individual acts against property/persons with no fatalities Political agitation: Campaigns urging authorities to impose restrictions on group Sporadic violent attacks: by gangs or other small groups. Some fatal actions Anti-group demonstrations : Rallies, marches Communal rioting: Armed attacks Communal warfare: Protracted, large-scale inter-group violence PROT Protest None reported Verbal opposition Requests by a minority-controlled regional group for independence (public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, court action, etc.). Symbolic resistance Sabotage, symbolic destruction of property OR political organizing activity on a substantial scale (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic). Small demonstrations A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total participation of less than 10,000. Medium demonstrations (total participation between 10,000 and 100,000) Large demonstrations (total participation over 100,000) REB Rebellion None reported Political banditry, sporadic terrorism (< events) Campaigns of terrorism (> events) Local rebellion Armed attempts to seize power in a locale except cases that are the beginning of a protracted guerrilla or civil war during the reported year. Small-scale guerrilla activity Includes all of the following traits: < 1000 armed fighters, sporadic armed attacks ( 1000 armed fighters, frequent armed attacks (>6 reported per year), and attacks affecting large part of the area occupied by the group. Civil war/protracted civil war fought by rebel military Has all the characteristics of large-scale guerrilla activity, plus rebels control large scale base areas that are secure over time. 3. Independent Variables taken directly from Minority at Risks Database AGGDIFXX Aggregate Based on the total number of differences checked for 18 indicators. Maximum differentials possible score is 18. Missing Values: -99. index ≧ ≧ ≧ 263 CULRES Cultural Restrictions index (90-00) Political Restrictions index (90-00) Summing the weight of eight types of cultural policy restrictions: religion, use of language, language instruction, ceremonies, appearance (e.g. dress), family life (e.g. marriage), cultural organizations, and others. POLRES Summing the weight of nine types of cultural policy restrictions: freedom of expression, freedom of movement, rights in judicial proceedings, restrictions on organizing, restrictions on voting rights, policy/military recruitment, civil service access, access to higher office, and other political restriction. ECDIS Economic No discrimination discrimination Neglect/remedial policies index Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group’s material well being. Neglect/No remedial policies No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group’s material well-being. Social exclusion/neutral policy Significant poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination Exclusion/restrictive policy Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups. 4. Independent Variables taken from Freedom House and World Bank FREEDOM Freedom status Free (country) Partly Free Not Free According to Freedom House, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights (PR) and for Civil Liberties (CL) fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 “Partly Free," and between 5.5 and 7.0 “Not Free.” Both PR and CL are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of Freedom and seven the lowest. INCOME Income status High Income country (country) Upper Middle Income country Lower Middle Income country Low According to World Bank, countries are classified as low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, or high income, based on each country’s GNI per capita in US$. 