Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 9 P41 ppsx

Stone was born on October 11, 1872, in Chesterfield, New Hampshire. He graduated from Amherst College in 1894 and Columbia Law School in 1898. Adm itted to the New York bar the year of his graduation, Stone became a member of a prominent New York City law firm, Satterlee, Sullivan & Stone. In 1899, he began lecturing at Columbia Law School. Stone accepted a professorship in 1902 and ultimately served as dean of the school from 1910 until 1923. He resigned in 1924 to join Sullivan and Cromwell, the most prestigious law firm in New York City. In 1924, President CALVIN COOLIDGE appointed Stone attorney general. The JUSTICE DEPARTMENT had been tarnished by the TEAPOT DOME SCANDAL during the administration of Coolidge’s predecessor, President WARREN G. HARDING. In addition, the Bureau of Investiga- tion (BI), the forerunner of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), had become a home to political cronyism and corruption. Stone appointed J. EDGAR HOOVER to head the BI and institute wide-ranging reforms. Stone’s admin- istration of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE drew praise from Congress and President Coolidge. Coolidge nominated Stone to the Supreme Court in 1925. Some senators were fearful that Stone’s Wall Street connections would cause him to favor business interests. Responding to these concerns, Stone proposed that he appear before the SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE to answer questions. The committee accepted, thereby creating the now-traditional confirmation pro- cess used for federal court appointments. Stone was easily confirmed. In the 1920s, the Court was dominated by conservative justices who struck down many state and federal laws that sought to regulate labor, business, commerce , and working con- ditions. Stone dissented from these decisions, arguing that the Court should exercise judicial restraint and allow Congress and state legisla- tures to craft laws that address pressing social and economic problems. With the election of President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT in 1932, the Supreme Court’s hostility to government regulation drew even greater attention as it declared unconstitutional a host of NEW DEAL economic reforms. Stone wrote a biting DISSENT in the case of United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477 (1936), which involved a processing tax paid by farmers to fund subsidies paid to eligible farmers under Roosevelt’s Agricultural Adjust- ment Act. The act was declared unconstitutional because all farmers were taxed but only specific farmers received benefits. Stone argued that the subsidies were valid. Stone and fellow Justices LOUIS BRANDEIS and BENJAMIN CARDOZO made up the liberal faction of the Court. Nicknamed “the Three Musketeers,” the justices supported President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs. Stone wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Da rby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), which upheld provisions of the FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT of 1938 . Although Stone was a Republican and President Roosevelt a Democrat, Roosevelt appointed Stone chief justice in 1941. Stone’s tenure as chief justice was marked by bitter fighting among the justices, which has been blamed partly on Stone’s inability to negotiate and build a consensus. As chief justice, Stone represented the majority in affirming the President’spowerto try Nazi saboteurs by military tribunals in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). He also authored the opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which established the terms by which state courts could possess PERSONAL JURISDICTION over litigants. Stone’s commitment to civil liberties was demonstrated in Minersville School District v. Harlan Fiske Stone. PHOTOGRAPH BY HARRIS & EWING. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES THE LAW [SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS ] A HERMETICALLY SEALED COMPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE , TO BE EXPLORED AND ITS PRINCIPLES FORMULATED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THOSE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES WHICH CALL LAW INTO EXISTENCE . —HARLAN FISKE STONE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 388 STONE, HARLAN FISKE Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375 (1940). He was the lone dissenter when the Court upheld a state law that required Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute the flag, even though this conflicted with their religiou s beliefs. Stone argued that the law infringed on the FIRST AMENDMENT right to the free exercise of religion. Three years later his view was endorsed by the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943), when it overruled Gobitis. In the area of civil rights, Stone helped move the Court from tacit acceptance of the racially discriminatory status quo in the southern states to a more aggressive stance. In Un ited States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941), the Court ruled that the federal