Not until the sixth century A.D. did Rome, under emperor Justinian I, accomplish a complete codification of its laws. The Code of Justinian, known as the CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS (Body of Civil Laws), became the legal authority of Rome in 533–34 A.D. Justinian’s code completely revised imperial laws; omitted obsolete, contradictory, and repetitive laws; and contained a digest of legal essays for guidance. The CORPUS JURIS Civilis was a LANDMARK in LEGAL HISTORY, and it served as the basis for modern CIVIL LAW systems. Civil law systems—based on comprehensive codes—were installed in such countries as Germany, France, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Japan, and Spain. Common law systems—based on case precedents—developed in England, South Africa, and Australia. Jurisprudence in colonial America was based on the English common law system. At first, all American colonies enacted laws, but none of these statutes purported to be a comprehensive codification of court procedures or of substantive areas of law (such as CRIMINAL LAW , real and personal PROPERTY LAW,or admiralty law). Early codification efforts were limited in scope to basic concepts and general criminal prohibitions. In 1611 Virginia became the first colony to adopt and print a body of laws. Massachusetts wrote the Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony of New England in 1641, and then the Laws and Liberties of Massachu- setts in 1648. The Massachusetts codes identi- fied simple rules of conduct based on biblical principles. Connecticut published its first code in 1650. Idolatry, BLASPHEMY, and witchcraft were identified as capital offenses in its Book of General Laws. In 1665 Long Island and Westchester, New York, adopted a set of laws relating to the rights of persons and property, and to civil and criminal procedures. Aside from these and similar laws, jurisprudence in colonial America was guided by precedent. The civil law system and the common law system were driven by diverging philosophies. Proponents of comprehensive codification and the civil law system saw the benefits of public notice. By using simple language to inform the citizenry, the state could allow people more freedom to conduct their affairs without fear of the unexpected. Codifiers contended that it was more democratic to live by rules that had been enacted by elected legislators, rather than judges, and that the common law system was too vast and obtuse for the lay public. Supporters of the common law system resisted codification. They noted that rules that were culled from reported case decisions and written in digests notified the public of behavior standards, and argued that it was impossible to distill legal nuances into authoritative rules. Common law advocates maintained that a simple rule could not be written to apply to all of the situations that it might cover. They further argued that precedents, carefully devel- oped over the centuries, were fairer than rules reflecting moods of the moment. The debate over codification raged in the 1800s. The democratic revolutions in France and theUnitedStatesinspiredcodifiers,whoempha- sized that codification by legislators would reflect the will of the people more than would law as determined by judges. In 1804 France enacted the Code Civil, a set of rules that were designed to regulate the organization of courts, civil court procedures, remedies, and the execution of judgments. The Code Civil, renamed the Code Napoléon during Napoléon’s reign as emperor, was supplemented shortly after 1804 to contain five codes relating to CIVIL PROCEDURE, commerce, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,criminallaws,andthe regulation of SLAVERY in French colonies. In the United States, the Code Napoléon inspired French-influenced Louisiana to enact a similar comprehensive code in 1824. A codifi- cation movement was also sparked in the northern states. In 1848 DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (1805–94) convinced the New York Legislature to enact the Code of Civil Procedure, which replaced a complicated common law system of PLEADING and installed a simpler, more rational system. The U.S. Congress passed the U.S. CODE in 1926. Before the enactment of this code, federal laws were contained in the REVISED STATUTES and the subse quent STATUTES AT LARGE. The new U.S. Code synthesized and rearranged those statutes, divided them into 50 titles, and compiled them all in four volumes. In 1932 a new edition of the U.S. Code was published. currently a new edition of the U.S. Code is promulgated every six years, with a cumulative supplement printed for each title in every intervening year. Procedural rules have been codified as well. The resulting codes include the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 498 CODIFICATION Procedure, and the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. Most states have codifie d their procedural rules based on these federal codes. The American Law Institute (ALI), a group of legal scholars, has been responsible for the most recent codification movement in the United States. The ALI has written restat ements of law for such areas as contracts, torts, and conflict of laws. The restatements do not have the force of law, but they are used by states as models for codification, and courts refer to them in judicial decisions. The ALI also drafts codes such as the MODEL PENAL CODE in an effort to help standardize and make consistent the application of