264 APPENDIX B-1: State-Pribumi-Chinese Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Indonesia Date Place Crisis (Pol/Eco/Soc-Cul) and/or Incidents The Dutch colonial period and the Japanese occupation (before 1945) Jakarta (then Batavia) Chinese v.s. the ruling Dutch 1740 Solo; Surabaya anti-Sinicism 1912 Kudus anti-Sinicism, by members of Sarekat Islam (SI) 1918 Mar/1942 Java; Sumatra Directly by the Japanese (against suspected dissidents) Oct/1943 “Pontianak Affair” large-scale arrests to suppress a suspected rebellion The war for Independence (Aug 1945 – Dec 1949) 10/Nov/1945 Surabaya n.a. 23/Mar/1946 Bandung n.a. 6-8/Jun Tangerang, Java The suspicion on the part of the Indonesian nationalists that the Chinese were pro-Dutch 18/Sept Bagansiapiapi 01/Jan/1947 Palembang Java Timur (E. Java) Anti-Dutch “1st police action” Java Barat (W. Java) Java Tengah (C. Java) Sumatra 19/Dec Jambi Anti-Dutch “2nd police action” Java Sumatra The 1960s: The Sukarno Regime Under the Threat of Communism May/1963 Bandung, Sukabumi, & Anti-Chinese sentiment under the PKI shadow fights cities in W Java b/t students of ITB riots 7-11/Jun Cirebon Late 1965~67 Java & Sumatra Anti-Communism & Anti-Chinese 10/Nov/1965 Makassar Riots by Muslim student and youth organizations, HMI (S. Sulawesi) & ANSOR 10/Dec Medan An attack on the Chinese consulate police shots rampage of the city Apr, Aug, Oct Jakarta “The Ling Siang Yu affair” an anti-Chinese mob attacked the mourning Chinese anti-communist 1967 youths launched a demonstration and broke into the Chinese embassy Oct-Nov W. Kalimantan Killings of Dayaks by Chinese communists/PGRS guerrillas riots by Dayaks against Chinese civilians 18/Oct/1968 ? The execution of Indonesian marines by Singapore caused anti-Chinese riots The 1970s and 1980s: The New Order 27/Jun/1973 Palu S-Cul: a Chinese shop owner uses a paper w/ Qur’an to pack, which was regarded as impiety 5/Aug Bandung (W. Java) S-Cul: a VW car with Chinese knocked down a local people on the road ECO.: rice shortage mid-Jan/1974 Jakarta ECO: thousands of students protested to oppose “the Malari riot” excessive Japanese investment, rising prices, and corruption turned into an anti-Chinese riot 20/Jul Apr/1980 Makassar Apr Medan (Sumatra) 19-21/Nov 24/Nov Early Dec 12/Sept/1984 Solo Semarang Magelang, Pekalongan, Kukus, towns of C Java Tanjung Priok C&E Java S-Cul: (rumor) a servant in a Chinese family, Suharti, died because of her boss’s maltreatment S-Cul: anti-Chinese demonstration by USU students anti-Chinese communal riots S-Cul: student fight w/ ethnic-Chinese involved POL: anti-government’s Bill on Mass Organizations SOC-CUL: C/E Java were flooded w/ underground Damages (esp. Chinese) & Government Response 6,000 killed n.a. n.a. n.a. Of the 1500 killed by the Japanese, 854 were Chinese 58 killed; 13 injured; missing; 43 houses damaged 54 killed; 50 injured; 36 missing; 5020 houses damaged 656 killed (136 women, 36 children); 496 injured; 403 missing; 3409 houses damaged 239 killed; 52 injured 256 killed; 114 injured; 594 missing; 3060 houses damaged 164 killed; 50 injured; 165 missing; 1849 arrested 83 killed; 18 injured; 52 missing; 7233 arrested 406 killed; injured; 180 missing; 6559 arrested 196 killed; 92 injured; 78 missing; 89 arrested killed; injured; missing; 389 houses damaged 757 killed; 89 injured; 9221 arrested 26 killed; 18 injured; 52 arrested n.a. 500000~1000000 killed, most were NOT Chinese The targets were Chinese buildings and other property rather than people About 200 killed killed; >20 injured Thousands of Chinese killed, more than 50,000 refugees Many houses, shops and property of the ethnic Chinese destroyed Chinese-owned shops were attacked killed; 23 hospitalized; 1500 shops and houses damaged; cost: 1000000 rupiah 11 killed; >800 detained; >100 buildings burned; >800 cars destroyed; thousands of shops looted. [*e.g. “Astra”, a local firm which imported Toyota automobiles, owned by a Chinese family, was burned] > 100 Chinese-owned houses and shops destroyed n.a. In total: killed; 14 injured; >680 arrested; 240 Chinese shops, 230 homes, 23 factories, 32 office buildings, and school damaged The 1st bombings were of the Bank Central Asia, part of the holdings of Liem Sioe Liong (Chinese tycoon); 28 were killed pamphlets inciting the faith to take up arms to defend their religion against those who would destroy Islam Jan/1985 Borobudur POL/S-Cul: last year’s riots spilled over Early Jul Jakarta POL/S-Cul: last year’s riots spilled over Sept 1986 Surabaya Buddhist images were bombed; the palace of the Susuhuman of Solo was burned The Metro shopping center in Chinatown was destroyed in a fire; the headquarters of Radio Republik Indonesia was gutted in a major blaze; 60 buildings in a Jakarta commercial district were flamed Chinese-owned cars and shops were burned S-Cul.: a girl servant claimed being maltreated by her Chinese boss The 1990s: the Last Years of the Suharto Regime 1/Jan/1994 n.a. Trishaw riders