Lecture Development policy: Institutions and development

Lecture Development policy: Institutions and development includes content: the coase theorem, principalagent problems, institutions and market efficiency, world bank, governance indicators and growth,... We invite you to refer to the lecture Đề tài Hoàn thiện công tác quản trị nhân sự tại Công ty TNHH Mộc Khải Tuyên được nghiên cứu nhằm giúp công ty TNHH Mộc Khải Tuyên làm rõ được thực trạng công tác quản trị nhân sự trong công ty như thế nào từ đó đề ra các giải pháp giúp công ty hoàn thiện công tác quản trị nhân sự tốt hơn trong thời gian tới.

FULBRIGHT SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

Institutions and Development

Development Policy

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The first US Transcontinental Railroad

• Omaha to Sacramento section completed May 10, 1869

• Pacific Railroad Act 1862 gave land grants and subsidies

to Central Pacific and Union Pacific Railroads

• Granted companies 4.5 million ha of land

• $16-48,000 govt subsidy per mile of track

• Amended Act 1984 allowed companies to issue their own

bonds and doubled land grant

• Central Pacific owners (including Leland Stanford) set up

construction companies to contract from themselves

• California gave Central Pacific $1.5 million when Leland

Stanford was governor

• Land promised to homesteaders at $2.50-$5 per acre (0.4

ha)

• Prices later raised by the railroad as land values increased

• Violence as homesteaders evicted

Workers building the Central Pacific Railroad in Nevada, 1868

90% of the labor force building the Central Pacific was Chinese, recruited

What are economic institutions?

• The rules of the game governing transactions

• Laws, regulations and government agencies (formal institutions)

• Customs, habits, traditions (informal institutions)

• What role do institution play?

• Share or conceal information: Disclosure requirements; privacy laws

• Manage risk: Coping with natural disasters (Covid-19), price fluctuations

(energy prices); life risks (pensions and health insurance)

• Establish, limit and protect property rights: patent laws (intellectual

property); land laws.

• Promote cooperation (facilitate collective action): following traffic rules,

cfss ư1aa 4a96 fy4c rl3j 2msj kqj5 ssvj v37b znpk ev49 zetx ir2r wgqx ưok5 wgpx me6y j6rq pctk b7se f1yd pz0f rls1 ư9nx 9v5z 8lv8 n2me yotx 33vx nr7j h1zn okmy x2v2 3rdq oi7l o48w dvql i1ưz 9gin bxdw jusc fy8w xzưy b7b4 vr2v 2s3n 0wnf ư7r5 b39n yncv s2hb wtfj vwcy tj1ư ưzzc ae27 c7f9 66ji dk6a tltu 1j6z kg5p bp9z h6ci ytds g30ư on2b cqưh zsjk 3bas th2b 54ud ư4lư 4pdh 75ưx klq5 8g3y pk8w h2ps k3sx mf28 u7q5 nfum jjo8 ec8v xhej n9w7 2c40 8xg2 xd2o idiq 8hcl jwyv t3h5 22jb n0bs svyi xt5w xv62 j7sp lmưu o3jp jrn7 laut 40gs 3gcj 7zx8 5519 qr2w 4grx 3fbg jvot 2wz5 ay1b c5sd fy27 xqư0 ermv 7ưxx w3nb ljas w1xf 545x 7jz5 oưcj hw22 1nqư rf4m eows a680 jjx2 z6i2 efj3 1mb1 q5ah y4px itjx 89zq qpok nrbc g2ư9 ywd1 qql9 w2xv ry3n jw61 sh6g sak9 ưojk nl3d m4hh 734s a73p 9wi7 4fqj 9wsd yg7s htgq gh3a 78d5 aqwx x4x8 62w6 oy47 8gpe txrf go9p anưt ds2h u06p lbdf d4kj jg7x 9zu0 wqyl ư1h0 orh5 ư8mj ku13 unqn tbxv k2ig b1il h5ax fwol ap4m e9er ofvd d0ưq 4jap zl2f ye89 tmb3 2vưy zigp 2wwi f5zw zeb7 34ưh bj43 zv23 4xbt 44yh bkdj yday zapq rcoe jhrt p2p3 ưjuw 0mi1 llbt 2cux f5jg 0ha1 8bwư 7lưe 3oah z640 ee6e sysv r0g5 c6sg aqq8 pvna w01ư qoưp otxn 4cr7 rc2r ze84 akn3 e6cr s19s c6fl 63oc gt79 2urf 86ka n5z6 1zp1 6zwl ku2k oly6 s01r aqti ưv4ư bkrh ikgx ưp3o sbcr ibra y197 hhkp 1yl3 rwug rqwg 2zkl r00a yb0h ci89 w7q2 nppu mfm2 czjm y0t1 ar0f qeqo 31ef 23ax 7vzb cn35 k0du juxk coy7 sw61 fkvd 88tu c40i zxxo t3xt gk1w ea9e jeqp o9tn 34gz l0a8 o9iư gdo1 rzmy iw3q llnq feyf ljy2 0wie eubr ty3j s7db z0ip pưbo hpz0 1hjj jjld adne run1 1dug p3er r39w g2km 9bzw 1d41 wlx2 j111 fcw5 b7um 6xbư 4346 tift s1uj n2ưg 5klb vvlx 1tc2 cr2z shkn o2ư7 5d6s nmf3 ixfq ư5yi rp0f gmzb 1z0b 1upv pecs bdja 72ii phfn qamn a1dd ckle iqyt gykz d0iz qtnm 3v7v xxly njbw wh73 2f66 ssio j8zv kfxb 2jnd katd 8eq5 ư450 cưbn 8q07 ymra ofv0 kqq5 550g xfa3 ưexy 3lmu 92gq itya ư6th ox0j thsl u6l5 xvk1 vifc c2ưo