law throughout the United States. The ALI also works with the National Confer- ence of Commissioners to promote uniform laws. The most notable of these effort s is the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, a collection of laws relating to commercial transactions such as sales and leasing of goods, transfer of funds, COMMERCIAL PAPER, bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, investment SECURITIES, and SECURED TRANSACTIONS. The Uniform COMMERCIAL CODE has been adopted in whole or in part by all of the states. Administrative agencies follow their own procedural and substantive codes. The CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS contains the general body of regulatory laws govern ing practice and proce- dure in federal administrative agencies. This code is divided into 50 titles and is revised annually. All states have codified regulations for their own administrative agencies. Yet another compilation of statutes, rules, and regulations is the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE , which covers the substantive and PROCEDURAL LAW governing the armed forces of the United States. FURTHER READINGS Clarke, R. Floyd. 1982. The Science of Law and Lawmaking: Being an Introduction to Law, a General View of Its Forms and Substance, and a Discussion of the Question of Codification. New York: Macmillan, 1898. Reprint. Littleton, CO: Rothman. Palmer, Vernon V. 1988. “The Death of a Code—The Birth of a Digest.” Tulane Law Review 60 (December). Rosen, Mark D. 1994. “What Has Happened to the Common Law? Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law’s Subsequent Development.” Wisconsin Law Review. CROSS REFERENCES Code Pleading; Napoleonic Code; U.S. Code. COERCION The intim idation of a victim to compel the individual to do some act against his or her will by the use of psychological pressu re, physical force, or threats. The crime of intentionally and un- lawfully restraining another’s freedom by threat- ening to commit a crime, accusing the victim of a crime, disclosing any secret that would seriously impair the victim’s reputation in the community, or by performing or refusing to perform an official action lawfully requested by the victim, or by causing an official to do so. A defense asserted in a criminal prosecution that a person who committed a crime did not do so of his or her own free will, but only because the individual was compelled by another through the use of physical force or threat of immediate serious bodily injury or death. In the laws governing wills, coercion is present when a TESTATOR is forced by another to make provisions in his or her will that he or she otherwise would not make if permitted to act according to free choice. It is an element of both DURESS and UNDUE INFLUENCE, two ways in which a testator is deprived of his or her free choice in making the will. If coercion is established in a proceeding to ad mit a will to probate, the document will be denied probate, thereby becoming void; and the property of the decedent will be distributed pursuant to the laws of DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. Coercion, as an element of duress, is grounds for seeking the RESCISSION or cancellation of a Patty Hearst, shown here in a poster issued by the Symbionese Liberation Army, later claimed she was coerced into committing crimes on behalf of the organization. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION COERCION 499 contract or deed. When one party to an instru- ment is forced against his or her will to agree to its terms the document can be declared void by a court. A marriage may be annulled or a SEPARATION or DIVORCE granted on the grounds of coercion. The coercion of small businesses by a CARTEL to fix prices of particular items supplied to them is a violation of antitrust laws, which are intended to prevent the restraint of competition in commerce . Laws regulating labor-management relations are violated by coercion when the employer coerces employees not to join a LABOR UNION or when a union REPRESENTATIVE pressures, uses physical force, or t hreatens an employee i nto joining the union. Coercion is recognized as a defense in prosecutions for crimes other than MURDER.If an accused can establish that he or she commit- ted a crime as a result of the coercion imposed by another the DEFENDANT will be acquitted on the charge as a MATTER OF LAW. He or she will not be excused for the crime if there was only fear of minor physical injury, damage to reputation, or property loss. The person who coerces another to commit a crime is GUILTY of the crime commit- ted. The coercer can also be prosecuted for the separate crime of coercion. Coercion by law is the rendition of a judgment or a decree by a court, tax assessment board, or other QUASI-JUDICIAL body for an amount of money presently due that mandates the sale of property owned by the defendant to pay the judgment. COGNIZABLE Conversely, a “cognizable group” of jurors or potential jurors refers to that common trait or characteristic among them that is recognized as distinguishing them from others, such as race, ethnicity, and gender. Trial counsel are generally prohibited from eliminating jurors who are in the same cognizable group as that of a party or litigant through discriminatory peremptory chal- lenges when that distinction is the basis for the challenge. In Bat son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 54 USLW 4425 (U.S.Ky., Apr 30, 1986) (NO. 