vs. police for an accident Chinese shops and vehicles were looted and destroyed Mid-Apr Medan POL: anti-government labor protest anti-Chinese riot Chinese killed; >150 Chinese-owned stores destroyed; a [* the most serious anti-Chinese riot in N Sumatra in the dozen factories destroyed; some 50 vehicles overturned past 12 years] 265 26/Jul/1995 2-4/Nov Banjarmasin (S. Kalimantan) Purwakarta (W. Java) 24-26/Nov 14/Jan/1996 27/Jul Pekalongan (M Java) Bandung (W. Java) Jakarta *PDI headquarters 10/Oct Situbondo (E. Java) 16/Dec 27/Jan/1997 30/Jan 18/Feb 27/Mar 23/May 2/Jun 9/Sept 15/Sept 5/Jan/1998 12-13/Jan 12-16/Jan 24/Jan 26/Jan~3/Feb 28-30/Jan 1-4/Feb 6/Feb 7/Feb 8/Feb 11/Feb 12/Feb 12-16/Feb 12-14/Feb 13/Feb 14/Feb 14/Feb 16/Feb S-Cul: an argument b/t a shopkeeper and a customer At least Chinese-owned shops destroyed S-Cul: (rumor) a 14-yr old Muslim girl of a local shop was slapped by her Chinese boss for stealing chocolate S-Cul: a Chinese tore pages from the Qur’an S-Cul: people couldn’t get ticket of a rock concert POL: anti-Suharto riots after the gov’t-supported ousting of Megawati as leader of the IDP > 20,000 people rampaged the business center; 18 shops, warehouses, houses and vehicles were destroyed Property owned by the ethnic Chinese was ransacked Chinese businesses and vehicles were targeted killed; 30 missing; 149 wounded; >20 buildings, banks, and 100 vehicles were burned; Chinese businesses were specifically attacked [* the most violent riots in decades in Jakarta] POL/relig: > 3000 Muslims rioted after a court decision to impose only 5-yr prison sentence on a Muslim leader who was charged w/ insulting Islam Tasikmalaya (W. Java) POL/relig: thousands of Muslims rioted for the police’s mistreatment of a Muslim teacher and senior Islamic students – who were beaten in a city jail for disciplining a policeman’s son Tanah Abang (Jabotabek) n.a. Rengasdengklok (W. Java) S-Cul: a Chinese complained about the noise made by Muslims who were observing Ramadan killed (Christian); 25 churches were burnt; a Chinese temple and dozens of Chinese-owned stores were vandalized of the dead were Chinese; Chinese businesses & Christian churches were targeted; >100 buildings (police stations, churches, factories, shops, schools, banks) were burned—cost $36 million A factory was burned down killed (1 Chinese); churches, Buddhist temples, 42 shops, 76 houses, banks, factories—many owned by the Chinese, were attacked; 21 rioters were arrested Bandung (W. Java) n.a. n.a. Pekalongan (C. Java) POL: Golkar vs. the PPP for the 29 May elections > 60 buildings, mostly Chinese, were damaged Banjarmasin (S. POL: riots almost daily during the election. A fire 130 people were killed as fire engulfed a shopping center; Kalimantan) occurred when thousands of Golkar and PPP supporters some churches and a Buddhist temple were burnt along w/ rampaged through the city Chinese-owned businesses Kadipaten (W. Java) S-Cul: (rumor) a Chinese shop boss strip- searched a Chinese properties and churches were attacked female accused of shoplifting Tangerang (Jabotabek) n.a. n.a. Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi) S-Cul: a Chinese man Benny w/ mental disease people killed (including Benny); 62 houses burned; allegedly murdered a 9-yr-old Muslim girl churches/ temples destroyed. The damage to 1471 homes and stores was valued at 17.5 billion rupiah ($1.8 million) Bandung (W Java) POL: 1000s against mishandled official attempts to 100s of shops along km stretch of road in the area of clean up roadside stalls anti-Chinese riots Cicadas destroyed, including Marahari Dept. store Genteng (W Java); ECO: against increase in the prices of basic goods, 100s of Chinese-owned warehouses, stores, and vehicles Glenmore, Jajag, Kalibaru, kerosene (also anti-government) were damaged Rogojampi, Srono, Singojuruh (E Java) Jember and surrounds (E Many Chinese shops were attacked; Sumber Mas, 2nd Java); Banyuwangi (W biggest dept store/shopping center was destroyed Java) Probolinggo (E Java) n.a. Pakisaji, Rembang, churches, >15 Chinese stores, >17 shops destroyed; A Chinese-owned rice milling company was attacked Kragan, Tuban (C & E Java); Banyuwangi Bulu, Jatirogo, Palang, ECO: coincides w/ Islamic holiday Idul Fitri b/c the Chinese-owned shops were looted; a Pentecostal church in Rembang, Tambakboy (E celebration food costs too high