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assigning the same work to another plant owned by the company. If the employer and employees bargain in GOOD FAITH, they generally settle their differences and sign a collective bargaining agreement. FURTHER READINGS Smith, Robert Michael, and Scott Molloy. 2003. From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of Commercialized Strikebreaking and Unionbusting in the United States. Athens: Ohio Univ. Press. Twomey, David. 2009. Labor and Employment Law: Text & Cases. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning. Zinn, Howard. 2002. Three Strikes: Miners, Musicians, Salesgirls and the Fighting Spirit of Labor’s Lost Century. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. CROSS REFERENCE Labor Law. STRING CITATION A series of references to cases that establish legal precedents and to other authorities that appear one after another and are printed following a legal assertion or conclusion as supportive authority. They can be useful in showing the extent of reliance on a rule. For example, to cite cases regarding summary judgment, the following might be used: Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). For example, in preparing a brief, an attorney might set forth a particular assertion based upon the facts of the case and applicable law and immediately thereafter make a list of all the cases that lend support to it, in descending order of strength. However, long string citations can be unwieldy and distract the reader, because they tend to interrupt the continuity of the main text. STRONG-ARM PROVISION The segment of the federal BANKRUPTCY law that grants the trustee the rights of the most secured creditor, so that he or she is able to seize all of the debtor’s property for proper distribution. v STRONG, WILLIAM William Strong served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1870 to 1880. He is best remembered for his majority opinion in the controversial case of Knox v. Lee (argued concurrently with Parker v. Davis), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871), commonly known as one of the Legal Tender Cases. Strong was born on May 6, 1808, in Somers, Connecticut. He graduated from Yale Univer- sity in 1828 and received a master’s degree from the same instit ution in 183 1. He attended Yale Law School and w as admitted t o the P ennsylvania bar in 1832. He practiced law in Reading, Pennsylvania, for 15 year s. In 1847 Strong entered politics with his election as a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives. He left Congress in 1851 and re-entered private practice. In 1857 Strong began a term as a justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Cour t. He remained on the bench until 1868, when he resumed private law practice, this time in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. During the Civil War, Strong changed his political affiliation from Democrat to Republican. This move proved auspicious for him, as President ULYSSES S. GRANT, a Republican, appointed Strong to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1870 to replace the retiring Justice ROBERT C. GRIER, a Pennsylvania Democrat. Strong’s appointment and first year on the Court were marked by controversy concerning the Legal Tender Cases. On the day he was ▼▼ ▼▼ William Strong 1808–1895 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ❖ 1808 Born, Somers, Conn. ◆◆ 1828 Earned B.A. from Yale University 1832 Admitted to Pennsylvania bar 1870 Court ruled in Hepburn v. Griswold that Congress lacked the power to make legal tender notes 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1812–14 War of 1812 1871 Wrote opinion in Knox v. Lee that reversed Hepburn ❖ 1895 Died, Minnewaska, N.Y. 1880 Ruled in Strauder v. West Virginia that a law requiring white, male-only juries violated the 14th Amendment 1847–51 Served in U.S. House 1857–68 Served on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ◆ ◆ ◆ 1870–80 Served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 408 STRING CITATION nominated, the Court announced its decision in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 19 L. Ed. 513 (1870), which concerned the Legal Tender Act of 1862 (12 Stat. 345) . The act, passed during the Civil War to finance the Union war effort, authorized the creation of paper money not redeemable in gold or silver. About $430 million worth of “greenbacks” were put into circulation, and by law this money had to be accepted for all taxes, debts, and other obligations, even those contracted before pas- sage of the act. The Court in Hepburn ruled, by a 4–3 vote, that Congress lacked the power to make the notes legal tender because the law violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against depriva- tion of property without DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Grant’s appointment of Strong and JOSEPH P. BRADLEY to the Supreme Court on the same day in 1870 was perceived as a court-packing scheme that was designed to overturn Hepburn. This view proved correct. With Strong and Bradley on the bench, the Court agreed to reconsider the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act. In 1871, Strong wrote the majority opinion in Knox v. Lee, which reversed the Hepburn decision. This time, the vote was 5– 4, in favor of the act. Strong held that Congress had the authority to pass monetary acts such as the greenbacks law during a time of national emergency. During the 1870s, numerous CIVIL RIGHTS CASES came before the Court. In Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 20 L. Ed. 638 (1872), Strong ruled that the federal govern- ment could not use a CIVIL RIGHTS law to prosecute a white man who was accused of murdering several African Americans because the victims were not persons “in existence” as required by the act, and because the interests of witnesses were not strong enough to give the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over the crime. The crime had occurred in Kentucky, where black witnesses were prohibited by law from testifying against whites. