This chapter reviews the existing literature on ethnic conflict and ethnic violence, and points out some major drawbacks. It then introduces a new analytical framework, “the ethnic triangle,” that will be applied to interpret the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations and the mechanism responsible for ethnic violence. This will be done by adopting a longitudinal as well as a cross-national comparison in the chapters that ensue.
Literature Review and Alternative Framework
Two broad traditions can be identified in the studies of ethnic conflict and violence. In the first tradition, scholars examine the “preconditions”—the origins or the causes—of ethnic conflict. Scholars following this tradition ask why and under what conditions people would be mobilized into collective action, and sometimes behave violently to collide with other groups of people or to fight against the state. Four schools of thought concerning the causes of violent conflicts are discussed later: primordialism, instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism. In the second tradition, scholars are more interested in the dynamics, the processes, and the durability of ethnic violence.
Here, scholars do not merely question what triggers violence or what makes conflicts deadly, rather they question how states manage such situations and interact with groups in conflict, and what strategies the conflicting groups apply to persist in their actions.
Along with state factors, some also investigate international factors that contribute to, or restrict, ethnic violence.
The Causes of Ethnic Conflict
When searching for the origins of ethnic conflict, scholars of the primordialist school believe that ethnic conflicts today can be traced back to the longstanding animosity between groups, and that animosities are based on inherent differences of kinship, race, religion, or culture. To be sure, the sense of belonging to a group and the prejudice of
“others” give rise to misunderstanding, distrust, and even hatred. Such “ancient hatreds”
may not be rational, but are indeed powerful in triggering violence—such as the violence between Hindus and Muslims, Serbs and Croats, Arabs and Jews, and Hutus and Tutsis.7
The primordialists sensitize us to the intimate links between ethnicity, culture, and religion, on the one hand, and conflict and violence, on the other. They also pay attention to the passionate and self-sacrificial characteristics of ethno-religious violence.
However, as Varshney (2002) points out, primordialists fail to explain why, if animosities are so deep and so rooted in cultural differences, tensions and violence between groups tend to take place at different times. Nor can they explain why, on average, cooperative and peaceful relations between ethnic groups are much more common than large-scale violence (Fearon & Laitin, 1996). In short, primordial difference alone is not sufficient in explaining ethnic violence.
Unlike primordialists who take ethno-cultural identity and distinction as a given, scholars of the instrumentalist school treat ethnic consciousness and affiliation as an artificial creation—which is created or, at least “chosen”, by the elites as a basis for
7 The role of cultural traditions, historical legacies, and other “primordial” factors are salient in many academic works. See Connor (1994), Geertz (1963), Huntington (1996), Kaplan (1993), and Smith (1971;
c1988; 1991; 1998) for some of the examples. Specifically, Fox (2000) points out that among all cultural factors, religion has a distinct and separate influence on ethnic conflict. For a critique of the primordialist/
culturalist approach, see Kurth (2001).
collective action. Therefore, instrumentalists focus on how political entrepreneurs strategically manipulate ethno-cultural factors and mobilize the masses to riot for the sake of political power or economic interest—such as access to lootable resources like diamonds (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Many empirical studies show the crucial role elites play in ethnic conflict. As Byman points out, even when the political and social circumstances might foster violence “a security dilemma may not occur if leaders see it in their interest to avoid, rather than to encourage, violence” (Byman, 2002: 17).
Unfortunately, however, in most cases, when mass sentiment is aroused, unscrupulous political and cultural elites are more than happy to play the ethnic card to attract supporters and manipulate the masses to riot for their self-interest, thereby expanding the violence (Laitin, 1998; Walter, 1999).
While the instrumentalist argument has both an intuitive and empirical appeal, it leaves many questions unanswered. For example, why do elites begin by choosing “ethnicity”
to polarize the groups, but not other social factors such as class or occupation? Why should the masses respond to elites exactly the way the elites wish? Given that the costs of participation in violence are extremely high, there must be a certain level of emotion, commitment, and desperation of the masses. Such factors, however, are ignored by the instrumentalists (Horowitz, 1985; Nodia, 2000).