government could regulate party primaries to prevent election FRAUD that resulted in the failure to count African American votes. Three years later the Court struck down the WHITE PRIMARY , which excluded African Americans from southern Democratic parties and Demo- cratic primary elections (Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 [1944]). Stone played a pivotal role in deciding these cases. Stone contributed to modern constitutional analysis in a famous footnote to his opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778, 82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938). Known as FOOTNOTE FOUR, it stated that “preju- dice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori- ties and which may call for a more searching judicial scrutiny.” This footnote became the basis for the “strict scrutiny” test, which the Court applies to assess the constitutionality of legislation concerning the rights of racial minorities, religious sects, ALIENS, prisoners, and other “discrete and insular minorities.” Under STRICT SCRUTINY the government must demonstrate more than just a rational basis for legislation. It must show a compelling STATE INTEREST and prove that the legislation is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Stone’s tenure, however, was not unblem- ished. In KOREMATSU V. UNITED STATES, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944), he upheld the forced relocation of Japanese Amer- icans to detention camps during WORLD WAR II. The decision was based on the wartime powers of the president to take emergency actions for national security reasons. Stone died on April 22, 1946, in Washington, D.C. FURTHER READINGS Galston, Miriam. 1995. “Activism and Restraint: The Evolution of Harlan Fiske Stone’s Judicial Philosophy.” Tulane Law Review 70 (November). Konefsky, Samuel Joseph. 1945. Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court. Reprint, 1971. New York: Hafner. Stone, Harlan Fiske. 2001. Law and Its Administration. Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange. Urofsky, Melvin I. 1997. Division and Discord: The Supreme Court under Stone and Vinson, 1941–1953. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press. CROSS REFERENCES Footnote 4; Japanese American Evacuation Cases; Flag Salute Cases. v STONE, LUCY Lucy Stone was one of the first leaders of the WOMEN’S RIGHTS movement in the United States. A noted lecturer and writer, Stone spent most of her life working for women’s suffrage. She is also believed to be the first married woman in the United States to keep her maiden name. ▼▼ ▼▼ Lucy Stone 1818–1893 1800 1850 1875 1900 1825 ❖ 1818 Born, West Brookfield, Mass. ◆◆ 1847 Graduated from Oberlin College 1850 Organized the first national Women's Rights Convention 1869 Helped form the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) ◆ 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1812–14 War of 1812 ◆ 1870 Founded the Woman's Journal, a weekly suffrage journal ◆ ◆ 1882 Handed editorial duties for the Woman's Journal over to her daughter, Alice Stone Blackwell ❖ 1893 Died, Dorchester, Mass. 1890 AWSA and NWSA merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association; Wyoming became first state to grant women the right to vote GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STONE, LUCY 389 Stone was born on August 13, 1818, in West Brookfield, Massachusetts, the eighth of nine children. Stone was eager to obtain an educa- tion, but only the boys in her family were able to attend school. Determined to go to college, she went to work as a teacher at the age of 16 to earn money for the tuition. Nine years later, Stone entered Oberlin College, the first coedu- cational college in the United States. While at Oberlin she formed the first women’s college debating society. Stone was a fiery and forceful orator. After graduating in 1847, Stone became a lecturer for the Massachusetts Anti-Slav ery Society, one of the leading abolitionist organ i- zations of its time. Stone became convinced that parallels existed between the positions of women and slaves. In her view both were expected to be passive, cooperative, and obedi- ent. In addition, the legal status of both slaves and women was inferior to that of white men. Stone persuaded the society to allow her to spend part of her time speaking on the topic of women’s righ ts. In 1850, she organized the first national Women’s Rights Convention in Worcester, Massachusetts. In 1855 Stone married Henry B. Blackwell, an Ohio merchant and abolitionist. The couple entered into the marriage “under protest”;at their wedding they read and signed a document explicitly protesting the legal rights that were given to a husband over his w ife. They omitted the word “obey” from the marriage vows and promised to treat each other equally. Stone also announced that she would not take her husband’s name and would be addressed instead as Mrs. Stone. This action drew national attention, and women who retained their maiden names were soon known as “Lucy Stoners.” After the Civil War Stone and Blackwell shifted their energies to women’s suffrage. Although Stone was in agreement with ELIZABETH CADY STANTON and SUSAN B. ANTHONY on