Lecture Development policy: Institutions and development

Lecture Development policy: Institutions and development includes content: the coase theorem, principalagent problems, institutions and market efficiency, world bank, governance indicators and growth,... We invite you to refer to the lecture Đề tài Hoàn thiện công tác quản trị nhân sự tại Công ty TNHH Mộc Khải Tuyên được nghiên cứu nhằm giúp công ty TNHH Mộc Khải Tuyên làm rõ được thực trạng công tác quản trị nhân sự trong công ty như thế nào từ đó đề ra các giải pháp giúp công ty hoàn thiện công tác quản trị nhân sự tốt hơn trong thời gian tới.

cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z FULBRIGHT SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy Institutions and Development g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 Development Policy Summer 2023 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv The first US Transcontinental Railroad 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy 90% of the labor force building the Central Pacific was Chinese, recruited from Guangdong and California Prices later raised by the railroad as land values increased • Violence as homesteaders evicted • 80 • a6 • ws eo • m • rf4 • Pacific Railroad Act 1862 gave land grants and subsidies to Central Pacific and Union Pacific Railroads Granted companies 4.5 million of land $16-48,000 govt subsidy per mile of track Amended Act 1984 allowed companies to issue their own bonds and doubled land grant Central Pacific owners (including Leland Stanford) set up construction companies to contract from themselves California gave Central Pacific $1.5 million when Leland Stanford was governor • Workers building the Central Pacific Railroad in Nevada, 1868 Land promised to homesteaders at $2.50-$5 per acre (0.4 ha) • Omaha to Sacramento section completed May 10, 1869 • br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv What are economic institutions? 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 xx v 7ư m nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un • er • ư0 xq fy2 • xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea The rules of the game governing transactions Laws, regulations and government agencies (formal institutions) Customs, habits, traditions (informal institutions) What role institution play? • Share or conceal information: Disclosure requirements; privacy laws • Manage risk: Coping with natural disasters (Covid-19), price fluctuations (energy prices); life risks (pensions and health insurance) • Establish, limit and protect property rights: patent laws (intellectual property); land laws • Promote cooperation (facilitate collective action): following traffic rules, recycling waste, picking up after your dog) • jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Ronald Coase 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx • “The Nature of the Firm” (1937): Why companies hire people rather than contract their services on the market? • Transaction costs: Searching for the service, bargaining, contracting the service, protecting trade secrets, incentivizing good performance • “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960): If transaction costs are low, and property rights are complete, external costs can be resolved through bargaining regardless of the initial distribution of property rights xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt The Coase Theorem: An example 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n • A factory producing plastics releases toxic effluent into a local river m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds • Two solutions if property rights are complete and transaction costs are low: 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 • The factory can compensate the owner of the river vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za • The owner of the river will pay the factory to stop releasing waste oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 • Bargaining will produce an efficient solution: if the market value of the plastics is greater than the market value of clean water, the factory will continue to operate 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Principal-Agent problems 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp • Conflicts between a person or group and representatives authorized to act on their behalf bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v • Workers agree to carry out tasks for their employer • But it is in their interest to the least amount of work possible and still receive payment • Costs are incurred monitoring the behavior of workers or companies hired to perform specific tasks p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb • “Moral hazard”: when it is in the agent’s interest to act against the principal jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y • A salesperson paid by the day rather than the sale will not work hard to make new sales • The recipient of a bank loan may use the proceeds of the loan for something other than that agreed ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a • Asymmetric information: Workers know more about their abilities and effort than employers gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Institutions and market efficiency 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 • Economists have focused on rule of law and property rights as institutions essential to achieve efficient market outcomes • People will not save and invest if they cannot be certain that they can protect their property from those who want to take it from them df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 • Farmers that not own the land will not make improvements to it vd of ưq d0 p 4ja b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 • Enforcement of contracts 89 • Banks will not lend money to investors f ye zl2 • Savers will not keep their money