Similar to the instrumentalists, constructivists also treat ethnic consciousness and affiliation as being created rather than determined by birth. Yet unlike instrumentalists who overemphasize the role of individuals (elites) on the identity creation process, constructivists argue that ethno-national identities are contingent, created or constituted by a specific macro-political or economic development—such as modernization
(Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1983), print-capitalism (Anderson, 1983), or colonialism (Prakash, c1995). Thus, scholars of the constructivist school focus more on explaining why, in a given historical process, some ethno-cultural cleavages acquire political and emotional salience and become “master cleavages”, and in some cases arouse frequent bitterness or cause terrible violence. For example, most people in Southeast Asia did not have a clear sense of “ethnic” or “racial” differences until the colonialists’
“divide-and-rule” policies. Nonetheless, having experienced ethnic separations for a long time, ethnic identities become deeply rooted in popular consciousness, and ethnic-related issues become highly sensitive in these pluralist societies. In the post-colonial phase, quarrels over the definition of citizenship or official religion, the language of education, or the representative proportion in the government, could easily produce violent conflicts between ethnic groups, for these issues affect a group’s relative status and social position in the new state (Horowitz, 1985: ch.5).
The constructivists advance our understanding of the macro-contexts of ethnic conflict.
What they fail to explain, however, is the dynamics between “the master cleavages” and the actual outcome—why are some cleavages the sources of violence in some parts of a country but not in others? Why does the same cleavage lead to different outcomes at different times? In short, the constructivists, like the other two approaches, have difficulty dealing with variance across time and space (Varshney, 2002).
In comparison to other approaches, institutionalists pay less attention to why ethnic conflicts emerge, and instead focus on the links between types of political institutions and ethnic peace or violence, especially those associated with the state and government structure such as electoral rules, party systems, parliamentarism or presidentalism, and
federal or unitary structure.8 In other words, institutionalists care more about how political systems manage ethnic conflicts. Institutions are crucial to ethnic relations because they not only “specify procedures, rules, and sites for political contestation,”
but also “generate predispositions to outcomes, given the number and size of ethnic groups” (Varshney, 2002:36). Nonetheless, in most countries these institutions are
“implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests, and identities of the majority group,”
creating “a range of burdens, barriers, stigmatizations, and exclusions of members of minority groups” (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000:4). Institutionalized injustice, such as cultural/political discrimination or the uneven distribution of economic resources and opportunities (or merely the perceptions of such injustice), creates inter-group grievances, anger, and resentment. As a result, an ethnic group that feels deprived tends to attack the groups that are benefiting or rebel against the state (Bates, 1974; Collier &
Hoeffler, 2000; Gurr, 1993a; 1993b; Gurr & Moore, 1997). According to Gurr’s study on global minorities, during the period between 1945 and 1989, 233 ethnic groups experienced discrimination, either economically (147 groups), politically (168 groups), or both, and more than 200 of these 233 groups organized politically to defend their interests against the state or other ethnic groups. In at least 80 cases, the conflict escalated to civil war (Gurr & Harff, 2003:6).
Along with state-level, formal institutions, many recent studies also take informal and local-level institutional factors into consideration. For example, Varshney (2002), in his study of ethnic violence in India, found inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic networks of civic
8 Specifically, several institutional designs are commonly recommended in divided societies, such as the proportional representation (PR) electoral system and power sharing on the elite level (Lijphart, 1977;
1996; 1999), special representations, poly-ethnic rights, self-government rights for cultural minorities (Kymlicka, 1995), and the constitutionalization of group rights (Tully, 1996). For detailed discussions on the relationship between constitutional design and ethnic conflict management, see Horowitz (2002); on the relationship between types of electoral systems and the incentives of inter-ethnic cooption, see Norris (2002), Reilly (2001), Reilly & Reynolds (1999), and Sartori (c1997).
engagement (both of which organized civic networks and everyday civic networks) had very different impacts on ethnic conflict. While inter-ethnic networks build bridges between ethnic groups, intra-ethnic networks reinforce ethnic boundaries and reduce positive communication and interaction between ethnic groups. In a society, if local communities are organized only along intra-ethnic lines, ethnic violence is much more likely to break out. On the other hand, vigorous inter-ethnic associations and organizations can act as a strong constraint against the polarizing strategies of a political elite intent on manipulating ethnic riots for his own selfish ends.
Traditional institutionalists who focus only on state-level factors were criticized as being strong in comparing countries with different political systems but weak in explaining the variance within a country. After taking domestic factors into account, scholars of the institutional school can better explain why, within one country, ethnic riots are so unevenly distributed across space. Although this still fails to answer why violence has so many ups and downs within a specific place during different time periods, the institutional school provides more convincing interpretations on why ethnic violence emerges, subsides, or remains dormant.
