In the early years of independence—i.e. during the period of 1950-1957—Indonesian politics was highly unstable, and the central government faced challenges from multiple forces. First, there were the Darul Islam rebels (1948-1962) along with several other groups in the Islamic movement in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh, all trying to overthrow the central authority in Jakarta (Dijk, 1981; Ramage: 1995: 17-26). Second,
while the military was a crucial partner of the central government in quashing local rebellions, it became troublesome when it opposed government policies and when many of its officers sought a dominant role in politics (Hindley, 1962). Third, in parliament there were about one hundred parties competing for power, resulting in “a constant change of cabinets and government coalitions” (Sundhaussen, 1989: 431). From September 1950 to March 1957, there were six cabinet changes in less than seven years.40 To be sure, the multiple political forces could be divided into three major camps: the nationalists (e.g. the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, the Nationalist Party of Indonesia)), the Muslims (e.g. Masjumi and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU)), and the Socialists (e.g. the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI, the Socialist Party of Indonesia) and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, the Communist Party of Indonesia)). The serious power struggle happened not only between camps, but also within each camp.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that although these three competing camps constituted a kind of “strategic triangle” in the central government, such a triangle was based on political ideology and party affiliation, not on ethnic identity. On the national level, the central government, island rebels, and the military also constituted a larger triangular relationship; still, the conflict or cooperation among them was constrained by complicated factors such as religion, ethnicity, political and economic interests, and even support from foreign countries.
Compared with the aforementioned social forces, the Chinese as an ethnic group was not salient in the political arena, as it constituted only three percent of the total population and its members were primarily concentrated in a few big cities.41 Although
40 For details about the cabinets and politics during this period, see Feith ([1962]2007).
41 The ethnic issue was sensitive in Indonesia, thus no census since 1930 included information about people’s ethnicity until the 2000 census. Yet, according to Suryadinata’s estimate (c2004; 2005) on the basis of people with Chinese surnames before the 1966 name-changing regulation, the Chinese in the mid-1960s constituted about three percent of the total population or about 2.3 to 2.6 million people.
the Chinese held disproportional economic power, it was not yet considered a serious socio-political “problem” that needed urgent correction. In society there were no anti-Chinese riot reported during 1950-1956. As for the government, while it did practice a set of discriminatory policies to seize economic control of foreign-owned businesses, these were targeted against foreigners in general.42 While the policies also affected non-citizen Chinese, they were not specifically directed against ethnic Chinese citizens. Besides, these practices and other related economic policies were not always strong, as the government often had to pay more attention to dealing with local rebellions and power struggles in the cabinet. Moreover, except for limited economic restrictions, the ethnic Chinese faced very few institutional restrictions on their cultural and political activities. Admittedly, in order to integrate Indonesian society the state did attempt to push minorities (including the Chinese) to join the mainstream through national schools and institutions and through popularization of national symbols and national ideology Pancasila.43 Yet, due to the practice of parliamentary democracy, it was hard to adopt coercive assimilation policies; ethnic minorities were able to retain a large degree of cultural autonomy (Suryadinata, 1997; 2004). As for the ethnic Chinese, the relatively open socio-political atmosphere and instigation from PRC diplomats led to a re-sinicization of the Chinese community in terms of an increasing flow of Chinese literature, the opening of Chinese-language schools, a resurrection of Chinese religions, and the construction of temples throughout the country in the early 1950s (Jacobsen, 2005). Some Chinese even formed several political parties to look after their interests.
Unfortunately, only Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki,
42 Such as the Urgency Industrialization Plan (1951) and two regulations aimed at “indigenizing” the rice-mill enterprises and harbor facilities (1954). For details about economic policies during 1950-1957, see Brooks (1997), Glassburner (1962), Schmitt (1962), Suryadinata (2005), and Taylor (1963).
43 Pancasila was affirmed by Sukarno in his 1945 national speech and then it formed the basis of the 1945 Constitution. The five tenets of Pancasila are: the belief in the one and only one God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, consultative democracy, and social justice for all.
the Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body, formed in 1954) developed to a certain scale within the Chinese community. Yet, it was still of little political influence at the national level. Chinese who had political ambitions had to join indigenous-dominated parties like the PNI, PKI, Partai Katholik (Catholic Party) and Muslim parties; they could not be treated as representatives of the Chinese community.44
Nonetheless, the Chinese gradually became “a problem” as a result of several developments: the rapid expansion of the PKI, the changing political nature and power structure in the Guided Democracy Era (1957-1965), and the breakdown of the Indonesian economy in the early 1960s.