in banks 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z • Quality of courts: independence from government, quality of legal education kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju • Bankruptcy procedures and courts: who gets the property when the business fails? y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Corruption 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n • Using the power of the government for private gain m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 • Diverts public resources and public action (regulation) from public to private purposes pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze • Increases the cost of public administration • Favors connected inefficient businesses over unconnected ones ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt • But “greases the wheels” and reduces the effects of bad regulation and slow government? rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt World Bank: World Governance Indicators 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja • https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp • Governance indicators for over 200 countries 1996–2021 bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co • Normalized on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5 f ye zl2 • Six dimensions • Voice and Accountability • Political Stability and Absence of Violence • Government Effectiveness • Regulatory Quality • Rule of Law • Control of Corruption • Based on a combination of perception surveys and outcome indicators 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv Governance indicators and growth: Rule of law and corruption 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m 0,0% 0,0% ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib Low and lower-middle income Low and lower-middle income Upper middle and high income Upper middle and high income Low control of Medium control High control of corruption of corruption corruption Low rule of law Medium rule of High rule of law law 1,0% 1,0% 2,0% 2,0% 3,0% 3,0% 4,0% 4,0% 5,0% 5,0% 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 10 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq 8% 7% x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7% 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 6% ax il h5 b1 6% ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v 5% b7 ưh 34 43 bj 5% p zig wi 2w zw f5 ze 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj 4% ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb 4% jg f5 a1 0h 8b 3% wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 1,5 0,5 -0,5 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar -1 -1,5 -2 1% 0% -2,5 R² = 0,1108 2% 1% 0% -1% Control of Corruption 2000 2,5 3% R² = 0,1115 2% 1,5 0,5 -0,5 -1 -1,5 -2 8% Average growth rate 2000-2019 tj1 9% 10% 10% Rule of Law Control of corruption 9% Average growth rate 2000-2019 cy fj vw wt Long run balance depends on achieving growth of exports equal to growth of exports qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx Rule of Law 2000 k0 -1% xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 11 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Governance indicators and growth 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 0,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 1,0% b7 ze 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly Low and lower-middle income Low and lower-middle income ưh 34 Upper middle and high income Upper middle and high income Low regulatory Medium High regulatory quality regulatory quality quality Low voice and Medium voice High voice and accountability and accountability accountability 4,5% 4,0% 3,5% 3,0% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% 5,0% aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 12 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Government effectiveness and growth 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 xx nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn 1% a6 2% v 7ư 4% m 5% er 6% ư0 xq fy2 3% r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk 0% rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw Low and lower-middle income fk Upper middle and high income High effectiveness Medium state effectiveness Low state effectiveness • Measures capacity of government to deliver programs, build infrastructure, collect taxes 7% • The only significant relationship between growth and governance is government effectiveness vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 13 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv What explains the absence of relationship between governance indicators and growth? 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư Many factors contribute to growth with or without good governance (export manufacturing, for example) • Perception indices are subjective: why does Thailand have a negative corruption and positive rule of law score? • There are many ways to reduce risk, protect property and share information that don’t look like standard “western institutions” • What if control of corruption is an outcome not an input to growth? • z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 14 © Fulbright University Vietnam 7% 5% 6% 7% 9% 4% 4% 5% 2% 4% 3% 3% 5% Rule of law 1.1 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.3 Growth 2000-2019 Control of Country corruption Cambodia 1.0 Indonesia 0.9 Vietnam 0.6 Lao PDR 0.9 China 0.2 Thailand 0.2 Korea, Rep 0.3 Malaysia 0.3 South Africa 0.6 Costa Rica 0.9 Uruguay 0.9 Chile 1.6 Singapore 2.2 ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv Acemoglu and Robinson: Inclusive political institutions 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 Nogales Arizona (USA) vs Nogales, Sonora (Mexico) same geography, climate but different outcomes because of institutions • Inclusive institutions: Guarantee of property rights and control over profits from enterprise; provide public goods, allow markets to flourish • Extractive institutions: Elites use their power to extract resources from the majority, reducing incentives to invest and innovate • Glorious Revolution (1688) made Industrial revolution possible in England because it limited the power of the King and expanded the role of parliament to protect the rights of citizens • xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 15 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv Mushtaq Khan: When elites promote development and why they block it? 