84-6263), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors may not use peremptory challenges to exclude African Amer- icans from a jury solely on the basis of race. Over the years, other cases have expanded the scope of protected or “cognizable groups” of jurors to include gender, religion, and socioeconomic status. CROSS REFERENCES Failure to State a Cla im; Peremptory Challenge. COGNIZANCE The power, authority, and ability of a judge to determine a particular legal matter. A judge’s decision to take note of or deal with a cause. That which is cognizable to a judge is within the scope of his or her jurisdiction. A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE would not have cognizance of a major criminal matter, for example. COGNOVIT ACTIONEM [Latin, He has confessed the action.] The written confession made by a defendant admitting the merits of the action brought against him or her by a plaintiff. The confession is usually based upon designated conditions, given in court, and impli- edly empowers the plaintiff’s attorney to sign judgment and issue execution for its enforcement. CROSS REFERENCE Cognovit Note. COGNOVIT NOTE An extraordinary document by which a debtor authorizes his or her creditor’s attorney to enter a confession in court that allows judgment against the debtor. A creditor may ask the borrower to sign a cognovit note when credit is extended. If the debtor falls into ARREARS the creditor can obtain a judgment against the person without notification to the debtor. There is usually little the debtor can do to attack the judgment when it is discovered. The Supreme Court has held that cognovit notes are not necessarily illegal but most states have outlawed their use in consumer transactions. COHABITATION Cohabitation is a living arrangement in which an unmarried couple lives together in a long-term relationship that resembles a marriage. Couples cohabit, rather than marry, for a variety of reasons. They may want to test their compatibility before they commit to a legal union. They may want to maintain their single status for financial reasons. In some cases, such as those involving gay or lesbian couples, or individuals already married to another person, the law does not allow them to marry. In other cases, the partners may feel that MARRIAGE is unnecessary. Whatever the reasons, between GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 500 COGNIZABLE 1970 and 1990, the number of couples living together outside marriage quadrupled, from 523,000 to nearly 3 million. These couples face some of the same legal issues as married couples, as well as some issues that their married friends need never consider. In most places it is legal for unmarried people to live together, although some zoning laws prohibit more than three unrelated people from inhabiting a house or apartment. A few states still prohibit FORNICATION, or sexual relations, between an unmarried man and woman, but such laws are no longer enforced. Even in the early twenty-first century, some states continue to prohibit SODOMY, which refers to sexual relations between male partners. Although these laws are rarely enforced, the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutional- ity of these sodomy statutes as applied to same- sex couples in Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140 [1986]). The Court reconsidered the same issue 17 years later, however, and decided that a Texas sodomy law that applied specifically to male homosexual conduct violated the due process clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (LAWRENCE V. TEXAS,539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472,156 L. Ed. 2d 508 [2003]). Advocates of GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS viewed the case as a victory for their cause. Still, as of 2008 six states had anti- cohabitation laws remaining on their books: Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia (North Dakota repealed its law in 2007). However, a North Carolina judge, in 2006, ruled that North Carolina’s anti-cohabitation law was unconsti- tutional, in light of the 2003 Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence v. Texas. The law traditionally has been biased in favor of marriage. PUBLIC POLICY supports marriage as necessary to the stability of the family, the basic societal unit. To preserve and encourage mar- riage, the law reserves many rights and privileges to married persons. Cohabitation carries none of those rights and privileges. It has been said that cohabitation has all of the difficulties of marriage without any of the benefits. Cohabiting couples have little guidance as to their legal rights in such areas as property ownership, responsibility for debts, custody, access to health care and other benefits, and survivorship. FAMILY LAW experts advise cohabiting couples to address these and other issues in a written cohabitation agreement, similar to a PREMARITAL AGREEMENT . The contract should outline how the two people will divide expenses and own property, whether they will maintain joint or separate bank accounts, and how their assets will be distributed if one partner dies or leaves the relationship. Property acquired during cohabitation, such as REAL ESTATE, home furnish- ings, antiques, artwork, china, silver, tools, and sports equipment, may be contested if partners separate or if one of them dies. To avoid this difficulty, the agreement should clearly outline who is entitled to what. When cohabiting couples separate, division of assets often becomes a contentious