2. 2T ng quan các kt qu nghiên cu t rc đây
5.2 Hn ch đ tài và h ng nghiên cu tip theo
B ng nghiên c u th c nghi m, tác gi đã c g ng tìm ra m i t ng quan gi a ba y u t g m t l c ph n s h u b i thành viên h i đ ng qu n tr và ban giám
đ c, s l ng m i quan h tín d ng v i các ngân hàng và hi u qu ho t đ ng c a các công ty v i phát hi n m i b sung thêm vào các nghiên c u th c nghi m hi n
có. Tuy nhiên, khi th c hi n nghiên c u, tác gi g p ph i m t s h n ch ch a đ c kh c ph c nh sau:
V d li u m u nghiên c u còn h n ch , ch gi i h n cho các công ty phi tài chính và niêm y t trên s giao d ch ch ng khoán Thành ph H Chí Minh nên ch a đ i di n đ y đ cho toàn th tr ng Vi t Nam.
Bi n nghiên c u RDSALES: t l chi tiêu chi phí nghiên c u phát tri n R&D
trên doanh thu, đ c bi t đ n là y u t tác đ ng c a Tobin's Q đ c s d ng trong bài nghiên c u g c. Tuy nhiên, d li u R&D h u nh không đ c các công ty trên th tr ng Vi t Nam công b , thay vào đó tác gi s d ng ch tiêu s thay đ i trong toàn b giá tr tài s n c a công ty n m hi n t i so v i n m tr c chia cho doanh
thu n m hi n t i. Vi c thay th này có th nh h ng đ n đ tin c y c a k t qu nghiên c u.
Ngoài các kho n vay t ngân hàng, các kho n vay t các t ch c, cá nhân
khác nh trái phi u doanh nghi p, ch ng ch n …c ng có tác d ng t o ra c ch giám sát bên ngoài nên c ng có kh n ng tác đ ng đ n giá tr doanh nghi p. Tuy
nhiên, do đ c đi m th tr ng Vi t Nam, các doanh nghi p h u nh b h n ch phát hành trái phi u, c ng nh ít có kh n ng ti p c n các ngu n v n vay khác ngoài ngân hàng, nên tác gi đã b qua tác đ ng, không đ a các nhân t này vào nghiên c u.
Do h n ch t v n đ công khai và minh b ch các thông tin công b c a các công ty trên th tr ng Vi t Nam nên d li u m u thu th p đ c có th ch a hoàn toàn chính xác, ph n ánh đ́ng b n ch t c a các m i quan h . Do b n ch t s ki n kinh t và các v n đ thu th p s li u, h s xác đ nh R2 còn th p, nên m c đ gi i thích c a k t qu c l ng là ch a cao.
Các khó kh n trong v n đ thu th p d li u và h n ch trong k thu t c
l ng đã nêu ra có th là c s đ các nghiên c u sau này kh c ph c và phát tri n thêm.
T̀I LI U THAM KH O
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A. Danh m c tài li u ti ng Vi t
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Ph l c 1: K t Qu Th ng Kê Mô T Các Bi n
Ph L c 2: K t qu h i quy ph các bi n đ c l p I. Bi n AGE
Dependent Variable: AGE Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:52 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 18.88219 4.919380 3.838327 0.0001
BLOCK 6.853859 2.284557 3.000083 0.0028
CAPEXTA -5.060379 4.410050 -1.147465 0.2516
COVERAGE -4.95E-05 0.000112 -0.442066 0.6586
COLLATERAL 1.723659 0.801849 2.149605 0.0320
EBITSD 5.74E-07 1.47E-06 0.389907 0.6967
LEVERAGE -5.573573 1.713066 -3.253566 0.0012
LOG(TA) -0.333943 0.382984 -0.871950 0.3836
PAYOUT -1.511425 2.122952 -0.711945 0.4768
RDSALES -0.205208 0.637029 -0.322132 0.7475
Log likelihood -2249.750 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.276384
F-statistic 2.610452 Durbin-Watson stat 0.375055
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004121
II. Bi n BLOCK
Dependent Variable: BLOCK Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:53 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.408576 0.085799 -4.762010 0.0000
AGE 0.002111 0.000704 3.000083 0.0028
CAPEXTA -0.068456 0.077435 -0.884046 0.3770
COVERAGE -3.00E-06 1.96E-06 -1.531468 0.1262
COLLATERAL 0.027085 0.014084 1.923145 0.0549
EBITSD 1.13E-08 2.58E-08 0.435850 0.6631
LEVERAGE -0.002869 0.030324 -0.094626 0.9246
LOG(TA) 0.039327 0.006536 6.017287 0.0000
PAYOUT 0.001499 0.037275 0.040228 0.9679
RDSALES 0.015030 0.011165 1.346201 0.1787
SGROWTH 0.010177 0.010464 0.972588 0.3311
R-squared 0.122249 Mean dependent var 0.179066
Adjusted R-squared 0.107930 S.D. dependent var 0.166925
S.E. of regression 0.157659 Akaike info criterion -0.839290
Sum squared resid 15.23701 Schwarz criterion -0.761088
Log likelihood 272.8584 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.808901
F-statistic 8.537572 Durbin-Watson stat 0.325500
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
III.Bi n CAPEXTA