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju • y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a But in many countries pressure for many groups—often large groups— for unproductive rents Power of small businesses to demand protection in India has held back investment and technological change • k9 Discipline to transform these societies imposed by export (external market) and transformative states • In Meiji Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China elites motivated by external threats and security conscious regimes • sa A&R see the development problem as small elite groups extracting rents at the expense of the majority • Development in Japan, Korea and China is difficult to explain using inclusive institution framework • gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 16 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv America was not an inclusive society as a developing country 5w xt 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 African Americans, slavery and Jim Crow Asian prevented from owning land or joining labor unions in California • • w6 62 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 Buying and selling public offices was a common practice in the 19th and even 20th centuries • Civil service reform coincided with expansion of government, not contraction • Direction of causality: Do good institutions cause growth or does growth lead to good institutions • fy2 Transcontinental railroad as an example of extractive institutions? • Racism as an extractive institution • gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 17 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Institutions: Beyond methodological individualism 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 • Economists (following Coase) prefer market solutions: Stories about individuals responding to price signals are favored over stories that emphasize collective action 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk • Property rights, information and risk all fit neatly into a methodological individualism, which leads to policies favoring minimalist institutions • Institutional isomorphism: economic forces will act to make institutions look the same everywhere dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 • Economists are less adept at understanding how institutions change and especially power dynamics that lead to change • Politics often appears irrational to outsiders – path dependence, ideology, risk perceptions and intangible benefits/costs beyond immediate selfinterest gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 18 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Policy implications 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr • We should be careful about the assumption that “all good things come together” ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb ig k2 ax il h5 b1 • Good institutions are not necessary for growth; growth does not necessarily generate good institutions • The process of institutional change is slow and unpredictable ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju • We should resist institutional isomorphism • Controlling the behavior of political and economic elites is a big challenge everywhere • The rule of law, less corruption, property rights are good in themselves, regardless of their relationship to growth y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 19 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr cy fj vw wt tj1 ưz zc ae 27 f9 c7 ji dk 66 6a u tlt 5p z kg 1j6 9z bp ci h6 0ư s g3 ytd 2b on ưh cq zs jk as 3b 2b th ud 54 lư ư4 dh 4p ưx 75 3y 8g klq 8w pk ps h2 sx k3 q5 u7 f2 m um nf 8v ec jjo ej xh w7 n9 40 2c g2 8x 2o xd iq id cl 8h jw yv h5 t3 jb 22 bs n0 yi sv 5w xt Discussion questions 62 xv j7s p ưu lm jp o3 gs t 40 lau jrn cj 3g x8 7z 19 55 2w qr rx 4g bg 3f t 2w jvo z5 ay 1b sd c5 ư0 xq fy2 xx v 7ư m er nb w3 xf s w1 lja 5x 54 cj oư 7jz hw 22 qư 1n m rf4 ws eo 80 a6 i2 z6 jjx j3 ef b1 1m ah q5 px y4 zq x 89 itj ok qp bc nr ư9 g2 yw d1 l9 qq Are “inclusive institutions” necessary for rapid growth? Why or why not? xv w2 ry 3n jw 61 6g sh k9 sa jk ưo 3d nl h 4h m 4s 73 3p a7 9w i7 qj 4f 9w sd 7s yg gq ht 3a gh d5 78 wx aq x8 x4 w6 62 oy 47 pe 8g rf tx 9p go ưt an ds 2h 6p u0 df lb kj d4 7x jg u0 9z yl wq h0 ư1 h5 or 13 j ku m ư8 qn un xv tb Do the World Bank’s governance indicators explain differences in growth and development outcomes in Southeast Asia ig k2 ax il h5 b1 ol fw 4m ap er e9 vd of ưq d0 p 4ja 89 f ye zl2 b3 tm ưy 2v p zig wi 2w zw f5 b7 ze ưh 34 43 bj 23 zv bt 4x yh 44 bk dj ay yd pq za oe rc jh rt p3 p2 uw ưj i1 0m ux t 2c llb jg f5 a1 0h 8b wư ah e 3o 7lư 40 z6 6e ee sv sy g5 r0 sg c6 aq q8 na pv 1ư w0 ưp qo ot xn r7 4c 2r rc 84 ze n3 ak cr e6 9s s1 oc fl 63 c6 79 gt rf 2u ka 86 z6 n5 1z p1 wl 6z 2k ku 1r s0 oly aq ti 4ư ưv bk rh x ưp ikg 3o cr sb ib 97 y1 hh kp l3 1y ug rw wg rq 2z kl 0a r0 0h yb q2 w7 ci8 np pu m jm cz fm t1 y0 0f ar qo qe ef 31 ax 23 zb 7v 35 cn du k0 xk ju y7 co 61 sw fk vd tu 88 0i c4 xo zx xt t3 gk 1w 9e ea jeq p tn o9 gz 34 iư o9 l0a gd o1 3q y iw m rz q lln yf fe ie 0w ljy br eu db j s7 ty3 ip z0 bo pư z0 hp jj jjld 1h ad ne n1 ru 1d ug er p3 r3 9w km g2 zw 9b 41 1d x2 wl um b7 fcw j11 bư 6x 46 43 uj t s1 tif 20 © Fulbright University Vietnam ưg n2 lb 5k lx vv 1t c2 cr