issue. In the past, courts refused to enforce agreements between unmarried couples to share income or assets, holding that such agreements were against public policy. In 1976, the California Supreme Court decided Marvin v. Marvin (18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106), holding that agreements between cohabiting individuals to share income received during the time they live together can be legally binding and enforceable. The highly publicized suit between actor Lee Marvin and his live-in companion, Michelle Triola Marvin, was the first of a series of palimony suits that have become more numerous since the 1980s. The PLAINTIFF in a palimony suit must prove that the agreement of financial support is not a meretricious agreement, that is, one made in exchange for a promise of sexual relations. Courts refuse to enforce meretricious contracts because of their similarity to contracts for PROSTITUTION. SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, America’s Families and Living Arrangements, 2008. Cohabiting and Married Couple Households, by Region, in 2008 Opposite Sex Unmarried Partner Households Married Couple Households Midwest 22.9% West 22.6% South 37.0% Northeast 17.5% 6,799,000 couples 58,370,000 couples West 25.7% Midwest 24.2% South 33.0% Northeast 17.1% ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION COHABITATION 501 The only way to guarantee that a valid agreement of support or division of property exists is to have it in writing. In the Marvin case, the plaintiff, who asked for $1.6 million, was awarded only $104,000. An appeals court revoked that amount and found that the plaintiff had failed to show that she and the DEFENDANT had an agreement (Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 [Cal. Ct. App. 1981]). Conversely, when tennis star Martina Navratilova separated from live-in partner Judy Nelson in 1993, Nelson filed a $16 million palimony suit, claiming that Navratilova reneged on a promise to share whatever the couple accu mulated during their relationship. A signed and videotaped 1986 cohabitation agreement supported Nelson’s claim, and Navratilova settled out of court for an undisclosed amount. Cohabiting parents may face legal difficul- ties if they separate without a written parenting agreement. An unmarried father must acknowl- edge PATERNITY by filing an AFFIDAVIT with the state legitimating his child and establishing his parental relationship. Likewise, both parents must actively partic ipate in the raising of the child in order to have a legitimate claim to custody or visitation. By legitimating their child and being involved in the child’s upbringing, unmarried parents establish their right to seek custody or visitation if the family breaks up. Legitimating is also important for inheritance purposes. If an unmarried father dies without a will, his legitimated child can freely inherit his estate (see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 [1977] , which held that a signed statement establishing paternity of a child born out of wedlock is adequate protection of the child’s inheritance rights). Of course, the best way to guarantee the distribution of assets to children is through a written will. Cohabiting individuals may face difficulties when one of them becomes ill and requires hospitalization or long-term care. The case of Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson illus- trates this problem. Kowalski and Thompson lived together for four years before Kowalski sustained serious head injuries in a 1983 automobile accident. She was left paralyzed and seriously brain damaged, but able to communicate. Kowalski’s parents refused to allow Thompson to see her or to participate in decisions about her treatment. In 1984 Kowalski’s father was awarded guardianship of Kowalski (In re Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 [Minn. Ct. App. 1986] ) and the family continued to frustrate Thompson’s efforts to see or assist Kowalski. In 1991 Kowalski’s father voluntarily gave up his guardianship for medical reasons, and a Min- nesota trial court awarded guardianship to Karen Tomberlin, a fam ily friend whom the court considered a “neutral third party.” The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and after a seven-year battle, Thompson was finally granted guardianship of Kowalski (In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 [Minn. Ct. App. 1991]). The court held that Kowalski had “sufficient capacity” to express her preference as to a guardian and that she had consistently said she wanted to be with Thompson. The court also noted the duration of the couple’s relation- ship as well as the fact that they had exchanged rings and named each other as insurance beneficiaries before Kowalski’saccident. Cohabiting individuals can avoid such conflicts by executing certain documents, in- cluding a durable POWER OF ATTORNEY and a medical power of attorney. A durable power of attorney grants an unmarried partner the necessary authority to make decisions in the event of physical or mental disability of the other partner. It goes further than a general power of attorney in that it specifically allows one partner to continue making decisions even if the other partner becomes incapacitated. A medical power of attorney allows one partner to make decisions regarding medical treatme nt for the other. If the partners have specific instruc- tions about funeral arrangements, these too should be put in writing. In addition, a written will or trust