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1880), Strong ruled that a law that allowed only white males to serve as jurors violated the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT . Following his resignation from the Court in 1880, Strong devoted his time to many religious causes and organizations. He led the National Reform Association, which proposed a consti- tutional amendment that would have pro- claimed Jesus Christ as the supreme authority. Although he disclaimed the idea of a national church, Strong believed that Christian princi- ples should govern many facets of U.S. society. Strong died on August 19, 1895, in Minne- waska, New York. v STROSSEN, NADINE M. Nadine Strossen is a lawyer and law professor who, in 1991, became the first woman president of the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU). Strossen served in this capacity until 2008, the longest presidential term in ACLU history. Strossen has since retained leadership positions within the ACLU as a member of its National Advisory Council and co-chair of its “Campaign for the Future.” Born August 18, 1950, in Jersey City, New Jersey, Strossen moved with her family to Hopkins, Minnesota, at the age of eight. When she was growing up, she expected to pursue a traditional career, perhaps as a teacher. As an outstanding member of her high school debate team, she was impressed with her teammates’ analytical skills and encouraged the boys among them to pursue a legal career. She did not envision a similar path until she became involved in debate and took an interes t in feminist causes while at Harvard College. After graduating Phi Beta Kappa from Harvard, she attended Harvard Law School, where she was William Strong. PHOTOGRAPH BY MATHEW BRADY. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION STROSSEN, NADINE M. 409 editor of the LAW REVIEW, graduating magna cum laude in 1975. After law school, Strossen was awarded a judicial clerkship at the Minnesota Supreme Court, then practiced law in several law firms. In 1984, she left private practice and began teaching at the School of Law of New York University. She joined the faculty at New York Law School in 1988, specializing in CONSTITU- TIONAL LAW , FREEDOM OF SPEECH, individual rights, and international HUMAN RIGHTS. Strossen has been a me mber of the ACLU since 1983, having served on the organization’s board of directors, executive committee, and as its general counsel. The ACLU has adopted controversial, unpopular positions on issues ranging from free speech and ABORTION rights to the rights of accused persons. Strossen has used steady, unrelenting persuasion, rather than confrontation, to educate others about the importance of safeguarding the individual liber- ties that are the heart of the U.S. Constitution. In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, Strossen and the ACLU found themselves in an ironic and seemingly contradictory position when new ideas about multiculturalism began to take root on college campuses. Proponents of these ideas seemed to espouse goals in common with the ACLU: protecting minority groups from DISCRIM- INATION , bias, hatred, or exclusion. However, in an effort to rid institutions of hatred and harassment, some academic groups adopted speech codes that banned the use of certain words or symbols they considered hateful, demeaning, violent, or merely inconsiderate. Such words were sometimes called “politically incorrect,” or not “PC.” Strossen and the ACLU vehemently opposed these codes because, they argued, such codes violate the FIRST AMENDMENT and discourage discussion of important but inflammatory subjects such as race and gender. Strossen believes that the free and open exchange of ideas, even ideas that may be repugnant, is essential in a free society and may actually defuse the hatred and bigotry that Nadine Strossen. AP IMAGES Nadine M. Strossen 1950– ▼▼ ▼▼ 2000 1975 1950 ❖ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ 1950 Born, Jersey City, N.J. ◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ 1972 Graduated from Harvard College 1975 Graduated from Harvard Law School 1978–83 Practiced law at Sullivan and Cromwell in New York City 1983 Became a member of the ACLU 1988 Joined faculty at New York Law School ◆ 1984 Began teaching at New York University Law School 1991 Became first woman president of the ACLU 1989 Joined the board of directors of the National Coalition Against Censorship 1989–91 Served on Executive Committee of Human Rights Watch 1990 Joined the board of directors of The Fund For Free Expression 2002 Testified on civil liberties dangers to forum of U.S. House Judiciary Committee 1998 Named by Vanity Fair as one of “America’s 200 Most Influential Women” 2001 Submitted testimony on post-September 11 detentions of immigrants to Senate Judiciary Committee ◆ 1995 Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex and the Fight for Women’s Rights first published; Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, written with Henry Louis Gates Jr., Anthony P. Griffin, Donald E. Lively, Robert C. Post, and William B. Rubenstein, published ◆ 1997 Adjunct Fellow, Yale University, Calhoun College ◆ 2009 ACLU comprised of more than 500,000 members 1998–99 President William J. Clinton impeached in House, acquitted in Senate 2001 ACLU opposed confirmation of Attorney General John Ashcroft; September 11 terrorist attacks; USA Patriot Act enacted 2005 Scholarly work honored by Tulsa Law Review at their annual legal symposium ◆◆ 2008 Resigned as president of ACLU GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 410 STROSSEN, NADINE M. underlie racist or sexist expressions. However, Strossen maintains that laws imposing en- hanced penalties for crimes motivated by bias or hatred differ from speech codes and are constitutional. Similar to the controversy over speech co des is the debate over whether sexually explicit material can be constitutionally banned. During the 1980s, a group of feminists, led by ANDREA DWORKIN and CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, began a movement to outlaw all sexually explicit materi- als on the ground that they condone conduct that is violent, dangerous, and degrading to women. Strossen and the ACLU argue that such materials are speech rather than conduct, and that even if most U.S. citizens find them offensive, their publication and dissemination are protected by the U.S. Constitution. Strossen contends that a prohibition on all sexually explicit material is a simplistic solution that only serves to drive the perpetrators underground. She says that CENSORSHIP does not solve the underlying problems of violence and discrimination and may ultimately be used as a means of oppressing the very groups it is intended to protect. Strossen is committed to defending free speech whenever it is threatened, even if she disagrees with the individual or group being targeted. For example, she is opposed to Supreme Court decisions that limit the activities of antiabortion protesters, even though the ACLU has always defended a woman’s right to reproductive freedom. Strossen believes that penalties imposed on antiabortion activists infringe on the activists’ exercise of free speech. In addition to working with the ACLU, Strossen has served on the boards of the Fund for Free Expression, the National Coalition against Censorship, the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews, the Council for America’s First Freedom, Feminists for Free Expression, Article XIX— The International Centre Against Censorship, Middle East Watch, Asia Watch, and HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH . She is a frequent lecturer on college campuses throughout the United States and abroad and serves as political commentator on a variety of national news programs. Strossen also has written extensively in the areas of constitutional law, civil liberties, and interna- tional human rights. In 2000 New York University Press republished her 1995 book Defending PORNOGRAPHY: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for Women’s Rights with a new introduc- tion by the author. In 2004 Strossen received the Woman Who Dared Award from the National Council of Jewish Women, a triennial award whose last recipient in 2001 was Supreme Court Justice RUTH BADER GINSBURG. Later that year, Strossen was presented the Religious Liberty Award by Americans for Religious Liberty and the Ameri- can Humanist Association. In 2005 Strossen was honored by the University of Tulsa College of Law and the Tulsa Law Review, which made her scholarly work the subject of their fifth annual Legal Scholarship Symposium, entitled “Nadine Strossen: Scholar as Activist.” Strossen holds honorary doctor of law degrees from the University of Rhode Island, the University of Vermont, San Joaquin College of Law, Rocky Mountain College, the Massa- chusetts School of Law, and Mount Holyoke College. As of 2009, Strossen conti nues to write, lecture, and comment extensively on constitu- tional issues while teaching at New York Law School and functioning as a national advisor to the ACLU. FURTHER READINGS Strossen, Nadine M. 2000. Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for Women’s Rights New York: New York Univ. Press. Walker, Samuel. 1999. In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Hate Crime; Por nography. STRUCK JURY A struck jury is selected in a manner whereby an official prepares a panel containing the names of forty-eight potential jurors, and the parties strike off names (often for reasons of hardship, demo- graphics, or potential prejudice) until the number of jurors is reduced to twelve. What distinguishes the stuck jury selection method from the sequential jury selection method is that it involves both parties questioning the entire pool of potential jurors, prior to using any of their perem ptory challenges. Accordingly, both parties have access to the same information about the potential jurors. FURTHER READINGS Frederick, Jeffrey T. 2005. Mastering Voir Dire and Jury Selection. Chicago: American Bar Association. Frederick, Wenke, Robert A. 1989. The Art of Selecting a Jury. Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STRUCK JURY 411 STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE As a focal point for student activism in the 1960s, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC, popularly called “Snick”) spearheaded major initiatives in the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT . At the forefront of INTEGRATION efforts, SNCC volunteers gained early recogni- tion for their lunch counter sit-ins at whites- only businesses and later for their participation in historic demonstrations that helped pave the way for the passage of landmark federal CIVIL RIGHTS legislation in 1964 and 1965. SNCC made significant gains in voter registration for blacks in the South, where it also ran schools and health clinics. Later adopting a more radical agenda, it ultimately became identified with the BLACK POWER MOVEMENT and distanced itself from traditional civil rights leaders, before disbanding in 1970. SNCC grew out of the SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC), led by MARTIN LUTHER KING JR . On Easter 1960, SCLC’s execu- tive director, ELLA J. BAKER, organized a meeting at Shaw University, in Ral eigh, North Carolina, with the goal of increasing student participation in the civil rights movement. Students were already taking action on their own: in February, they had staged a sit-in at a Woolworth store in Greensboro, North Carolina, refusing to leave the whites-only lunch counter. One hundred and forty students met with Baker and repre- sentatives of other civil rights organizations at the Easter conference, w here SNCC was con- ceived and founded. SNCC soon set up offices in Atlanta. Among its earliest members were JOHN LEWIS, a divinity student and future congressman; Marion S. Barry Jr., a future mayor of Washington, D.C.; and JULIAN BOND,a future Georgia state senator and liberal activist leader. In its statement of purpose, dated April 1960, SNCC embraced a philosophy of non- violence: We affirm the philosophical or religious ideal of non-violence as the foundation of our purpose, the presupposition of our faith, and the manner of our action By appealing to conscience and standing on the moral nature of human existence, nonviolence nurtures the atmosphere in which reconcili- ation and justice become actual possibilities. One method of non-violent protest adopted by SNCC was the sit-in. Used to integrate businesses in northern and border states as early as 1943, this tactic was a risky undertaking in the segregated South of 1960. What SNCC met at lunch counter sit-ins was far from a spirit of reconciliation: Whites taunted the demonstrators, poured ketchup and sugar on their heads, and sometimes hit them. SNCC volunteers perse- vered, and by late 1961, sit-ins had taken place in over one hundred southern communities. The pressure brought by these actions soon increased as SNCC rallied white and black students to a number of causes. In 1961 it joined members of the CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY (CORE) in a series of Freedom Rides—interstate bus trips through the South aimed at integrating bus termin als. Over the next three years, in states such as Georgia and Mississippi, SNCC began a grassroots campaign aimed at registering black voters. It also opened schools in order to teach illiterate farmers, and it established health clinics. In a 1964 project called Freedom Summer, it sent hundreds of white and black volunteers, mostly northern, middle-class students, to Mississippi to test the newly passed CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.). Throughout these endeavors, volunteers were met with beatings and jailings. Three civil rights workers were slain in Mississippi during Freedom Summer. By the mid 1960s tensions had developed within the civil rights movement. Under King, SCLC stayed its course. Frustrated by the pace of civil rights gains and doubtful of traditional methods, SNCC and CORE became increasingly aggressive. In 1965, after the nation watched televised footage of black marchers being beaten Stokely Carmichael, chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, speaks before a crowd of students on the campus of Florida A&M University in April 1967. Under the leadership of Carmichael, SNCC took a more radical course in an effort to gain political, economic, and legal liberation for African Americans. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 412 STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE in Selma, Alabama, SNCC decided to hold a second march, in which King chose to partici- pate. More assault s and a MURDER followed. In their wake, President LYNDON B. JOHNSON appealed to the nation for stronger civil rights legislation. Consequently, the Selma marches hastened the passage of the VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq.). SNCC took a more radical course under the leadership of activist STOKELY CARMICHAEL.Asa dramatically successful SNCC field organizer in Lowndes County, Mississippi, Carmichael had increased the number of registered black voters there from 70 to 2,600. He was elected chairman of SNCC in 1966, the year in which he coined the term black power. According to the organiza- tion’s position paper, titled The Basis of Black Power, its message of political, economic, and legal liberation, rather than integration, for blacks marked a turning point in the civil rights movement: “In the beginning of the movement, we had fallen into a trap whereby we thought that our problems revolved around the right to eat at certain lunch counters or the right to vote, or to organize our communities. We have seen, however, that the problem is much deeper.” SNCC, which now