Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 9 P29 ppsx

retailers of Betamax VCRs, and one individual Betamax owner. The district court ruled against Universal and Disney, finding an imp lied exemption for home video recording in the 1976 Copyright Revision Act (Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 [C.D. Calif. 1979]). The district court also held that Sony was not a contributory infringer of the studios’ copyrights because it did not know that home video recording was an infringement when it manufactured and sold the VCRs. Most impor- tantly, the district court held that home video recording was a fair use of the copyrighted tele- vision programs. Universal and Disney believed that the district court was the first court to hold that copying copyrighted material for mere entertainment or convenience could be a fair use, and they immediately appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that private home videotaping infringed on the studios’ copyrights (Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 [1981]). The appeals court also determined that Sony was liable to the studios for contributory infringement be- cause it knew that Betamax VCRs would be used to reproduce copyrighted programs. The Supreme Court agreed to hear Sony’s appeal. On January 17, 1984, the Supreme Court announced its decision reversing the Ninth Circuit court, holding that Sony had not infringed on copyrights held by Universal and Disney by manufacturing and marketing Beta- max VCRs. The Court was sharply divided, and both Justice JOHN PAUL STEVENS, who wrote for the majority, and Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN,who wrote for the dissent, issued lengthy opinions. As noted earlier, the Betamax case focused on two main issues: (1) whether home recording of copyrighted television programs constitutes a “fair use” of the copyrighted material, and (2) whether Sony committed “contributory in- fringement” by selling VCRs, thereby enabling VCR owners to copy the copyrighted television programs. Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to pass laws to protect the works of “Authors and Inventors” from copying by others. Pursuant to this power, Congress created copyrights and PATENTS. To encourage creativity, Congress gave copyright holders the exclusive right to their creative works. The courts, however, have permitted reproduction of copyrighted works without the copyright holder’s permission for a “fair use”; the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive righ t to a fair use. For example, a teacher may reproduce limited portions of a copyrighted book for the purpose of teaching without the permission of the author. This concept is referred to as the “fair use doctrine,” which was codified by Congress in the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C.A. § 107). The Betamax decision is one of the most important cases interpreting this doctrine. In determining that home recording of copyrighted television programs was a fair use under the copyright laws, the Supreme Court focused on the noncommercial nature of home recording. The Court stated that noncommer- cial use of copyrighted material is presumptively fair. The majority of the Court agreed with the district court that home record ing of copy- righted television programs simply does not harm the owners of the copyrig hts. The Court noted that television programs are broadcast free of charge and that Betamax VCRs enable viewers to watch programs they might otherwise miss. The Court also pointed out that copyright owners besides Universal and Disney had testi- fied at trial that they did not object to the home recording of their television programs. Based on all of these factors, the Court held that home recording of copyrighted television programs constitutes a fair use of the copyrighted material. Clearly, Sony was not itself infringing on the copyrights owned by Universal and Disney, regardless of whether home recording of televi- sion programs could be considered a fair use. Thus, the studios argued instead that Sony was liable for contributory infringement of their copyrights. The studios’ theory was that Sony supplied the means for the copyright infringe- ment and actively encouraged infringement through advertising. The Supreme Court rejected the studios’ argument. The Court agreed that contributory infringement of a copyright could occur in certain circumstances; however, manu- facturing and marketing the Betamax could not constitute contributory infringement be- cause the Betamax was capable of a number of uses that did not infringe on any copyrights. As examples of non-infringing uses, the Court noted that many copyright owners did not object to having their television programs recorded. Also, the Betamax could be used to play rented GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 268 SONY CORP. OF AMERICA V. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS or purchased tapes of copyrighted programs, thereby compensating the copyright holders for the right to view their works. Justices Blackmun, THURGOOD MARSHALL, LEWIS F . POWELL JR., and WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST dissented in an opinion by Blackmun. First, the dissent found that home recording of copyrighted televi- sion programs was not a fair use of the copy- righted material. Blackmun stated that “when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use usually does not apply.” Although the majority found no harm in allowing VCR owners to record copyrighted television programs, the dissent claimed that these recordings could harm the owners of the copy- rights. The dissent pointed out, for example, that persons who tape television programs for later viewing are much more like ly to skip through the commercials that ultimately pay for the television program, thereby potentially reducing advertising revenue. Also, the television ratings system, on which advertising prices are based, is unable to account for taped programs. The dissent further believed that Sony could be liable to the studios for contributory infringement of their copyrights, stating that “if virtually all of the product’s use is to infringe, contributory liability may be imposed.” The dissent would have remanded the case to determine whether the Betamax VCRs were used primarily for infringing or non-infringing uses. FURTHER READINGS Band, Jonathan, and Andrew J. McLaughlin. 