allows partners to specify the distribution of their property, including life insurance benefits, IRAs, and bank accounts. Partners may also name their preferred TRUSTEE or executor. Many cohabiting heterosexual individuals believe that the law will recognize their relationship as a COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE with the legal protections and financial benefits of marriage. Alabama, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah recognized common-law marriage as of 1990. But by 2008 four more states had repealed common-law marriages: Georgia, Idaho, Ohio, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 502 COHABITATION and Pennsylvania. In those states, a man and woman who live together and represent them- selves as married may be given common-law recognition. Once a common-law marriage has been established, it must be dissolved through DIVORCE. Cohabiting individuals who live in a state that recognizes common-law marriage and do not wish to be married should execute a statement that they are not married in order to avoid a later finding that a common-law marriage existed. However, over time, a few courts began to recognize the familial ties of unmarried couples. In Braschi v. Stahl Associates (74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S .2d 784 [1989]), New York State’s highest court found that a homo- sexual man and his deceased life partner had constituted a family for purposes of New York City’s rent control ordinance. The court found that in this case, the term family should be construed broadly and should encompass contemporary realities, including unmarried adult partners in a long-term, committed relationship that shows mutual sharing of the mundane tasks of everyday life. Similarly, in Dunphy v. Gregor (261 N.J. Super. 110, 617 A.2d 1248 [N.J. 1992]), the court found that a woman who had witnessed the events leading to her fiancé’s death had standing to sue for the emotional damage she suffered as a result. Previously, suits such as this (called bystander liability suits) were limited to those who were married or had blood ties to the victim. However, the court in Dunphy found that the plaintiff met the requirement of “intimate familial relationship,” noting that the plaintiff and her fiancé had lived together for several years, that there was a high degree of mutual dependence in their relationship, and that they contributed to and shared a common life. The tide has been changing for homosexual couples as well. In October 2008 the Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that denying same- sex couples the same rights, responsibilities, and designation of being “married” violated the EQUAL PROTECTION clause of the state’s constitution (Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, SC 17716). Just weeks later, in November 2008, the state began to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Accordingly, Connecticut became the third state ever to issue marriage licenses to same- sex couples, following Massachusetts (2004) and California (2008). The California Supreme Court had ruled just five months earlier, in May 2008 (In re Marriage Cases, No. S147999, 183 P.3d 384). However, subsequent to California’s court decision, California voters reversed the ruling through Proposition 8, a ballot initiative in the November 2008 elections that would amend California’s constitution. California’s reversal left only two states permitting same- sex marriages until the Iowa Supreme Court, on April 3, 2009, legalized gay marriages by also ruling that Iowa restrictions violated the state’s constitution. This ruling again brought the total to three states upholding such marriages, and the later addition of Vermont brought the total to four. For the majority of states prohibiting same- sex marriages (and amending their state constitutions to reflect that), legislative acknowl- edgment of domestic partnerships and cohabita- tions continued to increase. A growing number of states and municipalities passed laws allowing unmarried couples, both heterosexual and homosexual, to register as domestic partners. Some cities have established a domestic partner registry, while others extend certain benefits to domestic partners even if the city does not provide a registry. The state of California leads the nation in the number of cities and counties that provide benefits to domestic partners, offer domestic partner registries, or both. Cities providing domestic partn er benefits include New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia. The ordinances and statues in these cities allow couples to register as domestic partners and to dissolve their partnerships if they separate. Some same-sex cohabitants face other types of legal challenges. In Garcia v. Garcia (60 P.3d 1174 [Utah Ct. App. 2002]), the Utah Court of Appeals held that an ex-wife’s involvement in a same-sex relationship constituted cohabitation for the purpose of determining whether the ex-husband’s ALIMONY payments should be terminated. Under Utah law, a court’s order requiring alimony payments from one spouse to the other terminates upon proof that the spouse receiving alimony is cohabiting with another person. The ex-wife allegedly maintained a long-term relationship with another woman, during which time she shared a common RESIDENCY and had sexual contact. The trial court held that the statute’s definition of cohabitation applied only to relationships between members of the opposite sex. The appeals court disagreed, holding that the term GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION COHABITATION 503 “sexual contact” in the statute also included such contact between members of the same sex, and reversed the trial court’s decision. FURTHER READINGS American Bar Association. 