called the National Associa- tion for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP) reactionary and white U.S. citizens 180 million racists, was joined in espousing harsher views by CORE and the newly formed BLACK PANTHER PARTY FOR SELF -DEFENSE. Along with the new rhetoric came new policies. SNCC purged white members from its ranks, declaring that they should work to rid their own communities of racism. When SNCC members began carrying guns, Carmichael’s explanation drew a line between the old guard and the vanguard: “We are not King or SCLC. They don’t do the kind of work we do nor do they live in the same areas we live in” (Johnson 1990, 71). The organization subsequently deep- ened this division by pulling out of the White House Conference on Civil Rights. Toward the end of its existence, SNCC was torn apart by troubles. In 1966 clashes with the police in several cities began when 80 police officers raided SNCC’s Philadelphia office, charging that dynamite was stored there. The FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, which had been WIRETAPPING SNCC since 1960, targeted the group in 1967 for a Counterintelligence Pro- gram effort aimed at disrupting it. Critics blamed Carmichael’s inflammatory speeches for causing riots, and Carmichael left to join the Black Panthers. Amid growing militancy and an expanded vision that included antiwar protest, financial support began to dry up. Although the SNCC officially disbanded in 1970 shortly after its last chairman, H. Rap Brown, went underground to avoid arrest, Mario Marcel Salas, field secretary of the SNCC chapter in San Antonio, successfully kept operations open in that city until 1976. The San Antonio SNCC chapter was part Black Panther Party and part SNCC. Since 1976, various attempts have been made to revive the organization, but all of them have been short- lived. The latest attempt has been at the University of Louisville, where in 2009 the university’s official web site indicates that the SNCC is alive and well and hosting a variety of activities (htt p://l ouisville.edu/s tudentnews/ archive/2009-fall/its-coming-s ncc-week-200 9.ics). FURTHER READINGS Carson, Clayborne. 1982. In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. Greenberg, Cheryl Lynn, ed. 1998. A Circle of Trust: Remembering SNCC. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. Harris, Janet. 1967. The Long Freedom Road: The Civil Rights Story. Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.: McGraw-Hill. Johnson, Jacqueline, and Richard Gallin, eds. 1990. Stokely Carmichael: The Story of Black Power. Parsippany, N.Y.: Silver Burdett. Levy, Peter B. 1992. Let Freedom Ring: A Documentary History of the Modern Civil Rights Movement. New York: Praeger. Martinez, Elizabeth, ed. 2002. Letters from Mississippi. Brookline, Mass.: Zephyr. Zinn, Ho ward. 2002. SNCC: The New Abolitionists Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press. CROSS REFERENCES Carmichael, Stokely; Civil Rights Movement; Integration. STUMP V. SPARKMAN See JUDICIAL IMMUNITY “Stump v. Sparkman” (Sidebar). SUA SPONTE [Latin, Of his or her or its own will; voluntarily.] The term is used to describe actions of a court taken without prompting from either of the parties. For example, if a judge were to decide that his court did not have jurisdiction in a case, despite the fact that both parties agreed to appear, he would be acting sua sponte. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SUA SPONTE 413 SUB NOMINE [Latin, Under the name; in the name of; under the title of.] The phrase is often used in a case citation to denote a name change from one stage of a case to another. SUB SILENTIO [Latin, Under silence; by implication only, and without any notice being taken.] Passing a thing sub silentio may be evidence of consent. Acourtmayoverruleanearliercasesub silentio, generally by following a line of reasoning that would have caused a different result had it been employed in the earlier case. Without any express acknowledgement, the significance of the earlier case nevertheless falls by the legal wayside. FURTHER READING Vandevelde, Kenneth J. 1996. Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Boulder, Colo.: West- view Press. SUBCONTRACTOR One who takes a portion of a contract from the principal contractor or from another subcontractor. When an individual or a company is involved in a large-scale project, a contractor is often hired to see that the work is done. The contractor, however, rarely does all the work. The work that remains is performed by subcontractors, who are under contract to the contractor, who is usually designated the “general” or “prime contractor.” Subcontractors may, in turn, hire their own subcontractors to do part of the work that they have contracted to perform. Building construction is a common example of how the contractor-subcontractor relation- ship works. The general contractor takes primary responsibility for seeing that the building is constructed and signs a contract to do so. The cost of the contract is usually a fixed sum and may have been derived from a bid submitted by the contractor. Before offering the bid or before contract negotiations begin, the general contractor normally asks the subcon- tractors to estimate the price they will charge to do their part of the work. Thus, the general contractor will collect information from elec- tricians, plumbers, dry wall installers, and a host of other subcontractors. Once construction begins, the