1993. “The Marshall Papers: A Peek behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal.” Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts 17 (summer). Burks, Margaret A. 1985. “Is Copyright Law in Need of Congressional Action?” Northern Kentucky Law Review 12 (winter). Lawrence, John, and B. Timberg. 1989. Fair Use and Free Inquiry: Copyright Law and the New Media. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. Lunney, Glynn S., Jr. 2002. “Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited.” Boston University Law Review 82 (October). Samuelson, Pamela 2005-2006. “The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens.” Fordham Law Review 74. CROSS REFERENCES Broadcasting; Intellectual Property. v SOTOMAYOR, SONIA MARIA In 2009 Sonia Sotomayor became the nation’s first Hispanic Supreme Court justice. She was nominated for the position by President BARACK OBAMA to replace DAVID SOUTER. Chief Justice JOHN ROBERTS administered her oath on August 8, 2009, making her the 111th justice in U.S. history. Sotomayor was born in the Bronx borough of New York City on June 25, 1954. Her mother and father were both from Puerto Rico, and both were uneducated. She grew up among other Puerto Ricans in New York, and she did not become fluent in English until about the age of nine. By that time, she had been diagnosed with diabetes, requiring her to take daily insulin injections. At an early age, Sotomayor became a “true media child,” reading Nancy Drew books and watching the television show Perry Mason The latter proved influential on Soto- mayor’s decision to pursue law. “I noticed that Perry Mason was involved in a lot of the same kinds of investigative work that I had been fascinated with reading Nancy Drew, so I decided to become a lawyer,” sh e said. “Once I focused on becoming a lawyer, I never deviated from that goal.” After graduating from Cardinal Sp ellman High School in the Bronx in 1972, she enrolled at Princeton University. She was one of only a few Latinos who attended Princeton at that time, and she later acknowledged that her writing Sonia Sotomayor. STACEY ILYSE PHOTOGRAPHY/THE WHITE HOUSE VIA GETTY IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION SOTOMAYOR, SONIA MARIA 269 and vocabulary skills were relatively weak com- pared with her classmates. However, through hard work and determination, she improved her skills markedly. She also became an activist on campus, fighting for hiring of more Latino faculty members and for offering more courses focusing on Latin America. After graduating summa cum laude from Princeton in 1976, she enrolled at Yale Law School on a scholarship. She earned a position as an editor of the Yale Law Journal and served as managing editor of the Yale Studies in World Public Order. As a student, she interviewed with the law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trow- bridge. When a member of the firm suggested to her that she was only at Yale due to AFFIRMATIVE ACTION , she responded by filing a complaint with a tribunal at Yale. The law firm later apologized, and the apology made news in the Washington Post. Sotomayor graduated from Yale in 1979 and was admitted to the New York bar in 1980. Sotomayor accepted a position as an assis- tant district attorney with the New York County District Attorney’s Office. From 1979 to 1984, she worked with the office’s trial bureau and litigated cases involving a range of crimes, including murders, assaults, robberies, and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. She entered private practice in 1984 by joining the firm of Pavia & Harcourt in Manhattan. With only 35 attorneys overall and fewer than ten litigators, the firm was rather small. However, Sotomayor was able to gain trial experience. She specialized in COPY- RIGHT and trademark LITIGATION, along with INTERNATIONAL LAW and ARBITRATION. In 1986 she was featured on a segment of Good Morning America. During her time with the firm, she was active as a member of the New York City Campaign Finance Board as well as the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund. A managing part ner at Sotomayor’s firm encouraged her to apply for a position on the federal judiciary when the position came open in 1990. Although she was only in her 30s, she found support from Democratic senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who reportedly became convinced that she would beco me the first Hispanic justice on the Supreme Court. On November 27, 1991, President GEORGE H. W. BUSH nominated Sotomayor for a position on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Despite some political wrangling within the SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, the full Senate unanimously confirmed her nomination on August 11, 1992. Sotomayor quickly earned a solid reputa- tion as a district court judge. She kept a low profile b ut showed her willingness to accept anti-government positions. She was tough on sentencing in criminal cases, especially in WHITE- COLLAR CRIME