Bulu was destroyed Java) ECO & S-Cul: against rising prices of basic goods, food Stoned about Chinese shops and street lamps in Ujung Pandang (S. shortages, mass unemployment Donggala; Chinese-owned kerosene shops in Malang; and Sulawesi); Donggala (C Sulawesi); Sukarame (W S-Cul: anti-Chinese graffiti – Chinese are blamed for the dozens of Chinese-owned shops in Ujung Pandang Java); Malang, Pasuruan, above problems Puger (E Java); Bandar Lampung Brebes (C Java); Bima (W Warehouses of Chinese wholesalers of basic goods looted; Nusa Tenggara) Chinese-owned shops, hotel, shopping mall damaged. Bojonegoro (E Java) “Langgeng” attacked (Chinese-owned; largest store in the area selling basic commodities) Ende, Lombok (E & W >21 Chinese-owned shops destroyed; 71 shops looted; Nusa Tenggara) ethnic- Chinese sought sanctuary w/ the military & police Palu (C Sulawesi) n.a. Losari (Yogyakarta) young were shot; injured; 40 Chinese properties damaged; merchandise thrown into streets & burned Bulakamba, Gebang, killed; 10 injured; >150 Chinese-owned stores, hotels, Purwokerto, Brebes (C restaurants burned & looted; churches burn; Chinese Java); Bandung, Ciasem, Ciledug, Cirebon, Patrol, Sukamandi (W Java) families shelter in police stations/fled Jatiwangi (W. Java) Pamanukan (W Java); Padang Siampuan (N Sumatra) Lumajang (E Java); Sentani (Irian Jaya); Praya (Lombok) Kendari (SE Sulawesi) S-Cul.: anti-Chinese riots have been provoked by conservative Islamic scholars who called for a jihad against financial speculators and commodity hoarders. Pagaralam (S Sumatra) n.a. 25 Chinese stores burned; about 30 houses damaged n.a. killed and >26 injured; 150 Chinese businesses destroyed > 6000 rioted; Chinese-owned properties were attacked n.a. 266 10/May Medan (N Sumatra) POL.: Anti-government rioting Note: this is the worst unrest in Medan since 1994 13 killed; 70 injured; 100 buildings destroyed; raped; 50 cars/motors burned 13-15/May Jakarta POL: student protestors were shot by police forces the massive anti-Suharto riots ECO-CUL: anti-Chinese riots Total: > 2,200 people killed; 168 women raped; > 25,000 foreigners & Chinese fled the country b/t May 13~20 * Trisakti Students shooting: killed, 16 injured * Jakarta riots: 1188 killed, 1339 injured, 152 raped, 6230 buildings destroyed, 1948 cars/motors burned * Solo riots: 30 killed, 20 disappeared, 338 buildings destroyed, 919 cars/motors burned, 10 raped 14-15/May Solo (C Java), Medan Padang (W Sumatra), Palembang (Lampung), Yogyakarta Post-Suharto Period 29/May/1998 Jeneponto (S Sulawesi) 4/Dec 8/Dec 25/Dec * Reasons not clear, but this is one of the first outbreaks of violence since Suharto resigned Tegal (C Java) and other POL-ECO.: protesting against corruption and rising Java towns food prices Purworejo (C Java) n.a. Jeber (E Java) n.a. * Around 1000 people riot Wonosori (E Java); n.a. Cilacap (C Java); Lombok Aceh POL.: triggered by anti-military sentiments, targeting the Chinese Medan (N Sumatra) n.a. 1. Kebumen (C. Java); 2. 1. S-Cul.: (rumor) a Chinese boss hit a pribumi worker. Jakarta & Surabaya 2. ECO.: against the rising prices of basic goods Pontianak (W The hiking food prices made people who cannot buy Kalimantan) them plundered stores Riau, Jambi S-Cul.: (rumor) a Chinese killed a pribumi in a traffic accident Jakarta demonstrators (against Habibie) were shot by police near Atma Jaya Univ. looting and general disorder Pare (S Sulawesi) n.a. Luwu (S Sulawesi) n.a. Poso (S Sulawesi) n.a. 9/Jan/1999 Kerawang (W. Java) n.a. 8/Mar Early Apr Bandung (W Java) W. Kalimantan 15/Apr Jakarta Religious: Muslims vs. Catholic Chinese S-Cul: b/t Madurese settlers, Dayaks, and the Chinese; but mainly b/t Dayak & the Madurese. n.a. 23-24/Sept 28/Sept 17-19/Jan/ 2000 25/Jan 18/Feb/2001 Jakarta, Bandung, Medan, Protests against the proposed new security laws Ujungpandang, Lampung, Semarang Mataram (Lombok) POL: against resort & industrial developers begin on Bintan (Riau) S-Cul: victims were the Chinese and Bima, Sumbawa the Christians Selat Panjang (Riau) A gambling dispute triggered an anti-Chinese riot 10/May/2006 Makassar 15-16/Jun 26/Jun 17/Jul 28/Aug 31/Aug 31/Aug 2/Sept 7-9/Sept 8-9/Sept 15/Sept 13/Nov A Chinese man allegedly tortured his indigenous housemaid to death thousand of people poured onto the streets to vent their anger over the case Chinese shops were