the goal of women’s suffrage, she differed as to the best way to secure the vote for women. In 1869 Stone helped form the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA). The AWSA worked for women’s suffrage on a state-by- state basis, seeking amendments to state con- stitutions. Stanton and Anthony established a rival organization, the National Woman Suf- frage Association (NWSA), that sought an amendment to the U.S. Constitution similar to the FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT, which gave nonwhite men the right to vote. Whereas the AWSA concentrated on women’s suffrage, the NWSA took a broader approach, LOBBYING for improve- ments in the legal status of women in areas such as FAMILY LAW in addition to suffrage. Stone also helped found the Woman’s Journal, a weekly suffrage journal, in 1870. She edited the journal for many years, eventually turning the task over to her daughter, Alice Stone Blackwell, in 1882. As editor, Stone focused on the AWSA’s goal of suffrage. In 1890 the AWSA and the NWSA merged into the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). Stone became the chair of the executive committee, and Stanton served as the first president. In that same year, Wyoming became the first state to meet Stone’s goal as it entered the Union with a constitution that gave women the right to vote. Stone died on October 19, 1893, in Dorchester, Massachusetts. FURTHER READINGS Blackwell, Alice Stone. 2001. Lucy Stone: Pioneer of Woman’s Rights. Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia. Million, Joelle. 2003. Woman’s Voice, Woman’s Place: Lucy Stone and the Birth of the Woman’s Rights Movement. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. CROSS REFERENCE Nineteenth Amendment. Lucy Stone. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS THE FLOUR- MERCHANT AND THE POSTMAN CHARGE US NO LESS ON ACCOUNT OF OUR SEX , BUT WHEN WE ENDEAVOR TO EARN MONEY TO PAY ALL THESE , THEN, INDEED, WE FIND THE DIFFERENCE . —LUCY STONE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 390 STONE, LUCY STOP AND FRISK The situation in which a police officer who is suspicious of an individual detains the person and runs his hands lightly over the suspect’s outer garments to determine if the person is carrying a concealed weapon. One of the most controversial police procedures is the stop and frisk search. This type of limited search occurs when police confront a suspicious person in an effort to prevent a crime from taking place. The police frisk (patdown) the person for weapons and question the person. A stop is different from an arrest . An arrest is a lengthy process in which the suspect is taken to the police station and booked, whereas a stop involves only a temporary interference with a person’s liberty. If the officer uncovers further evidence during the frisk, the stop may lead to an actual arres t, but if no further evidence is found, the person is released. Unlike a full search, a frisk is generally limited to a patting down of the outer clothing. If the officer feels what seems to be a weapon, the officer may then reach inside the person’s clothing. If no weapon is felt, the search may not intrude further than the outer clothing. Though police had long followed the practice of stop and frisk, it was not until 1968 that the SUPREME COURT evaluated it under the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under FOURTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW, a constitutional SEARCH AND SEIZURE must be based on PROBABLE CAUSE . A stop and frisk was usually conducted on the basis of reasonable suspicion, a some- what lower standard than probable cause. In 1968 the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889. In Terry an experienced plainclothes officer observed three men acting suspiciously; they were walking back and forth on a street and peering into a particular store window. The officer concluded that the men were preparing to rob a nearby store and approached them. He identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names. Unsatisfied with their responses, he then subjected one of the men to a frisk, which produced a gun for which the suspect had no permit. In this case the officer did not have a warrant nor did he have probable cause. He did suspect that the men were “casing” the store and planning a ROBBERY. The defendants argued the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it was not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ arguments. The court noted that stops and frisks are considerably less intrusive than full- blown arrests and searches. It also observed that the interests in crime prevention and in police safety require that the police have some leeway to act before full probable cause has developed. The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement is sufficiently flexible to permit an officer to investigate the situation. The court was also concerned that requiring probable cause for a frisk would put an officer in unwarranted danger during the investigation. The “sole justification” for a frisk, said the court, is the “protection of the police officer and others nearby.” Because of this narrow scope, a frisk