cases. She issued one of her most famous decisions on Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, Inc. (880 F. Supp. 246 [S.D.N.Y. 1995]), which involved the Major League Baseball players’ strike. In the decision, she ruled that the league could not uni- laterally i mplement a new collective-bargaining agreement and use replacement players. T his ruling effe ctively ended the strike j ust before t he start of the 1995 season . In June 1997 President BILL CLINTON nomi- nated Sotomayor to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Some conser- vatives attempted to derail her confirmation, and these efforts were successful in delaying confirmation for more than a year. Republican Sonia Maria Sotomayor 1954– ▼▼ ▼▼ ❖ ◆ 1954 Born, New York City 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ 2000 1975 1950 1976 Earned B.A. from Princeton University 1979 Graduated from Yale Law School 1979–84 Served as assistant district attorney for New York County ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1980 Admitted to New York bar 1984 Joined firm of Pavia & Harcourt ◆ 1992–98 Served on U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 1995 Presided over Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, Inc. 1998 Appointed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2009 Confirmed as first Hispanic Supreme Court justice ◆◆ ◆ 2008 Barack Obama elected first African American president 2009 David Souter retired from Supreme Court I WANT TO STATE UPFRONT , UNEQUIVOCALLY AND WITHOUT DOUBT : I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY RACIAL , ETHNIC OR GENDER GROUP HAS AN ADVANTAGE IN SOUND JUDGING . I DO BELIEVE THAT EVERY PERSON HAS AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO BE A GOOD AND WISE JUDGE , REGARDLESS OF THEIR BACKGROUND OR LIFE EXPERIENCES . —SONIA SOTOMAYOR GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 270 SOTOMAYOR, SONIA MARIA senator Al D’Amato, however, urged several members of the Republican Party to vote in her favor, and the Senate confirmed her appoint- ment on October 2, 1998, by a vote of 67-29. Sotomayor later said she felt as if her critics during the confirmation process had stereo- typed her based on her ethnicity. In her more than ten years on the Second Circuit, she heard appeals in more than 3,000 cases. She wrote close to 380 opinions, of which the Supreme Court reviewed five and reversed three. Although some claimed that Sotomayor’s record tended to favor the left, the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ABA Journ al considered her to be a political centrist. Sotomayor’s opinions tended to be lengthier than her counterparts. She also earned a reputation for sometimes being blunt towards attorneys arguing their cases before her. In 2001 Sotomayor gave a speech at the University of California at Berkeley in which she paraphrased a quotation often used by Justices SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR and RUTH BADER GINSBURG. The quotation refers to a conclusion that a “wise old woman” or “wise old man” might make. In her speech, Sotomayor said, “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reac h a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.” In April 2009 the media revealed that Souter planned to step down from the Court. Sotomayor received attention as a possible candidate, and on May 25, 2009, he informed her that she would indeed be his candidate. She received harsh criticism for the comments in her 2001 speech (she had made similar comments in other speeches as well), and a poll later showed that the public disagreed with her “wise Latina” quip. However, polls also showed that a majority of Americans believed she was qualified to serve on the Court, and the American Bar Association rated her as “well qualified,” which is the highest rating the ABA gives with regard to Supreme Court nominees. Despite the controversy surrounding her remark, the Senate Judiciary Committee con- firmed her nomination by a vote of 13-6 along party lines. The full Senate then confirmed her nomination on August 6, 2009. She heard her first arguments on September 9, 2009. Sotomayor has won dozens of awards. She is a member of the Princeton University Board of Trustees and has taught classes at both New York University School of Law and Columbia Law School. She has received honorary law degrees from six different law schools. FURTHER READINGS Liptak, Adam. 2009. “The Newest Justice Takes Her Seat.” New York Times. September 9, 2009. Sotomayor, Sonya. “Statehood and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case for Puerto Rican Seabed Rights.” Yale Law Journal. 88. v SOUTER, DAVID HACKETT David Hackett Souter was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court on July 25, 1990, by President GEORGE H.W. BUSH. Chosen by the Bush adminis- tration because of his conservative judicial style, Souter proved to be a moderate justice whose personality and temperament enabled him to build a centrist coalition that garnered support from the Court’s ideological extremes. Souter was born on September 17, 1939, in Melrose, Massachusetts, six miles north of Boston. The only son of Joseph Souter, a bank manager, and Helen Souter, a gift store clerk, the future associate justice was remembered by his childhood friends as an intense, intelligent, and family-oriented person who was endowed with a sharp wit, but no athletic ability. At age eleven Souter and his parents moved to a ten- acre farm in the rural community of East Weare, New Hampshire. In 1957 Souter graduated second in a class of two hundred at Concord High School where his classmates named him the most literary, most sophisticated, and most likely to succeed. During high school Souter was named president of the National Honor Society and coeditor of the yearbook. According to legend, the only time Souter got into trouble as a teenager was when he stayed past closing time at the local historical society. After high school Souter attended Harvard University. Graduating magna c um laude with a philosophy major in 1961, Souter was inducted into Harvard’s prestigious chapter o f Phi Beta Kappa, considered by m any to be the nation’s highest undergraduate academic award. Souter wrote his senior thesis on Supreme Court Justice OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR ., which helped him earn a Rhodes Scholar- ship to study at Oxford University, where he received a bachelor’sdegreein JURISPRUDENCE in 196 3. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SOUTER, DAVID HACKETT 271 Upon returning to the United States, Souter entered Harvard Law School, quickly develop- ing a reputation as a serious student and an independent thinker. However, Souter was not prone to debate issues with his peers or volunteer in class. Although Souter was a solid law student, he graduated without academic hono rs and was not chosen for a place on the Harvard Law Review, Harvard’s esteemed legal journal, which was a highly coveted position among the students. In 1966 Souter joined Orr and Reno, a leading New Hampshire firm that handled corporate, probate, tax, and FAMILY LAW cases. Not feeling sufficiently challenged or stimulated by private practice, Souter went to work for the New Hampshire attorney general, ascen ding from assistant attorney general in 1968 to deputy attorney general in 1971 to attorney general in 1976. Souter did very little prosecut- ing during his tenure with the attorney general’s office, directly handling only nine cases in ten years. In 1978 Souter was appointed to the bench as a superior court judge in New Hampshire. Attorneys who appeared before Souter de- scribed him as an even-handed trial judge with a penchant for detail. Five years later Souter was elevated to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, where he authored more than 200 opinions and established himself as an assertive judge who often questioned lawyers during oral arguments. In February 1990 President Bush appointed Souter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Five months later, before Souter had written his first opinion as a federal judge, Bush appointed Souter to the U.S. Supreme Court. Subsequently confirmed by a Senate vote of 90–9, Souter became the 105th jurist to serve on the nation’s highest court. Souter disappointed those in the Bush administration who hoped he would provide the decisive fifth vote for the conservative wing of the Court, composed of Chief Justice WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST and Associate Justices ANTONIN SCALIA, CLARENCE THOMAS, and SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR. Instead, Souter proved to be a temperate justice, with a mainstream judicial philosophy. He took some positions that upset conservatives and other positions that upset liberals. Souter offended liberals when he voted to uphold federal regulations that prohibited David Hackett Souter 1939– ▼▼ ▼▼ ❖ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ 1939 Born, Melrose, Mass. 1939–45 World War II ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1962–63 Studied as Rhodes Scholar at Oxford 1968 Became assistant attorney general of New Hampshire 1976–78 Served as attorney general of New Hampshire 1978–83 Served on the Superior Court of New Hampshire 1983–90 Served on the New Hampshire Supreme Court 1990 Appointed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 1990 Appointed associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 1992 Drafted opinion with Kennedy and O’Connor in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 2003 Dissented in Woodford, Warden v. Garceau 1996 Joined majority opinions in Romer v. Evans and United States v. Virginia 1998 Wrote majority opinion in New Jersey v. New York; wrote majority opinion in Faragher v. Boca Raton 2000 Dissented in Bush v. Gore ◆ 2009 Delivered opinion in Abuelhawa v. United States; retired from Supreme Court 2000 1975 1950 2000 Presidential election result uncertain due to disputed Fla. vote count; recount halted by U.S. Supreme Court with 5–4 vote in Bush v. Gore David H. Souter. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 272 SOUTER, DAVID HACKETT doctors from providing ABORTION counseling at federally funded clinics, despite objections that such regulations violated the FIRST AMENDMENT (Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233 [1991]). Some liberals were again dismayed when Souter voted to affirm a state ban on nude dancing in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 115 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1991), even though four dissent- ing justices said the ban violated freedom of expression. Souter also regularly voted in favor of CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. On the other hand, many conservatives were distraught by Souter’s concurring opinion in LEE V. WEISMAN, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992), which relied on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to declare unconstitutional a nonsectarian prayer delivered by a clergyman at a public high school graduation ceremony. In ROMER V. EVANS, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996), Souter joined the Court’s majority opinion that relied on the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to strike down a Colorado constitutional provision pro- hibiting all legislative, executive, and JUDICIAL ACTION designed to protect homosexuals