targeted Peaceful protests turn violent as thousands attack Chinese properties Chinese businesses are among others targeted Chinese properties are looted and burnt. Wonosori: 1000s looted rice mills owned by the Chinese; Cilacap: >10000 fishermen set fire to 10 trawlers owned by the Chinese killed; Chinese businesses are attacked during two days of rioting by some 2,000 people n.a. Chinese properties are attacked; Chinese shops burned n.a. 3,000 people rampage through; government offices and around 400 buildings owned by the Chinese are torched. [Protests spread to Bandung, Surabaya, Yogya, Semarang, Padang Bali, Medan, Balikpapan, Samarinda and Ambon] n.a. n.a. 79 injured’ 130 houses, shops, 12 government offices, and 15 cars destroyed Mobs attacked Chinese properties; killed; 19 injured; 31 shops destroyed; cars burned >80 buildings, shop, cars, and school destroyed More than 200 people were killed A bomb exploded in a Chinese-owned department store 800 meters from the presidential palace students were shot in the Jakarta protest > 15 churches, central business (mainly Chinese-owned) and hundreds of houses burned; >1200 people dislocated A police station, housing for families of policeman, and many Chinese-owned shops were burned; 16 Chinese were killed; >2000 Chinese fled to Pekanbaru, Karimun island, and other locations. n.a. Sources: data before 1994 are collected from various Asian Survey annual reports and other academic articles; data after 1994 are based on reports from Jakarta Post, Far Eastern Economic Review, Sejarah Indonesia (Indonesian Matters), and Purdey (2006: 219-220, Appendices A). 267 APPENDIX B-2: State-Malay-Chinese Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Malaysia Date 1945-47 Jan/1958 May/1959 21/Jul/1961 Jul-Sept/1964 12/Jul/1964 1966 1967 Nov-Dec/ 1967 13/May-lateJuly/1969 1973 Dec/1974 Place Batu Pahat (45/46) Batu Malim (Raub) Batu Kikir (46) Penang Pangkor Damages & Government Response ** 1948-1960: the 1st time use of Emergency powers n.a. S-Cul.: a quarrel b/t Chinese & Malay A large-scare evacuation of 2,000 Chinese of the island Utusan Melayu Strike—when Utusan Melayu was forcibly taken over by the UMNO Singapore S-Cul.: (rumor) “the Chinese are planning to kill Malays riots; 30 killed who walk alone in areas where the Chinese predominate” Wellesley killed; the 2nd time use of Emergency powers Sarawak POL.: Oust opposition (SNAP) Chief Minister the 3rd time use of Emergency powers Bukit Mertajam Communal clashes Penang POL.: a strike by the Chinese Labor Party against a 29 killed, 200 injured, and 1300 arrested; the police seemed currency devaluation the killing of Malays led to riots unprepared targeting the Chinese KL & big cities of W. POL.: after election + ECO. 196 killed (143 Chinese), 1109 injured, and 9143 arrested. Malaysia The 4TH time use of Emergency powers; arrested Lim Kit Siang (DAP), V. David (Gerakan), and many activists. KL 1975-77 Sept/1976 1977-78 Crisis and/or Incidents POL: the Communist threat in Malaya communal clashes S-Cul.: The Chinese was outraged by the exam language Hundreds of Muslim students led by ABIM protested against peasant hunger and poverty POL.: succession crisis within UMNO (P.M. Razak died in Jan 1976) Kelantan Kelantan Arrested 1200 of the protesters under ISA Jun/76: journalists were arrested and accused of involvement “in a Communist scheme” Nov/76: deputy ministers, MCA official, DAP MPs & the chairman of the PSRM were arrested under the ISA. State of emergency; PAS ministers resigned The expulsion of PAS from the BN in Sept/77; the police imposed a curfew in Oct/19; the 5th time proclamation of emergency (until Mar/78’s election) PAS quarrel against central on timber issue rioting POL.: friction b/t PAS & UMNO in the state government Oct. 15, 1977: several demonstrations in Kota Baru & other towns 1979 Kerling 16/Oct/1980 Batu Pahat? suicide raid attack on a police killed, 23 injured station 1982 S-Cul.: Primary school education emphasizes Malay language ability Aug/1982 Kuala Terengganu A fight between UMNO and PAS supporters One person being killed 1983-84 POL.: constitutional crisis Government used police powers to stop any activity that might be a threat to national security and public order 1985 Baling 18 killed, 160 arrested 1985 Padang Terap (Kedah A fight between UMNO and PAS supporters in the A PAS