must be “reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the ASSAULT of the police officer.” As long as an officer has reasonable sus picion, a stop and frisk is constitutional under the Fourth Amend- ment. After Terry, this type of police encounter became known as a “Terry stop” or an “investigatory detention.” Police may stop and question suspicious persons, pat them down for weapons, and even subject them to nonintrusive search procedures such as the use of metal detectors and drug-sniffing dogs. While a suspect is detained, a computer search can be performed to see if the suspect is wanted for crimes. If so, he or she may be arrested and searched incident to that arrest. Persons who are being stopped and frisked have the right not to answer questions directed to them by police officers. In Hiibel v. Nevada, 542 U.S. 177,124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004), the court slightly modified this under- standing, permitting police officers to arrest individuals about whom they have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity but who refuse to give their names. Investigatory detention became an impor- tant law enforcement technique in the 1980s as police sought to curtail the trafficking of illegal drugs. In United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that police have the power to detain, question, and investigate suspected GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STOP AND FRISK 391 drug couriers. The case involved a Terry stop at an in ternational airport, during which the DEFENDANT aroused suspicion by conforming to a controversial “drug courier profile” developed by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The court said the DEA profile gave the offi cer reasonable suspicion, “which is more than a mere hunch but less than probable cause.” The Supreme Court has become increas- ingly permissive regarding what constitutes reasonable suspicion. In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990), the court upheld a Terry stop of an automobile based solely on an anonymous tip that described a certain car that would be at a specific location. Police went to the site, found the vehicle, and detained the driver. The police then found marijuana and cocaine in the automobile. The court observed that it was a “close case” but concluded that the tip and its corroboration were sufficiently reliable to justify the investigatory stop that ultimately led to the arrest of the driver and the seizure of the drugs. The court retreated from this holding in Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (U.S . 2000), in which it ruled that an anonymous tip identifying a person who is carrying a gun is not, without more reason, sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that person. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the tip, stating that a young black male was standing at a particular bus stop, wearing a plaid shirt, and carrying a gun, lacked sufficient reliability to provide reasonable sus- picion to make a Terry stop. In Arizona v. Johnson, __U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 781, __L.Ed.2d__ (2009), the court examined the scope of a Terry stop involving a passenger in a vehicle that had been stopped fo r a minor infraction. The police officer observed that passenger Lemon Johnson was wearing clothing associated with the Crips gang. He also had a scanner in his pocket, which the officer believed might be used to avoid the police following a criminal act. Johnson talked to the officer, volunteered that he had served time in prison and that he was from a town in Arizona that had a Crips gang. At this point the officer asked Johnson to step outside the car. The officer conducted a patdown and felt a gun butt near Johnson’s waist. He then struggled with the officer but was subdued. The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed with Johnson that the search had been illegal. Johnson had been lawfully seized when the officers stopped the car. However, by the time the officer asked Johnson to leave the car to be frisked, the detention had “evolved into a separate, consensual encounter stemming from an unrelated investigation” by the officer into Johnson’s possible gang affiliations. The officer failed to show a reasonable belief that Johnson was involved in criminal activity, making the patdown for weapons illegal. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the state ruling. The court held that patdown was lawful because it conformed to the limits of a Terry stop. The stop was short in duration and was intended to minimize harm to the police. Prior court decisions held that police may lawfully order a driver or a passenger out of a car. Once the driver or passenger has exited the vehicle, officers could conduct a patdown for weapons. In this case the i nteraction between the officer and Johnson was short in duration and the patdown took place moments after Johnson left the car. The stop of the car by police communicated to a “reasonable passen- ger that he or she is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will.” The officer in this case was not constitu- tionally required to give Johnson a chance to leave the scene after he stepped out of the vehicle “without first ensuring that, in so doing, she was not permitting a dangerous person to get be hind her.” FURTHER READINGS Bloom, Robert M. 2003. Searches, Seizures, and Warrants: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution. Westport, CT: Praeger. Cammack, Mark, and Norman Garland. 