1994. Family Legal Guide. New York: Random House. Dailey, Patricia A. 1994. “Domestic Partnerships in the Nineties.” Delaware Lawyer (summer). Duff, Johnette, and George G. Truitt. 1992. The Spousal Equivalent Handbook: A Legal and Financial Guide to Living Together. New York: Penguin, NAL/Dutton. Ihara, Toni, Ralph E. Warner, and Robin Leonard. 1994. The Living Together Kit. 7th ed. Berkeley, Calif.: Nolo Press. “Judge Rules N.C. Anti-Cohabitation Law Unconstitutional.” 2006. USA Today, July 21. Lind, Goran. 2008. Common Law Marriage: A Legal Institution for Cohabitation. New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press. Richardson, David G. 1993. “Family Rights for Unmarried Couples.” Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy (spring). “Vermont Legislature Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage.” 2009. The Washington Post, April 7. Samuels, M. Dee. 1995. “You Don’t Have to Be Married to Be Legal.” Compleat Lawyer (winter). Wallman, Lester. 1994. Cupid, Couples, and Contracts: A Guide to Living Together, Prenuptial Agreements, and Divorce. New York: MasterMedia. CROSS REFERENCE Parent and Child. v COHEN, FELIX SOLOMON Felix Solomon Cohen was born July 3, 1907, in New York City. He graduated from the College of the City of New York with a bachelor of arts degree in 1926. He subsequently received a master of arts degree in 1927, a doctor of philosophy degree in 1929 from Harvard University, and a bachelor of laws degree from Columbia Law School in 1931. In 1931 and 1932 Cohen performed the duties of secretary to the justice of the New York Supreme Court. He was also admitted to the New York bar and established his law office in New York. In 1948 Cohen was admitted to the District of Columbia bar; he practiced law in his later years in Washington, D.C. Cohen’s career interes ts extended to the field of education and he presented a series of lectures on legal philosophy at the New School for Social Research during 1932 and 1933. He entered government service in 1933, serving as assistant solicitor for the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR for ten years. From 1936 to 1948 he also acted on the board of appeals of the INTERIOR DEPARTMENT where he was presiding officer from 1940 to 1948. In 1939 he performed the duties of special assistant to the attorney general. Cohen served in the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE from 1939 to 1940 and returned to the Department of the Interior in 1943, acting as associate solicitor for the next five years. In 1946 Cohen returned to teaching and served as a visiting professor at the Yale Law School; he also taught law at the City College of New York in 1948. Cohen wrote several publications including Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals, which was published in 1933. He died October 19, 1953, in Washington, D.C. v COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL Morris Raphael Cohen achieved prominence as an educator and author. Cohen was born July 25, 1880, in Minsk, Russia. He immigrated to the United States in 1892 and earned a bachelor of science degree from the College of the City of New York in Felix Solomon Cohen 1907–1953 ▼▼ ▼▼ 19001900 19751975 19501950 19251925 ◆ ◆ ❖❖ 1907 Born, New York City 1914–18 World War I 1929 Stock market crash precipitated the Great Depression 1931–32 Served as secretary of N.Y. Supreme Court 1933 Published Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals; became assistant solicitor for the U.S. Dept. of the Interior 1936–48 Served on board of appeals of the Interior Department 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1953 Died, Washington, D.C. 1961–73 Vietnam War GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 504 COHEN, FELIX SOLOMON 1900 and a doctor of philosophy degree from Harvard University in 1906. Cohen was the father of FELIX COHEN, who became a somewhat noteworthy philosopher/writer in the jurispru- dential school of LEGAL REALISM. In 1899 Cohen began his teaching career as a history teacher at the Educational Alliance in New York. He also taught at Davidson Colle- giate Institute from 1900 to 1901, and in 1902 he accepted a position as mathematics teacher at his alma mater, the College of the City of New York. He held that position until 1912 when he switched his interests to philosophy and served as a professor until 1938. In that year he accepted a professorship at the University of Chicago and continued his career as a philoso- phy professor. In addition to his permanent teaching duties, Cohen also served at numerous institu- tions as a temporary professor—including his presentation of a series of lectures at Columbia Law School from 1906 to 1907, 1914 to 1915, the summer of 1918, and the summer of 1927; at Yale from 1929 to 1931; and at Harvard from 1938 to 1939. Cohen is the author of several noteworthy publications, including Reason and Nature (1931), Law and the Social Order (1933), and Faith of a Liberal (1945). He died January 28, 1947, in Washington, D.C. v COHN, ROY MARCUS Attorney, federal PROSECUTOR, and communist- hunter, Roy Marcus Cohn built a flamboyant, successful, and troubled career on his promi- nent role in Cold War politics. As a wunderkin d