member was killed and several others injured state) by-election campaign Nov/1985 Kampong Memali An arrest of Ibrahim Mahmood, a local religious teacher 18 people including policemen killed (Kedah) and an ex-PAS electoral candidate, resulted in a clash b/t the police and 400 armed villagers Mar-May 1986 Sabah POL+S-Cul.: Muslims riot to destabilize a government * Burned shops, cars, attacked police; killed representing after the 1985 state election 1987 Kuala Lumpur ECO+POL: recession + intra-Malay split * (Oct/27-Nov/14) 119 dissidents were arrested; 49 were served w/ 2-yr detention orders (34 were Chinese); rallies S-Cul: protests against government’s educational policy were prohibited; newspapers were suspended led by Chinese counter-protests by Malays 1994 POL.: anti-government’s ban of a Muslim sect, Al-Arquam, in early August ECO.: (December) Ringgit de-valued 60% 1997-98 1998 1998-2000 2000 Kampung Pawa, Penang KL KL 28/Apr/2007 Ijok (Selangor) 8/Sept 10/Nov Batu Buruk (Terengganu) KL Late Nov KL A minor communal clash Anwar’s arrest & trial causes periodically street protests UMNO Youth held a rally against Suqiu’s demand of ending Malay rights In Ijko by-election a violent clash b/t BN and PKR supporters on nomination day. A rally to campaign for electoral reforms turned violent when the riot police forcefully tried to break it up “The BERSIH demonstration”—estimated 40,000 to 60,000 people to participate—to pass a memorandum calling for electoral reforms to the Agong “The HINDRAF demonstration” by Indians Al-Arquam members were held in detention under the Internal Security Law (Sept/98) people were arrested under the penal code for spreading rumors on the internet about communal violence n.a. A wave of arrests Mahathir’s National Day speech: blacken Suqiu as an extreme group n.a. The police fired several shots and injured a number of supporters Peaceful except in a couple of locations where riot police shot tear gas and used water cannons; 29 were arrested and 17 later charged for a variety of violations Police dispersed the masses by tear gas Sources: pre-1969 data are from Horowitz (2001); post-1969 data are collected from various Asian Survey annual reports, New Straits Times, Far Eastern Economic Review, Azeem (2005), Christie & Roy (2001), Crouch (1996), and Lee (2008). 268 APPENDIX B-3: State-Chinese-Malay Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Singapore Dates 12/Dec/ 1950 12-13/ May/1955 24-29/Oct 1963 7/July/ 1964 3/Sept/ Mid-1969 1971 1975-77 1975-80 Jan/1982 Late 1986 May-Jun/ 1987 1999 Dec/2001, Aug/2002 2002; Jan/2003 2005 Crisis and/or Incidents “The Maria Hertogh Riots” – anti-government riots by the Muslims against a court verdict * N. Bridge Rd; Jalan Besar areas Damages & Government Response 18 dead; damaged including military & police vans outside the Sultan Mosque - 20 Dec: imposed a 7-day curfew after a police inspector died. - British & Malay soldiers & Gurkha troops deployed to assist the S’pore police “The Hock Lee Bus Company Riots”—by 2000 students dead, 31 injured and labor unionists in Alexandra Rd & Tiong Bahru - government banned pro-communist organizations and dissolved SCMSSU “The Chinese High School riots” 13 dead, >100 injured “The Operation Cold Store” detentions The arrests of 115 (pro-communist) BS leaders, journalists, and trade unionists under the ISA ( 1966: the 2ND wave of arrests) “The prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots” – competition 22 dead, 460 injured b/t UMNO & PAP became inter-ethnic riots b/t the - 12-days curfew until August Malays & the Chinese - arrested 2516 – 600 members of Chinese secret societies; 256 * Kallang; Geylang Serai, Chinatown areas possessing weapons; 1660 breaking curfew Began w/ a death of a rickshaw driver + Indonesian 187 incidents caused 12 dead; 23 seriously wounded; 64 injured paratroopers and agents - curfew; 480 arrested under the ISA * Geylang; Joo Chiat, Siglap - with Malaysian soldiers assistance - soft measures i.e. speeches, visits, shelters - “goodwill committee” in all 51 constituencies in July to help the Malays receive social welfare and job opportunities - 15 “peace committees” in the area mostly affected by the riots - ask local press to behave Spill-over rioting from the May riots in Malaysia dead, 60 injured, >100 arrested “The detention of Nanyang Siang Pau