2001. Advanced Criminal Procedure in a Nutshell. St. Paul, MN: West. Dash, Samuel. 2004. The Intruders: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures from King John to John Ashcroft. Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Automobile Searches; Criminal Law; Drugs and Narcotics. STOP ORDER A direction by a customer to a stock BROKER, directing the broker to wait until a stock reaches a particular price and then to complete the transac- tion by purchasing or selling shares of that stock. STOP PAYMENT ORDER Revocation of a check; a notice made by a depositor to his or her bank directing the bank GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 392 STOP ORDER to refuse payment on a specific check drawn by the depositor. An individual who writes a check can revoke it unless it has been certified, accepted, or paid. If a bank pays a check after a timely stop payment order by the depositor, the bank is usually liable to the depositor for the amount paid. STOPPAGE IN TRANSIT The right of a seller to prevent the delivery of goods to a buyer after such goods have been delivered to a common carrier for shipment. For example, the seller’s right to stop delivery in transit arises on the discovery by the seller of a buyer’s insolvency, or on the buyer’s repudiation or failure to make a payment due before delivery. CROSS REFERENCE Sales Law. v STORY, JOSEPH Joseph Story served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845. One of the towering figures in U.S. LEGAL HISTORY, Story shaped U.S. law both as a judge and as the author of a series of legal treatises. Some legal commentators believe Story’s treatises were as influential in the development of nineteenth- century U.S. law as the works of the English jurists SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE and SIR EDWARD COKE had been earlier. Story was born on September 18, 1779, in Marblehead, Massachusetts. He graduated from Harvard University in 1798 and read the law with Samuel Sewall. He established a practice in Salem, Massachusetts, in 1801 and quickly developed an impressive professional career, becoming a director and eventually the presi- dent of the Merchant’s Bank of Salem. He became a member of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY and was elected to the state legisla ture in 1805. He served part of a term in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1808 to 1809 and then returned to the state legislature in 1810. The following year he was elected speaker of the house. Send certified mail, with "Restricted Delivery" return receipt requested. Date:______________________________________(write date here) ______________________________________________________________________ (write name of person who wrote the check here) _________________________________________________________________________________ (write address of check writer here) Dear _____________________________________: (write name of person who wrote the check here) ______________________________________________________ (write your/payee's name here) is the payee of a check you wrote for $___________ on _______________________________________ (write amount of check and check date here). The check was not paid because you stopped payment, and I demand payment. You may have a good faith dispute about whether you owe the full amount. If you do not have a good faith dispute with me and fail to pay (1) the full amount of the check in cash, (2) a bank service charge of an amount not to exceed $25 for the first check written for which payment was stopped and an amount not to exceed $35 for each subsequent check written and then stopped before payment, and (3) the costs to mail this letter, within 30 days after this letter was mailed, you could be sued and held responsible to pay at least both of the following: 1. The amount of the check; and 2. Damages of at least $100 or, if higher, three times the amount of the check up to $1,500. If the court determines that you do have a good faith dispute with me, you won't have to pay the service charge, triple damages, or mailing cost. If you stopped payment because you have a good faith dispute with me, you should try to work out your dispute with me. You can contact me at:____________________________________________ (write your name here) ____________________________________________________________ (write your street address, city, state, and phone number here) You may wish to contact a lawyer to discuss your legal rights and responsibilities. _______________________________________________________ (sign your name) Stop Payment Letter A sample record of a stop payment request. ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION STORY, JOSEPH 393 In November 1811 President JAMES MADISON appointed Story, at the age of only 32, to the U.S. Supreme Court. Madison hoped that Story would help move the Court in a more democratic direction, correcting the aristocratic tendencies of the federal bench, which had been dominated by the Federalists. In particular, Madison sought to check the influence of Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL, whose nationalist philos- ophy led him to construe federal powers broadly. THOMAS JEFFERSON was opposed to the appointment, however, believing that Story did not subscribe to the Democratic party belief in according deference to state governments. Jefferson proved to be correct as Story quickly revealed an inclination to accept most of Marshall’s principles. In MARTIN V. HUNTER’S LESSEE , 14 U.S. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the Virginia Supreme Court declaring a section of the federal JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 unconstitu- tional. In his majority opinion, Story reversed the state supreme court and affirmed the Supreme Court ’s power to review the highest state courts in all civil cases involving the federal Constitution, statutes, and treaties. This deci- sion was a key component of federal judicial power and antithetical to Jefferso n’s conception of state-federal relations. In TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH C OLLEGE V. WOO DWARD, 17 U.S. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819), Story joined in Chief Justice Marshall’s holding that the grant of a corporate charter was a contract with the state. As the state had not reserved a power of amendment, the charter grantees were immune from destructive state interference. Story noted that this corporate IMMUNITY should be extended only to private, not public, corporations. In making this distinction, Story articulated for the first time that the public character of a corporation turned not on the services it performed but on the identity of the contribu- tors of its capital. Thus, a corporation that was chartered to serve the public, such as a bank, would be considered a private corporation if it was owned by private individuals, and its charter could not be withdrawn or amended in the absence of a legislative reservation at the time of the original grant. This definition of private corporations by reference to their capitalization was critical to corporate develop- ment in the nineteenth century. Joseph Story. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Joseph Story 1779–1845 ❖ 1779 Born, Marblehead, Mass. 1798 Graduated from Harvard University 1842 Declared all state fugitive laws unconstitutional in Prigg v. Pennsylvania; recognized existence of federal common law in Swift v. Tyson 1845 Died, Cambridge, Mass. ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18001800 1775–83 American Revolution 1812–14 War of 1812 1811–45 Served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court ◆◆ 1834 Conflict of Laws published 1801 Admitted to Mass. bar 1808–09 Served in U.S. House 1816 Wrote majority opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 1832 Bailments published 1836 Equity Jurisprudence published 1829 Appointed Dane Professor of Law at Harvard 1819 Joined Chief Justice Marshall's holding in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 1805–08 & 1810–11 Served in Mass. state legislature ◆◆◆◆ ❖ ◆ ◆◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 394 STORY, JOSEPH Story’s most controversial decision came in PRIGG V. PENNSYLVANIA, 41 U.S. 539, 10 L. Ed. 1060 (1842), which involved the federal FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT OF 1793. Many northern states demonstrated their hostility to SLAVERY by enacting laws designed to frustrate southern slave owners who came north in search of runaway slaves. Slave owners were outraged at these laws and argued that the federal act gave them the right to reclaim their property without interference by state governments. Story, writing for an 8–1 majority, declared unconstitutional all fugitive slave laws enacted by the states because the federal law provided the exclusive remedy for the return of runaway slaves. Story also ruled, however, that states were not compelled to enforce the federal fugitive slave provisions. It would be inconsistent and without legal basis, he reasoned, for the Court to declare the preeminence of federal law and then require state courts to help carry out that law. Prigg was a crucial decision because it announced that slavery was a national issue that could not be disturbed by STATE ACTION.It angered many opponents of slavery and hurt Story’s reputation in the north. Some state judges took Story’s opinion to heart and refused to participate in federal fugitive slave proceedings. Story’s other major contribution on the Court was the development of “federal common law,” which was first articulated in the 1842 CIVIL PROCEDURE case of SWIFT V. TYSON, 41 U.S. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865. The controversy arose on a technical question involving the negotiability of a commercial bill of exchange. New York and other states were divided over whether the bill was negotiable. Under the federal Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal courts were instructed to follow state laws when deciding cases between parties from two different states. Story, who believed the negotiability of such bills was crucial to the development of a national commercial community, declared that the decisions of the New York courts—based not on legislative statutes but on interpretations of the common la w— were not “laws” binding on federal judges. Common-law decisions were only “evidence” of the appropriate law. Story concluded that it was the duty of federal courts to examine evidence from all relevant state common-law jurisdictions before pro- claiming the governing rule. Story’s opinion came to stand for the proposition that a general federal COMMON LAW existed that federal courts were free to apply in virtually all common-law matters of private law. The idea of federal common law promoted national uniformity but also constituted a revolutionary expansion of federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court overruled this proposition in ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), declaring that federal courts must apply the law of the state, whether it is statutory or case law. Story’s influence went beyond his court decisions. In 1829 he was appointed to be the first Dane Professor of Law at Harvard. He remained in this position the rest of his life while simultaneously serving on the Su- preme Court and acting as president of the Salem bank. The endowment that Nathan Dane had given to Harvard Law School also paid for the publication of Story’s many legal commentaries and treatises, which summarized and codified various areas of the law. Story’s works included Bailments (1832), Bills of Exchange (1843), Conflict of Laws (1834), Equity Jurisprudence (1836), Equity Pleading (1838), Federal Consti- tution (1833), and Promissory Notes (1845). They served as valuable reference works for lawyers, j udges, and legislators and had a profound influence on the development of COMMERCIAL LAW in particular. Alexis de Tocque- ville, the French author of Democracy in America (1835–1840), a classic analysis of U.S. society and government, used Story’s constitu- tional commentaries in writing his work. Story died on September 10, 1845, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. FURTHER READINGS Finkelman, Paul. 2002. “Joseph Story and the Problem of Slavery: A New Englander’s Nationalist Dilemma.” Massachusetts Legal History 8. McClellan, James. 1990. Joseph Story and the American Constitution. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. Story, William W., ed. 2000. Life and Letters of Joseph Story, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Univ. Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange. v STOUT, JUANITA KIDD Juanita Kidd Stout was the first African Ameri- can woman to be elected judge in the United States. Before her election to the Pennsylvania bench, Stout worked in the Philadelphia district attorney’s office. She later was appointed to the [THE LAW] IS A JEALOUS MISTRESS AND REQUIRES A LONG AND CONSTANT COURTSHIP .IT IS NOT TO BE WON BY TRIFLING FAVORS , BUT BY LAVISH HOMAGE . —JOSEPH STORY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STOUT, JUANITA KIDD 395 Pennsylvania Supreme Court, becoming the first African American woman to serve on that court. Stout was born on March 7, 1919, in Wewoka, Oklahoma, the daughter of school- teachers Henry Maynard Kidd and Mary Alice Kidd. She earned a bachelor’s degree from the University of Iowa in 1939. At that time no accredited colleges in Oklahoma admitted African Americans. Between 1939 and 1942, Stout taught music in the high schools at Seminole and Sand Springs, Oklahoma. In 1942, she moved to Washington, D.C., and worked in a law office, which led to her decision to become a lawyer. Stout graduated from the University of Indiana Law School in 1948. She taught at Florida A&M University in 1949 and Texas Southern University in 1950. In 1950 she became an administrative assistant to a federal appeals court judge in Philadelphia. She left this position in 1954 and went into private practice. In 1955 she joined the city’s district attorney’s office, serving as chief appellate attorney. In September 1959 Governor David L. Lawrence appointed Stout a judge of the Philadelphia municipal court. Stout ran for a full term on the bench in November of that year and was elected, making her the first African American woman to be elected to a judgeship. In 1969 she was elected to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and was reelected in 1979, both times receiving the highest number of votes of the Philadelphia Bar Association with respect to judicial qualifications. During the 1960s Stout gained national recognition for her vigorous fight against crime and juvenile delinquency. She wrote numerous articles about race, crime, and justice, and toured six African countries in 1967, lecturing at law schools, colleges, and high schools. In 1988 Stout was appointed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Her tenure was brief, however, because an age limit specified by the state constitution forced her to retire one year later at age 70. Stout returned to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas to serve as a senior judge, where she continued to speak out on racial and gender bias in the courts. Over the years Stout gave numerous speeches and was the recipient of many awards. In 1988 she was Juanita Stout. AP IMAGES Juanita Kidd Stout 1919–1998 ❖ 1919 Born, Wewoka, Ok. 