from DISCRIMINATION. Many conservatives were also upset when Souter voted to invalidate the male- only admissions poli cy at the University of Virginia Military Institute because it discrimi- nated against women who sought entrance to the school’s citizen-soldier program ( UNITED STATES V . VIRGINIA, 518 U.S. 515, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 [1996]). Observers increasingly recognized Souter as the intellectual leader of the emerging moderate core of the Supreme Court. In a number of important decisions, Souter allied himself with Justices ANTHONY M. KENNEDY and O’Connor to forge an influential coalition that has been joined by members of the Court’s ideological extremes. In this regard, Souter played a critical role in building a consensus of judicial philoso- phy among the Supreme Court justices. In PlannedParenthoodv.Casey,505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992), for example, the state of Pennsylva nia asked the Supreme Court to overturn ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. C t. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 1 47 (1973), t he decision guaranteein g women t he right t o termi- nate their pregnancies under certain circumstances. After oral arguments, five justices—Rehnquist, Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, and BYRON R. WHITE—expressed serious reservations about the holding in Roe. Based on these reservations, Rehnquist was prepared to draft a majority opinion that would have gutted virtually every tenet in the 1973 precedent. Before Rehnquist finished writing the opin- ion, however, Souter, O’Connor, and Kennedy met outside the presence of the other justices to discuss the case. Following this meeting, the three justices presented a joint opinion that affirmed the central holding of Roe. Neither the state nor federal governments, the joint opinion in Casey stressed, may pass laws that place an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion. Souter, O’Connor, and Kennedy drew support from the traditionally liberal JOHN PAUL STEVENS and HARRY A. BLACKMUN, who concurred in principle with the joint opinion, and from the traditionally conservative Rehnquist, who concurred in judgment. Opinions in the Early 2000s Through the first decade of the 2000s, Souter continued to occupy a pivotal seat on the Supreme Court, using his polite and friendly personality, his patient and contemplative temperament, and his diligent work ethic to earn respect and win support across the ideological spectrum. Howe ver, many of his more noteworthy decisions between 1995 and 2003 came in a dissenting role . For example, Souter dissented from a Supreme Court decision holding that a sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison under California’sCareerCriminalPun- ishment Act, also known as the Three Strikes Law, on a conviction of two counts of petty theft with a prior conviction, was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (U.S. 2003). The defendant had been convicted of stealing videotapes worth $154. The defendant “did not somehow become twice as dangerous to society when he stole the second handful of video- tapes,” Souter said. “His dangerousness may justify treating one minor felony as serious and warranting long incapacitation, but a second such felony does not disclose greater danger warranting substantially longer incapacitation,” Justice Souter argued. If the defendant’s sen- tence is not grossly disproportionate to his crime under the Eighth Amendment’s propor- tionality analysis for determining whether a [I]N THE FIELD OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IF WE PLACE TOO MUCH RELIANCE ON FEDERAL PRECEDENT WE WILL RENDER THE STATE RULES A MERE ROW OF SHADOWS ; IF WE PLACE TOO LITTLE , WE WILL RENDER STATE PRACTICE INCOHERENT . —DAVID H. SOUTER GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SOUTER, DAVID HACKETT 273 punishment is cruel and unusual, Souter con- cluded, the principle would have “no meaning” in any other case to which it might apply. Souter al so dissented from a majority ruling that officers may conduct a routine, suspicion- less drug interdiction without informing bus passengers that they have the right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (U.S. 2002). The Court’s decision expanded upon an earlier case hold- ing that the FOURTH AMENDMENT permits police officers to approach bus passengers at random to ask questions and to request their consent to searches, provided a reasonable person would understand that he or she is free to leave. Souter conceded that “[a]nyone who travels by air today submits to searches of the person and luggage as a condition of boarding the aircraft,” and that “is universally accepted that such intrusions are necessary to hedge against risks that even small children understand.” How- ever, “the commonplace precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been justified for ground transportation and no such condi- tions have been placed on passengers getting on trains or buses. There is therefore an air of unreality about the Court’s explanation that bus passengers consent to searches of their luggage to “enhanc[e] their own safety and the safety of those around them,” Souter wrote. Many of Souter’s later dissenting opinions earned him a reputation as a liberal-leaning justice who broadly interpreted the constitu- tional rights of criminal defendants. However, Souter sided against the defendant in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (U.S. 2001), where he wrote the majority opinion in a 5–4 decision holding that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation puni- shable only by a fine. The case arose when a Texas police officer