general contractor coordinates the construction sched- ule, making sure the subcontractors are at the building site when needed so that the project remains on schedule. The sequencing of construction and the supervision of the work that the subcontractors perform are key roles for the general contractor. Subcontractors sign contracts with the general contractor that typically incorporate the agreement between the general contractor and the owner. A subcontractor who fails to complete work on time or whose work is not acceptable under the general contract may be required to pay damages if the project is delayed because of these problems. A subcontractor’s biggest concern is to be paid promptly for the work and materials provided to the project. The general contractor is under an obligation to pay the subcontractors any sums due them unless the contract states otherwise. Some contracts state that the sub- contractors will not be paid until the general contractor is paid by the owner. If the owner refuses to pay the general contractor for work a subcontractor has performed, the subcontractor has the right to file a MECHANIC’S LIEN against the property for the cost of the unpaid work. When changes are made to the project during construction, subcontractors expect to be paid for the time and mate rials expended on the change. Subcontractors must receive formal approval to make the change and have a cost attached to the change before doing the work. Otherwise, when they submit a compensation request, it may be denied either because too much time has passed or because the general contractor or the owner believes the work performed was within the scope of the original project. If a general contractor hires a subcontractor to perform work that the general contractor should recognize as likely to create a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, the general contractor is liable for any physical harm caused to the employees of a subcontractor if the general contractor fails to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the general contractor has provided, in the contract or otherwise, that the subcontractor shall be responsible for such precautions. A general contractor may also owe a duty of reasonable GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 414 SUB NOMINE care to a subcontractor’s employees if the general contractor (1) actively controls the manner and method of performing the contract work; (2) voluntarily undertakes responsibility for implementing the safety measures; or (3) retains possessory control over the work premises during work. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. For a court to have authority to adjudicate a dispute, it must have jurisdiction over the parties and over the type of legal issues in dispute. The first type of jurisdiction is called PERSONAL JURISDICTION; the other is subject matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction will be found if the persons involved in the LITIGATION are present in the state or are legal residents of the state in which the lawsuit has been filed or if the transaction in question has a substantial connection to the state. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the nature of the claim or controversy. The subject matter may be a criminal INFRINGEMENT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE , or the probating of an estate. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear particular types of cases. In state court systems, statutes that create different courts generally set boundaries on their subject matter jurisdiction. One state court or another has subject matter jurisdiction of any contro- versy that can be heard in courts of that state. Some courts specialize in a particular area of the law, such as probate law, FAMILY LAW,orJUVENILE LAW . A person who seeks custody of a child, for example, must go to a court that has authority in guardianship matters. A DIVORCE can be granted only in a court designated to hear matrimonial cases. A person charged with a felony cannot be tried in a criminal court authorized to hear only misdemeanor cases. In addi tion to the legal issue in dispute, the subject matter jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the monetary value of the dispute (the dollar AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY). Small claims courts, also known as conciliation courts, are limited by state statutes to small amounts of money in controversy, ranging from $1,000 to $5,000, depending upon the state. Therefore, if a plaintiff sues a defendant in SMALL CLAIMS COURT for $50,000, the court will reject the lawsuit because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on the amount in contro- versy. The amount in controversy limitations are designed to regulate the flow of litigation in the various courts of the state, ensuring that complicated disputes over large sums of money will be heard in courts that have the time and resources to hear such cases. The U.S. Constitution gives jurisdiction over some types of cases to federal courts only. Cases involving AMBASSADORS AND CONSULS or public ministers, admiralty and maritime cases, and cases in which the United States is a party must be heard in federal courts. Congress has also created subject matter jurisdiction by statute, mandatin g that antitrust suits, most SECURITIES lawsuits, BANKRUPTCY proceedings, and patent and COPYRIGHT cases be heard in federal courts. The Constitution also allows