To sum up, each of the above four approaches has its particular strength in explaining the causes of ethnic conflict. However, given that ethnic conflict is such a complex issue, none of the above approaches alone offers a comprehensive understanding. Moreover, the four research traditions also share some common weaknesses. It is undeniable that people have special attachment to their own ethno- national groups, no matter whether this sentiment is given at birth, framed by elites, or constructed by the society or the state. Nonetheless, the sense of belonging to one group does not necessarily cause
confrontations with other groups (not to mention fighting each other in brutal and bloody ways). Primordialists, instrumentalists, constructivists, and institutionalists all cannot explain why in the same state, members of two ethnic groups with very different languages and religions can live together in peace most of the time, but suddenly kill each other over a tiny issue. Nor can they explain why under the same appeal and similar ways of mobilization, ethnic violence has variations in terms of space and intensity. Furthermore, these approaches only tell us why conflict arises—that is, the pre-conditions of ethnic violence—but do not explain or predict when or how violent actions will occur, and how serious those actions will be.
The State and the Process of Ethnic Violence
The scholars who concentrate on the process of violence provide explanations regarding the dynamics, the repertories and trajectories, and the durability of ethnic violence—such as how actors construct collective identity, frame their claims, and set the strategies to achieve their goals (Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Snow, et al. 1986), and how cultural factors—norms, values, beliefs, and symbols—shape the way actors construct their claims and repertories (Johnson & Klandermans, 1995).
Within the literature, there has been emphasis on the crucial role of the state when discussing the process and intensity of ethnic violence, as the strategies taken by the state toward challengers combined with state capacities produce different opportunities (or constraints) for different types of mobilization (McAdam, 1982; 1996; Tarrow, c1998). For example, mature democratic states offer institutional channels, such as periodic elections and right to assemble and speak freely about politics, for people to express their grievances and dissent, so that they need not resort to a high-cost strategy of violence or rebellion (Cleary, 2000; Prezworski, 1991; Prezworski, et al. 1996;
Rothchild, 1991). In contrast, authoritarian regimes are more likely to use repression to stop protests and conflicts (Byman, 2002; Gurr & Harff, 2003; Tarrow, c1998:ch.5).
Repression, however, is a double-edged sword. Although it may effectively raise the costs of mobilization and thus discourage collective action, it also strengthens group consciousness as “the oppressed.” This may ultimately contribute to deeper grievances, and trigger more organized and extensive resistance movements.9
State capacity also matters. Strong states with effective and sophisticated policy instruments as well as rich economic resources are more likely to accommodate different political claims and economic demands of different groups, thus mitigating the unhappiness of affected and aggrieved groups (Prezworski, et al. 2000). But weak states, and/or states under foundational crises—such as a shift in economic resources or political power, the collapse of the state, the extreme stress of economic depressions, and bouts of social unrest—are more war-prone (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998; Hegre, et al.
2001; Walter, 1999). Similarly, states under democratic transition often lack the capacity to resolve ethnic violence. For states containing divided societies but lacking liberal and democratic traditions, the introduction of the freedom of speech and open competitive politics often allows political entrepreneurs to politicize ethnic groups and to inflame communal tensions, which lead to the consequent danger of violence (Dudley & Miller, 1998; Muller, 1985; Snyder, c2000; Snyder & Mansfield, 1995).10
9 An earlier study shows that the probability of escalation to ethnic violence is 15 percent in autocracies but merely 1 percent in democracies (Roeder, 1991). Admittedly here the scholars are talking about stable, mature democracies where the main political and socio-economic systems are institutionalized, the state respects civil liberties, and a culture of tolerance is consolidated in the society (Diamond, et al. 1995).
10 Thus, Gurr, et al. (2001) find that many transitioning states would shift partway back to a mixed regime with both democratic and autocratic features in response to crises. Although on the surface such pseudo-democratic regimes still follow Western democratic institutions, they are never liberal in content.