observed that a motorist driving a pickup truck, as well as her two children, were not wearing seatbelts. Souter rejected the motorist’s con- tention that “founding-era common-law rules” forbade PEACE OFFICERS from making warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of “breach of the peace,” a category the motorist claimed was then understood narrowly as covering only those non-felony-level offenses “involving or tending toward violence.” In the years leading up to American independence, Souter observed, Parliament repeatedly extended ex- press warrantless search authority to cover misdemeanor-level offenses not amounting to or involving any violent BREACH OF THE PEACE. Souter refused to mint a new rule of CONSTITU- TIONAL LAW forbidding custodial arrest, even upon PROBABLE CAUSE, when conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and the govern- ment could show no compelling need for immediate detention. In May of 2009, Justice Souter delivered the court’s opinion on Abuelhawa v. United States. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes it a felony “to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating” certain felonies prohibited by the statute. 84 Stat. 1263, 21 U. S. C. §843(b). The question was whether someone violates §843(b) in making a misde- meanor drug purchase, because his phone call to the dealer can be said to facilitate the felony of drug distribution. The answer was no. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consiste nt with the court’s opinion. Souter retired in 2009, after serving 18 years on the court. His last official day on the court was June 29. Notorious for being low-tech, Souter planned to enjoy his new home in New Hampshire, surrounded by books. FURTHER READINGS Gearan, Anne. 2003. “Long Sentences OK for Repeat Criminals.”Tallahassee Democrat (March 6). Henderson, Stephen. 2003. “Justices Uphold Megan’s Laws, 3-Strikes Laws.” Philadelphia Inquirer (March 6). Kan, Liang. 1996. “A Theory of Justice Souter.” Emory Law Journal 45 (fall). Murray, Frank J. 2002. “Minor Crimes Split Courts on Rights.” Washington Times (March 17). Puffer, Mark H. 1999. “A Survey of Justice Souter’s Decisions in the October 1998 Term.” New Hampshire Bar Journal 40 (September). Simon, James. 1995. The Center Holds: The Power Struggle inside the Rehnquist Court. New York: Simon & Schuster. Yarbrough, Tinsley E. 2005. David Hackett Souter: Tradi- tional Republican On The Rehnquist Court. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was an alliance organized pursuant to the Southeast GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 274 SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION Asia Defense Treaty to oppose the growing communist influence in Southeast Asia. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan signed the treaty and accompa- nying Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 1954. The treaty became operative in February 1955 and bound the signatories to mutual aid to resist armed attack or subversion; an armed attack on one signatory was interpreted as a danger to all. Headquartered in Bangkok, SEATO relied on the military forces of member nations rather than commanding its own standing forces, as does the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In its first few years of opera tion, SEATO’s effectiveness was not tested, but at the beginning of the 1960s, conflicts in South Vietnam and Laos challenged the strength of the alliance and ultimately found it lacking. France withdrew from military cooperation in SEATO in 1967, and Great Britain refused active military cooperation in the Vietnam conflict. Moreover, a 1960s dispute between Pakistan and India further undermined the efficacy of the alliance: Pakistan drew closer to communist China, while the United States provided aid to India. In 1972 Pakistan completely withdrew from the alliance; in 1974 France suspended its membership payments. In September 1975 the signatories decided to phase out the operations, and SEATO was formally dissolved on June 30, 1977. The collective defense treaty remains in effect, however. FURTHER READINGS Buszynski, Leszek. 1983. SEATO, the Failure of an Alliance Strategy. Singapore: Singapore University Press. Grenville, J.A.S., and Bernard Wasserstein. 2000. The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century. New York: Routledge. Schoenl, William, ed. 2002. New Perspectives on the Vietnam War: Our Allies’ Views. Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America. U.S. Department of State. 1995. Treaties in Force. Publica- tion 9433. SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE As a principal organization of the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT , the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) championed the use of nonviolent direct action to end legal and social discrimination against African Americans. Identified strongly with its original leader, the Reverend MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., the SCLC organized and sponsored many protest marches and demonstrations during the late 1950s and the 1960s. Although the group’s influence declined after King’s assassination in 1968, the SCLC continues to work for the betterment of the lives of African Americans. The SCLC emerged in the wake of a suc- cessful boycott of buses in Montgomery, Alabama, by the city’s black citizens in 1955, which had led to a December 1956 SUPREME COURT ruling upholding the desegregation of those buses (Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 77 S. Ct. 145, 1 L. Ed. 2d 114). Prodded by African American social activist Bayard Rustin, who hoped to carry the Montgomery victory to the rest of the South, King and other clerics formed the Southern Negr o Leaders Conference, fore- runner of the SCLC, during a meeting in Atlanta in January 1957. King, who had gained national renown through his role as head of the Montgomery Improvement Association, the organizer of the bus boycott, was a natural choice to lead the group. Other early SCLC leaders included the Reverends RALPH D. ABERNATHY and Fred Shuttlesworth. Later in 1957, the group changed its name to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The SCLC hoped to initiate nonviolent direct action throughout the South, modeling their activities on Gandhi’s methods of passive resistance. It hoped that such action woul d secure racial desegregation, voting rights, and Early leaders of the Souther Christian Leadership Conference, Revs. Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Shuttlesworth, and Ralph D. Abernathy speak at a press conference in Birmingham, Alabama, in May 1963. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 275 other gains for African Americans. Through this approach, the SCLC sought to take the CIVIL RIGHTS cause out of the courtroom and into the community, hoping to negotiate directly with whites for social change. As one of its first actions, the group led the 1957 Prayer Pilgrimage to Washington, D.C., which drew an estimated 25,000 people. In 1959, it organized a youth march on Washington, D.C., that attracte d 40,000 people. Despite these successful marches, the SCLC was hampered by disorganization during its early years. It experienced difficulty in meeting many of its major goals during the late 1950s, particularly in voter registration. It charted a new course in the early 1960s, when it recruited leaders such as the Reverends Wyatt T. Walker and Andrew J. Young. Between 1960 and 1964, the number of full-time SCLC staff members grew from 5 to 60, and the organization’s effect on the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT reached its zenith. Growth in its membership allowed SCLC to coordinate historic demonstrations that played a vital role in the civil rights movement. In April 1963, the SCLC led protests and boycotts in Birmingham, Alabama, that prompted violent police repression. Television viewers around the United States were shocked at the violence they saw directed at the clearly peaceful demonstra- tors. The SCLC won the sympathy of the nation again in a difficult 1965 civil rights campaign in Selma, Alabama, which also drew a violent response from whites. These protests are widely credited with hastening the passage of the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.) and the VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 e t seq.), l a ws that granted African Amer- icans many of the rights they had been seeking. By the mid-1960s, other African Americans began to question whether nonviolent direct action could achieve significant changes for their communities. More radical civil rights groups, notably the STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE and the CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY , publicly renounced the nonviolent approach of the SCLC. They pointed to the poverty and DE FACTO (actual) SEGREGATION experienced by Afri- can Americans in the northern cities and argued that the SCLC tactics were ineffective in the urban ghetto. King and the SCLC were sensitive to such criticism and increasingly began to focus their attention on the North. By 1967, the SCLC launched several new operations there: the Chicago Freedom Movement, Operation Bread- basket, and the Poor People’s Campaign. It brought in new, young leaders, including the divinity student JESSE JACKSON, to lead these efforts. The SCLC suffered a staggering setback when King was assassinated in April 1968. The group had always been closely identified with the charismatic preacher, and his death cost it the vital leadership, publicity, and fund-raising he had provided. Abernathy became president of the organization. By 1972, the staff had declined to 20 and leaders such as Young and Jackson had moved on to other pursuits. Joseph E. Lowery succeeded Abernathy as president of the SCLC in 1977. The Atlanta- based group has continued to work for the improvement of the lives of African Americans through leadership training and citizen educa- tion. It has also created campaigns to battle drug abuse and crime. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the SCLC had a number of leadership changes. Martin Luther King III replaced Lowery as president in 1997 and served until 2004. King was replaced briefly by famed civil rights activist Fred Shuttlesworth in 2004. Charles Kenzie Steele Jr., whose father was one of the original members of SCLC, replaced Shuttlesworth in 2004. Steele served until 2009, when he was replaced on an interim basis by Byron Clay. FURTHER READINGS Blumberg, Rhoda Lois. 1991. Civil Rights: The 1960s Freedom Struggle. Rev. ed. Boston: Twayne. Fairclough, Adam. 2001. To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King Jr. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press. Fairclough, Adam. 1989. “The Southern Christian Leader- ship Conference and the Second Reconstruction, 1957– 1973.” In We Shall Overcome. Edited by David J. Garrow. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson. Ford, Linda G. 1992. “Southern Christian Leadership Conference.” In Encyclopedia of African-American Civil Rights. Edited by Charles D. Lowery. San Diego, CA: Greenwood Press. Garrow, David J. 1986. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. New York: Morrow. Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Available online at http://sclcnational.org (accessed June 3, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Integration; Jim Crow Laws; NAACP; Parks, Rosa Louise McCauley. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 276 SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) is an internationally known nonprofit organization that files CLASS ACTION lawsuits to fight discrimi- nation and unequal treatment. It also tracks hate groups and runs a program to educate Americans about racism, anti-Semitism, and other forms of intolerance. The organization has received numerous awards and accolades for its work. SPLC has been the subject of vociferous attacks by racist and anti-Semitic groups as well as “white power” advocates. Based in Montgomery, Alabama, the SPLC was founded in 1971 by attorneys Morris Dees and Joseph J. Levin Jr. along with CIVIL RIGHTS leader JULIAN BOND. Dees graduated from the University of Alabama Law School in 1960 and started a PRIVATE LAW practice in the state’scapitol city, Montgomery. In 1967 Dees began to gain notoriety for his willingness to handle unpopular CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. Levin, who had returned home from army service to join his father’slaw practice, indicated his interest in the type of cases Dees was handling. The two attorneys started a law practice that specialized in civil rights cases. Their practice eventually developed into the Southern Poverty Law Center. Levin functioned as legal director of the Center from 1971 to 1976. During that period Levin worked on more than 50 significant civil rights cases. Levin left the center in 1976 but continued his involvement with SPLC by serving as president and board chair. In 1996, Levin returned to Montgomery to become the center’s chief executive officer. Julian Bond, a civil rights activist who co-founded the STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC) in 1960 and later served four terms on the board of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP), became the first president of SPLC. As of 2009, Bond still served on SPLC’s board of directors. SPLC has specialized in CLASS ACTION lawsuits that challenge SEGREGATION in numerous spheres. One case from the 1970s resulted in the election of 17 African American legislators to the Alabama General Assembly. Until 1972 there were no African Americans among the Alabama State Troopers. A lawsuit filed by SPLC that year resulted in a decision requiring the state to hire one qualified African American trooper for each Caucasian trooper hired until the former comprised 25 percent of the force. State officials fought the order and the case was litigated all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1987 the court decided in favor of the plaintiffs. By 1995 opposition had ended and in 2003, Alabama State Troopers had the highest percent- age of minority officers of any state in the nation. In 1976 SPLC challenged the in humane conditions of Alabama prisons. Since prevailing in that case, it has worked with state officials to reform the prison system. In 1995 the state reestablished a practice whereby prison inmates were shackled together as they worked along the state highways. The center sued the state and eventually obtained an agreement prohibiting the use of “chain gangs” in Alabama. The SPLC has challenged Georgia state officials and their eligibility guidelines for providing services to children with learning disabilities in addition to advocating for the provision of adequate care and health services for persons with mental retardation. Besides LOBBYING for better care for emotionally dis- turbed children in foster care, the SPLC has sought more assistance for adults with mental illness. Alabama’s failure to provide MEDICAID recipients with medically necessary transporta- tion has also been challenged. A federal court upheld SPLC’s action, and in 1996 the state began opera ting a program that helped provide affordable transportation to more than 40,000 Medicaid recipients. Although this ruling was overturned on appeal, the state continued to provide non-emergency Medicaid transportation. The SPLC has successfully fought for safer working conditions for employees of Alabama’s cotton mills, fair housing treatment for African Americans in Alabama who faced RACIAL DIS- CRIMINATION when trying to lease apartments, tax EQUITY in Kent ucky, and the removal of the Confederate battle flag from the dome of Alabama’s state capitol building. Additionally, SPLC has waged and won major battles over the convictions of a number of cases where inmates in southern states have faced CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. In response to the resurgence of the KU KLUX KLAN (KKK) in 1981, SPLC began to monitor hate activity. In the 2000s SPL C’s Intelligence Project tracked the activities of more than 600 active hate groups including the KKK, Neo- Nazis, Black separatists, and other racist and extremist organizations. The SPLC’s quarterly periodical, Intelligence Report, provides compre- hensive information on these groups to law GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 277 . of New Hampshire 198 3 90 Served on the New Hampshire Supreme Court 199 0 Appointed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 199 0 Appointed associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 199 2 Drafted opinion. liberals. Souter offended liberals when he voted to uphold federal regulations that prohibited David Hackett Souter 193 9– ▼▼ ▼▼ ❖ 195 0–53 Korean War 196 1–73 Vietnam War ◆ 193 9 Born, Melrose, Mass. 193 9–45 World. Sotomayor 195 4– ▼▼ ▼▼ ❖ ◆ 195 4 Born, New York City 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks 196 1–73 Vietnam War ◆ 2000 197 5 195 0 197 6 Earned B.A. from Princeton University 197 9 Graduated from Yale Law School