Dependent Variable: CAPEXTA Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:53 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.033921 0.045523 -0.745132 0.4565
LEVERAGE -0.158340 0.014456 -10.95353 0.0000
LOG(TA) 0.011198 0.003477 3.220842 0.0013
PAYOUT 0.027466 0.019399 1.415871 0.1573
RDSALES 0.011209 0.005811 1.929001 0.0542
SGROWTH 0.018999 0.005405 3.515388 0.0005
R-squared 0.219334 Mean dependent var 0.044696
Adjusted R-squared 0.206599 S.D. dependent var 0.092264
S.E. of regression 0.082182 Akaike info criterion -2.142287
Sum squared resid 4.140140 Schwarz criterion -2.064086
Log likelihood 679.3936 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.111899
F-statistic 17.22267 Durbin-Watson stat 1.856994
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
IV.Bi n COLLATERAL
Dependent Variable: COLLATERAL Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:53 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.075201 0.249794 0.301051 0.7635
AGE 0.004341 0.002019 2.149605 0.0320
BLOCK 0.221421 0.115135 1.923145 0.0549
CAPEXTA 0.243378 0.221324 1.099650 0.2719
COVERAGE -1.09E-05 5.60E-06 -1.939381 0.0529
EBITSD 2.69E-08 7.38E-08 0.364438 0.7157
LEVERAGE 0.259366 0.086069 3.013482 0.0027
LOG(TA) 0.027806 0.019198 1.448369 0.1480
PAYOUT -0.132671 0.106443 -1.246411 0.2131
RDSALES 0.037577 0.031934 1.176704 0.2398
SGROWTH 0.036694 0.029905 1.227017 0.2203
R-squared 0.068246 Mean dependent var 0.689103
Adjusted R-squared 0.053047 S.D. dependent var 0.463232
S.E. of regression 0.450778 Akaike info criterion 1.261789
Sum squared resid 124.5623 Schwarz criterion 1.339991
Log likelihood -382.6782 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.292178
F-statistic 4.489927 Durbin-Watson stat 0.698703
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004
V. Bi n COVERAGE
Dependent Variable: COVERAGE Method: Panel Least Squares
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 652.5585 1796.492 0.363240 0.7166 AGE -6.443061 14.57488 -0.442066 0.6586 BLOCK -1269.552 828.9767 -1.531468 0.1262 CAPEXTA 751.1730 1593.071 0.471525 0.6374 COLLATERAL -561.6462 289.6008 -1.939381 0.0529 EBITSD 0.003583 0.000511 7.012871 0.0000 LEVERAGE -858.3812 622.6215 -1.378656 0.1685 LOG(TA) 34.32066 138.3034 0.248155 0.8041 PAYOUT 737.7003 765.9419 0.963128 0.3359 RDSALES -716.2779 228.1053 -3.140119 0.0018 SGROWTH 134.9971 215.2768 0.627086 0.5308
R-squared 0.110663 Mean dependent var 276.5198
Adjusted R-squared 0.096155 S.D. dependent var 3410.157
S.E. of regression 3242.062 Akaike info criterion 19.02328
Sum squared resid 6.44E+09 Schwarz criterion 19.10148
Log likelihood -5924.263 Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.05367
F-statistic 7.627747 Durbin-Watson stat 2.064834
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
VI.Bi n LEVERAGE
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:58 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.255929 0.115911 -2.207972 0.0276
AGE -0.003046 0.000936 -3.253566 0.0012
BLOCK -0.005090 0.053795 -0.094626 0.9246
CAPEXTA -1.033774 0.094378 -10.95353 0.0000
COVERAGE -3.60E-06 2.61E-06 -1.378656 0.1685
COLLATERAL 0.056283 0.018677 3.013482 0.0027
EBITSD -1.45E-07 3.39E-08 -4.276832 0.0000
LOG(TA) 0.063126 0.008588 7.350563 0.0000
PAYOUT -0.231128 0.048762 -4.739915 0.0000
RDSALES -0.006639 0.014890 -0.445829 0.6559
SGROWTH 0.010000 0.013942 0.717276 0.4735
R-squared 0.301966 Mean dependent var 0.510075
Adjusted R-squared 0.290578 S.D. dependent var 0.249312
S.E. of regression 0.209988 Akaike info criterion -0.266061
VII. Bi n LOG(TA)
Dependent Variable: LOG(TA) Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 23:01 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 12.50415 0.142185 87.94254 0.0000
AGE -0.003709 0.004254 -0.871950 0.3836
BLOCK 1.418162 0.235681 6.017287 0.0000
CAPEXTA 1.486122 0.461408 3.220842 0.0013
COVERAGE 2.93E-06 1.18E-05 0.248155 0.8041
COLLATERAL 0.122654 0.084684 1.448369 0.1480
EBITSD 1.38E-06 1.45E-07 9.545814 0.0000
LEVERAGE 1.283186 0.174570 7.350563 0.0000
PAYOUT 0.362513 0.223361 1.622990 0.1051
RDSALES 0.172118 0.066784 2.577216 0.0102