Committing itself to a nationalist, anti-western and anti-capitalist position, the PKI had grown rapidly at the mass level since 1951, from only a few thousand to over one million members in mid-1950s. In order to protect themselves from repression by powerful factions in the military—within which voices were outspokenly anti-communist both in the central command and in the regions—the PKI attempted to build close ties with Sukarno, while Sukarno utilized the PKI to counterbalance the military, Muslim parties, and other opponents (Hindley, 1962; Lev, 1966; Sundhaussen, 1989). After the 1955 national election, tensions among major political forces intensified when no clear victor emerged in parliament.45 After two failed coups in late 1956 and the Permesta Rebellion in early 1957 by regional military leaders in the outer islands,46 Sukarno was out of patience for the chaos of party politics. In March 1957,
44 Such as the cases of Ong Eng Die (Minister of Finance) and Lie Kiat Teng (Minister of Health), who were two peranakan cabinet members during 1950-1957 (Suryadinata, 1993).
45 In this election, the PNI won 22 percent of votes and got 57 (out of 257) parliament seats, Masjumi won 21 percent of votes and 57 seats, the NU won 18 percent of votes and 45 seats, the PKI won 16 percent of votes and 39 seats, and other 25 parties carved up the rest 59 seats—including the Chinese-based party Baperki (one seat) (Feith, [1962]2007: 436).
46 Permesta (Piagam Perdjuangan Semesta, or Charter of Common Struggle) was a rebel movement led by the regional military leaders in North Sulawesi to fight against the Sukarno government. In 1958 it
prodded on by the military,47 Sukarno proclaimed martial law and forced the cabinet to resign. After Sukarno restored the original 1945 authoritarian constitution in July 1959 and outlawed the PSI and the Masjumi in August 1960, a new “triangle” in the politics and the three pillars of power was confirmed: Sukarno, the supreme authority and the leader of Indonesia; the military, the junior partner in government that challenged the president quite often (backed by the Muslims); and the PKI, the staunch ally of Sukarno with conflicting interests with the military.48 Eventually, pressure from the military and the Muslims pushed Sukarno even closer to the PKI, giving the PKI opportunities to further expand its strength. In 1962 the PKI claimed two million members and above 11 million members in a network of mass organizations, making it the largest communist party outside the Soviet bloc. The PKI was also well represented in local administrations as well as in several high-level councils to advise the government.49
The political implication of the PKI’s expansion, however, was much more than the intensifying conflict of interests between the PKI and the military. The alleged connections between the PKI and the communist regime in China, accompanied by the close relations between Jakarta and Beijing as a result of Sukarno’s increasing emphasis on a Jakarta-Beijing axis against neo-colonialist forces, caused many Indonesians to fear that Sukarno’s government would be a transition toward a communist state, that the PKI would be the vanguard of China, and that China would eventually invade Indonesia (Lev, 1966b). In this context, many Indonesians distrusted the Chinese, not only because
allied with Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), another rebel movement based in West Sumatra, in a revolt in February. Both were defeated by the central government in military campaigns, 1958-1959, yet the rebellion sputtered on until 1961. For details, see Doeppers (1972) and Lev (1966: 37-54).
47 As Roosa (2006: 205-206) pointed out, after the 1957 local elections—in which the PKI came out as the first-ranked party in Central Java and the second-ranked in East and West Java—many believed that the PKI would win the plurality of votes if elections were held again. Thus, many anti-PKI military officers supported Sukarno’s acquisition of dictatorial powers in the hope that he would block the PKI.