federal district courts to hear cases involving any rights or obligations that arise from the Constitution or other federal law, which is called FEDERAL QUESTION jurisdiction. Federal courts also have diversity jurisdiction, which gives the courts authority to hear cases involving disputes among citizens of different states. If, however, the amount in controversy is less than $10,000, federal question and diversity jurisdiction will not apply, and the case must be brought in state court. Even if the $10,000 amount is satisfied, a plaintiff may start the lawsuit in state court. A defendant, however, may seek to have the case moved to the federal court in that state by filing a transfer request called a removal action. A defendant who believes that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case may raise this issue before the trial court or in an appeal from the judgment. If a defect in subject matter jurisdiction is found, the judgment will usually be rendered void, having no legal force or binding effect. FURTHER READINGS Chemerinsky, Erwin. 2007. Federal Jurisdiction. 5th ed. Boston: Aspen. Little, Laura. 2007. Federal Courts Examples & Explanations. Boston: Aspen. Wright, Charles Alan. 2002. Law of Federal Courts. 6th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group. CROSS REFERENCE Jurisdiction. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 415 SUBLETTING The leasing of par t or all of the property held by a tenant, as opposed to a landlord, during a portion of his or her unexpired balance of the term of occupancy. A landlord may prohibit a tenant from subletting the leased premises without the land- lord’s permission by including such a term in the lease. When subletting is permitted, the original tenant becomes, in effect, the landlord of the sublessee. The sublessee pays the rent to the tenant, not the landlord. The original tenant is not, however, relieved of his or her responsibili- ties under the original lease with the landlord. A sublease is different from an assignment where a tenant assigns all of his or her rights under a lease to another. The assignee takes the place of the tenant and must deal with the landlord provided the landlord permits it. The original tenant is no longer responsible to the landlord who consents to the termination of their landlord-tenant relationship. CROSS REFERENCE Landlord and Tenant. SUBMERGED LANDS Soil lying beneath water or on the oceanside of the tideland. Minerals found in the soil of tidal and submerged lands belong to the state in its sovereign right. The federal government, how- ever, has full control over all the natural resources discovered in the soil under the ocean floor beyond the three-mile belt extending from the ordinary low-water mark along the coast. Congress, by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, ceded to the respective states title and ownership of lands beneath NAVIGABLE WATERS within state boundaries, and the natural resources within such lands and waters. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 did not alter the scope or effect of the equal footing doctrine, nor did it alter state PROPERTY LAW regarding riparian ownership, but the effect of the Act was merely to confirm the state’s title to beds of navigable waters within their boundaries as against any claim of the United States. As used in this statute, the term “lands beneath navigable waters” means all lands inside the boundaries of the states covered by nontidal waters that were navigable under the United States laws at the time the state entered the Union or acquired sovereignty, all lands permanently or periodi- cally covered by tidal waters up to but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three geographical miles from the coast line of the state, and all filled in, made, or reclaim ed lands that were previously beneath navigable waters.[FN5] The impetus behind the Sub- merged Lands Act seems to have been several Supreme Court cases holding that off-shore oil belonged to the federal government rather than to the individual states. The Act restored the rights to the submerged land and its resources to the individual states. The Submerged Lands Act does not alter the scope or effect of the equal footing doctrine, whereby new states, upon their admission to the Union, acquire title to the lands underlying navigable waters within their boundaries, nor does the Act alter state property law regarding riparian ownership; the effect of the Act is merely to confirm the states’ title to the beds of navigable waters within their boundaries as against any claim of the United States government. The term “boundaries,” as used in the Act includes the seaward boundaries of a state or its boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico or any of the Great Lakes as they existed at the time such state became a member of the Union, or as previously approved by the Congress, or as extended or confirmed pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. § 1312, but in no event is the term “boundaries” or the term “lands beneath navigable waters” to be interpreted as extending from the coastline more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico. The term “coast line” means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of INLAND WATERS. Thus, the coast line of the state of California follows the mean low water line along the natural coast, and does not follow the seaward edge of certain piers, which are attached