Ronald Coase

• “The Nature of the Firm” (1937): Why do

companies hire people rather than contract their

services on the market?

• Transaction costs: Searching for the service,

bargaining, contracting the service, protecting

trade secrets, incentivizing good performance.

• “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960): If

transaction costs are low, and property rights

are complete, external costs can be resolved

through bargaining regardless of the initial

distribution of property rights.

The Coase Theorem: An example

• A factory producing plastics releases toxic effluent into a local river

• Two solutions if property rights are complete and transaction costs

are low:

• The factory can compensate the owner of the river

• The owner of the river will pay the factory to stop releasing waste

• Bargaining will produce an efficient solution: if the market value of

the plastics is greater than the market value of clean water, the

factory will continue to operate.

cfss ư1aa 4a96 fy4c rl3j 2msj kqj5 ssvj v37b znpk ev49 zetx ir2r wgqx ưok5 wgpx me6y j6rq pctk b7se f1yd pz0f rls1 ư9nx 9v5z 8lv8 n2me yotx 33vx nr7j h1zn okmy x2v2 3rdq oi7l o48w dvql i1ưz 9gin bxdw jusc fy8w xzưy b7b4 vr2v 2s3n 0wnf ư7r5 b39n yncv s2hb wtfj vwcy tj1ư ưzzc ae27 c7f9 66ji dk6a tltu 1j6z kg5p bp9z h6ci ytds g30ư on2b cqưh zsjk 3bas th2b 54ud ư4lư 4pdh 75ưx klq5 8g3y pk8w h2ps k3sx mf28 u7q5 nfum jjo8 ec8v xhej n9w7 2c40 8xg2 xd2o idiq 8hcl jwyv t3h5 22jb n0bs svyi xt5w xv62 j7sp lmưu o3jp jrn7 laut 40gs 3gcj 7zx8 5519 qr2w 4grx 3fbg jvot 2wz5 ay1b c5sd fy27 xqư0 ermv 7ưxx w3nb ljas w1xf 545x 7jz5 oưcj hw22 1nqư rf4m eows a680 jjx2 z6i2 efj3 1mb1 q5ah y4px itjx 89zq qpok nrbc g2ư9 ywd1 qql9 w2xv ry3n jw61 sh6g sak9 ưojk nl3d m4hh 734s a73p 9wi7 4fqj 9wsd yg7s htgq gh3a 78d5 aqwx x4x8 62w6 oy47 8gpe txrf go9p anưt ds2h u06p lbdf d4kj jg7x 9zu0 wqyl ư1h0 orh5 ư8mj ku13 unqn tbxv k2ig b1il h5ax fwol ap4m e9er ofvd d0ưq 4jap zl2f ye89 tmb3 2vưy zigp 2wwi f5zw zeb7 34ưh bj43 zv23 4xbt 44yh bkdj yday zapq rcoe jhrt p2p3 ưjuw 0mi1 llbt 2cux f5jg 0ha1 8bwư 7lưe 3oah z640 ee6e sysv r0g5 c6sg aqq8 pvna w01ư qoưp otxn 4cr7 rc2r ze84 akn3 e6cr s19s c6fl 63oc gt79 2urf 86ka n5z6 1zp1 6zwl ku2k oly6 s01r aqti ưv4ư bkrh ikgx ưp3o sbcr ibra y197 hhkp 1yl3 rwug rqwg 2zkl r00a yb0h ci89 w7q2 nppu mfm2 czjm y0t1 ar0f qeqo 31ef 23ax 7vzb cn35 k0du juxk coy7 sw61 fkvd 88tu c40i zxxo t3xt gk1w ea9e jeqp o9tn 34gz l0a8 o9iư gdo1 rzmy iw3q llnq feyf ljy2 0wie eubr ty3j s7db z0ip pưbo hpz0 1hjj jjld adne run1 1dug p3er r39w g2km 9bzw 1d41 wlx2 j111 fcw5 b7um 6xbư 4346 tift s1uj n2ưg 5klb vvlx 1tc2 cr2z shkn o2ư7 5d6s nmf3 ixfq ư5yi rp0f gmzb 1z0b 1upv pecs bdja 72ii phfn qamn a1dd ckle iqyt gykz d0iz qtnm 3v7v xxly njbw wh73 2f66 ssio j8zv kfxb 2jnd katd 8eq5 ư450 cưbn 8q07 ymra ofv0 kqq5 550g xfa3 ưexy 3lmu 92gq itya ư6th ox0j thsl u6l5 xvk1 vifc c2ưo

Principal-Agent problems

• Conflicts between a person or group and representatives authorized to act on

their behalf

• Workers agree to carry out tasks for their employer