editors” – - government arrested members of the editorial & managerial staff journalists criticized state’s education and language of the Nanyang iang Pau for their “systematic campaign to work up policy racial feelings” and to create political instability sponsored by foreign forces - a similar charge also brought against the Eastern Sun, an English language paper “financed by communist agents in HK - The Singapore Herald, a local newspaper, was sued for foreclosure for a loan default by the Chase Manhattan Bank for a sum of $1.03 million the same year; license was withdrawn Several student protests in late 1974 The arrests of “suspected communists” The Nantah Issue: the Chinese community was against Nanyang University merged with the University of Singapore to the government’s decision to end the Nanyang created the NUS in 1980 University “The arrests of 10 SPLO members” whipped up Malays’ The government further tightened its grip on the media resentment “The Herzog Incident”—the Malays protested against PM Lee Kuan Yew and other officials questioned the Malays’ loyalty the visit of Israeli President Chaim Herzog to Singapore “The Marxist conspiracy” The government arrested 22 activists of the Catholic Church and the Workers’ Party who allegedly tried to subvert Singapore “The Istana Kampong Gelam and Malay Heritage Centre - A number of the government’s Malay MPs and prominent Issue” – Malay newspaper reports arose the doubt of personalities were utilized to explain the situation state policy - Foreign Minister issued a statement: the Malaysian media’s involvement in matters that affect local Malays constitutes interference in domestic politics w/ a potential to destabilize ethnic relations and could harm bilateral ties b/t the countries The arrests of 34 JI members (who planned bomb Local Malay first inflamed when officials called the alleged terrorists attacks against the US embassy, Changi Airport, etc) as “Malay Muslims” DPM Tony Tan placated the Malay community immediately “The Tudung issue” – disagreement b/t the parents of - not allowed to change school attire Malay-Muslim girls and the Ministry of Education on - the government garner ground support from the larger Malay the wearing of headscarfs during school hours community through its MPs & religious authorities and organizations like the Mufti and MUIS. - Against foreign interference: official statements plus rejected an employment-pass application from a Malaysian lawyer to represent the families of those affected by the tudung issue. Some Chinese bloggers used pictures and insulted words The government arrested three bloggers under the Sedition Act (the to humiliate Malay Muslims online first time since 1966) Note: data gathered from various Asian Survey annual reports, Straits Times, Far Eastern Economic Review, Ganesan Narayanan (c2004: 41-64), and Lee (2000: 38-39). 269 APPENDIX C: GDP Growth Rate (%) of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, 1961-2007 15 10 -5 Indonesia Malaysia Singapore -10 -15 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Indonesia 5.7 1.8 -2.2 3.5 1.1 2.8 1.4 6.9 10.9 7.5 8.1 7.6 6.9 8.9 7.7 6.3 9.9 7.6 2.2 4.2 2.5 5.9 4.9 5.8 7.5 7.2 6.5 6.8 7.5 8.2 7.8 4.7 -13.1 0.8 5.4 3.6 4.5 4.8 5.7 5.5 Malaysia 7.6 6.4 7.3 5.4 7.7 7.8 3.9 4.9 5.8 9.4 11.7 8.3 0.8 11.6 7.8 6.7 9.4 7.4 6.9 5.9 6.3 7.8 -0.9 1.2 5.4 9.9 9.1 9.5 8.9 9.9 9.2 9.8 10 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.7 0.5 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.8 6.3 12.5 13.3 11.3 6.8 7.2 7.8 8.6 9.3 9.7 9.7 7.1 8.5 8.3 -1.4 2.1 9.8 11.5 10 9.2 6.6 6.3 11.7 11.6 8.2 7.8 8.3 -1.4 7.2 10.1 -2.4 4.2 3.5 7.3 8.2 7.7 Singapore 6.3 Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (1980-2008); Sundrum (1986: 42) for Indonesia 1961-1973; Sundrum (1988: 43) for Indonesia 1974-1979; NationMaster.com for Malaysia 1961-1979; Swivel Preview for Singapore 1971-1979. 270 [...]