SGROWTH 0.025247 0.062877 0.401521 0.6882
R-squared 0.320627 Mean dependent var 13.72381
Adjusted R-squared 0.309544 S.D. dependent var 1.139380
S.E. of regression 0.946753 Akaike info criterion 2.745913
Sum squared resid 549.4568 Schwarz criterion 2.824115
Log likelihood -845.7249 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.776302
F-statistic 28.93025 Durbin-Watson stat 0.616506
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
VIII. Bi n EBITSD
Dependent Variable: EBITSD Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:54 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1147185. 128548.5 -8.924139 0.0000 AGE 432.2154 1108.508 0.389907 0.6967 BLOCK 27527.04 63157.21 0.435850 0.6631 CAPEXTA -228469.8 120828.6 -1.890859 0.0591 COVERAGE 20.72652 2.955497 7.012871 0.0000 COLLATERAL 8050.507 22090.20 0.364438 0.7157
SGROWTH 25401.43 16345.61 1.554021 0.1207
R-squared 0.348259 Mean dependent var 74356.62
Adjusted R-squared 0.337627 S.D. dependent var 302962.3
S.E. of regression 246569.9 Akaike info criterion 27.68615
Sum squared resid 3.73E+13 Schwarz criterion 27.76435
Log likelihood -8627.079 Hannan-Quinn criter. 27.71654
F-statistic 32.75570 Durbin-Watson stat 2.001411
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
IX.Bi n PAYOUT
Dependent Variable: PAYOUT Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:54 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.101054 0.094583 1.068418 0.2858
AGE -0.000547 0.000768 -0.711945 0.4768
BLOCK 0.001761 0.043764 0.040228 0.9679
CAPEXTA 0.118679 0.083821 1.415871 0.1573
COVERAGE 2.05E-06 2.13E-06 0.963128 0.3359
COLLATERAL -0.019054 0.015287 -1.246411 0.2131
EBITSD -2.64E-08 2.80E-08 -0.944656 0.3452
LEVERAGE -0.152967 0.032272 -4.739915 0.0000
LOG(TA) 0.011803 0.007272 1.622990 0.1051
RDSALES -0.002112 0.012115 -0.174350 0.8616
SGROWTH 0.023435 0.011307 2.072524 0.0386
R-squared 0.076844 Mean dependent var 0.172756
Adjusted R-squared 0.061784 S.D. dependent var 0.176366
S.E. of regression 0.170831 Akaike info criterion -0.678812
Sum squared resid 17.88934 Schwarz criterion -0.600610
Log likelihood 222.7893 Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.648423
F-statistic 5.102636 Durbin-Watson stat 1.389146
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
X. Bi n RDSALES
Dependent Variable: RDSALES Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:56 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
C -0.759635 0.314108 -2.418387 0.0159
AGE -0.000825 0.002560 -0.322132 0.7475
BLOCK 0.196114 0.145680 1.346201 0.1787
CAPEXTA 0.538272 0.279042 1.929001 0.0542
COVERAGE -2.21E-05 7.04E-06 -3.140119 0.0018
COLLATERAL 0.059976 0.050969 1.176704 0.2398
EBITSD 7.24E-07 8.86E-08 8.169096 0.0000
LEVERAGE -0.048827 0.109520 -0.445829 0.6559
LOG(TA) 0.062278 0.024165 2.577216 0.0102
PAYOUT -0.023475 0.134643 -0.174350 0.8616
SGROWTH 0.119441 0.037518 3.183518 0.0015
R-squared 0.216099 Mean dependent var 0.225878
Adjusted R-squared 0.203311 S.D. dependent var 0.638038
S.E. of regression 0.569496 Akaike info criterion 1.729341
Sum squared resid 198.8116 Schwarz criterion 1.807542
Log likelihood -528.5544 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.759730
F-statistic 16.89864 Durbin-Watson stat 1.592262
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
XI.Bi n SGROWTH
Dependent Variable: SGROWTH Method: Panel Least Squares Date: 08/24/14 Time: 22:57 Sample: 2008 2013
Periods included: 6
Cross-sections included: 104
Total panel (balanced) observations: 624
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.207463 0.336877 -0.615842 0.5382
AGE -0.000265 0.002734 -0.096788 0.9229
BLOCK 0.151391 0.155658 0.972588 0.3311
CAPEXTA 1.040127 0.295878 3.515388 0.0005
COVERAGE 4.75E-06 7.57E-06 0.627086 0.5308
COLLATERAL 0.066770 0.054416 1.227017 0.2203
EBITSD 1.54E-07 9.94E-08 1.554021 0.1207
LEVERAGE 0.083856 0.116909 0.717276 0.4735
LOG(TA) 0.010415 0.025938 0.401521 0.6882
PAYOUT 0.296921 0.143265 2.072524 0.0386
RDSALES 0.136170 0.042773 3.183518 0.0015
R-squared 0.084827 Mean dependent var 0.189165
Adjusted R-squared 0.069898 S.D. dependent var 0.630506