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II ▼▼ ▼▼ 19501950 19251925 19751975 20002000 ◆ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ 1998 Died, Philadelphia, Pa. 1997 Einhorn caught in France; extradited, 2001; convicted of murder, 2002 1939 Earned B.A. from University of Iowa 1939–42 Taught music at high schools in Oklahoma 1948 Graduated from University of Indiana Law School 1955 Joined Philadelphia district attorney's office as chief appellate attorney 1969–88 Served on Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 1993 Conducted murder trial in absentia of international fugitive Ira Einhorn 1988–89 Became first African American woman to sit on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 1989 Took senior judge status with the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 1959 Became first African American woman elected judge when she joined the Philadelphia municipal court 1967 Toured six African countries on a lecture tour; Thurgood Marshall appointed to U.S. Supreme Court GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 396 STOUT, JUANITA KIDD chosen Justice of the Year by the National Association of Women Judges. Stout died August 21, 1998, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. RESOURCES Brennan, Lisa. 1989. “Stout Forced to Retire.” Pennsylvania Law Journal-Reporter (May 22). Brooks, Joseph K., and Marjorie Torney. 2002. “Juanita Kidd Stout: A Register of Her Papers in the Library of Congress.” Washington, D.C.: Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Halbert, Marvin R. 1981. “Off the Bench and Off the Cuff.” Pennsylvania Law Journal-Reporter (February 23). v STOWE, HARRIET BEECHER Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of one of America’s most famous and popular books, helped to strengthen the ABOLITION movement by bringing white Americans and people around the world to the realization of the cruelties and misery endured by black slaves in the 1850s. Her book, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, was one of the biggest sellers of the nineteenth century, second only to sales of the Bible. Since its publication, the book has never been out of print. Stowe was born June 14, 1811, in Litchfield, Connecticut. She was the seventh child of prominent Congregationalist minister Lyman Beecher and his wife Roxana Foote Beecher, who died when Harriet was five. The Stowes grew up in an environment steeped in a Protestant tradition that demanded living a pious and moral life. Stowe’s younger brother, HENRY WARD BEECHER, eventu ally became one of the country’s most famous preachers and a major leader of the abolition movement. Her sister, Catharine, established several schools for young women throughout the United States. Stowe attended Catharine’s Hartford Female Seminary, one of the only schools open to young women at the time. She received an excellent education, and blossomed as a writer under her sister’s tutelage. In 1832, she accompanied her sister and father to Cincinnati, Ohio, where Catharine opened another school and their father became president of Lane Theological Seminary. The following year, in 1833, Stowe coauthored and published her first book—a children’s geography—under her sis- ter’s name. In 1834 Harriet Beecher married widower Calvin Stowe, a poorly paid professor of biblical literature at Lane. During the first seven years of her marriage, Stowe bore five of the seven ▼▼ ▼▼ Harriet Beecher Stowe 1811–1896 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ❖ 1811 Born, Litchfield, Conn. 1833 Coauthored and published first book under sister's name ◆ ◆ 1834 The Mayflower published 1851-52 Uncle Tom's Cabin published serially in National Era, an anti- slavery newspaper ◆ 1852 Uncle Tom's Cabin published as a novel ◆ ❖ 1896 Died, Hartford, Conn. 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act passed, repealed Missouri Compromise and established new slave states ◆ 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford decision denied citizenship to African Americans 1861-65 U.S. Civil War 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision upheld "separate but equal" racial segregation ◆ Harriet Beecher Stowe. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION STOWE, HARRIET BEECHER 397 . awards. In 198 8 she was Juanita Stout. AP IMAGES Juanita Kidd Stout 191 9– 199 8 ❖ 191 9 Born, Wewoka, Ok. 191 4–18 World War I 193 9–45 World War II ▼▼ ▼▼ 195 0 195 0 192 5 192 5 197 5 197 5 20002000 ◆ 195 0–53 Korean. War 196 1–73 Vietnam War ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ 199 8 Died, Philadelphia, Pa. 199 7 Einhorn caught in France; extradited, 2001; convicted of murder, 2002 193 9 Earned B.A. from University of Iowa 193 9–42. Supreme Court GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 396 STOUT, JUANITA KIDD chosen Justice of the Year by the National Association of Women Judges. Stout died August 21, 199 8, in Philadelphia,