For example, a state may hold competitive elections for a legislature that exercises no effective control over the executive branch. A state may institutionally guarantee all citizens equal status and rights, but in practice exclude the minorities from participating in political decision-making. A state may also refuse to provide public services, including news media, education and judicial processes, in any but the official
International factors are also important in ethnic violence, especially for rebellious groups. The legitimacy and the duration of resistance usually rely on whether rebellious groups can attract international attention and recognition, and whether they can get external financial and/or military support. The availability of international support, however, is to a large degree determined by the state. The higher the international status of a state (which depends on its geopolitical and economic importance, etc.), the less likely a rebellious group can get external support (Fearon, 1995; Fearon & Laitin, 2003;
Gurr, 1993a; 1993b; Jha, 1997; Keohane & Martin, 1995; Lake & Rothchild, 1996a;
1996b).
That said, scholars who focus on the process of the violence tend to be state-centered:
state institutions and management capacities provide the context for violence; its response strategies and its interactions with the rebellious groups to a large degree determine the development of violence; and the power ratio between the state and the rebellious group determines whether this battle can persist. Nonetheless, one weakness of following this logic is the tendency to conclude that ethnic violence mostly refers to fights between the state and rebellious groups—usually the ethnic minority. Obviously, much of the evidence does not validate this. Ethnic violence happens not only between the state and unsatisfied minorities, but also between different ethnic groups.
Furthermore, there indeed exist various types of ethnic violence, with respect to the intensity, the target, the participants and the victims of the violence. This point will be elaborated in the following section.
Ethnic Conflict vs. Ethnic Violence
language. Nonetheless, many such “illiberal democracies,” including Malaysia and Singapore, can maintain peace and stability (Zakaria, 1997).
Thus far, this chapter has briefly surveyed various interpretations of ethnic conflict and violence. It becomes clear that a distinction should be made between ethnic “conflict”
and ethnic “violence,” and between various types of ethnic violence—a task that most of the relevant literature has failed to do. For many scholars, ethnic conflict and ethnic violence are two interchangeable terms; and thus when they talk about ethnic conflict, they are actually referring to quite different things, ranging from inter-group competition to protests to ethnic riots or even to civil wars.11 Such a situation is not satisfactory. Indeed, due to the long-standing trend of global migration, almost all states today are multiethnic states that contain more than two distinct ethno-cultural or religious groups within the state territory and they all compete with each other in politics, in the economy, and in cultural affairs. Yet, not all inter-group competitions have led to an accumulation of conflicts or escalated into violence. As stated before, in the whole of human history, ethnic cooperation and peace are much more common than conflict and violence.
Thus, first of all, the general term “ethnic conflict” as employed in this dissertation—as in Varshney’s research (2002)—refers to conflicts between ethnic groups because of mutual competition over resources and power. Such conflicts are inevitable in multiethnic societies but are not necessarily violent. For example, if ethnic protest is expressed through such institutions as parliaments, assemblies, or government ministries or through non-violent street demonstrations, it is “conflict” but not
“violence.” On the contrary, “ethnic violence” refers to conflicts expressed in violent ways, which would cause injury, death or damage to property.
11 Some exceptions include Horowitz (2001) and Varshney (2002).
Second, with regard to violence, there is a huge variation in the structure, actors, and intensity of violence—from the lynching of people with specific ethnicity (e.g. the lynching of the blacks by members of the Ku Klux Klan in the Southern United States) to violent anti-government protests and mass riots to terrorist assassinations or bombings to civil war between the state and separatists (e.g. the case of Aceh) and finally to genocide (e.g. ethnic cleansing in Rwanda).12 Each type of ethnic violence cited above is very different in nature. For example, “ethnic riot” refers to a more or less spontaneous, emotional and relatively unorganized mass attack on members of one ethnic group by members of another. Such riots differ from lynching because the victims of mass riots are chosen randomly on the basis of group membership. Ethnic riots also differ from violent anti-government protests because rioters target the properties and members of an ethnic group rather than government buildings and institutions. However, it should be stressed that, in most cases, mass riots are not consciously directed toward the end of genocide. Compared to terrorist attacks, mass riots are less organized and planned. Finally, compared to separatist wars, mass riots are
“more concentrated in time and space, more episodic, and apparently less instrumental and calculative” (Horowitz, 2001:18).
Another way to classify ethnic violence is to distinguish between horizontal and vertical violence. This “horizontal versus vertical” distinction is made on the basis of the
“actors” involved in the violence. Horizontal violence refers to violence within the society itself—i.e. violence between ethnic groups under a single political authority, while vertical violence refers to violence between the state and an ethnic group within the nation-state. This analytical distinction, according to Sukma (2005), is commonly
12 For definitions, cases, and comparisons of various types of ethnic violence, see Horowitz (2001:
17-28).