48 For an excellent account of this triangular relationship, see Feith (1963: 336-342).
49 For example, in 1962, the deputy governors of three of the four provinces in Java were PKI members, and two main PKI leaders were appointed by Sukarno as advisory ministers in March (Pauker, 1965).
of the prevailing view among the Indonesians that the Chinese were sympathetic to the communists by their association with the Baperki, but also because of their Chinese extraction—that as long as the Chinese in Indonesia remained unassimilated, they were a potential “fifth column” of the PRC (Tan, 2004). It should be noted that in the late 1950s, the majority of ethnic Chinese still had dual nationals of both Indonesia and China, thus their loyalties to Indonesia were often questioned.50 Largely due to this political concern (i.e. the loyalty issue), the government began to exercise more rigid control over Chinese schools and newspapers. In late 1957, the government issued a law prohibiting Indonesian citizens from entering foreign schools, i.e. the Chinese-medium schools. In April and October 1958, the government banned all Chinese newspapers and closed down the pro-Taipei Chinese schools due to Taiwan’s alleged involvement in the regional rebellions in Sumatra and South Sulawesi (Suryadinata, c2004). In 1960, foreign schools were converted to national schools following government regulation PP No.48 (Pelly, 2004).
In addition to the changing political system and political nature, there were also great changes in the Indonesian economy during 1957-1965, which made “the Chinese problem” an increasingly salient issue for the pribumis. As mentioned before, the major businesses in Indonesia used to be controlled mostly by the Europeans—especially the Dutch—and some by ethnic Chinese. Although the government had practiced several
“indigenization” policies since the early 1950s, the success of these policies was limited.
Although indigenous businessmen were granted privileges and licenses in various fields, they lacked capital, managing skills, and commercial linkage to customers and suppliers.
50 Under Chinese law a person was considered a Chinese citizen according to the principle of jus sanguis (law of the blood, meaning one’s nationality is passed from parents). This meant that the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent could maintain their nationals of China. In the 1955 Bandung Conference, China and Indonesia signed the Dual Nationality Treaty, making provisions with ethnic Chinese with Indonesian citizenship to be released from Chinese citizenship. Yet, the treaty did not come into effect until 1962. For details, see Purdey (2006: 9-14).
As a result, they usually sold their names or their licenses as the nominal owners of ethnic-Chinese firms (a.k.a. “Ali Baba” enterprises), thus giving the Chinese good opportunities to expand their dominance from their traditional activities (wholesale and retail trade) to the fields of import and export trade and industry that had once been controlled by the Dutch (Siregar, 1969). The failure of economic reform in the early 1950s gave rise to resentment and frustration among the indigenous businessmen and stimulated the Assaat Movement in 1956 calling for affirmative action for indigenous business.51 Although the movement eventually failed due to lack of support from the government, it fed the rise of anti-Sinicism in Indonesia in late 1950s. More importantly, in 1957, the deterioration in Indonesian-Dutch relations resulted in the announcement of an Indonesian government takeover of Dutch companies, which fatally impacted the ethnic Chinese. After Dutch business was eliminated, the Chinese community became the second largest economic power next to the state. Although the Chinese by no means dominated the Indonesian economy in the same way the Dutch did prior to 1957, its growing economic power and its foreign origin, accompanied by the fact that the average Chinese was better off than the average pribumi, made this community an obvious target for pribumi nationalists (Dick, 2002). In 1959, under pressure from the military, the Muslims, and other sections of economic nationalists, Sukarno first announced the take-over of 13 Chinese-owned banks, and then introduced Presidential Decree No.10 (PP10), banning aliens from maintaining residence in rural West Java and engaging in retail trade in all rural areas. While the ban was not applied against the Chinese Indonesian citizens and Sukarno also intervened to lessen the severity of the attacks on Chinese by the regional authority, the resulting forced evacuation of the Chinese community to major towns and cities was seen as a racist move aimed at
51 This movement was launched by an indigenous businessman, Mohammad Assaat, and was supported by the Masjumi and the PSI. Later it established branches across Java and on the Outer Islands (Alatas, 1997: 130; Feith, [1962]2007: 481-487).
containing the Chinese in ghettos.52 Unfortunately, the expulsion of Chinese traders from rural areas did not succeed in curtailing Chinese economic participation in Indonesia, as the Chinese could keep running their businesses by sharing profits with pribumi license holders through the Ali Baba system. Moreover, this anti-Chinese action caused serious protest from Beijing, which immediately dispatched ships to Indonesian ports to repatriate the Chinese. It was reported that in 1960 about 136,000 Chinese left Indonesia. Beijing’s drastic reaction, however, further strengthened many Indonesians’
fear of communism and their distrust toward the local Chinese (Mackie, 1976: 82-97).