... cases from Southeast Asian countries are examined in more detail Chapters IV through VI review the changes in the state-majority -minority relations in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, respectively, and interpret the processes in which the aforementioned variables influence the interactions among the state, the ethnic majority, and the minority during different time periods After looking at three... Malaysia, Malays and the indigenous people make up 61 percent of the population, while Chinese make up 24 percent and Indians seven percent of the total In Singapore, Chinese are numerically dominant, making up 74 percent of the population, while Malays make up 14 percent and Indians 9 percent of the total 6 However, despite these differences, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore share many points in common,... between different ethnic groups Furthermore, there indeed exist various types of ethnic violence, with respect to the intensity, the target, the participants and the victims of the violence This point will be elaborated in the following section Ethnic Conflict vs Ethnic Violence language Nonetheless, many such “illiberal democracies,” including Malaysia and Singapore, can maintain peace and stability (Zakaria,... state institutions and policies, on the one hand, and ethnic conflict and violence, on the other? Inspired by the “strategic triangle theory of international relations, this dissertation attempts to construct an ethnic triangle model to explain how state institutions and policies affect state-society and inter -ethnic relations, how an ethnic group responds to the changes of state institutions and. .. contacts and interviews with local people For reasons of manageability, the fieldwork and interviews were conducted in only three cities: Jakarta, Indonesia; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and Singapore The interviewees include actors in ethnic- based associations, local scholars who study ethnic- related issues, journalists, and ordinary people from both the Chinese and the Malay/Indonesian ethnic groups Nonetheless,... relations, and thus enhance or reduce state capacity to manage ethnic conflict; thirdly, to understand the dynamic interactions between the state, the majority, and the minority group(s) via a simple but comprehensive model; and fourthly, to assess the links between the types of ethnic relations and the types of ethnic violence via this conceptual model Most of the key concepts mentioned above the state, the. .. religious lines, while the Tamils in Sri Lanka and Quebecois in Canada differentiate themselves from others on the basis of language In Pakistan, the main cleavage seems to be religious sect, while in South Africa the main cleavage is race The difference between Malays, Chinese and Indians in Malaysia and Singapore relates to racial, linguistic, religious, as well as cultural 3 dimensions Since the major... unavailable In all, different relations between the state and ethnic groups along with different inter -ethnic relations form different types of triangular equilibria; and different triangles either make ethnic peace possible or provide opportunities for various forms of ethnic violence Applying the ethnic triangle model to ethnic conflicts in Southeast Asia, especially the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, ... policies, and how such responses cause chain reactions from other groups and from the state.3 Through the ethnic triangle, one may identify two major mechanisms that link institutional factors to ethnic conflict First, by generally satisfying the demands and interests of both the majority and minority ethnic groups, institutions make state-society relations peaceful—or at least controllable by the state Otherwise,... as the keys of paradigm shifts—i.e the changes of policy orientations and triangular relations—from one to another Regarding the data sources of the three cases, in addition to government documents and academic studies, there is also information from fieldwork and interviews in the three countries The main purpose of the fieldwork is to get an insight into the tensions between Chinese and Malays/Indonesians . in the relationships among the principal actors in the triangle , namely, the State, the Chinese, and the indigenous population, in three post-colonial countries Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. . THE ETHNIC TRIANGLE: STATE, MAJORITY AND MINORITY IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE SUN TSAI-WEI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2010 THE ETHNIC TRIANGLE: . and interpret the processes in which the aforementioned variables influence the interactions among the state, the ethnic majority, and the minority during different time periods. After looking