whose legal prowess quickly brought him to national attention, Cohn took part in the controversial ESPIONAGE trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1951. In the mid-1950s he helped engineer Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s notori- ous anti-Communist witch hunts. From the 1950s to the 1980s his private practice put him in the top rank of celebrity attorneys, but questionable ethics ultimately led to his being disbarred in 1986. The privilege of family connections helped launch Cohn’s career. He was born on February 20, 1927, in New York, New York, the son of a prominent state supreme court judge. His father was well connected in the DEMOCRATIC PARTY.By age ten, Cohn had already met FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. Academic brilliance helped Cohn sail quickly through college, and he earned his law degree from Columbia University in 1947 at the age of twenty. He then had to wait one year in order to meet the state’s minimum age for admission to the New York State Bar. Mean- while, he worked for two years in the U.S. district attorney’s office before moving to Washington, D.C., in 1950, to join the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT as an assistant U.S. attorney. In Washington, Cohn established his anti- Communist creden tials. For the period of the Cold War, this was an auspicious career move: Hysteria was about to afflict the nation, and he would help tighten the grip. At age 23, he served as the third -ranking prosecutor on the espio- nage trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the American Communists who were convicted and sentenced to death in 1951 for furnishing atomic secrets to Soviet spies. During the trial, Cohn held a number of improper Morris Raphael Cohen 1880–1947 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18751875 19501950 19251925 19001900 ◆◆◆◆ ◆◆◆◆ ❖❖ 1880 Born, Minsk, Russia 1892 Immigrated to the United States 1902 Began teaching mathematics at City College 1906 Earned Ph.D. from Harvard University 1912 Became professor of philosophy at City College 1914–18 World War I 1931 Reason and Nature published 1933 Law and the Social Order published 1938 Joined faculty of the University of Chicago 1939–45 World War II 1945 Faith of a Liberal published 1947 Died, Washington, D.C. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION COHN, ROY MARCUS 505 ex parte—one-sided—private conversations with Judge Irving Kaufman outside of court. Accord- ing to Nicholas von Hoffman’s 1988 biography Citizen Cohn, the attorney probably used these talks to convince Judge Kaufman to impose the death penalty. Cohn denied doing so, in his posthumously published 1988 book The Autobi- ography of Roy Cohn, but he claimed that the judge had told him the verdict of the trial even before ithad begun. The AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ultimately exonerated both Cohn and Kaufman for their conversations. The Rosenberg trial put Cohn on a fast track to prominence. Adding to his reputation as an enemy of radicalism, Cohn toured U.S sponsored libraries in Europe in 1952 on behalf of the U.S. Senate, confiscating subversive books. In 1953 he was a special assistant to Attorney General JAMES MCGRANERY, but he left the job for greater visibility. He became chief counsel to the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, beating out ROBERT F. KENNEDY for the position. The subcommittee would make history as the bully pulpit for Senator JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, who used it to conduct his relentless pursuit of communists in the U. S. government. Cohn was McCarthy’s right-hand man. In the Senate, he sat beside the senator and took part in the grilling of WITNESSES who were hauled before the commi ttee. Officially, his role as McCarthy’s spe cial counsel made him the senator’s assistant, but the relationship worked differently behind the scenes. Cohn knew more people than McCarthy did. He helped to compile lists of witnesses and suspects, a task made easier by his friendship with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. When McCarthy blundered by challenging the army in 195 4, his political career ended abruptly. Cohn was criticized for having sought special favors for a friend in the army. But unlike McCarthy, who was censured by the Senate and died a broken man in 1957, Cohn escaped to a new, lucrative career. In private practice in New York, Cohn flourished. Although many intellectuals excori- ated him for his role in the McCarthy witch hunts, he gained prominent clients from across the political spectrum. He represented everyone from alleged mafia bosses to pop stars, and he was largely successful, often without having to appear in court. Cohn had developed the right friends: newspaper columnists, publishing mag- nates, politicians, judges, and fellow lawyers. He was as feared for his ability to get headlines published as he was for any oral argument he might make. Outside of his law practice, he wrote widely in the popular and legal press, and Roy Marcus Cohn 1927–1986 ▼▼ ▼▼ 19251925 20002000 19751975 19501950 ◆◆◆◆◆◆ ❖ ❖ 1927 Born, New York City 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1951 Helped prosecute and convict Julius and Ethel Rosenberg on espionage charges 1947 Earned law degree 1953–54 Served as chief counsel of the U.S. Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee under Senator McCarthy 1957 McCarthy died; Cohn began adjunct teaching career at New York law school 1959 Joined Saxe, Beacon & Bolan 1961–73 Vietnam War 1970 A Fool for a Client published 1981 How to Stand Up for Your Rights— And Win! published 1986 Disbarred for ethical abuses; died, New York City Roy Marcus Cohn. AP IMAGES I BRING OUT THE WORST IN MY ENEMIES AND THAT ’S HOW I GET THEM TO DEFEAT THEMSELVES . —ROY COHN GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 506 COHN, ROY MARCUS authored four books, including How to Stand Up for Your Rights—and Win! (1981). Though successful and popular until shortly before his death, Cohn was a complicated and enigmatic figure. Although he was Jewish, he befriended anti-Semites and used anti-Semitic jibes. Outspoken against homosexual rights, he was a gay man himself. Until the end, he concealed the fact that he was dying of AIDS. Pursued for 20 years by the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (IRS), he had no bank account and owned little property; the IRS was unable to collect the reported $7 million he owed in back taxes. Months before his death on August 2, 1986, Cohn was disbarred for ethical abuses that included lying, stealing, attemptin g to DEFRAUD a client, and FORGERY. CROSS REFERENCE Communism. COINSURANCE A provision of an insurance policy that provides that the insurance company and the insured will apportion between them any loss covered by the policy according to a fixed percentage of the value for which the property, or the person, is insured. Insurance is intended to spread the risk of any loss among every insured who purchases a particular type of policy from an insurance company and the company itself. The likelihood that every policyholder will suffer the loss that has been insured against is slim, and, therefore, an insurance company should be able to compensate those who have losses, if those policyholders have complied with the terms of their policies. Coinsurance divides the risk of loss accord- ing to the amoun t of insurance purchased by each person through the payment of premiums. The size of insurance premiums is based primarily upon the value of the property covered by the policy. If a person fails to insure a property for an amount close to its ACTUAL CASH VALUE or replacement cost, then the person must accept a greater share of the risk of loss than someone who pays larger premiums to insure his or her property for an amount close or equal to its actual value. In insurance policies for fire or water damage the coinsurance clause provides that property must be insured for a specific percentage, usually 80 percent of its actual cash value. The 80 percent provision is known as the New York Standard Coinsurance Clause. The owner of the property is liable for the remaining 20 percent of its actual cash value. If the insured party’s property is only partially damaged, that person’s recovery under the policy will be reduced in proportion to the amount of loss suffered. For example, a homeowner has a $120,000 fire insurance policy on her home, which is valued at $150,000. The woman ’s coverage is 80 percent of the home’s actual cash value. If her house is completely destroyed by a fire that is not ARSON, she will recover $120,000, which is the full face amount of the policy. She is responsible for the remaining 20 percent of its actual cash value, or $30,000. If a fire caused only $20,000 worth of damages, the homeowner could recover only $16,000, or 80 percent of the loss. The homeowner is a coinsurer for the remaining $4,000, or 20 percent of the replace- ment cost of the property. If that homeowner has purchased only $36,000 worth of fire insurance, or 60 percent of replacement costs, thereby paying a lower premium than a policy with coverage for $48,000, she would be responsible for a larger share of the damages incurred in the total or partial destruction of the property. The total destruction of the $60,000 house will result in a recovery limited to the amount of insurance bought by the homeowner, or $36,000. She is responsible for 40 percent of replacement costs. The recovery for the partial loss of $20,000 will be $12,000, or 60 percent of the loss, since recovery is reduced proportionately by the amount of actual loss. Although in surance policies stipulate a specific percentage of loss that must be covered, an insured may purchase maximum insuran ce coverage for up to 100 percent of the replace- ment cost of the prop erty covered by the policy. The premiums for such protection will be proportionately larger than the one for 80 percent of the property’s actual cash value. Coinsurance clauses in fire or water damage policies encourage property owners to purchase full or nearly full coverage. It is important for policyholders to periodically review their insur- ance policies to verify that their coverage adequately protects the value of their property. In medical or HEALTH INSURANCE polici es, coinsurance has a similar meaning. The amount of expenses that a medical insurer will GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION COINSURANCE 507 . couples West 25 .7% Midwest 24 .2% South 33.0% Northeast 17.1% ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD. Utah recognized common -law marriage as of 1990. But by 20 08 four more states had repealed common -law marriages: Georgia, Idaho, Ohio, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 5 02 COHABITATION and. include the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 498 CODIFICATION Procedure, and the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. Most states