Nevertheless, what had led Indonesia to economic crisis since the start of the 1960s was not the failure to takeover Chinese economic power, but the government’s overall neglect of economic development during this period, as there were always other more pressing matters on the national agenda. For example, the government announced an eight-year economic development plan to be initiated in January 1961. Yet, its implementation was almost nonexistent, as eighty percent of national resources were devoted to the expenditures that the government considered necessary “for the achievement of internal security”—as well as for the campaign against the Dutch over West Irian (1962) and the “Konfrontasi” (Confrontation) with Malaysia over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia (1963-1966) (Pauker, 1963: 73). Adding insult to injury, in 1962-1963 there was a prolonged drought that caused crop failure and a great plague that destroyed all the rice plants and stocks in the country causing famine throughout Java (Adam, 2008: 5). When basic goods became scarce and prices skyrocketed, people became panicky and social tensions visibly increased.
52 According to Somers (1965: 208-209), the total number of Chinese businesses in rural areas subject to this ban was 20-25,000. About half of these were in Java. During the same period, the total number of foreign enterprises involved in trade was about 125,000; presumably most of these were Chinese-owned.
To conclude, the politics of Indonesia in the 1960s was similar to the sixth type of ethnic triangle in Table 2-1, where there was a close alliance between Sukarno and his supporters on the one hand, and the PKI and pro-communist factions—including the ethnic Chinese—on the other; meanwhile, the majority—the military, the Muslims, and other non-Communist and anti-PKI pribumis—were outcast from this partnership of the state and the minority.53 Understandably, the majority’s complaints and grievances against the government and the PKI were very strong—and the hatred spilled over to the ethnic Chinese. By the mid-1960s, economic suffering of the people had reached intolerable proportions, and frequent anti-state and anti-PKI violence occurred all around Indonesia, particularly in Central and East Java and Bali (Lev, 1966b; Pauker, 1965). Although most of such riots were not targeted at the Chinese, the Chinese became easily caught secondary targets whenever riots broke out. Meanwhile, many frustrated pribumis also cast blame on the Chinese “for their ostentatious way of life during a time of economic troubles” (Somers, 1974: 45), leading to a series of attacks on the Chinese community across West and Central Java in 1963.54
By 1965, as Sukarno was ailing and without a successor, the military and the PKI increasingly conflicted, and Indonesia had become a dangerous cockpit of socio-political hostility. Finally, a coup occurred on 30 September, ending not only the Sukarno-PKI partnership but also the “Old Order” era. According to official Indonesian statements, the 1965 Coup (a.k.a. G30S) was initiated by some pro-PKI military officers who kidnapped and killed six anti-PKI generals on 30 September. Then the army, led by
53 Although in the 1960s the PKI was no doubt the best organized and most militant of political groups, it was restricted to third place in the triangular game due to its immense political disadvantages. By the mid-1960s, the various “anti-PKI” elements formed a “coalition of majority,” the total power of which was stronger than the pro-PKI camp. For details, see Lev (1966b) and Utrecht (1969).
54 This wave of anti-Chinese riots began in late March in Cirebon, later in May spread to several towns in Central and West Java and Solo, Surabaya, Malang and Medan, and last of all came the most serious outbreak at Sukabumi and Cibadak on 18-19 May. For details, see Mackie (1976: 97-110).
Suharto, stopped the coup and arrested the “betrayers.” Yet, evidence linking the PKI to the coup is inconclusive, leading to speculation that its involvement was very limited.
Some foreign scholars suggested the coup was an internal military power struggle—perhaps even engineered by Suharto as a pretext to destroy the PKI.55 Both of these accounts can be further explained by the triangular theory. In the former account, the tense horizontal confrontations between the majority (military) and the minority (PKI) in past years, along with the hope of seizing power in the post-Sukarno era, gave the PKI good reason to initiate a coup against the military. In the latter account, the coup can be regarded as vertical violence triggered by the outcast majority against the sitting government; it was a reaction from the outcast side against the state-minority alliance. No matter whether G30S was plotted by the PKI or Suharto, the final winner was no doubt the military—or, more precisely, the pro-Suharto factions in the military.