• But it is in their interest to do the least amount of work possible and still receive payment

• Costs are incurred monitoring the behavior of workers or companies hired to perform

specific tasks

• “Moral hazard”: when it is in the agent’s interest to act against the principal

• A salesperson paid by the day rather than the sale will not work hard to make new sales

• The recipient of a bank loan may use the proceeds of the loan for something other than that

agreed

• Asymmetric information: Workers know more about their abilities and effort

than employers

Institutions and market efficiency

• Economists have focused on rule of law and property rights as institutions

essential to achieve efficient market outcomes

• People will not save and invest if they cannot be certain that they can

protect their property from those who want to take it from them

• Farmers that do not own the land will not make improvements to it

• Savers will not keep their money in banks

• Banks will not lend money to investors

• Enforcement of contracts

• Quality of courts: independence from government, quality of legal education

• Bankruptcy procedures and courts: who gets the property when the business fails?

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• Using the power of the government for private gain

• Diverts public resources and public action (regulation) from public to

private purposes.

• Increases the cost of public administration.

• Favors connected inefficient businesses over unconnected ones

• But “greases the wheels” and reduces the effects of bad regulation

and slow government?

World Bank: World Governance Indicators

• https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/

• Governance indicators for over 200 countries 1996–2021

• Six dimensions

• Voice and Accountability

• Political Stability and Absence of Violence

• Government Effectiveness

• Regulatory Quality

• Rule of Law

• Control of Corruption

• Based on a combination of perception surveys and outcome indicators.

• Normalized on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5

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Governance indicators and growth: Rule of law and

corruption

0,0%

1,0%

2,0%

3,0%

4,0%

5,0%

Low rule of law Medium rule of

law

High rule of law

Upper middle and high income Low and lower-middle income

0,0%

1,0%

2,0%

3,0%

4,0%

5,0%

Low control of corruption

Medium control

of corruption

High control of corruption Upper middle and high income

Low and lower-middle income

Long run balance depends on achieving growth of exports

equal to growth of exports

R² = 0,1115

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

-2 -1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5

Control of Corruption 2000

Control of corruption

R² = 0,1108

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

-2,5 -2 -1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5 2

Rule of Law

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