to the mainland and under which water flows freely, nor does it extend from an artificial isla nd complex projecting into the sea which is connected to the shore by a causeway under which water flows freely. Exceptions to the rights of the states to submerged lands are made in the Act, and it is declared not to apply to the authority and rights of the United States GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 416 SUBLETTING respecting navigation, flood control, and the production of power; state laws relating to the ownership and control of ground and surface waters in states which lie wholly or in part westward of the 98th meridian; lands acquired by the United States from any state or by EMINENT DOMAIN, and certain other lands held by the United States for the benefit of Indians; structures and improvements constructed by the United States in the exercise of its navigational servitude; and rights previously acquired under laws of the United States. SUBMISSION OF CONTROVERSY A procedure by which the parties to a particular dispute place any matter of real controversy existing between them before a court for a final determination. Some states have enacted laws that authorize parties in a legal dispute to bypass the normal procedures for resolving a civil la wsuit and use a process called submission of controversy. For a court to hear a case under a submission of controversy, the parties must agree to all the facts and present only questions of law for the court to resolve. A submission of controversy dispenses with the need for the plaintiff to file a summons and complaint and the defendant to file an answer. Instead, the parties mu st agree to a statement of facts, because the court does not take evidence in such a proceeding. The agreement to the facts must be absolute, without reservations, and unequivocal and must stipulate all of the facts necessary for a complete determination of the controversy. The parties must also describe a CAUSE OF ACTION, explain why the court has jurisdiction over the parties, and propose what relief is being sought from the court. Once the facts of the controversy are agreed upon, the court cannot dispute them. It must hold a trial or hearing on the questions of law in dispute and then render a decision that determines how the law applies to the stipulated facts. The inability of the court to judge the facts as a jury would distinguishes the submission of controversy from a trial without a jury. The statutes that grant this right determine the type of controversies that can be submitted. Submission of controversy is not available in cases when the reli ef cannot be given or when the controversy involves a matter of public policy. A submission can only be granted when the controversy affects the private rights of the parties. Like any case presented to a court, the controversy must present a QUESTION OF LAW, which must be real, and it must be one that can be followed by an effective judgment. The parties cannot submit abstract or moot ques- tions for the purpose of obtaining the advice of the court. Nor will a court decide a question of law that does not arise from the facts in the case. Submission of controversy is not used very often because of the difficulty in getting parties to agree to the facts of the case. Without such an agreement, this procedure cannot be used. Some states have repealed their statutes because the process has fallen into disfavor. ARBITRATION and mediation are more commonly used to resolve disputes informally and without filin g a lawsuit. Under both of these ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION mechanisms, the parties may still present their version of the facts, but the process is informal and usually more timely than a submission of controversy. SUBMIT To offer for determination; commit to the judgment or discretion of another individual or authority. To submit evidence means to present or introduce it. Similarly a political issue might be submitted to the voters’ judgment. SUBORDINATION To put in an inferior class or order; to make subject to, or subservient. A legal status that refers to the establishment of priority between various existing liens or encumbrances on the same parcel of property. A subordination agreement is a contract whereby a creditor agrees that the claims of specified senior creditors must be paid in full before any payment on a subordinate debt can be paid to the subordinate creditor. A subordination clause in a mortgage or LIEN is a provision that gives a subsequent mortgage priority over one that has been executed at an earlier date. SUBORNATION OF PERJURY The criminal offense of procuring another to commit perjury, which is the crime of lying, in a material matter, while under oath. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SUBORNATION OF PERJURY 417 . School 199 1 Became first woman president of the ACLU 198 9 Joined the board of directors of the National Coalition Against Censorship 198 9 91 Served on Executive Committee of Human Rights Watch 199 0. Jury Selection. Chicago: American Bar Association. Frederick, Wenke, Robert A. 198 9. The Art of Selecting a Jury. Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STRUCK. date. SUBORNATION OF PERJURY The criminal offense of procuring another to commit perjury, which is the crime of lying, in a material matter, while under oath. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SUBORNATION

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